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Abstract  
The Redistributive Effects of Fiscal Policies in Turkey, 2003 
Thesis submitted to the University of ottingham for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, April, 2009 
Özlem Albayrak 
This thesis investigates redistributive impacts of fiscal policies at household level in 
a middle income developing country, Turkey, in 2003.  
It utilizes the benefit and tax incidence methodologies and applies the welfare 
dominance analysis and summary indices of progressivity to assess the distributional impacts 
of the fiscal policies. The 2003 Household Income and Consumption Expenditures Survey 
from the Turkish Statistical Institute is used for this purpose. 
. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature for measuring inequality 
and progressivity. The aim of the chapter is to review and discuss the measures used in the 
thesis. This is followed by the three empirical studies that form the core of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 and 4 examine redistributive impacts of publicly provided education, 
health, infrastructure services and social cash and in kind transfers. The key findings show 
that apart from primary education, none of the social services in question are well targeted to 
the poor, although the incidence of the services is progressive. 
In Chapter 5, attention is paid to direct and indirect tax policies in Turkey. Indirect 
taxes dominate tax revenues in Turkey. The results of the standard tax incidence analysis 
show that direct taxes are progressive thanks to personal income tax and property taxes. In 
the context of indirect taxes, redistributive power of indirect taxes is limited. The incidence 
of indirect taxes is sensitive to the welfare indicator chosen. While the indirect taxes reduce 
 
 
ii 
expenditure inequality, they increase income inequality. Effective indirect tax rates estimated 
by using input+output tables prove the importance of taxation on imported goods and 
intermediate goods, which are ignored by the standard tax incidence analysis. The incidence 
with effective indirect taxes is less progressive in the case of expenditure as the welfare 
indicator and more regressive in the case of income. The net fiscal incidence indicates that 
the fiscal policies have a positive redistributive impact on both expenditure and income 
inequality, and this positive impact is mainly driven by the public benefits. 
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CHAPTER 1:  I*TRODUCTIO* 
The economics literature recognizes three main functions of the public sector 
(Stiglitz, 2000: 20; Musgrave, 1959): allocation, stabilisation and redistribution. With the 
allocation function, the aim of the public sector is to allocate its economic resources 
efficiently to different sectors. It can be done by direct interventions to the economy such as 
production through public firms or indirect interventions through taxes and subsidies. The 
second function requires the public sector to apply macro economic policies to keep the 
economy stable at full employment. The final function is based on equity concerns of 
societies and requires redistributive policies to create more equitable distribution of welfare, 
depending the societies’ preferences. In the last two decades there has been an important 
scientific debate in the public finance literature on the role of the public sector, mainly 
regarding concerns that public interventions may be distortionary and inefficient with the 
reference to first two functions of the public sector. Economic growth has been seen as the 
most important dynamic in fighting against income inequality and poverty from which most 
developing countries suffer. For the developing countries the main aim has been to enhance 
growth. To achieve this, the economic policies have focussed mostly on stabilisation, 
adjustment and market liberalisation.  
In line with these policies, there has been a huge literature discussing if growth or 
redistributive policies should be chosen to fight against poverty and inequality.  While 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) argue that redistribution slows economic growth, Aghion and 
Bolton (1997) see redistribution as a growth enhancing factor. Although there is no common 
concensus on this issue, it has been shown that inequality has a negative impact on growth 
by decreasing investment in human capital, increasing populist public expenditures, 
corruption, and political instability (Barro, 2000; World Bank, 2001).  On the other hand, 
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empirical studies have shown that high growth rates don’t necessarily cause any reduction in 
poverty and income distribution. In other words, there is not any systematic (negative or 
positive) relationship between growth and inequality and it depends on the initial conditions 
of countries (Fields, 1980:181+248; Fields, 2000)1. Furthermore, the inequality literature has 
shown the negative relationship between inequality and social welfare theoretically under a 
social welfare function with high inequality aversion (Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1997; Shorrocks, 
1983).  
Despite all these discussions on the role of the public sector and on determining the 
best policy to increase the well+being of individuals and decrease inequality and poverty, 
public policies have inevitable effects on inequality of income distribution and need to be 
examined in this respect. Since in the last three decades there has been a rising trend in 
inequalities all over the world (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Mitra and Yemtsov, 2007; 
OECD, 2008), researchers’ focus has been turned to investigate the sources of income 
inequality and the ways to reduce it. Reflecting these efforts, since the 1990s a huge body of 
empirical literature has been produced on the redistributive impacts of government revenue 
and expenditure policies, particularly in developing countries, to find out if government 
policies have been one of the sources contributing to rising inequalities (regressivity of the 
policies) as well as if government policies can be used as an effective instrument to mitigate 
inequalities and poverty (redistributive impacts, or progressivity in policies).  
This thesis addresses the measurement of redistributive effects of fiscal policies in a 
middle income country, Turkey, where high inequality has been a persistent problem for a 
long time. The thesis does not attempt to investigate the causes of inequality2, neither does it 
discuss the role of the public sector directly. The starting point of this work is that fiscal 
policies have important effects on inequality and poverty in direct and indirect ways and 
                                                           
1 See Dollar and Kraay (2002), Bruno, Ravallion Square (1999) for the relationship between equality 
or poverty and growth.  
2 For the sources of high inequality in Turkey, see Kose and Karahanogullari (2005), Silber and 
Özmucur (2000) and Baslevent and Dayioglu, (2005). 
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regardless of the main aims for these policies these effects should be examined, given the 
concerns for inequality. It is an important task to measure and discuss these impacts of fiscal 
policies to find out the possible obstacles against fighting inequality and poverty. In this 
framework, the main contribution of the thesis is empirical and it will attempt to see how the 
existing fiscal policies of Turkey affect redistribution and inequality in 2003.  
Turkish Case 
Since 1994, the Turkish economy experienced two serious financial crises (1994 and 
2000/2001) accompanied by enormous public imbalances and a drastic reduction of domestic 
income. In the aftermath of the last crises, Turkey implemented a structural adjustment 
program to overcome the economic problems caused by the crises under the supervision and 
technical support of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank3. It is well known 
that fiscal discipline, namely attaining primary fiscal surpluses, has been a major component 
of these types of programs (Taylor, 2004). The negative effects of these fiscal policies have 
been twofold: on the expenditure side, the direct result is reduction of public welfare 
spending such as on education, health and infrastructure. On the income side, the change in 
the composition of tax structure (increases in the share of indirect taxes) has also created 
direct and indirect redistributive effects on different household groups via price and income 
changes. Empirical studies concerning the effects of structural adjustment programs on 
growth, inequality and poverty in developing countries have different conclusions and 
implications and the results vary according to countries’ initial conditions (Crisp and Kelly, 
1999; Sahn and Younger, 1999).  
A direct effect of these two successive crises has been a drastic reduction in the real 
economy. As can be seen from Table 1.1, after both the 1994 and 2000/2001 crises, the 
Turkish economy shrank. The growth rates of 1994 and 2001 are +6.1% and –9.5 % 
respectively. However, after each crisis, the Turkish economy rapidly achieved very high 
                                                           
3 For detailed information for Turkish experience with IMF, see., Yeldan (2002)  
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growth rates, of 8% in 1995 and 2002. Despite these high growth rates, the negative effects 
of the crises on already high inequality in income distribution are still felt and the 
unemployment rate has increased rather than declined, implying a persistent effect on 
income inequality (Table 1.1 and Table 1.2). The tables indicate some improvements in 
income inequality and poverty but the rates are still above international averages for a 
middle income country, which highlights a need for further attention to distributional issues. 
Table 1.1: Some Basic Indicators of Turkish Economy over time  
  1994 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gini Coefficient (income) 0.49  0.46 0.44 0.42 0.4 0.38 
Growth Rate (at 1987 prices) +7.8 6.1 +11.1 6.4 4.2 8.2 7.2 
GDP per capita* 1768 1874 1842 1962 2049 2222 2362 
Unemployment rate (Age over 15) 8.6 7.6  8.4 10.3 10.5 10.3 10.3 
Unemployment rate (Age between 15?24) 16 15.5 16.2 19.2 20.5 19.7 19.3 
Inflation (Consumer Price Index)** 125.5 78.9 68.5 29.7 18.5 9.3 10.5 
*US Dollar, at 1987 real prices. **Base year is 1987 for 1994, 1994 for the other years 
Source: SPO and Turksat 
 
Table 1.2: Individual Poverty Rates, 2002?2003?2006* 
Methodologies 
Individual Poverty Rate (%) 
Turkey  Urban Rural 
2002 2003 2006 2002 2003 2006 2002 2003 2006 
Food poverty (famine) 1.35 1.29 0.74 0.92 0.74 0.04 2.01 2.15 1.91 
Poverty (food+non?
food) 
26.96 28.12 17.81 21.95 22.3 9.31 34.48 37.13 31.98 
$1 per person per day 
poverty 
0.2 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 0 0.46 0.01 0 
$2.15per person per 
day poverty 
3.04 2.39 1.41 2.37 1.54 0.24 4.06 3.71 3.36 
$4.3 per person per 
day poverty 
30.3 23.75 13.33 24.62 18.31 6.13 38.82 32.18 25.35 
*Headcount Rate 
Source:  Turksat 
 
The objectives of government expenditure policies are twofold: 1) to increase 
efficiency in the allocation of resources by providing goods and services that private markets 
fail to provide, or fail to provide at an optimal level; 2) to improve equity in the distribution 
of income. The second objective is achieved through social transfers and provision of goods 
and services that may benefit the poor in particular. It is commonly believed that 
redistribution through tax policies is limited and this limitation is particularly significant in 
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developing countries whose tax effort as a percentage of Gross National Product is especially 
small due to the limited tax base, arising from the size of the informal economy and tax 
evasion. Given this, the expenditure side of government budgets appears to be a potentially 
more effective tool to redistribute incomes for developing countries. The first studies in this 
area examined the distributional impact of the whole government budget. However, the 
recent empirical literature for developing countries focuses on public spending programs that 
have the explicit goal of improving distributional equity and confer personal benefit upon 
users, such as education, health, infrastructure services and social transfers. These services 
are important in terms of their positive impact on growth and development as well as their 
redistributive power and it has been shown that public expenditures on these services narrow 
inequalities significantly (OECD, 2008: Chapter 9).  
Table 1.3 provides percentage shares of public services in the consolidated budget in 
Turkey over time. The share of public spending on social services is negatively affected by 
the financial crisis in 2001, it dropped to 22%, yet there has been a rising trend since then. 
The total expenditures on social services (education, health, infrastructure and social 
transfers) account for about 27% of the total consolidated budget in 2003, whereas interest 
payments and the expenditures on general public services (expenditures on general 
administration, law and order and defence) account for 73% of the consolidated budget. The 
share of debt interest payments increased in time and it is around 50% for the 2000s. As 
these expenditures go to higher income households who have savings to lend to the 
government by buying government bonds, they are expected to have a widening impact on 
the distribution of income. This thesis concentrates on the distributional impacts of social 
services, which are supposed to have positive redistributive impacts, to see if those 
expenditures help to reduce inequality and target the poor, thus the thesis examines just over 
a quarter of the consolidated budget.  
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Table 1.3: The Composition of the Consolidated Budget by services, Turkey, 1995?2003 
  1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
General Public Services 37.5 32.0 32.9 31.7 26.7 27.2 26.7 
Education (Primary and Secondary) 8.0 8.8 8.5 6.9 5.9 6.6 7.2 
Higher Education 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.7 
Health* 10.1 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.8 10.7 11.7 
Infrastructure 7.0 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.2 
Total Expenditure on Social Services** 28.2 26.6 25.9 23.7 22.2 25.3 26.7 
Interest Payments 34.3 41.4 41.2 44.6 51.1 47.5 46.6 
Consolidated Budget 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
otes: *Total health expenditures include social transfers to social security institutions too as pensions and other 
social cash transfers are paid by the social security organisations 
Health, Education, Infrastructure and Social Transfers 
Source: SPO and Ministry of Public Finance 
 
Despite the common belief that the role of taxes is limited as a redistributive 
instrument, government revenue policies are very important for both equity concerns and 
creating revenues for government expenditures in developing countries. Developing 
countries have changed their tax structure since the 1980s to increase their tax revenues. 
They have decreased the share of trade taxes in total tax revenues and generated more 
revenue from domestic indirect taxes. Value Added Tax (VAT) has been introduced by most 
developing countries and indirect taxes have become the most important revenue source. 
These structural changes in the revenue side of government budgets naturally have impacts 
on income distribution, given the general perception that indirect taxes generate generally 
disequalising impacts on income distribution (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2003). Given these 
developments, examining distributional impacts of changes in tax structures of governments 
has been an important empirical area. Tax incidence analysis has been performed for 
developing countries recently. These studies generally deal with the impacts of recent tax 
policy changes in developing countries and capture the effects of both direct and indirect 
taxes depending on data available.  
The existing tax structure of the Turkish economy is representative of a typical 
developing country. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, since 1985, in which VAT was 
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introduced, indirect taxes have increased as a share of total tax revenues and today are the 
most important source for tax revenues + 70% of total tax revenues in 2005. As lower income 
households have higher propensity to consume, indirect taxes are perceived to increase 
inequalities. In order to prevent such an impact, VAT is applied with differential rates 
(which is the case for Turkey).  
 
 
Although Turkey has been suffering from high income inequality, to date there has 
been only one study investigating the redistributive effects of public policies in Turkey. 
Pinar (2004) examined both tax and expenditure policies of Turkey for 1994 and 2002. The 
author applied the fiscal incidence method by comparing quintiles’ share of household 
incomes before and after tax and expenditure policies. However Pinar (2004) ignores the 
statistical robustness of the results, which may cause one to question the reliability of the 
results4. Pinar showed that public expenditures on education and health redistribute incomes 
                                                           
4 In addition to this, the data sets Pinar used have some important drawbacks. The 1994 HICES do not 
have any question to identify students in households. Pinar used the question to identify students, 
0
20%
60%
80%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Years
Indirect Taxes Tax Effort 
Direct Taxes 
Figure 1.1:  The Trend of Direct and Indirect Taxes and Tax Effort in Turkey
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towards low income groups, however, the poor receive a smaller share of health services 
than of basic education services. Moreover, Pinar concluded that infrastructure services have 
a positive impact on income inequality. Pinar found that VAT has almost no impact on 
income inequality, but it has small negative impact on lower income groups, whereas 
personal income tax redistributes incomes towards lower income groups, but the poorest get 
the smallest share from redistribution.  
The first contribution of the thesis is to investigate distributional impacts of fiscal 
policies for Turkey in 2003. Secondly, the thesis considers the statistical robustness of the 
results which was ignored by the only study for Turkey, Pinar (2004). Thirdly, both income 
and expenditure measures are used as welfare indicators to test the sensitivity of the results 
to the chosen welfare indicator, which was also ignored by Pinar (2004).  Finally, in addition 
to the stantard tax incidence analysis for indirect taxes, we estimate effective tax rates by 
making use of input+output tables to include the impacts of taxation on imported and 
intermediate goods.  
The basic data used is the Household Income and Consumption Expenditure Surveys 
(HICES), conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Turksat) to measure households’ 
living standards and utilization of public services. The HICES data were collected for 1994, 
2002, 2003, 2004, and 2006. The sample of HICES was designed to be representative of the 
population of Turkey, and two of the surveys + 1994 and 2003 + are also regionally 
representative. Moreover, all of them provide reliable information needed for an urban+rural 
breakdown and they have information at both individual and household level. In the thesis, 
the HICES 2003 with 25,920 households is used. The reason for utilising only 2003 survey is 
that the 2003 HICES is the most recent, comprehensive and regionally representative 
household survey. As the surveys conducted after 2003 have smaller sample size (8,640 
households), they are not regionally representative and they are not as comprehensive as the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
which seeks to find out the reasons of unemployed individuals for not seeking job and asked to the 
individuals over 10 year+old in households. This gives rise to drop individuals under the age of 10 
from the analysis that makes impossible to investigate the incidence of primary education. 
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2003 HICES, particularly in terms of consumption data. Furthermore, we need regional 
disaggregation to take into account variations in the quality of the public services examined, 
which is captured by disaggregated public spending on publicly provided services. 
The Outline of The Thesis 
In this framework, the thesis aims to investigate tax and expenditure policies for 
Turkey in 2003. The thesis comprises five more chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature for measuring inequality and progressivity. The aim of the chapter is 
to review and discuss the measures used in the thesis. This is followed by the three empirical 
studies that form the core of the thesis. 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on measuring the redistributive impacts of publicly provided 
services which are accepted to be effective instruments to mitigate inequality and poverty. 
The non+behavioural benefit incidence analysis is applied in both for one year of cross+
sectional micro data. It is assumed that the benefit derived by consumers can be 
approximated by the unit cost to the government of providing the services. Thus we estimate 
how average benefits are distributed across households by assuming that average benefits are 
equal to marginal benefits. We also focus on the direct  incidence of the benefits, as it is very 
difficult to estimate the indirect incidence (externalities) of the services. Chapter 3 
investigates if public education services decrease high inequality in Turkey and if the 
services go to households in need. Education has been seen as an effective instrument against 
poverty and, despite widening private provision of education services in developing 
countries, the public sector is still the main provider for these services.  
Chapter 4 examines distributional impacts of public health and infrastructure 
services and public social transfers to compliment measuring redistributive impacts of social 
expenditures. This chapter suffers from lack of information on the users of health and 
infrastructure services. To overcome this problem indicators as approximations for the users 
of the services are created. The analysis of social transfers may provide more robust 
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estimations than the analsysis of health and infrastructure services as the data provide  
information on public cash and in kind transfers to individuals.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the revenue side of the goverment budget and investigates 
progressivity and the redistributive role of direct and indirect taxes. Tax incidence analysis is 
conducted and both direct and indirect taxes are investigated by applying statutory tax rates 
to households/individuals’ expenditure and income sources to calculate tax burdens. In 
additon to the indirect tax incidence with statutory tax rates, the effective indirect tax rates 
are estimated by making use of input+output tables which allow consideration of the 
redistributive impacts of taxation on imported and intermediary goods. After estimating tax 
and benefit incidence, the results of the three empirical chapters are combined to examine the 
net fiscal incidence of both public tax and expenditure policies. 
It has been emphasized by several empirical studies on Turkey that regional 
disparities are an important component of income inequality and poverty (World Bank, 
2003, 2005; Başlevent and Dayıoğlu, 2005). Earlier studies showed that living in certain 
areas considerably affects the likelihood of being poor. Thus, regional level analysis is also 
conducted for all three empirical chapters to see if public policies reduce regional disparities. 
Finally the main findings of the thesis are summarised and some conclusions are drawn in 
Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 2:  MEASURI*G PROGRESSIVITY A*D 
REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES 
2.1 Introduction  
The impacts of public policies (tax and transfer policies) on income distribution are 
assessed by the notion of progressivity. Progressivity (regressivity) is defined as a measure 
of the deviation of a tax or benefit system from proportionality in favour of the poorer 
(richer) (Kakwani, 1986: 73)1. Also, any progressive policy instrument (tax or benefit) is 
supposed to improve the distribution of welfare in the society, so it is expected to have 
positive redistributive impacts. In other words, progressive policies are supposed to make 
inequality of net incomes (after tax and/or transfer incomes) lower than that of gross 
incomes. The reason for focusing on progressivity comes, as noted before, from the role of 
governments in reducing discrepancies in the well+being of individuals (equity) as well as 
increasing welfare (efficiency). As will be seen in this chapter, depending on the presence of 
inequality+averse social welfare functions, it has been shown that progressive tax policies are 
also welfare improving2.  
There are two equity principles in the public finance and inequality literature: 
horizontal and vertical equity. The first + “the equal treatment of equals” + requires that 
people in equal positions should be treated equally. The second one is based on the principle 
of “the ability+to+pay” which leads to the principle of “the unequal treatment of unequals”. It 
necessitates that people with greater ability should pay more taxes. The empirical fiscal 
incidence literature generally deals with the issues of vertical equity since it seeks to 
                                                           
1 The notion of progressivity and measures of it have been developed in the tax context and extended 
to public benefits. Thus, throughout this chapter we also discuss progressivity generally in the tax 
context. Generally speaking, the progressivity of public benefits is defined in the opposite way to 
taxes, and benefits are defined as negative taxes (Duclos 2000). 
2 For the discussion on efficiency and equity aims of governments, see Chapter 3. 
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determine whether public policies are inequality reducing or not. A public policy (tax or 
transfer) will be horizontally equitable if the ranking of individuals based on pre+tax or 
transfer welfare are not altered as a result of public intervention. However, as we will discuss 
later, reranking occurs for several reasons and may decrease the redistributive power of 
progressive policies. Because of this, horizontal equity is also relevant in examining 
progressivity of public policies (Kakwani, 1986:72+86; Lambert 1993:140).  
Specifically, a tax is called progressive (regressive, proportional) if (average) tax 
rate increases (decreases, stays same) with pre+tax income and also is expected to have an 
equalizing impact on income distribution. The definition of progressivity for a benefit is the 
reverse of the tax case. A benefit (public service) is called progressive (regressive, 
proportional) if the utilization share of that benefit by individuals decreases (increase, stays 
same) with incomes of individuals (Kakwani, 1986:72+86; Lambert 1993: 139+201).  
The aim of this chapter is to examine methodologies for measuring inequality and 
progressivity and for comparing different income distributions theoretically. Thus Section 
3.2 examines the measures of inequality, the criteria for inequality comparisons and the 
method of welfare dominance; Section 3.3 reviews the most common progressivity indices 
theoretically; Section 3.4 discusses the statistical inference of comparisons of distributions 
and progressivity indices; and finally some conclusions are drawn in Section 3.5. 
2.2 The Measures of Inequality: Gini Index and Lorenz Curves  
The first necessary step to understand how public policies may affect inequality of a 
given income distribution (before tax or benefit distribution) is to choose a method to 
measure inequality. We do not go into the whole range of inequality measures here; instead 
we prefer to focus on the most commonly used inequality measures, namely Lorenz curves 
and S+Gini inequality indices, and the corresponding progressivity measures. These are the 
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measures commonly used in the fiscal incidence literature and we will also use them in our 
analysis.  
The main functions and notations used in this chapter are given below, before 
starting with the measures of inequality and progressivity. In the inequality literature, there 
are three main functions to explain measures of inequality and to understand the features of a 
distribution. The first is the cumulative distribution function (cdf), formulated as p=F(y), 
where p is the proportion of individuals in the population who receive a level of income that 
is less than or equal to y, y is a welfare indicator which can be income or consumption, F is a 
non+decreasing function of y and takes values between 0 and 13. We assume that F(y) is 
continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in y. The second function is the density 
function (f(y)) that is the first derivative of the cdf and strictly positive when F(y) is assumed 
to be strictly increasing in y. The third useful function is the quantile function [Q(p)], which 
can be formulated as F(Q(P)) = p. Q(p) is the income or expenditure level of an individual 
whose percentile in the distribution is p. The quantile function is particularly helpful to 
define Lorenz curve and other Lorenz curve related measures (Duclos and Araar (2006). 
The most widely used index of inequality in empirical analysis is the Gini index due 
to the direct relation of the index with the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve provides 
complete information on the whole distribution of incomes relative to the mean. It draws the 
percentages of the population arranged from the poorest to the richest on the horizontal axis 
against the percentages of income enjoyed by the bottom x% of the population on the 
vertical axis.  
                                                           
3 So the population size is normalised to 1, which refers also to the population or replication 
invariance principle. See Appendix 2.1 for the main principles of good inequality measures which 
have been introduced in the literature. 
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Thus the mathematical form of Lorenz curves for a continuous distribution can be 
defined as follows: ∫
∫
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where V is the mean level of y. 
Analogous to the Lorenz curve, the concentration curve was introduced as a 
descriptive and normative tool for assessing the impact of tax and transfer policies4.  
Concentration curves plot households from the poorest to the richest, ranked by a chosen 
welfare indicator (e.g. gross incomes or expenditures), on the horizontal axis against the 
cumulative proportion of taxes (benefits) paid (received) by households.  
Therefore, the concentration curve for a tax is defined as follows: 
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where T  is average tax liabilities and q is the proportion of tax liabilities of the sample 
ranked by pre+incomes. The function T(q) represents the quantile function for tax liabilities 
which are ranked by y. 
The Gini coefficient as a summary measure is directly computed from the Lorenz 
curve by measuring the extent to which the Lorenz curve departs from the perfectly equal 
distribution whose Lorenz curve lies along the 45+degree (perfect equality) line. Hence, the 
Gini index is defined as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45+degree line 
to the total area of the triangle. This relationship ensures that the value of the Gini coefficient 
                                                           
4 Kakwani (1977) thinks that the Lorenz curve is a special case of concentration curves for income. 
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lies between “0” (for complete equality) and “1” (for extreme inequality). The Gini 
coefficient (G) can be defined mathematically as follows: 
∫ −=
1
0
))((2 dppLpG  
It is worth noting that the Lorenz curve provides partial ordering when we use it to 
compare different distributions, since it shows inequality along the overall income 
distribution. However, by providing a single summary number, the Gini index is able to 
present a complete ordering among different distributions. Because of this feature, and 
because the Gini index is Lorenz consistent, it is very popular to compare distributions in 
empirical analyses. The Gini index also satisfies the Pigou:Dalton principle, but it tends to 
be most sensitive to transfers around the middle of the distribution and least sensitive to 
transfers among the very rich or the very poor; in other words it does not satisfy the principle 
of diminishing transfers
5. The Gini coefficient gives equal weight to all incomes regardless 
of whether they are received by the rich or the poor. As a result of this, it computes the 
average distance between cumulated population shares and cumulated income shares. 
Moreover, the Gini index satisfies principles of replication (population) invariance and scale 
invariance and thus the Gini index depends only on relative incomes, not on absolute values 
of incomes (Shorrocks, 1988). 
Following Atkinson (1970), which introduced an inequality aversion parameter into 
the measurement of inequalities, different ethical weights have been introduced to determine 
to which side of a distribution researchers want to give more importance while estimating 
inequality. These percentile+dependent weights are used to aggregate the distance p:L(p). 
Using the Lorenz curve and these weights, S+Gini inequality indices (Single+Parameter Gini 
                                                           
5 See Allison (1978), Atkinson (1970), Creedy (1998), Jenkins (1991), Sen (1997) and Shorrocks 
(1988) for the assessments of different inequality measures and principles of inequality indices. The 
principle of diminishing transfers demands that an inequality index be more sensitive to the transfers 
taking place at the lower income levels. We will discuss the importance of this principle in the section 
on inequality comparisons. 
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inequality indices) can be computed. If we take the general formula below for ethical 
weights suggested by Yitzhaki (1983):  
)2()1)(1();( −−−= ρρρρκ pp  
where ρ is the value of a single “ethical” parameter indicating inequality aversion. ρ must be 
greater than 1 to make the weights, κ(p;ρ), positive everywhere. The larger the value of ρ is, 
the larger the value of );( ρκ p  for small p, in other words for lower parts of the distribution. 
Using this weighting function we can define S+Gini Indices6 of inequality: 
∫ −=
1
0
);())(()( dpppLpI ρκρ  
As ρ=2 makes κ(p;ρ=2) take the value, 2, I(2) gives the Gini index, which gives 
equal weight to all distances, p:L(p). When ρ>2 relatively more weight is given to the 
distances found at lower values of p and vice versa.  By using these percentile+dependent 
weights, higher order dominance can be tested when there is any ambiguity on ranking 
distributions. As put by Lambert (1993:119), therefore, S+Gini Indices of inequality provide 
the analyst with the opportunity to select a range of values of ρ to check the robustness of the 
implied inequality ranking of different distributional judgements.  
As in the case of S+Gini inequality indices, the general formula for S+Gini indices of 
concentration can be written in the following form: 
∫ −=
1
0
);())(()IC( dpppCp ρκρ  
In the empirical fiscal incidence literature, some researchers have applied S+Gini 
Indices of inequality and concentration when they were not able to rank taxes or benefits in 
                                                           
6 S+Gini Indices of inequality were suggested by Yitzhaki (1983). They are also named the extended 
or generalised Gini coefficient.  With this generalisation, Gini is thought to have most of the features 
of Atkinson (1970)’s inequality measure, which first considered including value judgements into the 
inequality measurement.  
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terms of progressivity or when they faced the problem of ranking before and after fiscal 
policies distributions to see the redistributive characteristics of the policies. This practice is 
called the extended+Gini test and will be examined later in the chapter (Sahn and Younger, 
1999; Sahn, Younger and Simler, 2000).  
2.2.1 Decomposing Income by Sources of Income 
An S+Gini inequality index for a welfare indicator can easily be decomposed as a 
sum of the concentration indices of the different income sources, which add up to that 
welfare indicator. The decomposition method is used to assess the contributions of different 
sources of income or expenditure to inequality.   
We can write concentration indices for different sources of income: 
∫ −=
1
0
X );())(()(IC i dpppCp ρκρ  
where X is the total income and i denotes different sources of income (such as wages, 
transfers, agricultural incomes). Hence, we can define S+Gini index of inequality in the total 
income as a weighted sum of the concentration indices of each source of income:  
∑=
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where 
ix
  illustrates average income from the ith source and, X  is average total income, 
thus iπ  is the share of income source i in total income. We can rewrite the above definition 
so as to see the contributions of each income source to inequality (Duclos and Araar 2006).  
[ ] 0)()(
1
=−∑
i
XXi ii
IIC ρρπ  
       Chapter 2 
 18 
The decomposition comprises of two impacts: the share of the income source in the 
total income and the contributions of the sources of income to the inequality index. The 
product of the coefficient of concentration and the share of income source will give us the 
absolute contribution of the source of income to inequality. If the coefficient of 
concentration is negative, it means that the source of income contributes to the equality 
instead of inequality. 
2.2.2 Inequality Comparisons and Welfare Dominance Analysis 
If we wish to compare two different distributions which might be before and after 
fiscal policies, we can use measures of inequality rankings. The Lorenz curve is an important 
instrument not only to measure inequality but also to compare different distributions. If 
Lorenz curves of two distributions (say x and y) don’t intersect, it can be shown that x is 
more equally distributed than y if x lies entirely inside of y and then it can be said that x 
Lorenz dominates y. By using the normative approach, Atkinson (1970) proved Lorenz 
dominance which provides welfare interpretations on the distributions. Suppose that social 
welfare (W) is the sum of individual utility (U) functions which have strictly diminishing 
marginal utility; in other words utility functions are strictly concave functions of income yi: 
W(y)= ∑ =
n
i i
yU
1
)(  
0)( >′ yU  and 0)( <′′ yU  for all y>0 
If the Lorenz curve of distribution x lies strictly inside that of y, and the mean 
income is the same for both distributions, we can write the following: 
)()( pLpL YX ≥  for all p, [ ]1,0∈p  ⇔  ∑∑
==
≥
n
i
i
m
j
j yUxU
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Then according to the theory of Lorenz dominance, it can be said that W(x) is greater 
than W(y). Concavity of utility functions guarantees inequality aversion in the sense that the 
Lorenz+dominating distribution is the one which has lower inequality than the other 
distribution, when both distributions have the same mean income and non+intersecting 
Lorenz curves. The value judgement behind this idea is the transfer principle of Pigou+
Dalton, which states that an income transfer from a richer to a poorer person that doesn’t 
change the mean income and the rank of the individuals is an improvement. Such a transfer 
shifts the Lorenz curve inwards towards 45+degree line which means that the criterion of 
first+degree Lorenz dominance is consistent with the Pigou+Dalton principle of transfers 
(Sen, 1997; Lambert 1993). Atkinson borrows the notion of inequality aversion from the 
finance literature and defines inequality aversion as equivalent to risk aversion in the theory 
of choice under uncertainty7.  
However, Atkinson’s approach can only be used for distributions which have the 
same mean and where the Lorenz curves of the distributions do not cross. When they 
intersect, it is impossible to conclude which distribution has higher inequality and which 
distribution produces higher welfare. Shorrocks (1983) introduced generalized Lorenz curves 
which make it possible to compare distributions with different means and in some cases it 
also allows us to rank distributions even when their Lorenz curves intersect. In order to 
compare distributions with different means, the author offered the notion of the “generalized 
Lorenz curve” GL(y, p), which is simply the ordinary Lorenz curve times the mean of the 
distribution: 
),(),( pyLpyGL =  
Generalised Lorenz curves satisfy the scale independence principle which states that 
if all incomes are multiplied by the same number then the new distribution is just as unequal 
                                                           
7 In the finance literature, second+degree stochastic dominance refers to situations such that a 
portfolio, x, dominates another portfolio y, if x has less risk than y does. This requires a risk+averse 
utility function. Thus, Atkinson (1970) showed that Lorenz dominance and the second+degree 
stochastic dominance in the finance literature have the same requirements. 
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as the old distribution. Shorrocks also presumes that society cares about efficiency (higher 
real incomes) as well as equity under GL (Blackwood and Lynch, 1994). As Lambert stated 
(1993: 54+66), for equal+mean comparisons, the result is identical with Atkinson’s. But if the 
distributions have different mean incomes, the distribution with the higher mean income and 
dominating Lorenz curve (much closer Lorenz curve to the 45+degree line) will have higher 
social welfare. Thus if )()( pLpL YX ≥  for all p, [ ]1,0∈p  and , YX  >  we can state that 
the distribution X generalized Lorenz dominates the distribution Y. However, Generalised 
Lorenz Curves may also cross or may cause some cases in which a distribution with higher 
inequality and also with a higher mean looks better (Lambert 1993: 61; Kakwani 1984).   
Since generalised Lorenz curves may intersect as well, in order to rank Lorenz 
curves intersecting unambiguously, higher order Lorenz dominance methods8 have been 
offered which have weaker criteria than first+degree Lorenz dominance requires. The higher 
degree of dominance gives more importance to movements at the bottom part of the 
distribution. These higher+degree dominance criteria are obtained by strengthening the 
Pigou+Dalton principle of transfers. Although the Pigou+Dalton principle captures inequality 
aversion, it is not sensitive to the position of equalising transfers in the income distribution. 
 The principle of diminishing transfers “ensures that more weight in the inequality 
assessment is attached to transfers taking place lower down in the distribution” (Shorrocks 
and Foster, 1987: 485)9. With the principle of diminishing transfers, Shorrocks and Foster 
(1987) try to prevent such regressive transfers that take place in the higher part of the 
distribution (from a less rich individual to a much richer individual) to increase inequality. 
Davies and Hoy (1995) also use the principle under the name of aversion to downside 
inequality (ADI) and prove that even if Lorenz curves intersect, distributions can still be 
ranked if we have a social utility function which holds ADI. In other words they show that in 
comparing two Lorenz curves intersecting once, the distribution with less downside 
                                                           
8 First+degree Lorenz dominance means that the higher of two non+intersecting Lorenz curves is 
preferred. Please see Aaberge (2008) for the definitions of different degrees of Lorenz dominance.  
9 Shorrocks and Foster (1987) call the principle of transfer sensitivity “relative transfer sensitivity”. 
       Chapter 2 
 21 
inequality dominates the other distribution. Aaberge (2008) uses more general definitions of 
the second degree Lorenz dominance. They define second+degree downward and upward 
dominance to make their point. The terms upward and downward refer to the direction of the 
aggregation of the Lorenz curve. When income shares are aggregated below with weights 
linearly decreasing with increasing rank of income unit in the distribution, then we obtain 
second+degree upward Lorenz dominance. With second+degree upward Lorenz dominance 
we have “a social decision+maker (who) pays more attention to inequality in the lower than 
in the upper part of the income” (Aaberge, 2008: 8). Thus, for second+degree downward 
dominance we have a social decision+maker who pays more attention to inequality in the 
upper than in the lower part of the income.  
In the fiscal incidence literature, when researchers face the difficulty of ranking 
distributions before and after government intervention, S+Gini Indices are used for higher+
degree dominance by changing the ethical parameter. This gives the opportunity to see how 
the distributions can be ranked with different social welfare functions. We will discuss this 
issue later in the chapter under the heading of extended Gini test.  
2.2.3 Welfare Dominance Analysis in the Public Finance 
Context 
As concentration curves draw the distribution of tax liabilities or benefits, it has been 
used to compare progressivity of different taxes and benefits. The welfare dominance 
analysis10 suggested by Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) has been used to rank public transfers 
and taxes in terms of their progressivity by using concentration curves. Following Atkinson 
(1970), they borrow the methodology of stochastic dominance from the finance literature, 
which is employed to rank portfolios. They establish that for any social welfare function that 
favors an equitable distribution of income, if the concentration curve of one commodity (say 
                                                           
10 For the full development of the methodology with different country cases, see Yitzhaki and Thirsk 
(1990), Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995) and Yitzhaki and Lewis (1996). The full name of the method is 
‘marginal conditional welfare dominance’. 
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food) is everywhere above another commodity’s (say luxury goods) concentration curve, 
changing the tax structure marginally by reducing taxes on food and increasing those on 
luxury goods by just enough to keep total revenues constant will improve social welfare 
when the concentration curve for food is everywhere above that of luxury goods. For the 
benefit case, if the concentration curve of a benefit is everywhere above another benefit’s 
concentration curve, marginally raising the subsidy of the first benefit while reducing that of 
the second will improve social welfare (Yitzhaki and Slemrod, 1991; Sahn and Younger, 
2000).  
By using this approach, we could rank benefits/taxes by just comparing the locations 
of the concentration curves of the public policies. However, concentration curves provide 
only partial ranking since they may intersect so that the ranking concentration curves suggest 
can be only partial (Kakwani, 1986: 72+85). Therefore, single summary measures for 
progressivity have been offered to reach complete ranking. Those measures will be studied 
below. 
2.3  Progressivity Measures 
Before we start with measures of progressivity, it would be worth showing the 
welfare improving role of progressivity. Jacobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976) showed that if 
tax liabilities are distributed more unequally than pre+tax incomes, in other words, if the tax 
is progressive, then the after+tax distribution is less unequal than the pre+tax distribution if 
there is no reranking. Lambert (1993:152+153) proves that an inequality reducing 
progressive tax system is also welfare improving by using Shorrocks’ theory of generalised 
Lorenz dominance. If income taxation is proportional, then the Lorenz curve for post+tax 
income coincides with the Lorenz curve for pre+tax incomes since proportional income tax 
does not change the distribution of incomes.  
)()( pLpL Yprop =   for all [ ]1,0∈p  
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where propL  indicates the Lorenz curve for post+tax incomes in the case of proportional 
income tax. Therefore, we can write the following, which indicates that in the case of 
progressive tax, taxation reduces social welfare11 less than equal+yield12 proportional tax: 
)()()1()()1()()1()( pGLpLtpLtpLtpGL proppropYTYTY =−=−≥−= −−    
for all [ ]1,0∈p  
where TYL −  is the Lorenz curve for the post+tax incomes after progressive taxation and t is 
average tax burden. Since post+tax incomes for progressive taxation are more equally 
distributed than that for proportional tax as proved by Jacobsson and Fellman theorem, “the 
impact of progression on a given income distribution is favourable compared with that of 
proportional taxation” (Lambert, 1993:153). 
After showing the welfare enhancing role of progressive taxation, we may discuss 
measures of progressivity. There are four local progressivity measures:  
1. Liability progression (LP) (elasticity of tax liability with respect to pre+tax 
income). 
1
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2. Residual income progression (RP) (elasticity of post+tax income with respect to 
pre+tax income, measure for redistribution) 
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3. Average rate progression (ARP) (derivative of average tax rate with respect to 
pre+tax income) 
                                                           
11 This theorem is valid under individualistic, symmetric, additively separable and inequality averse 
(concave utility functions) social welfare functions. 
12 Equal+yield taxation means that regardless of the distribution of liabilities of different tax systems, 
tax systems in question yield the equal amount of total tax revenue. 
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4. Marginal rate progression (MRP) (derivative of marginal tax rate with respect to 
pre+tax income);  
0)()()( ≥′=′′= ymytyMRP  
(Lambert, 1993: 160+162; Liu, 1985) 
where m(y) and a(y) are marginal and average tax rates experienced by an income y 
respectively and t(y) is tax schedule. So for strict progression m(y)>a(y) should hold for all 
y. There are two preliminary requirements for progressivity (Lambert, 1993: 148: 1): Tax 
liabilities are distributed more unequally than pre+tax incomes+ the rich have an even greater 
share of taxes than of pre+tax income; 2) post+tax incomes are distributed more equally than 
pre+tax incomes.  The second requirement refers to the redistributive power of public 
policies and demands that if a tax system does not produce less unequal post+tax or benefit 
incomes, that tax or benefit system cannot be called progressive. Of the local progressivity 
measures, the liability progression deals with the issue of departure from proportionality, 
whereas the residual progression is related to the redistributive impacts of the taxes on post+
tax income distribution. Therefore, the local measures of progressivity are capable of 
detecting these requirements over examined income ranges but they do not give information 
about the whole distribution. On the other hand, local measures may not guarantee to detect 
the second requirement; if there is reranking as a result of taxes or transfers and since the 
actual redistributive impact depends on the interaction of the local progression with the 
distribution of gross incomes.    
Progressive public policies may not produce less unequal post+tax or transfer 
distribution if there is reranking13. Reranking occurs when the tax schedule does not depend 
only on income level but also on non+income characteristics of the tax unit (e.g. different tax 
                                                           
13 Redistributive impacts of a tax or benefit may also be limited due to the small share of tax or benefit 
in the individual/household incomes.  
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rates for single and married households even if their income level is the same). Moreover, 
reranking occurs if the tax schedule makes the marginal tax rate be over 1. Reranking is an 
issue related to horizontal inequity. If a tax or benefit creates reranking, therefore it is also 
horizontally inequitable. This may create a problem to determine the progressivity of taxes 
or public transfers if we only consider some local progressivity indices but not pay attention 
to the distributional impact of the taxation on gross incomes. 
If the tax causes  reranking of income units, then concentration curves for post+tax 
income ranked by pre+tax incomes and Lorenz curve for post+tax income do not coincide, 
implying smaller inequality reducing impacts than no+reranking would produce. This can be 
seen clearly in Figure 2.1. The redistributive impact is measured by the difference between 
before and after tax Lorenz curves [L(Y) and L(Y:T) respectively in the figure]. Since the 
concentration curve for post+tax income [C(Y:T)] differs from L(Y:T), there is reranking. As 
we see, if there was no reranking, L(Y:T) would lie along C(Y:T), and the redistributive 
impact would be equal to the difference between L(Y) : C(Y:T) which is higher than the 
difference of L(Y) : L(Y:T) (Duclos and Araar, 2006; Lambert 1993).  
Figure 2.1 
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We can see if a tax or benefit is progressive by comparing concentration curves to 
two benchmarks, namely, a 45+degree line and the Lorenz curve. If the concentration curve 
of a benefit (tax) is everywhere above (below) the Lorenz curve, the benefit (tax) is called 
progressive. Since the principle of departure from proportionality requires that concentration 
curves for taxes should be distributed more unequally than gross incomes, the closer the 
concentration curve for a tax to 45+degree line the more regressive it is. The opposite is true 
for public transfers. Thus, we can write the following conditions for progressive taxes and 
benefits (satisfying the first requirement of the progressivity) respectively: 
)()( pCpL TY ≥  for all [ ]1,0∈p   
)()( pCpL BY ≤  for all [ ]1,0∈p  
where CT and CB are concentration curves for a tax and a benefit respectively ranked by gross 
incomes (y).  
Sahn and Younger (2000) introduced the second definition of progressivity for 
public services by using concentration curves: absolute (or per capita) progressivity. The 
absolute progressivity requires a benefit’s concentration curve to lie above the 45+degree 
line; in other words, to be concave rather than convex. If a benefit is absolute progressive it 
means that it is utilised by the poor disproportionately and thus we can call the benefit pro+
poor. It is worth noting that the above conditions on progressivity are focussing on the first 
requirement of progressive public policies. For the second requirement, we need to take into 
account the relationship between concentration curves of post+tax incomes ranked by pre+tax 
incomes and Lorenz curve of pre+tax incomes. We will discuss this second approach below.  
The global measures of progressivity which focus on the relationship between the 
local measures of progressivity and the distribution of gross incomes and which are capable 
to give information on the whole distribution have been introduced. However, these global 
measures should also be consistent with local measures of progressivity. Jacobsson (1976) 
and Kakwani (1977) established the link between two local measures of progressivity, 
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residual progression and liability progression, and changes in the distribution of the tax 
burden which can be seen with the help of concentration curves. 
According to the theorem of Jacobsson+Kakwani, if one tax is more LP progressive 
than another tax for all income levels, then the concentration curve of the first tax lies below 
that of the second one. More formally: 
)()( 12 yLPyLP ≥  for all y ⇔ 12 TT CC ≤  for every pre+tax income distribution 
F(y). 
For the redistributive impacts, we look at the link between residual progression and 
the distributions of post+tax incomes. 
)()( 12 yLPyLP ≥  for all y ⇔ 12 TYTY CC −− ≥  for every pre+tax income 
distribution F(y). 
By using the conditions explained above we can define the global progressivity 
measures. There are two approaches to attaining global summary measures of progressivity, 
namely Tax+Redistribution (TR) and Income+Redistribution (IR). Globally, TR involves 
comparing the Lorenz curve for gross income (pre+tax income), LX(p), and the concentration 
curves ,C(p), for taxes or benefits, so it is related to the liability progression. Therefore, the 
TR approach deals with the first distributive feature of progressivity, namely departure from 
proportionality. On the other hand, the IR approach takes into account the difference 
between the concentration curves of net income and the Lorenz curve for gross income. 
Hence, the IR approach measures redistributive impacts. If there is no reranking, TR and IR 
approaches give the same ranking of public policies, since concentration curves for post+tax 
incomes and the Lorenz curve for post+tax incomes coincide.  
Thus, S+Gini Indices of TR (IT(ρ)) and IR (IV(ρ)) progressivity, reranking (RR) and 
redistribution (IR) are given by following equations respectively: 
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IT(ρ=2), IV(ρ=2) and RR(ρ=2) are known as the Kakwani index of TR 
progressivity, Reynolds+Smolensky of IR progressivity and Atkinson+Plotnick index or 
reranking (Duclos and Araar, 2006)14. These two approaches carry different information on 
the progressivity of public policies. The Kakwani index measures the difference between the 
Gini coefficient of gross expenditures/incomes and concentration coefficients of benefits. 
Hence, it does not really give information on the redistributive impact of taxes and benefits 
in reducing inequality in net expenditures. On the other hand, the Reynolds+Smolensky index 
is thought to be a better tool to see not only the progressiveness of taxes and benefits but also 
their redistributive impacts since it takes into account the importance of the average rate of 
taxation in the redistribution of welfare. 
We can write the total redistributive impact, that is, the difference between the 
Lorenz curve of net and gross incomes in a way including both IR+progressivity and 
horizontal inequity. This would indicate the extent of the redistribution caused by public 
policies.  
[ ] [ ])()()()()()( pLpCpLpCpLpL BYBYYBYYBY ++++ −−−=−  
                                                           
14 Please see Table 2.1 in Appendix 2.2 for the general conditions of progressivity under TR and IR 
approaches. 
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where, LY+B(p) is the Lorenz curve for post+benefit (net) incomes and CY+B(p) is the 
concentration curve for post+benefit (net) incomes ranked by pre+benefit (gross) incomes (Y). 
The first term on the left hand side gives us IR+progressivity (vertical equity) caused by the 
benefit, B, and the second term is the horizontal inequity or reranking, which apparently 
decreases the progressive impact of the benefit (Duclos and Araar, 2006; Kakwani 1986:82+
83).  
2.4 Statistical Inference 
Since Lorenz and concentration curves (similarly inequality and progressivity 
indices) are computed by a sample, not from the whole population, statistical robustness 
should be checked.  In order to decide if one transfer is progressive or if one transfer 
dominates another, we need to test if there is a statistically significant difference between 
two concentration curves or a concentration curve and Lorenz curve or 45+degree line. 
Davidson and Duclos (1997) derived the distribution+free15 standard errors for the difference 
between two concentration curves that may be dependent. The null hypothesis of the test is 
that the ordinates of two concentration curves are all the same, in other words there is no 
dominance. There are two decision rules to reject the null hypothesis in the literature. In the 
first criterion, which is common in the literature, the null hypothesis can be rejected in 
favour of dominance if the difference between any one pair of ordinates is statistically 
significant and none of the pairs of ordinates is significant in the opposite direction (which 
implies crossing and no dominance) (Demery 2003). As for the second criterion (Howes 
1993), we can reject the null hypothesis in favour of dominance if the ordinates of one curve 
are all above the other, or in favour of crossing concentration curves if at one point the 
ordinates of one distribution are greater than the other but at another point the reverse is true. 
                                                           
15 By distribution+free standard errors, the authors mean that their results do not require a specification 
of the population distributions from which the samples are drawn. 
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Howes (1993) supports the second decision rule16, since this procedure makes sure that the 
probability of type I errors is never greater than 5%. We will apply both decision rules to 
assess the progressivity of concentration curves.  
We need to decide how many ordinates we should take to apply the test. The 
common practice in the literature is to take 20 or 10 equally spaced ordinates and exclude the 
top and bottom ordinates (Younger, 1999; Sahn and Younger, 2000)17. The reason for 
excluding the top and bottom percentiles is that the differences between ordinates at the 
extremes of the distribution are accepted as statistically different. Software for Distributive 
Analysis (DAD) by Duclos and Arrar (2006) is employed to produce the differences between 
the ordinates of curves with asymptotic standard errors; also Distributive Analysis Stata 
Package (DASP) by Abdelkrim and Duclos (2007) provides graphically the differences 
between the ordinates of the curves with confidence intervals.  
2.4.1 Extended Gini Test 
Despite the advantages of the dominance testing methodology, it is very likely not to 
reject the null hypothesis, which leaves us with ambiguous results on the progressivity and 
redistributive impacts of public policies. Sahn, Younger and Simler (2000), Sahn and 
Younger (2000), Younger, et.al, (1999) and Rajemison et al. (2003) used the extended or 
generalised Gini and concentration indices (Yitzhaki 1983) as a cardinal measure to reach 
robust conclusions. Sahn, Younger and Simler (2000) thinks that Yitzhaki (1983) “provides 
a middle ground between the normative generality (and consequent indeterminacy) of the 
welfare dominance approach and the precision (and lack of normative generality) of a 
cardinal measure of social welfare”. The common practice of the extended Gini test is to 
calculate coefficients for increasing inequality aversion parameter, ρ , which offers a sense 
of how a more progressive social welfare function ranks the value of a given public service 
                                                           
16 We will call the dominance test under the second decision rule Howes’ criterion/test, following the 
literature.  
17 We took both 20 and 10 equally spaced ordinates. Since we obtain the same result, we will report in 
this study the results of the test with 20 ordinates. 
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or tax policy. Coefficients are estimated for different ρ  values from 1.01 to 4 or 518 in steps 
of 0.5 for gross income or expenditure and for the transfers and taxes. The higher the 
parameter, the greater the emphasis on the bottom of the distribution; in other words on the 
poorer. If we find that for all parameter values one tax is more concentrated among the poor 
than another,+ in other words, if the extended concentration coefficient of a tax is higher than 
that of another tax + we say that the first tax is dominated by the second one19. The extended 
Gini test can also be employed by using S+Gini indices of TR+Progressivity by different 
inequality aversion parameters, as TR+Progressivity gives the difference between Gini index 
for gross income/expenditure and the concentration coefficient for a tax or benefit. It is also 
possible to compare extended Gini coefficients for gross incomes and net incomes to see the 
redistributive impacts of public policies under different inequality aversion parameters.  
2.5 Conclusions 
Progressivity (regressivity) is defined as a measure of the deviation of a tax or 
benefit system from proportionality in favour of the poorer (richer). Also any progressive 
policy instrument (tax or benefit) is supposed to improve the distribution of welfare in the 
society, so it is expected to have positive redistributive impacts. Theoretically, it is also 
confirmed that progressive public policies may be welfare improving. The aim of this 
chapter was to theoretically review the main features and also advantages and disadvantages 
of the measurement methodologies of inequality and progressivity.  
The Lorenz curve and the Gini index are the most common statistical tools to 
measure disparities in the distributions of incomes and to compare different distributions. 
Progressivity indices derived by using concentration curves and Lorenz curves have also 
been commonly used in the empirical public finance literature. In this study, we will also use 
                                                           
18 “4” is the upper limit suggested by Duclos (2000) in most of the empirical studies cited above.  
19 For public transfers, if the extended concentration coefficient of a transfer is lower (more 
concentrated among the poor) than that of another one, the first one dominates the second one 
according to the extended Gini test. 
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the methods and indices based on Lorenz curves and the Gini index. Since our focus is 
mainly on the progressivity of taxes and benefits and the final redistributive impacts of these 
public instruments, we will use the analysis of welfare dominance to compare distributions 
of incomes before and after government intervention, as well as employing the most 
common progressivity indices to detect the progressiveness of a single public policy and also 
to rank the progressiveness of different policies. Namely, we will report the TR+
Progressivity of Kakwani, IR+Progressivity of Reynolds+Smolensky, redistribution of 
Atkinson+Plotnic and horizontal inequity indices to capture both progressivity and 
redistributive impacts. Statistical inference based on Davidson and Duclos’ (1997) approach 
will also be run. We will use DAD Software to estimate asymptotic standard errors to test the 
robustness of the analysis statistically. However, when results are inconclusive in ranking 
different public policies in terms of their redistributive impacts, we utilize the extended+Gini 
test which allows us to consider different ethical values to assess the public policies. 
Additionally, we will report S+Gini progressivity indices for a wide range of inequality 
aversion parameters to assess if progressivity or redistributive power of a fiscal policy varies 
when we give more weight to different parts of the society. This will allow us to examine if 
fiscal policies target the poor effectively.  
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 2.1: Principles of Good Inequality Measures 
1) Symmetry: If one income distribution is derived from another by a permutation of 
incomes, then two distributions are identical (the inequality measure remains unchanged). 
2) Replication invariance: If an income distribution y is obtained from another 
distribution x by the replication of the population k times (with all the incomes 
correspondingly replicated), this must leave the poverty and the inequality measure 
unchanged.  
3) Scale invariance: if one distribution is obtained from another by multiplication of 
a constant, the two distributions are identical.  
4) Pigou+Dalton principle of transfers: Any mean+preserving transfer from a poorer 
person to a richer one, other things remaining the same, always increases inequality and 
poverty. 
5) Principle of diminishing transfers: an inequality index should be more sensitive to 
the progressive mean+preserving transfer taking place at the lower part of the distribution 
than the one taking place at the upper part of the distribution. Thus, the index should 
decrease more when the progressive mean+preserving transfer takes place at the lower 
incomes (Blackwood and Lynch, 1994; Fields and Fei 1978; Sen, 1997; Zheng, 1997).  
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Appendix 2.2: Conditions for Global Progressivity 
We call a tax or a benefit system progressive if the following conditions are met 
(Duclos and Araar, 2006): 
Table 2.1. TR and IR Progressivity Rules for Tax and Transfers 
  
A Tax or Transfer is TR(IR) 
Progressive  If 
TR Progressivity Tax (T) CT(p)<LY(p) for all p [0,1] (LY dominates CT) 
 Transfer (B) CB(p)>LY(p) for all p (CB dominates LY) 
 Tax(T1)?Tax(T2) CT(1)(p)<CT(2)  for all p 
 Transfer(B1)?Transfer(B2) CB(1)(p)>CB(2)  for all p 
 Tax?Transfer LY(p)+CT(p)>CB(p)+LX(p) for all p 
IR Progressivity Tax CY+T(p)>LY(p) for all p 
 Benefit CY+B(p)>LX(p) for all p 
 Tax(T1)?Tax(T2) CY+T1(p)>CY+T2(p) for all p 
 Transfer(B1)?Transfer(B2) CY+B1(p)>CY+B2 for all p 
  Tax?Transfer CY+T (p)> CY+B(p) 
 
where CT(p) and CB(p) are concentration curves for a tax and a benefit respectively;. LY(p)  
is Lorenz curve for gross income or expenditure; B1 is the first public transfer and B2 is the 
second one; T1 is the first tax and T2 is the second tax.  
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CHAPTER 3:  THE DISTRIBUTIO*AL IMPACTS OF PUBLIC 
EDUCATIO* SERVICES I* TURKEY, 2003 
3.1 Introduction 
Education has been widely accepted as an effective tool in enhancing growth and 
development (both individual and social) and also in improving poverty and income 
disparities (Becker 1993; Schultz, 1988; Sylwester, 2002). The positive relationship between 
education and growth/development depends on the role of education in increasing factor 
productivity and rates of return (individual and social) from educational investments1. The 
role of education in developing countries is particularly important as a development 
instrument.  
Due to the positive impact of education in development and growth, the 
redistributive role of education has become an important empirical question. Since it has 
been found that for most of the countries examined the total education expenditures have a 
progressive impact on income distribution, the policy recommendation for developing 
countries with high inequalities is to extend their educational services. Public primary and 
secondary education services have been found to be progressive whereas higher education 
services have tended to be regressive for developing countries. Additionally, the 
progressivity of education services decrease with the education level, in other words, 
primary education is the most progressive level followed by secondary and tertiary levels2.  
Turkey, as a middle+income country, has an institutionalised, wide coverage 
education system. It has been shown that education has positive impacts on labour force 
participation and earnings in Turkey. Education increases labour force participation, and this 
                                                           
1 See Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) for a recent review of the empirical literature on returns to 
investment in education. They emphasize that the average rate of return to another year of schooling is 
10 percent and the highest returns are recorded in low and middle+income countries such as Turkey. 
2 Please see the benefit incidence studies for several developing countries such as Castro+Leal et.al 
(1999), Chu et al., (2000), Glick and Razakamanantsoa (2002), Healtberg et. Al. (2003), Lanjouw et 
al. (2002), Sahn and Younger (2000), Younger (2002), Selden and Wasylenko (1992) among others.  
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effect and the returns to education increase with the level of education in Turkey. The 
income share of workers with a low level of education in total incomes has reduced over 
time in Turkey, whereas earnings of people with university degree have significantly 
increased in recent years (Table A 3.1 in Appendix 3.1). This provides further supporting 
evidence that education plays an important role in inequality in Turkey (Duman, 2008; 
Tansel, 1994, 2004). The distributional effects of public education services in Turkey were 
investigated by Pinar (2004) for 1994 and 2002. He found that primary and secondary 
education is pro+poor, but this pro+poor impact declines when private expenditures on 
education is included into the analysis. As noted in Chapter 1, Pinar (2004) does not apply 
the methodologies we apply here and ignore the statistical robustness of the results. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to investigate the redistributive impacts of public 
education services for 2003 to see if Pinar’s results are valid for 2003 with the welfare 
dominance analysis and S+Gini progressivity indices, and check the robustness of the results 
statistically.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the benefit incidence 
method and the theoretical issues regarding choosing the welfare indicator. Section 2 also 
explains the data used and the method of calculating unit costs of the services and 
determining the users of the services. Section 3 presents an overview of the Turkish 
education system with the enrolment rates by education level. The results are given in 
Section 4 and Section 5 summarises the main conclusions.  
3.2 Method: Benefit Incidence Analysis 
Measuring the welfare effects of publicly provided services has been an important 
empirical issue in the welfare and public economics literature. The interest in benefit 
incidence studies is generally based on the need to assess the welfare impacts of publicly 
provided goods on the poor, since it is seen that public spending is a potentially powerful 
instrument for fighting poverty and inequality (Davoodi et. al. 2003; Demery, 2003: 43; 
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Selden and Wasylenko, 1992: 1; Van de Walle, 1998: 365; Martinez+Vazquez, 2001: 28+29). 
The first studies in the literature were done by Selowsky (1979) and Meerman (1979) for two 
developing countries: Colombia and Malaysia respectively.  
The main goal of benefit incidence3 analysis is to identify who benefits from public 
spending and by how much (Martinez+Vazquez, 2001: 31). The usual practice of incidence 
studies is to see how the initial, ‘pre+intervention’ position of individuals is altered as a result 
of public spending. In other words, the researcher’s aim in using benefit incidence analysis is 
to compare the distribution of welfare with and without public expenditures. This ‘pre+
intervention’ position is generally called the counterfactual and based on a welfare indicator 
(e.g. per capita household income/expenditure), which does not include the monetary value 
of the benefits secured from publicly provided goods. 
Two general approaches4 have been widely used in the estimation of public 
expenditure incidence: Benefit incidence (or non+behavioural benefit incidence) and 
behavioural benefit incidence. The former has been the most frequently applied methodology 
and will be applied in this study. We will first elaborate the non+behavioural benefit 
incidence and discuss the main advantages and disadvantages of the method. We then 
summarise the behavioural benefit incidence and compare the two methods.  
Three kinds of information are needed for the calculation of the incidence of 
government spending on services. These are government expenditures on a service (net of 
any cost recovery fees, out of pocket expenses by users of the service, or user fees), public 
                                                           
3 Assessing the distributional impacts of public spending is called expenditure or benefit incidence. 
The application procedure of both is the same, the only difference comes from the assumption of the 
benefit incidence which states that the unit cost of a public service to a government can be taken as 
per user benefit that public service produces for the intended users. We will follow the benefit 
incidence approach. 
4 The theoretical discussion on how public expenditures benefits individuals has been provided by 
Aaron and McGuire (1970) and Brennan (1976). Aaron and McGuire argued that the value of a 
publicly provided good or service should be determined by the individual’s own valuation of the 
good. This approach requires estimating the individual preferences for the publicly provided goods 
and services which is data demanding. Brennan (1976) offered the second approach in which public 
services and goods are valued at their marginal cost. While the former approach provides a theoretical 
ground for the behavioural benefit incidence analysis, the second one leads to the non+behavioural 
benefit incidence approach. See Cornes (1995) for an assessment of the two approaches. 
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utilization of the service and the socioeconomic characteristics of the population using the 
service. Household budget surveys are used to attain the information on households’ or 
individuals’ standard of living, social statue and beneficiaries of the social services of the 
government. Government spending data are typically obtained from budget execution data as 
reported by the ministry of finance, the relevant line ministry, or the central statistical agency 
(Davoodi et. al. 2003: 5). 
The non+behavioural benefit incidence approach is conducted in three steps. In the 
first step, we rank individuals or households in groups such as income/expenditure quintiles, 
location (urban/rural or geographical location), race and gender, by some chosen measure of 
current welfare. In the second step, the information on individual utilization or participation 
in the publicly provided program is drawn from the surveys to count the numbers of 
beneficiaries in each group. In the last step, the unit cost or subsidy of the publicly provided 
goods is estimated by generally using public expenditure accounts of the country in question. 
After obtaining unit cost of provision, we multiply the unit cost by the numbers of the 
beneficiaries in each group to arrive at estimates of the distribution of benefits (Davoodi et. 
al. 2003: 7+10; Demery, 2003; Martinez+Vazquez, 2001: 32; Van de Walle, 1998: 367+368).  
In order to put into effect the non+behavioural benefit incidence approach, some 
assumptions are accepted in the literature due to the data restrictions. The main assumption 
of the non+behavioural approach is that the benefit derived by consumers can be 
approximated by the cost to the government of providing the service. However, it is thought 
that the unit cost of provision may have little relation to the value of the benefits to the 
individual. A well+known example to support this criticism is that the unit cost of education 
service cannot include the lifetime benefits of education. Another strong assumption is that 
the government expenditure is efficient. In the literature, it is seen that this assumption is one 
of the most important drawbacks of the approach and instead some researchers recommend 
the behavioural approach, which estimates the benefits of social services drawn from each 
                                                                                                                                     Chapter 3 
 39 
individual by using some micro econometric methodologies5. Other assumptions of benefit 
incidence analysis are that all relative prices and real incomes are fixed, benefits are not 
shifted, that is benefits go to the people who are intended, and marginal benefits are equal to 
average benefits (Selden and Wasylenko, 1992).  
Given these assumptions, the methodology has faced numerous criticisms6. The first 
concerns the omission of indirect transfer impacts; the non+behavioural benefit incidence 
takes into account only direct transfer impacts. Indirect impacts may be of considerable 
consequence to the distributional outcome due to benefit shifting. Although the general 
empirical result of the benefit incidence studies is that university education is not pro+poor, 
the indirect benefits, (good governance, the increase in service quality, the existence of a 
class of technocrats) may be helpful for the poor. However, indirect benefits and externalities 
are difficult to estimate. 
The second important point is that it presents results on the distribution of average 
benefits, even if marginal benefits may be of greater interest in assessing public policy 
reform. Incidence analysis at one point in time attempts to estimate how average benefits are 
distributed. In order to overcome this drawback, comparisons over time have been 
recommended by using cross+section data and panel data or pseudo+panel data. However, 
some researchers argue that marginal incidence is more important for policy makers, since 
policy makers need to know who is going to benefit from public services if they make some 
changes in public expenditures. Panel data was thought necessary to examine marginal 
incidence, until Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) introduced a methodology to investigate 
marginal incidence of public spending using single cross+section data. They used a simple 
political economy model to show the importance of marginal changes. They worked with 
India’s National Sample Survey for 1993+1994 that includes data on public service (or 
                                                           
5 For the comparison of the behavioural and non+behavioural approaches with advantages and 
disadvantages of these two approaches, see Van de Walle, 1998. 
6 Davoodi et. al. (2003), Van de Walle, (1998) and Selden and Wasylenko, (1992) have been used to 
discuss the limitations of the benefit incidence approach.   
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program) participation across geographic regions. They calculate the average participation 
rate for a given public service for each quintile and each region. They use the common 
information that the participation rate for a given quintile varies across regions according to 
the level of spending on the public service in each region. Using this they regress the 
quintile+specific participation rates across regions on the state’s average participation rate 
(for all quintiles and all regions) for each public service. The basic regression that Lanjouw 
and Ravallion (1999) estimate is as follows: 
qkqqqki upap ++= β,,   (1) 
where i indexes a small geographical unit (62 regions in their case), k indexes a 
larger one (19 states in their case) which contains small geographical units, and q indexes the 
welfare quintile. The technique requires some information on service participation at the 
household level and sufficient regional disaggregation and variance in participation for 
estimation to be possible. They found that expansion of primary schooling would be pro+
poor in contrast to average incidence figures that suggest the opposite.  
One of the most serious critiques of benefit incidence studies concerns their 
assumptions about the counterfactual or the pre+intervention world. As mentioned before, it 
is assumed that the counterfactual is the welfare indicator chosen. It has been argued that 
public policies affect individual behaviour, including labour supply, consumption, savings 
and investment decisions. However, non+behavioural benefit incidence studies ignore 
behavioural responses.  
The behavioural incidence approach (or estimation based approach) uses 
econometric techniques to estimate the individual preferences (willingness to pay) for 
publicly provided goods to value the individual benefits that publicly provided goods and 
services produce (Gertler and Glewwe 1989; Gertler and der Gaag, 1990; Van de Walle, 
1998; Younger, 1999; Van de Walle 2003). So it tries to solve the criticisms that the benefit 
incidence studies faced over determining the pre+intervention welfare indicator and the value 
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of benefits. The behavioural methodology has been applied more often in recent years as 
data and techniques have become more available to overcome some important drawbacks of 
the non+behavioural approach. The main focus of behavioural incidence studies was to study 
if user fees alter the demand for publicly provided services. The method requires estimating 
econometrically the effects of public expenditures on welfare while controlling for other 
factors which could also be influencing outcomes. Although it is thought to be a better way 
of examining the redistributive impacts of public spending policies since it has stronger 
theoretical grounds, the method is more data demanding (particularly information on price 
or/and fee of services) than the non+behavioural benefit incidence which makes it less 
possible to apply for most of the developing countries (including Turkey). The estimation 
based approaches are also criticised on the fact that they require strong assumptions about 
the functional form for household decisionmaking and about the distribution of the error 
term (Selden Wasylenko, 1993; Van de Walle, 1998; 2003). Additionally, it is warned that 
“the private willingness to pay of the household decisionmaker may not be a good indicator 
of the social benefit derived from +a public service+ in the presence of externalities or 
intrahousehold inequity” (Selden Wasylenko, 1993: 180).  
Despite their limitations, it is thought that benefit incidence studies provide a useful 
first look at the allocation of government expenditure among households. The advantage of 
benefit incidence analysis is that it allows us to focus on the important issues of how 
effectively public expenditure programmes target the poor by focusing on different rates of 
usage of publicly provided goods and services. Additionally, it is worth seeing how specific 
components of public spending are distributed across key socio+economic groups of interest. 
We cannot apply the behavioural benefit incidence approach in the thesis mainly because of 
the data limitations for Turkey. We do not have any information on fees for public services 
which is compulsory information to estimate demand for the public services with the 
behavioural benefit incidence. Moreover, there is evidence that the two methods may not 
lead to substantially different conclusions. Younger (1999 and 2002), applying both methods 
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for education and health services in Ecuador and Peru, found that they gave consistent results 
and concluded that “if one’s main interest is to order public services by their progressivity, it 
does not matter which method one uses to value public services” (Younger 1999: 339). So 
this also makes us less worried about the reliability of our results.  
3.2.1 Choosing the Welfare Indicator 
Before discussing the indicator of welfare, it is necessary to discuss which unit of 
analysis should be used. The main concern of theoretical welfare economics and 
measurement methodologies is the well+being of individuals. However, from the empirical 
point of view, households become much more appropriate units to focus on, particularly for 
developing countries. The family unit7 is typically viewed as the most appropriate unit of 
measure because of the income or consumption+sharing phenomena (economies of scale) 
that occur within families. Moreover, as opposed to income, the data on consumption is 
collected generally at the household level as it is too difficult to identify the consumption of 
each household member. However, there are three problems with using family units. The 
first problem concerns the heterogeneity of household units in terms of size and demographic 
indicators. The second problem is the fact that household expenditure rises with household 
size, but not as rapidly. It is found that large households are overrepresented among the poor. 
The third problem is an unsolved issue in empirical micro studies, namely intra household 
allocation. Even if it is known that inequalities in the intra+household allocation of household 
welfare are very common in every society, particularly in developing countries, it cannot be 
identified empirically by the data researchers generally use. Hence, if we pay attention only 
to household total welfare, we can easily conclude that inequalities in the income distribution 
of the society in question and poverty are lower than they are in fact. Moreover, because of 
the variations between households in terms of household size, the direct comparison of the 
                                                           
7 The definition of household or family unit varies across different surveys. The 2003 HICES defines 
household as a unit in which individuals live and eat together; share their incomes and attain the 
administration of the household together regardless if they have any “blood relation” or not.  
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welfare levels of households might give unreasonable conclusions. In order to make welfare 
comparisons among families with different sizes and demographic indicators, the common 
practice is to convert each family into a certain number of “equivalent adults” by the use of 
some “equivalence scale” (Deaton, 2000: Chapter 3 and 4). Nevertheless, data restrictions 
and targets also determine which unit will be chosen. We are using household as a unit of 
analysis to capture two related facts about Turkish society: first income+consumption sharing 
phenomena in households is still valid even for households in urban areas; second – related 
to the first + family relations are culturally important in Turkey8. 
In the literature, there are two main theoretical approaches in defining welfare or 
living standard of an individual: 1) the welfarist approach and 2) the non+welfarist approach. 
The welfarist approach is based on the utility level of an individual who is able to assess 
her/his utility level rationally. On the other hand, the non+welfarist approach may pay little 
or no regard to information on utilities. For example a non+welfarist poverty assessment may 
thus deem that the poor are better off even if the poor do not agree (Ravallion, 1992). In that 
sense, A. K. Sen’s capability approach is the most important, non+welfarist alternative way 
in assessing individual well+being. According to this approach, the well+being of an 
individual cannot be reduced to having some commodities. Sen (1984, 1985) argues that this 
approach is “commodity fetishism” and people should have what they need to be capable to 
protect them from deprivation. In other words the living standard should cover also the right 
of being able to live long, being well+nourished, being healthy, being literate, and taking part 
in the life of the community. Sen has argued that poverty should be defined in terms of a 
fixed set of "capabilities"+the activities a person is able to perform.  By this view, the 
commodities needed to attain those capabilities may vary, but the capabilities do not. This 
approach is also called the human development approach and is accepted by United Nations 
                                                           
8 Households with individuals living alone or living with housemates account for only 4 percent of 
total households. Indviduals over 18 years old tend to live with their parents until they get married if 
they live in the same city. 43% of total households have at least one family member over 18. 
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Development Programme9. This method is also known as a non+money metric, in contrast 
with money metric methods, which use only consumption and income as welfare indicators.  
There are two main, widely used, welfare indicators in the money metric method, 
namely total expenditure on consumption and total income. It is thought in the literature that 
consumption is superior to income. Two reasons can be put forward to support this view. 
The first relies on Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis. Consumption is seen as 
a better measure of lifetime welfare than is current income, because of the consumption 
smoothing behaviour of individuals. Jorgenson (1998)10 argued that consumption is an 
excellent proxy for household resources since the transitory component of consumption is 
relatively small. In the absence of reliable data on lifetime income, it has been generally 
thought that current consumption is a better indicator of permanent income (Fields, 1980: 
140+142). The second reason is based on data quality. Although measurement difficulties 
such as imputations (for such as in+kind incomes and own+productions), recall bias, 
seasonality, and long questionnaires apply to both income and expenditure, it is commonly 
accepted that income is more sensitive than consumption in most respects. As Deaton (2000: 
29) puts it: accurate estimates of  income also require knowledge of assets and their returns, 
a topic that is always likely to be difficult, and where respondents often have incentives to 
underestimate. This is a more serious problem for families engaged in agricultural activities 
since they are required to have proper accounting systems to obtain profits over agricultural 
activities, which is not the case for small+scale farmers in most developing countries.  
Despite of advantages of using consumption, this choice is criticized on the grounds 
that it does not consider the impact of saving behaviours and the accumulation of wealth, 
which is a very important element affecting inequality. It is known from empirical work that 
consumption generates lower inequality than income does; and this is the case for Turkey 
too. The impact of wealth accumulation and high savings of rich households are thought to 
                                                           
9 See Anand and Ravallion (1993) for discussion on reflections and difficulties of the capability 
approach. 
10 Jorgenson (1998) was cited in Liberati (2001:84) 
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lead to consumption measures’ underestimating inequality. However, it is also widely 
accepted that rich households tend to underreport their incomes to hide their true income for 
a number of reasons. Properly working credit markets are crucial for individuals to smooth 
their income. Another important criticism against using consumption as an indicator of 
permanent income argues that in developing countries credit market imperfections prevail, 
so individuals are not as successful as developed country counterparts to smooth their 
consumption. This criticism can be answered by the existence of informal or nonmarket 
borrowing opportunities11 in developing countries. In light of all these advantages and 
disadvantages of both indicators, it appears that the choice of welfare indicator should not be 
made only on the basis of theoretical considerations, the data quality and country facts 
should also be taken into account. In order to decide which welfare indicator should be used; 
we therefore need to explain the data we will use in this study.  
3.2.2 The 2003 HICES Data 
The basic data are the Household Income and Consumption Expenditure Surveys 
(HICES), conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Turksat) to measure households’ 
living standards and utilization of public services. The HICES data were collected for 1994, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. The sample of HICES was designed to be representative 
of the population of Turkey, and two of the surveys + 1994 and 2003 + are also regionally 
representative. Moreover, all of them provide reliable information needed for an urban+
rural12 breakdown and they have information at both individual and household level. The 
HICES are detailed consumption and income surveys that provide a very wide range of 
information about households’ consumption patterns and individuals’ income and wealth 
sources. Income (consumption) data provide both cash and in+kind income (consumption), 
which is particularly important to measure the welfare of households/individuals who live in 
                                                           
11 See Besley (1995) for an analysis of informal or nonmarket credit institutions in developing 
countries. 
12 The provinces whose population are at least 20,001 are called urban whereas provinces whose 
population is equal to or lower than 20,000 are called rural.  
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rural areas. Individual income data (both monthly and annual) is provided by sources of 
income such as wages and salaries, public and private transfers, entrepreneurial, agricultural 
and rental income. The data also provide reliable information about the social status of 
individuals/ households.  
In this study, we are only using the HICES 2003. The HICES is the latest regionally 
representative household survey and we especially need regional representativeness to use 
regionally disaggregated government expenditures to capture variations in the quality of the 
public services examined. It may be useful to explain the data collection methodology of the 
HICES 2003. The HICES was applied monthly to about 2160 households, differing every 
month between January 1st and December 31st in 2003, yielding a total sample size of about 
25,920 households. The households in the survey were visited four times in a month. This 
data collection methodology may cause some problems in consumption data (particularly 
when price differences are important across months in a year), since we do not know which 
households were interviewed in which month13. The quality of the survey data are, however, 
“ambiguous” according to the OECD standards—the total disposable income data gathered 
through the surveys were about 50+60% of the national income for the corresponding years 
(Yükseler and Zafer 2008; Duygan and Güner, 2006). 
The HICES have both income and consumption data. Income data shows both 
monthly and annual incomes. For monthly incomes, individuals were asked how much their 
monthly salary or earnings (net of taxes) were in the month they were interviewed, whereas 
for annual incomes, individuals were asked how much they had earned in the last 12 months 
(net of taxes). Since the households interviewed were different for every month, and Turkey 
has a high rate of inflation14 the data provides a price index to bring the annual incomes of 
households interviewed in 12 months to a comparable level at the end of year 2003. We 
think that annual income is much more comprehensive than monthly income as monthly 
                                                           
13 See Yükseler and Türkan (2008) for more information on the HICES. 
14 Consumer Price Index was 29.7 and 18.9% in 2002 and 2003 respectively.  
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income does not have information on some sources of income such as premiums for wage 
earners. Another important point worth mentioning is that although individuals may have 
been unemployed in the month they were interviewed, so that they may have reported zero 
monthly income, this does not mean necessarily that that household is poor15.  
The 2003 HICES data have very detailed consumption data at the household level. 
Household food and non+food consumption is recorded only monthly. The consumption data 
have records on 1,408 food items and 537 non+food items with information on whether the 
items were obtained from markets, own+production, or individuals/public institutions as a 
gift or transfer. The consumption data was gathered together from a recording book in which 
each household had to record their consumption over the month. The households were 
visited  four times during the month to check recordings. Because of this data collection 
method for consumtion data, we think the consumption data have fewer recall problems – 
and so are more reliable + than annual income data.  
We use one year cross+sectional data and aim at attaining not only the trends in 
redistributive impacts of public policies in 2003 but a general trend valid for today’s Turkey. 
Therefore, for the reasons we explained above and in accordance with our aims in this study 
we use household expenditures as a welfare indicator. However, to consider the effects of 
economies of scale and the different consumption needs of different household members, 
household size is converted into adult equivalent (AE) using the following formula for the 
household i:  
θα )(A  AE ii iC+=  
where Ai is the number of adults in the household, Ci is the number of children, and α and θ 
are parameters. Children are individuals aged 14 and below. We apply a value of θ=0.6 and 
                                                           
15 For these reasons, we use annual disposable incomes (including imputed rent in addition to earnings 
of individuals) in the tax incidence chapter to estimate tax liabilities for direct taxes.  
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α=0.9 following World Bank (2005). Adjusted adult equivalent size of the household i 
(AE*i) following Deaton and Zaidi (2002) is defined as:  
iAE
CA
CA
θα )(
*AE
00
00
i +
+
=  
where A0 and C0 are the number of adults and children in the “pivotal” households (average 
number of adults and children in Turkey) and Ai and Ci are the number of adults and children 
in the ith household. The modal or pivotal household in Turkey is a 4+member household 
with 2 adults and 2 children. As can be seen from Table 3.3, mean household size is 4.13 for 
Turkey.  
3.2.3 Determining User of the Services and Unit Cost of the 
Services 
Government expenditures on education are classified into three categories: Primary, 
secondary, and higher education, which includes both university and non+university 
(vocational) higher education. The Ministry of National Education (MONE)’s annual 
spending is used for the spending on primary and secondary education, and the spending by 
the Higher Education Council (HEC) and public universities for higher education. The data 
on annul spending of MONE, HEC and public universities were obtained from the Turkish 
Ministry of Public Finance.  
Government subsidies for services vary significantly by region. MONE’s annual 
spending at regional level enables us to take into account regional disparities in providing 
public education services. Table 3.1 below presents MONE’s spending by program in 
200316. The largest share (65 percent) of the total spending by MONE goes to primary 
education. By ignoring MONE’s spending on higher education (only 0.46 percent), we 
allocate the rest of the MONE spending to secondary education (35.5 percent).  
                                                           
16 To attain this table, we allocate MONE spending on general administration to primary and 
secondary education equally. 
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As for higher education services, we have the total spending of HEC and that of each 
public university. We aggregate total expenditures of public universities regionally and then 
allocate the total spending of HEC to each region according to percentage share of each 
region’s public universities in total expenditure of public universities. Since we do not know 
which university higher education students in the survey are enrolled in, we assume that they 
are going to local universities. This assumption enables us to allocate the total higher 
education spending of each region to higher education students who are assumed to go to 
universities in that region. The calculated regional monthly average government expenditure 
per student on primary, secondary and higher education are given in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.1: MO*E Expenditures by Program, 2003  
Trillion TL 2003 % 
Basic Education
1
 6,926,980 65.42 
Secondary Education
2
 3,612,531 34.12 
Higher Education
3
 48,836 0.46 
Total 10,588,348 100 
Source: MOE, 2003:2004 Statistics 
otes: 1Includes pre:school education and half of the spending on general administration 
2General and Vocational:Technical High Schools and on:Formal Education and half of the 
spending on general administration 
3Expenditures on Higher Education made by the MOE, additional to that by universities 
 
Table 3.2: Average Per Student Monthly Government Spending on Education, 
 by Region, Turkey, 2003 (Million TL) 
Regions Primary Secondary Higher Education 
Istanbul 41 63 152 
West Marmara 71 107 218 
Aegean 63 104 257 
East Marmara 66 87 354 
West Anatolia 65 106 303 
Mediterranean 54 101 194 
Central Anatolia 57 105 281 
West Black Sea 73 136 193 
East Black Sea 61 102 139 
*orth East Anatolia 55 123 370 
 Central East Anatolia 47 96 275 
South East Anatolia 36 154 195 
Turkey 57 107 233 
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In order to apply the benefit incidence methodology, we first rank households into 
welfare deciles by total per adult equivalent monthly household expenditure. In the second 
step, we draw on information on household level participation from 2003 HICES to check 
numbers of beneficiaries in each decile and each region.  
We calculate average unit costs for primary, secondary and higher education. For 
primary and secondary education, we divide total regional government expenditure on 
education services by the total number of beneficiaries (enrolled students) in each region to 
obtain per student average cost of the service to the government. Hence, we assume that the 
benefit derived by consumers can be approximated by the average cost to the government of 
providing the service and that all beneficiaries in each region receive the same average 
benefits. The general formula for calculating unit cost of primary, secondary and higher 
education and the value of the total primary, secondary and higher education is given below. 
The subsidy imputed to group j (Sj) depends on s, the unit cost of education services, E, total 
government expenditure, and N, the total number of beneficiaries for each education service. 
ik
ik
i
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j sS  
where i indexes education levels: primary, secondary education and higher 
education; k, 12 geographical regions of Turkey. 
An important deficiency of HICES is that we do not have information on which 
students are going to private schools. Households are asked only if they have any child in a 
private school, not how many are enrolled in a private school (if the family has more than 
one child going to school). Therefore, we assume that students in households saying “yes” to 
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this question are private school students and we exclude them from benefits of public 
education services17.  
After determining who attends public school, we multiply the government’s unit cost 
of provision (average cost of the service in each region) by the number of beneficiaries in 
each household to impute how much each household receive from publicly provided 
education. We then divide this total household benefit by the equivalent adult household size 
to acquire per adult equivalent household benefits. In the last step, we add these per adult 
equivalent household benefits to household per adult equivalent (AE) monthly expenditures 
to obtain the distribution after education spending. The formula for after government 
spending allocation to the households is given below for per adult equivalent incidence. Wi is 
per adult equivalent monthly household expenditure after education benefits, W is the initial 
per adult equivalent monthly household expenditure18, AE* is equivalence scale and ci is per 
student monthly benefit (i.e. unit cost) and bi is the number of beneficiaries in each 
household. 
 
*
)(
i
iii
AE
bc
WW
×
+=  i= primary, secondary and higher education. 
These calculations provide monetary values for the education benefits received by 
households. The per student regional student spending was allocated to the households 
according to the number of students they have. Table 3.3 presents quintile shares of per 
capita (adult equivalent+AE) total expenditures and mean household size, mean number of 
primary, secondary and higher education students per household. This table gives an idea of 
who benefits from public education services. While per adult equivalent mean household 
expenditure, mean household size and mean number of primary and secondary students 
                                                           
17 In HICES 2003, only 253 of 25, 920 households answered “yes” to the question of whether they 
have a child going to private schools. With sample weights, this number accounts for 337,726. 
According to MONE 231,351 primary and secondary education students were enrolled in private 
schools. Thus even if we do not know exactly which child in a family goes to private school, this 
number shows that our assumption is reasonable.  
18 In the thesis we generally use AE_EXP to refer to per adult equivalent household expenditure.  
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decline, mean number of higher education students increase as household per adult 
equivalent expenditure increases. 
 
Table 3.3: The Distribution of Per Capita (Per AE) Monthly Total Household Expenditure and 
Average *umbers of Students by quintile, Turkey, 2003 
Expenditure and Region 1 2 3 4 5 Turkey 
Per capita expenditure as % of total 5.31 9.55 13.90 20.67 50.57 100 
AE_EXP as a percentage of total 6.37 10.70 14.88 21.04 47.00 100 
Mean Household per capita expenditure* 58 105 153 227 556 220 
Mean AE_EXP* 65 107 147 206 452 195 
Mean Household Size 5.83 4.54 3.98 3.45 2.86 4.13 
Mean number of primary student per 
household 
1.25 0.74 0.56 0.41 0.26 0.64 
Mean number of secondary student per 
household 
0.21 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.19 
Mean *umber of higher education student 
per household 
0.03 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.09 
% Distribution of Primary Level Student 
by quintile 
38.8 23.0 17.5 12.6 8.0 100 
% Distribution of Secondary Level  
Student by quintile 
23.0 22.2 21.8 19.7 13.2 100 
% Distribution of Higher Education 
Student by quintile 
6.5 12.5 19.7 25.0 36.3 100 
*Million Turkish Lira. Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure (AE_EXP) 
 
 
3.3 Education System 
The Ministry of National Education (MONE) and the Higher Education Council 
(HEC) are the two entities responsible for determining education policies and financing and 
organizing the education sector in Turkey. The Public Expenditure and Institutional Review 
(PEIR) in Turkey carried out by the World Bank (2001) highlighted that, in 1999, about 72 
percent of the allocation of public expenditures on education is directed to MONE programs, 
about 20 percent to higher education programs, and the residual to other institutions. Local 
governments also finance education in Turkey. However, since their share in total education 
spending is less than 1 percent in 2002 Table 3.4, we ignore total expenditures of local 
governments on education and utilize the total spending of MONE for primary and 
                                                                                                                                     Chapter 3 
 53 
secondary education19 and the total spending of HEC and public universities for higher 
education to calculate per student education benefits. 
In Turkey, public schools for basic and higher education are the main service 
providers. More than 98 percent of all primary schools and 90 percent of secondary schools 
are public, while more than 98 percent and 97 percent of all students are enrolled in public 
primary and secondary schools respectively20. 
Table 3.4: Education Expenditures in Turkey, in 2002 by source  
  % 
Central Government Revenue 61.4 
Household Funds 33.4 
Foundations, Associations, Firms 1.9 
International Resources 0.1 
Local Government Revenue 0.9 
Other Sources 2.3 
Source: Chawla (2005:23) 
 
The current structure of the Turkish education system was established during the 
1997+1998 school year, with the increase in compulsory schooling from 5 years to 8 years 
for children aged 6+14. Upon completion of the 8+year primary school education, students 
may enroll in general or vocational secondary schools, usually for three years21. Tertiary 
schooling is provided by universities and by specialized vocational training academies that 
are either two or four years in duration, depending on the programme (Mete, 2006).  
There are four different types of secondary level public schools in Turkey: general 
public high schools, Anatolian High Schools, Science High Schools and lower+prestige 
vocational schools. All children who have a primary education degree can go to a public 
high school (either general or vocational) without paying any fee. However, children who 
want to enroll in the high quality Anatolia and Science High Schools have to pass the 
                                                           
19 Primary education includes both pre+primary school education and primary school education. 
Secondary education includes both general high schools and vocational and technical high schools.  
20 See Table A 3.2 in Appendix 3.1. 
21 In some both general and vocational secondary schools, there is an additional year to 3+year 
duration of secondary education in which one foreign language is thought.  
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Secondary School Student Selection and Placement Examination (Turkish acronym OKS). 
Even though these schools are also free, this exam is highly competitive and students need 
high scores. Entrance to university is also primarily based on a centrally administered 
examination, the Student Selection Exam (Turkish acronym, OSS). Grades in secondary 
school are the other factor that determines the overall score. This exam is extremely 
competitive due to the high demand for university education. The high demand for education 
is driven by the high young population of the country, the higher possibility of being 
employed and getting well+paid jobs and the prestige of being with university degree in the 
society. Because of this central entrance exam, private tutoring cram schools (dershane) are 
thought necessary to achieve high scores and thus enter high+quality universities. About 78 
% of all undergraduate students report receiving preparatory courses in private tutoring 
centers in 1997. The main reason for not participating in private tutoring is generally lack of 
money, since they are very expensive (World Bank, 2006). Research on the economic profile 
of university students in Turkey showed too that in 1997, students from high+income 
families are much more likely to be enrolled in private universities, and they are more likely 
to be enrolled in “well+established” and “new and developing” public universities (World 
Bank, 2006).  
Tansel and Bircan (2008) also examined the determinants of receiving private 
tutoring and getting placed in a university program by using 2002 survey of the applicants to 
the university entrance examination and their performance in OSS. The survey was 
conducted by the Student Selection and Placement Center (OSYM) of Turkey. According to 
the survey, applicants of OSS who receive private tutoring accounted for 45% of the total 
applicants and even at the low level of incomes the applicants tend to have private tutoring 
courses22.  The findings of the paper shows that parents’ education level, employment status 
and income level affect positively the possibility to receive private tutoring and also to get 
                                                           
22 Tansel and Bircan (2008) reports that the percentage of the applicants who attended dersane was 31 
% of the applicants with the lowest level of income. This rate rises to 47% for the second category of 
income level in the survey, which correspondes to about 225 US Dolars per month. 
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placed in a university program. Applicants’ gender is another important factor; female 
applicants are less likely to access to the private tutoring. Additionally graduating from high 
school with high honors, honors or satisfactory degrees increase the probability of receiving 
private tutoring; suggesting students with higher motivation are more likely to receive 
private tutoring.  
Although public education services dominate the education system in Turkey, out+of 
pocket expenditures on education may still create barriers to utilising public education 
services for people with low+income groups, which we have seen clearly for higher 
education services above. Even if the tuition fees for public universities are nominal in 
Turkey, getting placed in a public university requires household private expenditures on 
education. Household private expenditures on education by deciles and regions are reported 
in Table 3.5 below and Table A 3.3 in Appendix 3.1. 
Before moving onto the analysis, it is worth noting that reported education 
expenditures in HICES include only direct expenditures on education such as tuition fees 
(for public higher education institutions and private schools) and grants by households. For 
example, transportation and school clothes are not included in the households’ spending on 
education, since they are recorded in general transportation or clothes expenditures. Hence, 
unfortunately, the data do not allow us assess the real impact of out+of+pocket expenditures. 
However, we can interpret these tables in the way that they present school fees for either 
private or public schools23.  
Household private expenditures for all education levels increase steadily with 
income for all deciles. According to Table 3.5, 70% of total household expenditures on 
primary and secondary education come from the richest decile, suggesting that the rich 
prefer largely to use private education services rather than public or their children are 
                                                           
23 For public primary and secondary schools there is no legal fee. However, due to the financial 
problems schools face, they ask for grants/donations from households. For universities and non+
university higher education institutions there is a legal tution fee, whose amount changes according to 
the department. 
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enrolled in high quality city public schools which demand high grants from households. The 
second part of the table includes percentage shares of household expenditures on each 
education level in total household education expenditures by deciles. Households’ higher 
education expenditures are higher than their expenditures on primary and secondary levels. 
The national university entrance exam is the main reason behind this. When we look at 
household expenditures on education regionally, we see that rural Turkey, especially 
households living in East Anatolia and South East Anatolia are the most dependent on public 
education services in the sense that they have the smallest shares in the total private 
expenditures on education despite of the high student numbers in these regions (Table A 3.3 
and Table A 3.4).  
 
Table 3.5: Monthly Household per Adult Equivalent Expenditure (AE) on Education 
As a percentage of total , by decile, Turkey, 2003 
Expenditure &Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Turkey  
Primary Education 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.4 1.8 5.7 3.9 7.1 8.8 70.2 100 
Secondary Education 0.3 0.5 1.3 0.7 2.8 2.8 4 6.9 10.8 69.9 100 
University Education 0 0 0.2 0.8 1.1 1.6 2.2 3.2 10 80.9 100 
*on?University Higher 
Education 
0.3 0.3 1.1 3.2 3.6 5.8 9.5 13.4 22.2 40.6 100 
Higher Education* 0.2 0.1 0.6 1.9 2.3 3.6 5.6 8 15.7 61.9 100 
Education Materials 3.7 5.5 6 7.9 7 8.7 9.8 11.4 13.5 26.5 100 
Pre?School Education 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 5.3 7.5 3.7 82.4 100 
Other Education 0.1 0.3 1.1 1.7 2.8 2.9 3 5.6 15.5 67.1 100 
Total Education 
Expenditure 
0.4 0.6 1.2 2.1 2.7 4.1 5.2 7.8 13.7 62.2 100 
% of Expenditures in Total Education Expenditure  
Primary Education 5.2 6.7 8.7 9.4 9.8 19.8 10.6 12.8 9.1 16 14.2 
Secondary Education 9.2 12.2 17.1 4.8 15.8 10.3 11.3 13.3 11.9 16.9 15 
Primary&Secondary 
Education 
14.3 18.9 25.8 14.2 25.7 30.1 21.9 26.1 20.9 32.9 29.2 
Higher Education 21.5 13.1 29.9 52.1 47.9 49.6 60.2 57.9 64.3 56 56.2 
*University+on:University Higher Education  
Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure 
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3.3.1 Enrolment Rates and the Quality of the Services 
Tansel (2002), Hoşgör and Smits (2006) and Bakis et. al. (2009) studied the 
determinants of educational attainment in Turkey for the years 1994 and 2003 at the primary 
and secondary levels. They have found that parents’ education and income level, gender and 
regional differences are the most important factors affecting the schooling trends in Turkey. 
In this section, we will examine enrolment rates in Turkey by considering these factors to 
draw a map on the characteristics of the users of public education services.  
Although average years of schooling have been increasing in Turkey (Table A 3.5 in 
Appendix 3.1), there are still inequalities among regions and gender. It seems that economic 
conditions affect the quality of education and the likelihood of access to education at every 
level of education. Poor children who have little chance to access high quality primary 
schools and are unable to afford expensive private tutoring for the central exams have a 
much lower likelihood of passing the OKS and the OSS. Household income seems to play a 
large role in determining access to all levels of post+compulsory education. In this section, 
we present enrollment rates by several socio+economic indicators such as welfare level (by 
per adult equivalent expenditure quintiles), parental schooling, gender and region. These 
factors seem to affect enrolment conditions of children.  
Enrolment rates (percentage of relevant age group declared as enrolled) for each 
education level were calculated using the following formula: 
100×=
ijk
ijk
ijk
C
S
e
, i= primary, secondary, primary+secondary and higher education 
       j: quintiles from 1 to 5 
         k: female and male 
where e is the enrolment rate, S is the total number of female/male students in each 
quintile for each education level, and C is the total number of children whose age 
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corresponds to the education level in question. For primary education, the school age is 6 to 
14 years, while for secondary and higher education the ages are 15 to 17 and 18 to 23 years 
respectively. We calculate a second enrolment rate for secondary and higher education levels 
by excluding children who do not have a primary (secondary) level diploma from the 
secondary (higher education) school age group. 
We calculated a summary statistic (GDR ) to see the level of gender differences in 
enrolment rates:  








−
−
=





=
ij
ij
ij
m
f
GDR
1
1
enrollednot  are  whostudents male of Percentage
enrollednot  are  whostudents female of Percentage
 
where   fij, ( mij ) is percentage of female (male) enrollment at level i in quintile j.  
Therefore, if GDR is equal to one, there are no differences in enrollment rates by 
gender. However, if GDR is larger than one, GDR shows the extent of the gap between 
female and male enrolment rates.  
Table A 3.6 and Table A 3.7 in Appendix 3.1 present the number of students and 
school age groups as a percentage of the total by deciles and education level. These tables 
indicate that lower deciles have more school age children, for all levels of education, which 
would affect the distributional impacts of education benefits.  However, as we will see with 
the enrolment rates, Table A 3.6  shows that households in the lower deciles are less likely to 
send their children to higher level school after 8+year compulsory primary education, even if 
we exclude individuals without primary (secondary) education from secondary (higher) 
education age group (4th and 5th Columns in Table A 3.7).  
Enrolment rates are provided in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 by expenditure quintiles, 
education level and gender. Enrolment rates for primary, secondary and higher education in 
Turkey are 96%, 72% (86%)24 and 24% (48%). When we look at expenditure quintiles, we 
                                                           
24 Enrolment rates according to the second definition in parentheses, i.e. percentage of eligible age 
group enrolled. 
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see that enrolment rates in the first quintile are lower than the average enrolment rate and the 
difference between the poorest and richest quintile is high for all levels of education. As 
expected, secondary education enrolment rate is lower than that of primary education. 
Although public schools at primary and secondary levels are free for all citizens and public 
higher education institutions demand low tuition fees, these rates reflect the fact that the 
welfare level of households is still an important factor affecting access to public education 
services.  
Another important observation we can make from these two tables is that the 
differences in enrolment rates between genders are still a problem for poorer parts of Turkey. 
While 88% of female primary school age children in the first quintile go to school, this rate 
is 95% for male primary school age children. This difference increases with education level, 
but the enrolment rate difference between sexes declines with income. The female enrolment 
rate for higher education is 4.5 percent for the poorest quintile, whereas the female 
enrolment rate for higher education is 49 percent for the richest quintile.  
For the richest quintile, some enrolment rates are more than 100 percent. The reason 
for this is that higher quality secondary schools, that are Anatolia and Science High Schools, 
and private secondary schools last 4 years instead of 3 years and private primary schools also 
last 9 years instead of 8 years, as those have an extra class for foreign language education. 
Therefore, since we did not include 15 year old children in the primary school age group and 
18 year old children in secondary school age group, in the richest quintile we had more than 
100 percentage enrolment rates. 
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Table 3.6: Enrolment Rates, by quintiles 
Education Level 1 2 3 4 5 Turkey  
Primary 91.6 97.0 98.0 97.4 99.5 95.7 
Female 88.2 94.4 98.1 96.9 99.7 93.9 
Male 94.9 99.6 97.9 97.9 99.3 97.4 
GDR 2.3 12.6 0.9 1.4 0.4 2.4 
Secondary 49.1 65.8 76.4 91.0 102.3 71.8 
Female 38.0 57.1 70.4 85.6 101.1 63.7 
Male 62.7 74.9 82.6 96.6 103.5 80.6 
GDR 1.7 1.7 1.7 4.2 0.3 1.9 
Prim./Sec. 80.1 86.7 90.1 92.9 96.8 87.3 
Female 74.0 82.3 87.5 91.5 95.9 83.4 
Male 86.3 90.9 92.6 94.2 97.7 91.1 
GDR 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.9 
Higher Education 5.7 11.6 20.9 30.7 60.3 23.7 
Female 4.5 7.8 15.6 24.9 48.8 18.2 
Male 7.3 16.7 28.5 38.0 74.3 31.2 
GDR 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 2.0 1.2 
otes: Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure 
 
Table 3.7:Enrolment Rates with only the children who have primary (secondary) 
degree, by quintiles 
Education Level 1 2 3 4 5 Turkey  
Secondary 65.52 79.41 88.10 100.85 109.59 85.66 
Female 53.21 71.17 82.73 96.48 109.08 78.36 
Male 79.16 87.54 93.45 105.16 110.09 93.10 
GDR 2.2 2.3 2.6 ?0.7 0.9 3.1 
Higher Education 22.03 27.89 40.76 49.72 79.93 48.01 
Female 22.88 23.02 33.60 42.77 68.12 41.70 
Male 21.30 32.20 48.85 57.58 92.93 54.57 
GDR 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 4.5 1.3 
otes: Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure 
 
We know from the literature that there is a close relationship between the education 
level of parents and that of children. Table 3.8 shows percentage of children of the household 
head and his/her partner who are not students classified by education of the household head 
and his/her partner25. According to this table, more than half of the population has only a 
primary level diploma. The illiteracy rate is 6.3% for household heads and 18.5% for their 
                                                           
25 In HICES 2003, the person who earns the highest income is called the household head. In Turkey, 
the household head is generally also the father of the family.  
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partners (mostly women). Table 3.9 shows the importance of parental schooling: Illiterate 
household heads are not sending 27 percent of their children to primary school, and this rises 
to 68 percent for secondary school. As education level of parents increase, percentage of 
children not enrolled decreases very sharply. Parents’ education level and welfare level are 
also in close relationship. Almost 60% of illiterate people are in the poorest first three 
deciles, whereas 50% of people with higher education is in the richest 10th decile.  
Gender discrimination is also very clear for uneducated families. While 38 percent 
of male children of illiterate household head are not enrolled in primary school, this 
percentage rises to 71 percent for female children for primary school. For secondary school 
the rates become much higher: 67% of children of illiterate household heads are not enrolled 
and this is 76 and 56 percent for female and male children. Education level of mothers 
follow very similar pattern. However it seems that gender discrimination is less intense for 
households with educated mothers than with educated fathers. 
Regional disparities are another important issue. As can be seen from Table 3.10, 
while enrolment rates are above the national average in Istanbul, Marmara, Aegean, Central 
Anatolia, Black Sea and Mediterranean regions for primary and secondary education; East 
and South East Anatolia, the poorest regions of the country, have the lowest enrolment rates 
for all educational levels. We also see from the table that female children living in East and 
South East Anatolia seem to have less chance to go to school than female children in other 
regions; GDR is higher in those regions for primary education than the average for Turkey. 
However, for secondary and higher education, East and South East Anatolia have GDR 
ratios below the national mean. We can interpret these numbers as showing that in those 
poorer regions only educated and relatively richer households can send their children to 
secondary and higher level schools and they do not exercise gender discrimination. What 
these descriptive statistics confirm, as would be expected, is that school attendance is low 
and the difference in enrolment rates between sexes is high for children in poor, uneducated 
households. 
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Table 3.8:School Attendance by Parental Schooling      
   Primary Education   Secondary Education  
    Household Percentage of Children Aged 6?14, Percentage of Children Aged 15?17, 
    Size  Who Are *ot Students   Who Are *ot Students  
Education Level of Household Head % Mean Both Genders Male Female GDR B. Genders Male  Female GDR 
Illiterate 6.3 4.72 11.81 9.57 13.84 1.45 13.4 12.72 13.83 1.09 
Literate without diploma 5.35 4.38 5.79 5.08 6.42 1.26 9.88 9.71 9.99 1.03 
Primary 62.31 4.31 64.81 67.34 62.52 0.93 69.94 70.77 69.41 0.98 
Secondary 16.49 3.81 13.55 14.11 13.04 0.92 5.58 5.51 5.63 1.02 
Vocational Higher Education 1.91 3.5 1.12 1.38 0.88 0.64 0.15 0.23 0.1 0.43 
Higher Education 7.65 3.4 2.92 2.51 3.29 1.31 1.05 1.06 1.04 0.98 
Turkey  4.13         
Ed. Level of Household Head's Partner %   Both Genders Male Female GDR B. Genders Male  Female GDR 
Illiterate 18.54  33.14 27.95 37.91 1.36 40.14 38.87 40.92 1.05 
Literate without diploma 7.39  8.09 8.29 7.91 0.95 9.68 8.36 10.5 1.26 
Primary 59.19  50.72 56.29 45.61 0.81 48.7 51.12 47.2 0.92 
Secondary 10.47  6.47 5.74 7.15 1.25 1.36 1.53 1.26 0.82 
Vocational Higher Education 1.13  0.43 0.68 0.21 0.31 0.01 0.03 0 0.00 
Higher Education 3.28   1.14 1.05 1.22 1.16 0.1 0.09 0.11 1.22 
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Table 3.9: School Attendance by Parental Schooling    
   Primary Education   Secondary Education  
    Household % of *on?enrolled Children of  % of *on?enrolled Children of  
    Size Parents Parents 
Education Level of Household Head % Mean Both Genders Male  Female GDR B. Genders Male  Female GDR 
Illiterate 6.3 4.72 26.67 38.2 71.37 1.87 67.82 56.69 76.46 1.35 
Literate without diploma 5.35 4.38 18.32 34.17 60.48 1.77 60.01 44.86 75.54 1.68 
Primary 62.31 4.31 15.57 26.65 34.79 1.31 38.97 31.87 45.43 1.43 
Secondary 16.49 3.81 14.51 17.38 22.7 1.31 15.88 12.07 19.69 1.63 
Vocational Higher Education 1.91 3.5 13.02 16.97 12.13 0.71 4.82 6.27 3.64 0.58 
Higher Education 7.65 3.4 9.71 10.51 15.14 1.44 8.26 6.38 10.16 1.59 
Ed.Level of Household Head's Partner %   Both Genders Male Female GDR B. Genders Male Female GDR 
Illiterate 18.54   22.45 34.12 59.28 1.74 57.46 44.25 69.73 1.58 
Literate without diploma 7.39   18.76 29.45 46.79 1.59 47.45 36.72 55.80 1.52 
Primary 59.19   13.89 23.60 27.23 1.15 31.19 25.74 36.38 1.41 
Secondary 10.47   13.66 12.98 20.09 1.55 8.85 7.97 9.65 1.21 
Vocational Higher Education 1.13   7.54 12.23 5.36 0.44 5.49 1.47 9.30 6.35 
Higher Education 3.28   11.12 10.68 14.53 1.36 3.82 1.55 5.89 3.79 
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Table 3.10: Enrolment Rates by Region and Gender     
  Primary Secondary Higher Education 
  B.Genders Female Male GDR B. Genders Female Male GDR B. Genders Female Male GDR 
Istanbul 97.35 97.26 97.43 1.07 86.34 85.27 87.43 1.17 39.54 35.04 45.38 1.19 
Marmara 97.71 98.88 96.61 0.33 85.6 79.5 92.48 2.73 22.72 16.34 31.95 1.23 
Aegean 96.39 95.34 97.48 1.85 78.15 72.24 83.75 1.71 26.44 21.95 31.92 1.15 
Black Sea 97.75 97.33 98.17 1.46 72.42 63.97 81.7 1.97 15.95 10.86 24.53 1.18 
East Anatolia 92.31 87.72 96.52 3.53 65.81 49.15 82.74 2.95 15.39 9.64 23.35 1.18 
Central Anatolia 98.52 98.72 98.33 0.77 75.04 64.11 87.47 2.86 29.22 24.16 35.79 1.18 
Mediterranean 97.29 96.73 97.83 1.51 73.24 68.2 79.38 1.54 20.65 14.51 29.11 1.21 
S. East Anatolia 88.86 79.65 96.88 6.52 34.13 22.93 46.69 1.45 10.79 5.11 18.16 1.16 
Turkey 95.69 93.85 97.42 2.38 71.83 63.72 80.62 1.87 23.67 18.17 31.16 1.19 
Second Definition of enrolment rates                      
Istanbul 97.35 97.26 97.43 1.07 96.25 95.58 96.91 1.43 64.81 58.13 73.27 1.57 
Marmara 97.71 98.88 96.61 0.33 95.74 90.76 101.13 ?8.18 41.18 34.1 48.66 1.28 
Aegean 96.39 95.34 97.48 1.85 87.49 82.34 92.19 2.26 56.64 53.56 59.51 1.15 
Black Sea 97.75 97.33 98.17 1.46 82.14 73.43 91.46 3.11 35.65 27.91 44.98 1.31 
East Anatolia 92.31 87.72 96.52 3.53 80.82 66.27 93.18 4.95 38.82 35.53 40.99 1.09 
Central Anatolia 98.52 98.72 98.33 0.77 84.74 74.66 95.49 5.62 51.64 46.58 57.06 1.24 
Mediterranean 97.29 96.73 97.83 1.51 85.04 81.56 89.02 1.68 38.05 28.48 49.47 1.42 
S. East Anatolia 88.86 79.65 96.88 6.52 61.39 43.66 79.06 2.69 41.47 29 49.18 1.40 
Turkey 95.69 93.85 97.42 2.38 85.66 78.36 93.1 3.14 48.01 41.7 54.57 1.28 
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Table 3.11 shows the number of students per teacher in each region. For the regions 
Istanbul, East Anatolia and South East Anatolia, the number of students per teacher is higher 
than that of Turkish average, implying low quality in the services. Additionally, Table A 3.8  
in Appendix 3.1 gives the percentage share of students and teachers by region. For the 
regions Istanbul, East Anatolia and South East Anatolia, the difference between the number 
of teachers and that of students is negative and high. This suggests that the quality of 
education services is the lowest in those regions. Since Istanbul is the center of industry, 
finance and art in Turkey, it has a serious immigration problem, especially from poorer 
regions of Turkey. South East and East Anatolia are the poorest regions of Turkey. 
Table 3.11: The number of Students per teacher by education level and 
region, 2003 
  Primary Education Secondary Education 
Istanbul 35.37 24.84 
Marmara 24.08 16.23 
Aegean  22.11 15.32 
Black Sea  21.67 14.8 
East Anatolia  27.65 17.81 
Central Anatolia  23.87 15.62 
Mediterranean  25.41 15.03 
South East Anatolia 35.35 23.18 
Turkey  26.49 17.1 
Source: MOE 2003   
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Before starting to apply the welfare dominance method and the progressivity indices 
to study the distributional impact of education benefits, following Demery (2000, 2003), we 
would like to compare the needs for the services and the actual utilization of the services to 
assess if the poor are well targeted by the services. We use the number of school age children 
by education level and decile as an indicator of the social need for the services1. Education 
benefits are equal to per student public expenditure on each education level times the number 
                                                           
1 School age for primary and secondary education is between 6 and 17, for higher education it is 
between 18 and 23. 
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of students in each family divided by the equivalence scale. The upper part of Table 3.12 
reports per adult equivalent household expenditure by deciles in comparison with per adult 
equivalent benefits by education level and deciles. The benefits of primary education 
decrease with deciles, suggesting that benefits are more concentrated in the lower deciles 
(pro+poor). On the other hand, the benefits of secondary and higher education increases with 
deciles. However, as percentage share of household expenditure is higher than percentage 
share of primary and secondary education, these two benefits have a progressive character. 
For higher education benefits, it seems that the middle and upper deciles receive benefits 
more than their expenditure share, implying regressivity to higher education. Finally, the 
total benefits from all levels of education are distributed proportional to the decile 
population, implying that the total education benefits are progressive but not pro+poor. 
The bottom part of Table 3.12 presents the needs for services by decile and 
education level. When we compare percentage shares for education needs with percentage 
shares of education benefits, we see that apart from the first two deciles and the richest 
decile, primary education benefits are able to cover the needs of all deciles. The poorest first 
two quintiles receive 29.4% of total primary level benefits whereas the share of primary age 
children for these deciles is 33.9%. This pattern is very similar for secondary and higher 
education, although the difference between needs for secondary and higher education 
services and actual government expenditure is greater. While the poorest first two deciles 
receive 20% (4.7%) of total secondary (higher) level benefits, 29% (22.5%) percent of 
secondary (higher) level age group are included in these deciles. However, when we take 
into account children without primary and secondary level diplomas in calculating secondary 
and higher education needs, the difference between service needs and publicly provided 
benefits decreases. The numbers in parentheses in the table show the percentage of the 
secondary (higher education) age group who had a primary (secondary) level diploma in 
each decile. Even though the difference between education needs and benefits decreases with 
this new definition, the first four deciles still do not receive enough benefits to cover their 
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needs for both secondary and higher education. Therefore, although benefits decrease with 
deciles for primary and secondary education, the poorest deciles are not well targeted; higher 
education benefits seem to be regressive since they are far from meeting social needs and 
increase with deciles. When we assess the overall education benefits, we see that benefits are 
distributed almost equally across the deciles, even if the deciles’ share of benefits is higher 
than expenditure share, with the exception of the last three deciles. 
 
  Table 3.12: Education Service *eeds and Per AE* Benefits, by decile % shares 
Deciles AE_EXP 
Primary 
Education 
Benefits 
Secondary 
Education Benefits 
Higher 
Education 
Benefits 
Total Education 
1 2.51 15.12 8.83 1.6 9.58 
2 3.84 14.31 11.2 3.09 10.23 
3 4.85 12.45 10.19 3.88 9.37 
4 5.83 10.43 10.88 6.36 9.34 
5 6.83 10.43 10.34 9.19 10.04 
6 8.02 9.13 10.37 9.29 9.48 
7 9.49 8.57 10.9 13.19 10.51 
8 11.53 7.92 10.82 13.45 10.27 
9 15.04 6.62 9.64 17.97 10.71 
10 32.04 5.03 6.83 21.99 10.47 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Deciles   
*umber of 
Primary Age 
Children 
*umber of 
Secondary 
Education Age 
Children 
*umber of 
Higher 
Education  Age 
People 
Total Education 
Age Children 
1  19 15.5 (13)** 11.5 (4.4) 16.2 (15.3) 
2  14.85 13 (12.8) 11 (7.4) 13.5 (13.2) 
3  12.32 12 (11.5) 10.3 (8) 11.7 (11.4) 
4  9.98 10.8 (10.9) 11.4 (10.3) 10.5 (10.2) 
5  9.52 9.8 (9.9) 9.7 (9.5) 9.6 (9.6) 
6  8.48 9.3 (9.6) 10.4 (11.5) 9.2 (9.2) 
7  7.99 8.5 (9.2) 9.95 (11.6) 8.6 (8.9) 
8  7.08 8.4 (8.9) 9.67 (12.9)  8.1 (8.4) 
9  5.67 7 (7.8) 8.78 (12.7) 6.8 (7.3) 
10  5.1 5.6 (6.3) 7.23 (11.8) 5.8 (6.5) 
Total   100 100 100 100 
otes: Households were ranked by per adult equivalent total household 
expenditure.(AE_EXP)   
*Benefits are per adult equivalent public education expenditure allocated to households  
**The numbers in parentheses show the percentage of secondary (higher education) age people who had 
primary (secondary) level diploma in each decile. 
 
                                                                                                                                     Chapter 3 
 68 
3.4.2 Welfare Dominance Analysis 
After these descriptive analyses, we consider benefit incidence by applying the 
welfare dominance analysis and statistical dominance tests. Figure 3.1 presents concentration 
curves for per adult equivalent education benefits with the Lorenz curve of per adult 
equivalent household expenditure (AE_EXP). We are interested in determining whether 
social services are: a) per capita progressive (i.e. the concentration curve is above the 45+
degree line, implying that the poor receive more benefit than rich in absolute terms) b) are 
progressive (i.e. the concentration curve is above the Lorenz curve, implying that the poor 
benefit more in relative terms) and c) can be ranked or ordered by their degree of 
progressivity. According to 
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Figure 3.1Figure 3.1 primary education appears to be per capita progressive; secondary 
education is progressive but crosses the 45+degree line; higher education crosses the Lorenz 
curve; and finally the concentration curve for the total education benefits crosses the 45+
degree line. As concentration curves of secondary and higher education benefits cross the 
45+degree line and the Lorenz curve respectively, we have inconclusive results and need to 
test statistically whether these casual observations are statistically robust or not.  
Table 3.132 reports the dominance test results for public education services for both 
decision procedures3. We use DAD software to estimate asymptotic standard errors of the 
differences between the ordinates of the curves. After calculating the differences between 
concentration curves and a concentration curve and the 45+degree line/Lorenz curve, we do a 
two+sided hypothesis test of whether these differences are equal to zero or not.  
                                                           
2 Table A 3.9 provides the differences between ordinates of the Lorenz curve for per adult equivalent 
expenditure and the concentration curves for per adult equivalent benefits. Figures from Figure A 3.1 
to Figure A 3.6 in Appendix 3.2 provide the differences between concentration curves and the Lorenz 
curve and 45+degree line with confidence interval. The figures were drawn with the help of Araar and 
Duclos’s (2007) Stata DASP package.  
3 See Chapter 2 for the details of the welfare dominance test methodology.  
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Figure 3.1 
 
Based on t+tests for the difference between ordinates of the two curves and both 
decision rules, we find that primary education is confirmed to be per capita progressive, that 
is, we reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the 45+degree line and the 
concentration curve of primary education is statistically zero. In other words, the 
concentration curve for primary education benefits dominates both the 45+degree line and 
Lorenz curve statistically. Secondary education benefits are progressive in the sense that the 
concentration curve is above the Lorenz curve and the difference between these curves is 
statistically significant. However, the comparison of the concentration curve for this service 
relative to the 45+degree line to see if the service is absolute progressive (pro+poor) delivers 
an inconclusive result. According to the first decision rule, it seems that the secondary 
education benefits are per+capita progressive. However, under Howes’ criterion the test is 
inconclusive since we cannot reject the null hypothesis in favor of dominance for each 
                                                                                                                                     Chapter 3 
 71 
ordinate tested. For higher education, both decision rules show that the concentration curve 
for the higher education benefits is dominated by the 45+degree line, but it crosses the 
Lorenz curve. By comparing the concentration curves of the services, we can say that the 
most progressive benefit is primary education, followed by secondary education services.   
Table 3.13: Dominance Results for Public Education Services, (Per AE Benefits) 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve and the 45?Degree Line  
  Per Adult Equivalent Benefits 
  
Primary 
Education Secondary  Education Higher   Education Total Benefits 
  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Decision rule 1 + + + + x + + x 
Howes' Test + + + nd* x + + x 
*otes: 1) compares the column's concentration curve with the Lorenz curve for per adult equivalent household 
expenditures 
2) compares the column's concentration curve with the 45:degree line 
‘+' indicates that the benefits from the column's service are more concentrated among the poor  
than per adult equivalent expenditures (for (1)) or an equal per adult equivalent distribution (for (2)) 
‘' indicates  that the service is less concentrated among the poor  
‘x' indicates that the concentration curves cross 
*nd: non dominance: we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
 
3.4.3 Progressivity Indices and the Extended Gini Test 
To overcome ambiguity regarding the progressivity of higher education and 
secondary education benefits and also to examine the redistributive impacts and magnitude 
of the progressivity of the benefits, in this section we apply S+Gini progressivity indices and 
the extended Gini test. We report the indices for the wide range of inequality aversion 
parameters, ranging from 1.01 to 4. This allows us to see if progressivity and redistributive 
power of the benefits vary with the ethical parameter values (ρ). There are two approaches 
for global progressivity indices4: Tax Redistribution (TR+Progressivity) and Income 
Redistribution (IR+Progressivity). We are reporting the two most common indices, the 
Kakwani index of TR+Progressivity and the Reynolds+Smolensky index of IR+Progressivity, 
as well as the indices for redistribution and horizontal inequity. As discussed earlier, these 
two approaches carry different information on the progressivity of public policies. The 
                                                           
4 See Chapter 2 for the approaches on progressivity. 
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Kakwani index measures the difference between the Gini coefficient of gross 
expenditures/incomes and the concentration coefficients of benefits. Hence, it deals with 
only the first feature of progressivity +departure from proportionality+ and does not really 
give information on the redistributive impact of taxes and benefits in reducing inequality in 
net expenditures. On the other hand, the Reynolds+Smolensky index is thought to be a better 
tool to see not only the departure of taxes and benefits from proportionality but also their 
redistributive impacts since it takes into account the interaction between the distribution of 
benefits and average benefits as a proportion of post+transfer expenditures (Duclos 2000)5. 
The indices are zero for a proportional benefit and positive (negative) for a progressive 
(regressive) benefit. We report the indices of horizontal inequity (Atkinson+Plotnick Index) 
and redistribution in order to see the extent of inequality reducing impacts of benefits in 
addition to determining if they are progressive.  
Table 3.14 presents S+Gini Indices at ρ=2 for education benefits with asymptotic 
standard errors estimated by DAD. As can be seen, all comparisons are statistically 
significant. Our aim in giving these indices is to obtain conclusive results on the 
progressivity of the services and their redistributive power. All indices will carry different 
information on the benefits in question. All levels of education and the total benefits are 
progressive as they have positive values for Kakwani and Reynolds+Smolensky indices and 
the ranking by both indices is the same: the most progressive level of education is primary, 
followed by secondary level, and the least progressive is higher education with a very small 
progressivity. If there is no reranking and no important difference between average benefits 
of the two benefits, the two approaches give the same ranking. The Atkinson+Plotnick index 
has positive numbers for all levels of education and does not alter the ranking. However, the 
redistributive impact estimated as the difference of Gini indices for pre+transfer and post 
                                                           
5 Indices of IR+Progressivity can be defined as the products of TR progressivity indices and the 
average rate of taxation as a proportion of net expenditures (Duclos and Araar 2006; Kakwani, 1986). 
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transfer household6 expenditure is lower. Primary, secondary and total education benefits 
cause 1.9, 0.7 and 2.2  percent inequality reduction respectively, whereas higher education 
increases inequality at 0.3 percent. Higher education has a negative estimated redistribution 
index because it has very small IR progressivity and the horizontal inequity rules out this 
progressive impact.  
Table 3.14: S?Gini Indices for Benefits (ρ=2)   
 
Kakwani Index 
TR Progression 
Reynolds?Smolensky  
IR Progression 
Atkinson?Plotnick 
Horizontal Inequity 
Redistribution 
Primary  0.5770 0.0210 0.0019 0.0190 
 0.007 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 
Secondary  0.4260 0.0090 0.0017 0.0070 
 0.011 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 
Higher  0.0430 0.0010 0.0037 +0.0030 
 0.014 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
Total  0.3820 0.0291 0.0068 0.0223 
 0.008 0.0005 0.000 0.0005 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors estimated by DAD are in italic 
 
 Although the progressivity indices with ρ=2 provide us with information on the 
ranking of benefits, their progressivity and redistributive impacts, we need to test if this 
information is consistent with different inequality aversion parameters (ρ). This will allow us 
to assess if we can confirm the results we have attained so far under different social welfare 
functions. If we can attain higher progressivity indices for one transfer for the whole range of 
parameters, we say that that transfer “dominates” the others. Sahn and Younger (1999) 
introduced the extended Gini test that the researchers can use when they face inconclusive 
results from the welfare dominance analysis. The test basically requires comparing the S+
Gini or the extended Gini coefficient for the welfare indicator chosen and the extended 
concentration coefficient for the transfers for a wide range of inequality aversion parameters 
(from 1.01 to 4 in steps of 0.5). We apply the same procedure with a slightly different 
interpretation. It has been noted that the difference between the Gini coefficient and 
concentration coefficient for a benefit gives us TR+progressivity index. So we directly give 
                                                           
6 The redistribution index can be calculated from the difference between Reynolds+Smolensky and 
Atkinson Plotnick indices too. 
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S+Gini Indices of TR progressivity for the whole range of inequality aversion parameter, 
which will indicate if the difference between the Lorenz curve and the concentration curve 
for a benefit is statistically different from zero. When TR progressivity is positive for a 
benefit for the whole range of the parameter, it signifies that the concentration curve 
dominates the Lorenz curve, so the benefit is progressive. Additionally, we give the extended 
Gini coefficient for per adult household expenditure and coefficients of concentration of the 
benefits for different inequality weights, to test if the benefits dominate the 45+degree line. If 
we can reject the null hypothesis of the estimated negative coefficient being zero, we call the 
benefit pro+poor.  
To sum up, S+Gini indices of TR progressivity will provide the extended Ginis test 
in the sense of Sahn and Younger (1999), and provide us with summary statistics directly 
related to the welfare dominance analysis over a range of inequality aversion parameters. 
Meanwhile, S+Gini indices of IR progressivity and redistribution will show if the transfers 
improve inequality for the whole distribution.  
Tables from Table A 3.10  to Table A 3.12 and figures from Figure A 3.7 to Figure 
A 3.9 in Appendix 3 provide S+Gini indices of TR and IR progressivity and redistribution 
and show us how the ranking of the benefits varies with values of ρ. We summarise the 
information in Table 3.15. With the per adult equivalent benefit method, we are still not able 
to reach an ambiguous result on the per capita progressivity of secondary level services, as 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of extended coefficients of concentration (for the values 
of ρ from 2.5 to 4) being zero for the whole range  of ρ (Table A 3.13); the estimated 
coefficients are negative, indicating that the benefit dominates 45+degree line. We have 
found with the welfare dominance method that the concentration curve for higher education 
benefits crosses the Lorenz curve. However, the extended+Gini test does not support this as 
TR progressivity rates for 2.5+4 of ρ are not statistically robust, which can be checked by 
asymptotic standard errors provided in Table A 3.10. Thus, although we cannot confirm the 
result of the crossing of curves we have found with Howes’ test, we cannot say higher 
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education services are progressive either, since we cannot reject the null hypothesis for all 
values of ρ. This may suggest that higher education may only be progressive if we put more 
weight on the middle and the upper parts of the distribution. In other words, if we had a 
social welfare function which gives more preference to the middle and higher income 
classes, we may draw a conclusion that higher education is progressive.  
By using S+Gini indices of IR and redistribution for different values of ρ, we can 
confirm that primary and secondary education and the total education benefits are 
progressive and reduce inequality for the whole range of inequality aversion parameters. If 
we check the figures, the inequality reducing impact of the benefits increase with ρ for 
primary education, implying pro+poor characteristic; the indices for secondary level 
education jumps after the value 1.5, but stays almost at the same rate after 2.5, and takes an 
even smaller value once ρ is 4; conversely higher education services increase inequality 
except at ρ= 1.01, which gives more weight to the rich. However, even if the estimated 
indices are statistically significant, their values are very close to zero. This is not surprising 
as we have found with the welfare dominance analysis that the difference between the 
ordinates (up to 0.6) of the Lorenz curve and the concentration curve for higher education 
benefits is zero (Table A 3.9). The total education benefits have increasing redistributive 
impacts as we move to higher ρ values.  
Table 3.15: The Extended?Ginis Test Results 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve and the 45?Degree Line         
  Primary Education Secondary  Education Higher   Education 
ρ 1 2 1 2 1 2 
1.01 + + + + + ? 
1.5 + + + + + ? 
2 + + + + + ? 
2.5 + + + nd* (+) nd (+) + 
3 + + + nd (+) nd (+) + 
3.5 + + + nd (+) nd (+) + 
4 + + + nd (+) nd (+) + 
otes: Based on Table A 3.10 and Table A 3.13 
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3.4.4 Regional Level Analysis 
It has been emphasized by several empirical studies on Turkey that regional 
disparities are an important component of income inequality and poverty (World Bank, 
2003, 2005; Başlevent and Dayıoğlu, 2005). Earlier studies showed that living in certain 
areas affects considerably the possibility of being poor. The survey design allows for 
regional level analysis based on Turkey’s seven geographical regions: Marmara, Aegean, 
Mediterranean, Central Anatolia, Black Sea, East Anatolia, and South East Anatolia; 
Turkey’s biggest city, Istanbul, is examined separately.  
Before turning to examine the distribution of benefits across geographical regions, it 
is worth investigating the contributions of regions to overall inequality in Turkey. Table 3.16 
provides the decomposition of Gini inequality coefficient into regions. The table has 
information on the population and expenditure share of regions and their absolute and 
relative contribution to inequality. Absolute contribution is calculated by multiplying the 
estimated Gini coefficient for a subgroup with population and expenditure share of the 
subgroup; and relative contribution is obtained by dividing the absolute contribution of a 
subgroup by the overall Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient for the country is 0.40. The 
Gini coefficient of all regions with the exception of Istanbul is smaller than the country’s 
Gini coefficient, as expected since regional (horizontal) inequality contributes to the national 
Gini. Istanbul, with the highest population expenditure share, has the highest contribution to 
inequality, followed by Central Anatolia, Aegean, Marmara, Mediterranean, Black Sea, East 
Anatolia and S. East Anatolia. East and S. East Anatolia are the poorest regions with the 
smallest population and expenditure share, yet they have high inequality rates.  
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Table 3.16: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini 
Population 
Share 
Expenditure 
Share 
Absolute 
Contribution 
Relative 
Contribution 
Total Expenditure 0.400         
Istanbul 0.423 0.171 0.276 0.020 0.050 
Marmara 0.327 0.138 0.134 0.006 0.015 
Aegean  0.365 0.153 0.143 0.008 0.020 
Black Sea  0.337 0.110 0.084 0.003 0.008 
Central Anatolia  0.381 0.158 0.156 0.009 0.024 
Mediterranean  0.375 0.134 0.120 0.006 0.015 
East Anatolia  0.369 0.069 0.048 0.001 0.003 
S. East Anatolia 0.363 0.067 0.040 0.001 0.002 
WithinGroup     0.055 0.137 
BetweenGroup     0.149 0.372 
Overlap        0.197 0.492 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure  
Decomposition Approach: Analytical  
 
Figure A 3.9, 10 and 11 give also some useful descriptive statistics at the regional 
level. According to Table 3.17 and Figure A 3.10, only Istanbul’s mean expenditure/income 
is higher than the country’s mean expenditure/income, whereas Central Anatolia (housing 
the capital) and Marmara’s mean incomes/expenditures are almost equal to Turkey’s 
averages. The poorest regions, South East and East Anatolia are characterized with the 
highest household size too, whereas richer regions (such as Istanbul, Marmara and Aegean) 
have household sizes under the country average. Figure A 3.11 shows that urban living 
standards are higher than that of rural areas. 
Table 3.17: Descriptive Statistics by region, (Mean Values) 
Regions Income* Expenditure** 
Household 
Size 
Primary 
Ed. Stud. 
Secondary 
Ed. Stud. 
Higher 
Ed. Stud. 
Turkey  237 195 4.13 0.64 0.18 0.09 
Istanbul  386 315 3.73 0.52 0.18 0.13 
Marmara 228 189 3.79 0.49 0.19 0.07 
Aegean  226 183 3.59 0.49 0.16 0.07 
Black Sea  183 149 4.3 0.64 0.19 0.06 
Central Anatolia  230 193 4.05 0.62 0.19 0.11 
Mediterranean  219 175 4.01 0.64 0.18 0.07 
East Anatolia  161 138 5.41 1.04 0.26 0.08 
S. East Anatolia 118 116 5.93 1.27 0.16 0.06 
* Million TL:per adult equivalent monthly income; ** Million TL:per adult equivalent monthly expenditure 
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Table 3.18 compares the needs for public schools in each region and per adult 
equivalent benefits received by them; similarly Table 3.19 compares benefits with student 
numbers by region. Regions are in ascending order according to their per adult equivalent 
expenditure share. It is worth noting that the smallest share is received by the poorest region 
and the benefits increase with regions’ expenditure level. According to Table 3.18, the 
highest share of benefits goes to Central Anatolia for all levels of education, whereas the 
smallest share goes to the poorest region, S. East Anatolia. However, if we do not compare 
benefits with either student numbers or potential users of the schools (eligible age group for 
each level of education), the distribution of benefits across regions would give rather little 
information. Therefore, the comparison between needs and benefits tells us that Istanbul, 
East and South East Anatolia and Black Sea do not receive enough public transfers to meet 
their educational needs for primary education. Although Istanbul is the richest city in 
Turkey, because of its immigration problem it has difficulty providing public services, 
particularly in poor slum areas of the city. The poorest regions of Turkey have the biggest 
negative gap between benefits and needs for primary education, S. East Anatolia can only 
cover half of its needs, whereas E. Anatolia covers 22% of its needs for primary schools. 
For secondary education, Istanbul, East and South Anatolia are not able to cover 
their needs. Additionally, South East Anatolia seems to be the most unfortunate region for all 
education levels. If we look at the table closely, we see that when we exclude children 
without primary (secondary) degrees from the corresponding age group, the need increases 
for the regions such as Istanbul, Marmara, Central Anatolia, and Mediterranean which have 
higher enrollments rates for secondary and higher education. On the other hand, for the poor 
regions, S. East Anatolia and East Anatolia, the needs for secondary and higher education 
levels decrease as it seems the children in those regions have less opportunity to continue 
their education after primary level, as we noted in Section 3. Therefore, by focusing on the 
eligible age group for secondary education, the negative gap between benefits and needs 
becomes bigger for Istanbul and the positive gap for Marmara, C. Anatolia and 
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Mediterranean gets smaller as a result of the increase in needs. Although for the two poorest 
regions the negative gap becomes smaller, they still are not able to cover their needs, 
suggesting that the public education benefits do not target the poor effectively. 
As for higher education, regions housing big public universities, such as Istanbul, 
Marmara, Central Anatolia and Aegean seem to receive the most benefit. The universities in 
these regions demand high scores from the central university entrance exam, which are hard 
to achieve if a student has not graduated from a high quality high school and has not attended 
an expensive private preparation course. These regions are also able to cover their needs, in 
contrast to Black Sea, Mediterranean, S. East and East Anatolia. By considering only the 
eligible age group, the needs for higher education increases for the regions with high 
secondary level graduates (Istanbul, Marmara, C. Anatolia and Mediterranean).  As a result 
of this, while the positive gap for Istanbul becomes negative, the negative gap for 
Mediterranean becomes bigger. For the poorest regions, even if the negative gap gets 
smaller, they do not receive enough benefits to cover their needs.  
Table 3.18: Education *eeds and Shares of Benefits, Turkey, 2003  
Regions Primary Ed. Benefits Secondary  Ed. Benefits Higher Ed. Benefits 
S. East Anatolia 7.4 7.3 3.5 
East Anatolia  9 9.1 8.2 
Black Sea  13.3 13.7 5.8 
Mediterranean  13.7 13.6 9 
Marmara 14.2 14 15.4 
Aegean  14.2 14.4 15.2 
Central Anatolia  17.6 17.6 26.3 
Istanbul 10.4 10.3 16.4 
Regions 
*umber of Primary 
Age Children 
*umber of Secondary Age 
People 
*umber of Higher Edu. Age 
People 
S. East Anatolia 14.35 12 (7.95) 10.6 (5.57) 
East Anatolia  11.54 10.5 (10.21) 10.3 (8.26) 
Black Sea  10.67 11.1 (11.71) 11.8 (10.75) 
Mediterranean  13.05 13 (13.34) 12.6 (13.89) 
Marmara 10.41 11.91 (12.70) 11.6 (13.02) 
Aegean  11.51 11.9 (12.70) 11.27 (10.67) 
Central Anatolia  14.86 15.7 (16.62) 16.9 (19.41) 
Istanbul 13.61 13.80 (14.77) 14.89 (18.43) 
ote: The numbers in bracket show the percentage of secondary (higher education) age people who had primary 
(secondary) level diploma in each quintile. 
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Table 3.19: Education *eeds and Shares of Benefits, Turkey, 2003  
Regions Primary Ed. Benefits Secondary Ed. Benefits Higher Ed. Benefits 
S. East Anatolia 7.4 7.3 3.5 
East Anatolia  9 9.1 8.2 
Black Sea  13.3 13.7 5.8 
Mediterranean  13.7 13.6 9 
Marmara 14.2 14 15.4 
Aegean  14.2 14.4 15.2 
Central Anatolia  17.6 17.6 26.3 
Istanbul 10.4 10.3 16.4 
 *umber of Prim. Educ. *umber of Secon. Educ. *umber of Higher Educ. 
  Student  Student  Student 
S. East Anatolia 13.33 5.7 4.81 
East Anatolia  11.13 9.63 6.68 
Black Sea  10.91 11.23 7.98 
Mediterranean  13.27 13.24 11.01 
Marmara 10.63 14.2 11.17 
Aegean  11.59 12.97 12.59 
Central Anatolia  15.3 16.44 20.88 
Istanbul 13.85 16.59 24.88 
 
However, we need to be careful with the regional analysis for higher education 
services, as universities are concentrated in richer regions, which produce a bias toward the 
richer regions as one would expect. 
In order to see if the public education services decrease the inequalities in each 
region and across regions, we decompose the Gini coefficient for after benefits household 
expenditure by regions. The tables7 for the decomposition analysis are reported in Appendix 
3.1. Table 3.20 also gives the redistribution index which estimates the difference between 
Gini coefficients of before and after benefits household expenditures, and summary 
information from the decomposition analysis for each public service. Both primary and 
secondary education benefits decreases expenditure inequality in the regions. The biggest 
inequality reduction after primary education benefits (secondary education) occurs in East 
Anatolia followed by South East Anatolia, Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Mediterranean, 
Aegean and Marmara (Central Anatolia, Mediterranean, Marmara, Black Sea, Aegean and 
                                                           
7 Table A 3.14, Table A 3.15 and Table A 3.16. 
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Istanbul), whereas the smallest inequality reduction happens in Istanbul (S. East Anatolia)8. 
This also supports the pro+poor character of public primary education services. The 
comparison of Table 3.16 with Table A 3.14 and Table A 3.15 show that both primary and 
secondary education decrease both within and between group inequalities, but apparently the 
impact of primary education is bigger than secondary education which is in line with the 
previous results on the progressive power of benefits. Higher education either increases 
inequality in the regions or it has no impact (Istanbul). The biggest inequality increasing 
impact is seen in Central Anatolia followed by East Anatolia, S. East Anatolia, Aegean, 
Black Sea, Marmara and Mediterranean. It is interesting seeing that the public higher 
education services increase within group inequalities which we have seen with the 
redistribution index, yet it decreases between group inequalities. We believe that the source 
of this result arises from East Anatolia, the second poorest region in Turkey. New 
universities were opened in East Anatolia in the last 10 years to provide higher education 
services for the eastern part of the country.  
We finally want to assess the direction of redistribution across regions with the help 
of a descriptive table. Table 3.21 presents the distribution of household expenditures before 
and after education benefits by education level and regions. Columns 3, 5 and 7 give the 
difference between post+transfer and pre+transfer expenditures for primary, secondary and 
higher education respectively. The negative difference means that after transfers the 
expenditure share of the region gets smaller. In other words, redistribution takes place from 
the regions with negative difference to the regions with positive difference. East and South 
East Anatolia have the lowest share of per adult equivalent expenditure, 4.83% and 3.97% 
respectively. Public education services seem to help mitigate inequality among regions. After 
per adult equivalent primary (secondary) education benefits, Black Sea, East Anatolia and 
South East Anatolia receive the largest shares from redistribution 0.17% (0.1%), 0.15% 
                                                           
8 The difference between Gini coefficients for before and after secondary education benefits 
expenditure is not statistically different from zero. So secondary education does not change inequality 
in South East Anatolia. 
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(0.08%) and 0.15% (0.07%) (Column 3 and 5) respectively. Istanbul is the only region 
(province), whose expenditure share shrinks after primary and secondary education benefits. 
After higher education services, the biggest share (0.26%) (Column 7) of redistribution goes 
to Central Anatolia, which includes the capital of Turkey, Ankara. Three of the biggest 
public universities and five private universities are in Ankara. After higher education 
transfers, redistribution takes place from Istanbul, Black Sea, Mediterranean and South East 
Anatolia to other regions. While primary and secondary education redistributes expenditures 
to the poorer regions, so help mitigating inequality, higher education seems not to be pro+
poor regionally either. Redistribution rates for rural+urban breakdown suggest that primary 
education is more helpful to fight against inequality in rural areas than urban areas with a 
higher redistribution rate. This also supports the finding regarding pro+poor feature of public 
primary education services.  However, secondary education has a higher redistributive 
impact in urban areas and higher education’s disequalising impact is higher for rural areas as 
expected. 
Table 3.20: Redistribution Index by regions 
 Primary Secondary Higher 
Istanbul  0.0096 0.0035 0.0007 
 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 
Marmara 0.0132 0.0056 +0.0033 
 0.0008 0.0006 0.0009 
Aegean  0.017 0.0049 +0.0048 
 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 
Black Sea  0.0231 0.0055 +0.0034 
 0.0012 0.001 0.0008 
Central Anatolia  0.0204 0.0072 +0.0084 
 0.0008 0.0006 0.001 
Mediterranean  0.0174 0.0059 ?0.0012 
 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 
East Anatolia  0.0306 0.0087 +0.0077 
 0.0017 0.0013 0.0018 
S. East Anatolia 0.0282 0.0023 +0.0057 
 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 
Turkey 0.0191 0.0068 +0.0026 
 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
Urban 0.0161 0.0072 +0.0014 
 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 
Rural 0.0230 0.0052 +0.0032 
 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006 
ote:Values are the differences of Gini indices of expenditure distributions before&after education benefits.  
Asymptotic standard errors estimated by DAD are in italic . 
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Table 3.21: Redistributive Impacts of Education, by Region 
Regions 
1  
AE_EXP 
2  
Exp. 
After 
Prim. Ed. 
3 
(2?1) 
4  
Exp. After 
Secon. Ed. 
5 
 (4?1) 
6  
Exp. After  
High Ed. 
7  
(6?1) 
S.East Anatolia 3.97 4.12 0.15 4.04 0.07 3.97 0.01 
East Anatolia  4.83 4.98 0.15 4.91 0.08 4.92 0.09 
Black Sea  8.37 8.54 0.17 8.48 0.1 8.32 0.05 
Mediterranean  11.98 12.04 0.06 12.01 0.03 11.9 0.08 
Marmara 13.36 13.4 0.04 13.36 0.01 13.39 0.04 
Aegean  14.24 14.25 0.01 14.26 0.02 14.29 0.04 
Central 
Anatolia  15.65 15.69 0.05 15.67 0.02 15.9 0.25 
Istanbul  27.6 26.97 0.62 27.26 0.34 27.32 0.28 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the redistributive impacts of publicly 
provided primary, secondary and higher education services (university and non+university) in 
Turkey for 2003. Enrolment rates show that there are inequalities in accessing public 
education services regarding the factor of welfare level, gender and regions. These 
inequalities are important particularly for secondary and higher education.  
We found that only primary education is pro+poor (benefits are absolutely more 
concentrated in the poor) according to the welfare dominance analysis and the extended Gini 
test procedure. However, the concentration curve for higher education services crosses the 
Lorenz curve, thus the progressivity result is ambiguous. In order to overcome this 
ambiguity, we estimated progressivity indices and applied the extended Gini test. The 
extended Gini test showed that higher education spending is progressive if higher ethical 
weight is attached to the upper income deciles. Therefore, under a social welfare function 
which puts more weight on the poor, we may conclude that higher education benefits are 
regressive.  
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By comparing Gini coefficients (ρ=2) for before and after education benefits 
expenditure, we can attain the redistributive power of public education services. Primary, 
secondary and total education benefits cause 1.9, 0.7 and 2.2 percent inequality reduction 
respectively, whereas higher education increases inequality by 0.3 percent. The magnitude of 
redistributive impacts is highest for primary education.  
Another observation is that for secondary and higher education, the middle classes 
have more chance to reach public education services. It seems that the poor struggle to send 
their children to school after 8+years compulsory primary education. This is more the case 
for girls than for boys.  
Regional analysis has also been conducted. According to the results of regional 
analysis, the poorer regions, South East and East Anatolia receive the least share of the 
benefits. In addition to these poor regions, Istanbul is also having difficulty covering the 
educational needs of its huge population. The inequality decomposition analysis shows that 
both the primary and secondary education services decrease both within regions and between 
regions inequalities, however, whilst the higher education services increase within region 
inequalities it decreases between regions inequalities. The reason for this finding may be that 
new universities have been opened in East Anatolia, the second poorest regions, in the last 
10 years. 
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Appendix 3 
Appendix 3.1: Tables 
Table A 3.1: Income Shares by Education Level (as % of total income earned) 
  Illiterate 
 Literate but 
*o Diploma 
Primary 
School 
Secondary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
1987 9.06 6.87 47.16 7.69 10.24 15.02 
1994 5.99 4.81 45.82 8.8 14.81 17.02 
2002 2.91 3.59 42.89 9.59 13.15 18.25 
2003 2.58 3.09 38.92 10.59 16.57 19.56 
2004 2.75 2.75 39.66 9.89 16 20.77 
2005 2.82 2.87 42.42 10.13 15.46 17.76 
Source: Duman (2008: 374)     
 
Table A 3.2: The *umber of Students and Schools by provider in 2003?2004 Academic Year 
  Primary Secondary 
  Student % School % Student % School % 
Public 98.42 98.3 97.35 90.88 
Private 1.58 1.7 2.65 9.12 
Source: MOE 
 
Table A 3.3: Monthly Household per AE Expenditure on Education by region (% of total) 
Expenditure and Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Rural Urban 
Primary Education 44.5 9.3 10.5 6.8 10.8 16.3 0.7 1.1 8.7 91.3 
Secondary Education 44.9 11.8 9.1 7.4 16.1 8.7 1.4 0.7 10.0 90.0 
University Education 66.3 8.7 5.5 2.8 10.3 3.1 2.5 0.8 13.7 86.3 
*on?University Higher 
education 14.8 11.1 12.6 17.2 18.5 15.5 5.9 4.3 19.7 80.3 
Higher education* 42.2 9.8 8.8 9.6 14.2 8.9 4.1 2.4 16.5 83.5 
Education Materials 25.5 11.8 12.1 9.3 16.0 14.8 5.1 5.4 25.3 74.7 
Pre?School Education 1.8 34.8 23.2 2.8 1.1 32.7 3.6 0.0 6.4 93.6 
Other Education 54.8 6.0 12.2 1.6 17.6 5.3 1.9 0.5 6.1 93.9 
Total Household 
Expenditure 42.2 10.1 9.7 8.3 14.2 10.3 3.1 2.1 14.3 85.7 
*University+on:University Higher Education  
 1:Istanbul, 2:Marmara, 3:Aegean, 4:Black Sea, 5:Central Anatolia, 6:Mediterrenaen, 7:East Anatolia, 8:S. East 
Anatolia 
 
 
Table A 3.4:The *umber of Public School Students by 
Education Level and Regions 
  Primary Secondary Higher 
Istanbul 13.32 15.97 24.33 
Marmara 10.66 14.33 11.50 
Aegean 11.61 13.01 12.55 
Black Sea 11.00 11.41 8.26 
Central Anatolia 15.33 16.48 20.41 
Mediterranean 13.31 13.17 11.17 
East Anatolia 11.27 9.82 6.79 
South East Anatolia 13.49 5.81 4.99 
Turkey 100 100 100 
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Table A 3.5: Average Years of Schooling 
Years  Turkey Developing Countries Developed Countries 
1960s 2.1 2.05 7.06 
1970s 2.71 2.67 7.56 
1980s 3.5 3.57 8.86 
1990s 4.7 4.5 9.41 
2000s 5.29 5.13 9.76 
Source: Duman (2008: 376)  
 
 
Table A 3.6: The number of students as a percentage of total by deciles and level of education 
Deciles Primary Secondary Primary and Secondary Higher Education 
1 17.70 8.77 15.71 2.04 
2 14.70 10.97 13.86 3.34 
3 12.36 10.06 11.85 3.89 
4 10.26 10.69 10.36 6.72 
5 9.78 9.94 9.82 8.65 
6 8.65 10.18 8.99 9.18 
7 8.03 10.62 8.61 12.31 
8 7.32 10.80 8.10 13.09 
9 5.87 9.60 6.70 17.44 
10 5.33 8.37 6.01 23.33 
Turkey 100 100 100 100 
otes: Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure  
 
Table A 3.7: The *umber of School Age Individuals as a percentage of total by deciles and level 
of education  
Deciles 
Primary 
Age 
Group 
Secondary 
Age Group 
Secondary Age 
Group with 
Primary 
Degree 
Higher 
Education 
Age Group 
Higher Education Age 
Group with Secondary 
Degree 
1 19.00 15.49 12.98 11.50 4.37 
2 14.85 13.41 12.83 11.01 7.35 
3 12.32 11.90 11.46 10.30 7.98 
4 9.98 10.77 10.93 11.41 10.28 
5 9.52 9.68 9.93 9.72 9.49 
6 8.48 9.25 9.64 10.43 11.52 
7 7.99 8.49 9.22 9.95 11.64 
8 7.08 8.40 8.97 9.66 12.89 
9 5.67 7.03 7.75 8.78 12.73 
10 5.10 5.59 6.29 7.23 11.76 
Turkey 100 100 100 100 100 
otes: Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure  
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Table A 3.8:Percentage Shares of *umber of Teachers and Students, by Region, 2003 
 Primary Education (%) Secondary Education (%) 
 
1 
*umber of 
Students 
2 
*umber of 
Students 
(1?2) 
3 
*umber of 
Students 
4 
*umber of 
Teachers 
(3?4) 
Istanbul 15.92 11.92 ?4 16.91 11.64 ?5.27 
Marmara 11.42 12.56 1.14 14.42 15.19 0.77 
Aegean 11.39 13.65 2.26 13.19 14.72 1.53 
Black Sea 10.03 12.27 2.23 11.13 12.85 1.72 
East Anatolia 10.3 9.86 ?0.43 6.81 6.54 ?0.27 
Central Anatolia 14.51 16.1 1.59 16.68 18.26 1.58 
Mediterranean 13.09 13.64 0.55 13.58 15.44 1.86 
South East 
Anatolia 
13.34 9.99 ?3.34 7.29 5.38 ?1.91 
Source: MOE       
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Table A 3.9: The differences of ordinates of the Lorenz curve and Concentration Curves  
Ordinates (p) 
Primary 
Education 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education 
Total Benefits 
0.05 +0.071 +0.035 0.000 +0.042 
 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.1 +0.132 +0.070 0.002 +0.078 
 0.014 0.014 0.004 0.003 
0.15 +0.183 +0.106 0.007 +0.109 
 0.020 0.016 0.006 0.004 
0.2 +0.238 +0.148 0.012 +0.144 
 0.028 0.011 0.008 0.004 
0.25 +0.283 +0.186 0.018 +0.173 
 0.038 0.015 0.009 0.005 
0.3 +0.316 +0.208 0.027 +0.191 
 0.046 0.020 0.010 0.005 
0.35 +0.344 +0.236 0.024 +0.212 
 0.050 0.024 0.011 0.005 
0.4 +0.365 +0.263 0.026 +0.228 
 0.052 0.029 0.013 0.005 
0.45 +0.388 +0.278 0.013 +0.245 
 0.053 0.033 0.014 0.005 
0.5 +0.404 +0.297 ?0.005 +0.263 
 0.054 0.037 0.014 0.005 
0.55 +0.411 +0.314 ?0.006 +0.271 
 0.058 0.042 0.015 0.005 
0.6 +0.418 +0.318 +0.039 +0.285 
 0.060 0.049 0.015 0.005 
0.65 +0.413 +0.335 +0.065 +0.294 
 0.063 0.051 0.015 0.005 
0.7 +0.407 +0.336 +0.066 +0.292 
 0.064 0.054 0.015 0.005 
0.75 +0.392 +0.342 +0.083 +0.291 
 0.067 0.059 0.015 0.005 
0.8 +0.376 +0.335 +0.087 +0.283 
 0.068 0.063 0.015 0.005 
0.85 +0.340 +0.312 +0.096 +0.263 
 0.069 0.066 0.014 0.005 
0.9 +0.293 +0.277 +0.128 +0.242 
 0.066 0.061 0.012 0.004 
0.95 +0.217 +0.204 +0.135 +0.190 
 0.037 0.036 0.009 0.003 
0.99 +0.089 +0.089 +0.077 +0.085 
  0.011 0.010 0.001 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% 
significance level  
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Table A 3.10: S?Gini Indices of TR?Progressivity for Education Benefits  
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Primary Secondary Higher Total 
1.01 0.0123 0.0105 0.0041 0.0094 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 
1.5 0.3881 0.3050 0.0633 0.2717 
 0.0051 0.0071 0.0107 0.0055 
2 0.5768 0.4258 0.0432 0.3820 
 0.0073 0.0111 0.0143 0.0075 
2.5 0.6969 0.4901 0.0186 0.4457 
 0.0090 0.0142 0.0163 0.0088 
3 0.7831 0.5301 ?0.0019 0.4890 
 0.0106 0.0169 0.0176 0.0099 
3.5 0.8493 0.5572 ?0.0180 0.5213 
 0.0120 0.0192 0.0188 0.0109 
4 0.9023 0.5766 ?0.0306 0.5466 
 0.0133 0.0214 0.0198 0.0118 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% 
significance level 
 
 
 
 
Table A 3.11: S?Gini Indices of IR?Progressivity for Education Benefits  
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Primary Secondary Higher Total 
1.01 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1.5 0.0141 0.0061 0.0015 0.0207 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 
2 0.0210 0.0085 0.0010 0.0291 
 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 
2.5 0.0254 0.0098 0.0004 0.0340 
 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 
3 0.0285 0.0106 ?0.0001 0.0373 
 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 
3.5 0.0309 0.0111 ?0.0004 0.0397 
 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0008 
4 0.0328 0.0115 ?0.0007 0.0417 
 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 
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Table A 3.12: S?Gini Indices of Redistribution  
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Primary Secondary Higher Total 
1.01 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.013 0.005 +0.001 0.017 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.019 0.007 +0.003 0.022 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2.5 0.023 0.007 +0.004 0.025 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3 0.025 0.008 +0.005 0.027 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3.5 0.026 0.008 +0.005 0.028 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
4 0.028 0.007 +0.005 0.029 
  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Redistribution is measured by the difference between Lorenz curves for pre: and post:benefit household 
expenditure 
 
 
Table A 3.13: Extended Coefficients of Gini and Concentration for Household 
Expenditure and Benefits  
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
AE_EXP 
Primary 
Education 
Secondary  
Education 
Higher  
Education 
1.01 0.010 +0.003 +0.0009318 0.005 
 0.000 0.000 0.0001568 0.000 
1.5 0.282 +0.106 +0.0232892 0.218 
 0.004 0.003 0.0060889 0.010 
2 0.400 +0.177 +0.0255205 0.357 
 0.004 0.006 0.0102513 0.014 
2.5 0.468 +0.228 ?0.0215688 0.450 
 0.004 0.008 0.0135539 0.016 
3 0.514 +0.269 ?0.0156884 0.516 
 0.004 0.010 0.0163410 0.017 
3.5 0.548 +0.301 ?0.0092596 0.566 
 0.004 0.011 0.0187836 0.019 
4 0.574 +0.328 ?0.0027527 0.604 
 0.004 0.012 0.0209858 0.020 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors computed with DAD in italic 
The null hypothesis of the index not being zero could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% 
significance level 
egative concentration coefficients indicate that the benefit dominates 45:degree line if the estimation 
is statistically robust. 
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Table A 3.14: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure After Primary Education Benefits* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini 
Population 
Share 
Expenditure 
Share 
Absolute 
Contribution 
Relative 
Contributio
n 
Total 
Expenditure 0.381     
Istanbul 0.41 0.17 0.27 0.02 0.05 
Marmara 0.31 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Aegean  0.35 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.02 
Black Sea  0.31 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.01 
Central Anatolia  0.36 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.02 
Mediterranean  0.36 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.02 
East Anatolia  0.34 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
S. East Anatolia 0.33 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 
WithinGroup     0.052 0.137 
BetweenGroup     0.140 0.368 
Overlap        0.189 0.495 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure plus per AE primary education 
benefits 
Decomposition Approach: Analytical 
 
 
 
 
Table A 3.15: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure After Secondary Education Benefits* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini 
Population 
Share 
Expenditure 
Share 
Absolute 
Contribution 
Relative 
Contribution 
Total 
Expenditure 0.393     
Istanbul 0.420 0.17 0.27 0.02 0.05 
Marmara 0.322 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Aegean  0.360 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.02 
Black Sea  0.332 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.01 
Central Anatolia  0.374 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.02 
Mediterranean  0.369 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.02 
East Anatolia  0.360 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
S. East Anatolia 0.361 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 
WithinGroup     0.054 0.137 
BetweenGroup     0.144 0.366 
Overlap        0.195 0.497 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure plus per AE secondary education 
benefits 
Decomposition Approach: Analytical 
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Table A 3.16: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure After Higher Education Benefits* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini  
Population 
Share  
Expenditure 
Share  
Absolute 
Contribution  
Relative 
Cont.  
Total Expenditure 0.403     
Istanbul 0.423 0.17 0.27 0.02 0.05 
Marmara 0.331 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Aegean  0.370 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.02 
Black Sea  0.341 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.01 
Central Anatolia  0.389 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.02 
Mediterranean  0.376 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.01 
East Anatolia  0.376 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
S. East Anatolia 0.369 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 
WithinGroup     0.055 0.137 
BetweenGroup     0.148 0.367 
Overlap        0.200 0.496 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure plus per AE secondary education 
benefits 
Decomposition Approach: Analytical 
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Appendix 3.2: Figures 
Figure A 3.1: 
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Figure A 3.2: 
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Figure A 3.3: 
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Figure A 3.4:  
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Figure A 3.5: 
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Figure A 3.6: 
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Figure A 3.7: 
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Figure A 3.8:  
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Figure A 3.9:  
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Figure A 3.10: 
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Figure A 3.11: 
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Figure A 3.12 
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Figure A 3.13 
 
 
Percentage Share of Benefits in Household Expenditure, by regions (Per AE)
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CHAPTER 4:  BE*EFIT I*CIDE*CE A*ALYSIS O* PUBLIC 
SERVICES FOR HEALTH, I*FRASTRUCTURE A*D SOCIAL 
TRA*SFERS 
4.1 Introduction 
As with education, health and infrastructure services and social transfers have been 
considered by researchers as effective tools to improve welfare and capabilities of the poor. The 
justification for pro+poor health spending is based on both the common perception of health as a 
basic human right and its “instrumental value in raising the health of the population and so the 
productivity of the labour force, and consequently, economic growth” (O’Donnell et. al., 2008: 
165). Infrastructure services are expected to have a positive impact on growth, income 
distribution and health status (through facilities such as sewerage, clean water and electricity).  
They increase the opportunities of the population to access the other services such as education 
and health (through facilities such as roads) (Calderón and Servé, 2004; Leipziger et al., 2003).  
Social transfers are seen as a direct way of fighting poverty and inequalities by reaching the 
people in need and providing income maintenance or insurance system, which may redistribute 
incomes across the lifecycle.  
The empirical studies on the benefit incidence of these three services have been done for 
developing countries1. Pinar (2004) investigated the incidence of these services for 1994 and 
2002. He found that these services are progressive but middle income classes seem to benefit 
more than the poor.  
                                                           
1 See Davoodi et. al. (2003), Lanjouw et. Al. (2002), O’Donnell et. al. (2008), Pinar (2004), Van de Walle 
(1995), Heady et. Al. (2001) and Whiteford (2008) for the benefit incidence analysis on health and 
infrastructure services and social transfers among others. 
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This chapter analyses the incidence of the public spending on these services, stated 
above, following the analysis of education in the previous chapter. In this case the data are 
limited. In particular, the HICES 2003 does not provide information on the usage of these 
services except for public cash and in+kind transfers. In order to assess the distributional impacts 
of health and infrastructure services, we create proxy measures to allocate the public spending 
on these services to the users of the services.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The second section summarizes the general 
setting of the social services, namely health, infrastructure and social transfers. The third section 
gives the results. The fourth section has the conclusions.   
4.2 The General System of Public Health, Infrastructure Services and Social 
Transfers 
In this section our aim is to give the broad characteristics of the services to provide a 
background for the potential distributive impacts these services can produce. The first subsection 
explains the public health system, the second one is public infrastructure services, and the final 
subsection explains public cash transfers. 
4.2.1 Health System in Turkey 
Turkey has a complex structure for financing and providing health care facilities (see 
Table A 4.1). The Ministry of Health (MoH) is the main government body responsible for health 
sector policy making, implementation of the national health strategies and the largest health 
services provider. Turkey does not have universal coverage for health services; only people who 
are covered by a social security organisation2 can access public health services freely. The Green 
                                                           
2 Turkey has three social security organisations that provide health insurance to their members and 
dependants of the members: the Social Insurance Agency of Merchants, Artisans and the Self+employed, 
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Card was introduced in 1992 as a mechanism to ensure targeted delivery of health services to the 
poor who have little or no capacity to pay for health services. This card enables people who are 
not covered by any social security organisation to access public health services without paying 
any fee or social security contribution if they can prove that they earn less than 1/3 of minimum 
wage. The Green Card program is seen as a transitional solution until a general health insurance 
system is introduced. There are a number of obstacles for Green Card holders to access the 
services and there are concerns about the quality of services they utilise.  
Health services in Turkey are provided mainly by the MoH, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security (through hospitals of SSK)3, universities (through university hospitals), the 
Ministry of Defence (through hospitals for military workers), private hospitals (including 
minority hospitals). MoH is the major provider of primary and secondary health care, maternal 
health services, children’s and family planning services. It is essentially the only provider of 
preventive health services through an extensive network of health facilities (health centres and 
health posts) providing primary, secondary, and specialized in+patient and out+patient services. 
The public sector accounts for ninety two percent of hospital capacity in Turkey. MoH, SSK and 
the universities are the major public providers of in+patient hospital care. MoH hospitals account 
for about forty six percent of all hospital beds, SSK accounts for eighteen percent, while 
university hospitals account for about sixteen percent. A number of authorized private hospitals 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(Turkish acronym, Bag+Kur), the Social Insurance Organisation, (turkish acronym of Sosyal Sigortalar 
Kurumu, SSK), and the Government Employees Retirement Fund (turkish acronym of Emekli Sandigi, 
ES). Bag+Kur covers merchants, artisans and other self employed persons. ES covers active civil servants 
working according to Personnel Law No. 657 and their dependants and retired civil servants and their 
dependants. SSK is for private sector employees and blue collar public sector employees and their 
dependants. While Bag+Kur and ES function only as an insurer, SSK functions both as an insurer and as a 
health care provider. Members of these institutions pay payroll taxes to benefit the services (both health 
insurance and pensions). Membership status for these social security institutions by deciles are reported in 
Table A 4.2 in Appendix 4.1.  
3 With the reform program on health system in 2007, hospitals of SSK have been integrated with public 
hospitals that are run by MoH. 
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and health services have also been established in addition to the public facilities (Agartan 2005, 
Giray 2003, MoH 2004).  
SSK, as both a provider and a financer of the health services, provides mainly curative 
services to its members. SSK health services are funded by premiums paid by employees and 
employers. Income from fees paid on behalf of non+members using SSK facilities, income 
obtained through co+payments of drug costs for outpatients and general state budget transfers (to 
compensate its deficits) are also the other sources of income for SSK. Bag+Kur and ES only 
finance the health services that the members use from the public health facilities.  
There are differences among the services that the members of these social security 
organisations could achieve. The members of SSK should use SSK hospitals but are referred 
when needed to MoH, university and private health institutions. However, the service quality is 
known to be very poor in SSK hospitals. Since the members of ES can go to any hospitals of 
MoH, university hospitals and health centres, it is accepted that ES members (civil servants, 
active or retired and their dependants) could achieve better public health services than SSK and 
Bağ+Kur members (Agartan, 2005; MoH 2004; MoH, 2006; Giray, 2003). Since ES members 
are concentrated in the higher deciles (68% of ES members are in last 4 deciles), this differential 
service quality becomes more important. Unfortunately we are not able to consider the quality 
differences among service providers and this more likely leads to overestimate progressivity of 
health services. 
Turkish public health system has three main problems: absence of universal coverage for 
health services, inadequate public spending on health services and low quality of services. The 
share of MoH budget and total public expenditure on health care in GNP are given in Table A 
4.3. Although the percentage share of the total public health spending4 in GNP has risen from 
                                                           
4 The total public health spending includes the spending of other government institutions and social 
security organisations in addition to MoH budget.  
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2.7 in 1994 to 5.3% in 2004, it is still lower than its desired rate (MoH 2004). In addition to the 
general problems outlined, it is worth mentioning two other characteristics of the Turkish public 
health system. First, the sick tend to go directly to the hospitals for outpatient services, since 
they think that they can achieve better quality of both staff and equipment than they could get at 
MoH primary health centres.  As a result of this general impression about primary health centres, 
hospital outpatient facilities have become over+loaded with patients who do not require specialist 
care5. On the other hand, the overcrowding of hospital outpatient facilities has led to an 
extremely heavy workload on doctors, which decreases the quality of services too: MoH, SSK 
hospitals and health centres which are used by the poor generally provide low quality health 
services (MoH 2004).6 MoH also accepts that the Turkish health system is based on the principle 
of the ability to pay instead of the service utilisation according to need (MoH, 2004: 69).  
Secondly, doctors working in MoH and university hospitals are allowed to see private 
out+patients in these facilities after 4.00 pm. Social insurance beneficiaries making appointments 
with specific doctors in public facilities after 4.00 pm pay an out+of+pocket surcharge, while 
basic treatment fees are covered by their insurance institution. Revenues from treatment of 
private patients in public hospitals are shared between the hospitals’ revolving fund and the 
physician. While such arrangements help public hospitals and physicians increase their 
revenues7, they again pose a significant moral hazard problem, as doctors have little incentives 
                                                           
5 The fact that there is no referral from a primary care physician is needed and there is no penalty if a 
patient makes direct use of outpatient facilities also helps make hospitals overcrowded.  
6 See the Table A 4.4. 
7 These revenues of hospitals and other health facilities and payments by people who are not eligible to 
use public health facilities free are called “revolving funds”. Therefore, revolving funds suggests out+of 
pocket expenditures of households who may have right to use public health services free or not. Revolving 
funds have become more important to public hospitals and to the system in time. 95% of private health 
expenditures are revolving funds of public health institutions. Thus, only 5% of private health 
expenditures goes to private health hospitals and centres in 2003. Revolving funds account for 17% of 
total public expenditures (SPO 2004, 2006; MoH 2005).  
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to treat patients adequately before 4.00 pm8. This implies that even people having the right to use 
public health services free need to pay to achieve better health services, and also causes 
differences in the quality of services utilised by insurance beneficiaries. Unfortunately we are 
not able to consider these quality differences in our analysis (MoH 2004). 
Private Expenditures on Health Care 
Given the fact that people still need to pay money to reach better public health services 
even if they have free access to the services, it is worth seeing how private expenditures on 
health care are distributed. Almost 78% of the households who spent money on health care have 
at least one individual in the family with health insurance, implying the importance of out+of+
pocket expenditures in the health system. According to MoH (2006)9, 16% of people with a 
health problem did not do anything, for 60% of these it was due to lack of money, and most were 
living in East regions, rural areas and uninsured10. 
Table A 4.5 reports monthly per adult equivalent household expenditures on health 
according to location (rural/urban) and deciles of per adult equivalent monthly household 
expenditure in 2003. Drugs are the highest expenditure component followed by doctors and 
inpatient care in Turkey, whereas the same pattern is shared by both urban and rural residents. 
                                                           
8 Specialists who work for public hospitals have also private offices outside the hospitals. It is a common 
knowledge that patients who have seen a specialist in his/her private office and have paid private service 
fee will be able to reach better treatment in the hospitals and will not need to wait for inpatient services if 
necessary. SSK physicians can not see private patients at SSK facilities except from a recently initiated 
pilot in a limited number of SSK facilities. 
9 Turkey Households Health Expenditures Survey by MoH (2006) examined households’ health 
expenditure attitudes for 2002+2003. The survey’s main aim was to study the size and the distribution of 
out+of+pocket expenditures among households. The survey also provides information on the size, share 
and providers of resources allocated to health care besides destination, dimension and kinds of the services 
used. The survey has about 10,000 households interviewed. Unfortunately, since the data set was not 
given us, we could not able to use this rich data set and we could only give the results of this study to 
support our findings from HICES.  
10 It may be assumed also that the poor tend to ignore ilnesses (out of necessity) more than rich ones (van 
de Walle, 1995). 
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The bottom decile spent most on drugs; in contrast, the highest expenditure components for the 
top decile are doctors and drugs.  
Some 72% of total private expenditures on health care are by households living in urban 
areas, although the total private expenditures are higher in rural areas than urban areas for the 
first 7 deciles (mostly on drugs). We do not have information on if drugs purchased by 
households are prescribed or not, but it is well known that people without health insurance (or 
people with health insurance but who think the quality of services they would get is low) have a 
tendency to use non+prescribed drugs to solve their health problems if they do not have any 
chance to see a doctor. MoH (2006) reports that people in the first income quintile and people 
without health insurance have the highest mean out+of+pocket expenditure on drugs in outpatient 
care. The fact that 90% of individuals without health insurance are in the first 7 deciles is also 
another explanation for why drugs are the highest expenditure component in Turkey (MoH, 
2006). Additionally, in rural areas people may have more problems to access the public health 
services because of time they need to spend to get to the health centres or hospitals. Thus, they 
prefer to use non+prescribed drugs without getting any professional treatment. Generally, the 
private expenditure on health care increases with overall living standards, suggesting higher out+
of+pocket expenditures to reach better quality public health services and higher usage of private 
health services11. As a simple summary measure, the least squares elasticities are recorded in the 
last column of Table A 4.5 following van de Walle (1995). We attain this by regressing the 
natural logarithm of per adult equivalent household private expenditure in each health category 
on the natural logarithm of per adult equivalent total household expenditure. The elasticity of 
expenditures for each category with respect to total household expenditures tends to exceed 1 
with the exceptions of paramedics, outpatient and inpatient care, suggesting that private 
                                                           
11 As we noted before, only 20% of total private household health expenditures were made by household 
without any member with health insurance. So it would not be very wrong if we conclude that most of the 
private health expnditures by households are out of pocket expenditures. 
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expenditures increase more than proportionately with consumption. An elasticity less than 1 for 
some categories may be related the fact that expenditures on these services make up a very small 
part of total health expenditures of households12.  
There are also concerns about some health indicators such as infant mortality rates and 
life expectancy. Although Turkey has achieved significant declines in the recent past, infant 
mortality (28.8 per 1000 live births in 2005) still remains much higher than that of other 
countries in the European region as well as the EU average (8 per 1000 live births). Life 
expectancy at birth is about 68 for males and about 73 for females in 2005 and this is 10 years 
shorter than the average of OECD countries (MoH 2004; MoH 2005).  
There are discrepancies across geographical areas. Table A 4.6 gives the distribution of 
public health spending and number of health staff by regions in 2003. Comparison between the 
population share of a region and the public expenditure share on health care13 may show if 
regions are treated according to their need. Istanbul, the biggest city of Turkey, and South East 
Anatolia, the poorest region of Turkey, receive public health fund less than they need to serve 
their population. In terms of health staff, west regions and Istanbul have enough personnel, 
whereas South East Anatolia, East Anatolia (both north and central) and Black Sea regions have 
less health staff than they would need given population. Table A 4.7 from MoH (2006) also 
supports the regional differences in health expenditures (both private and public). According to 
the table, while 72% of the total health expenditures spent in West was by public agents, this rate 
is 56 and 59% in South and East regions respectively, implying higher out+of pocket 
expenditures and private health expenditures. We try to consider these discrepancies among 
regions allocating regional public health expenditure to households with respect to the regions 
they locate in.  
                                                           
12 Households spend only 0.9, 3 and 13 percent of their total health expenditures on paramedics, outpatient 
and inpatient care respectively. 68% of total household health expenditures goes to drugs and doctors.  
13 How we calculate regional public health spending is explained below. 
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Data and Determining Users of the Public Health Services 
As mentioned before, Turkey has a complex system regarding financing and providing 
public health services. Public expenditures on health consist of expenditures incurred by the 
MoH, General Directorate of Coastal Health Services, universities, other ministries and 
agencies, local governments, state enterprises, civil servants, and social security institutions. 
Because of this complex system, overlapping functions between financing agents and providers 
of the services make it hard to calculate public health expenditures. The State Planning 
Organisation (SPO) provides annual public health expenditure since 1980 at a national level by 
taking into account all public agents performing in public health provision. General practice in 
estimating unit costs of the services, is to disaggregate the total public expenditure on health 
down to facility/or service (hospital, health centre/inpatient, outpatient etc.) and to geographic 
region to consider differences in the quality of the services to some extent. We neither have 
disaggregation at the facility or service level nor do we have information on the users of 
different services or facilities. However we still can consider regional differences in the public 
health spending by allocating the total public health expenditure with respect to regions’ health 
expenditure share from 2004 consolidated budget14. We divide the total regional government 
expenditure by the population15 in each region to obtain per capita average cost of the service to 
                                                           
14 Ministry of Finance started reporting consolidated budget by functional classification from 2004 by 
provinces. Also the total health expenditure of Ministry of Health also can be found at the province level. 
We prefer to use 2004 consolidated budget instead of using the total expenditure of Ministry of Health, 
since the public expenditure on health care consists of more than the budget of MoH as mentioned before. 
Except for a few regions, the index that we would get from the MoH budget is almost same as the one we 
have attained using Ministry of Finance’s data.   
15 Since HICES do not provide any information on the usage of public or private health services, we use 
per capita average regional subsidy to obtain unit cost of the health services by regions. The usual practice 
is to divide the total government health spending by the total visits to the health institutions.  As HICES 
does not provide this information, we assume that the health system targets the whole population. We also 
used per insurer health subsidy which is found by dividing the total public health spending by the number 
of people with health insurance (including Green card holders). There are two advantages of using per 
capita public spending over using per insurer subsidy. First, it might capture the quality of the services 
which may be assumed to be inversely correlated with the population density through the higher demand 
towards the services. Secondly, in the poorer regions such as South East Anatolia and East Anatolia, the 
number of people with health insurance is very small. When we use the number of people with health 
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the government. Hence, we assume that the potential benefit to individuals can be approximated 
by the average cost to the government of providing the service and all beneficiaries in each 
region receive the same potential average benefits.  Table 4.1 presents per capita annual 
spending of the public health services.  
 
Table 4.1: Per Capita Annual Public Spending of Health Services 
Regions Million TL 
Istanbul 138 
East Marmara  209 
South East Anatolia 221 
West Marmara  247 
Mediterranean  254 
Central Anatolia  258 
Aegean  259 
West Black Sea  286 
*orth East Anatolia 310 
East Black Sea  312 
Central East Anatolia 319 
West Anatolia  328 
Turkey  247 
Source: SPO 
 
To examine the redistributive impacts of public health spending, we need to know who 
uses the public health facilities and the extent to which public health services are used by 
individuals (van de Walle, 1995). This information is obtained from household expenditure 
surveys via the direct questions on the utilisation16 of public health facilities. However, HICES 
does not include any question on usage of the public health facilities and so does not provide 
accurate information on usage of public health services. However, the data have three questions 
                                                                                                                                                                           
insurance to attain average unit subsidy, this may lead to the false perception that people in those regions 
attain higher subsidy from the government. We only report the estimations based on per capita average 
health subsidy.  
16 Household budget and expenditure surveys include questions such as if individuals need to get any 
medical help; if individuals have visited any public health facility in the interview period; if they have not 
visited any public health institution even if they were ill, and the reason for this. For the details of surveys 
including questions for the analysis of health benefit incidence see van de Walle (1995) and O’Donnell et 
al. (2008).  
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that we can use to obtain a reasonable approximation for users of public health services. The first 
question identifies individuals covered by any social security institution and having health 
insurance (including the Green Card holders). The individuals with health insurance through 
public social security institutions have the right to use public health services free and we can call 
these individuals the potential users (or intended beneficiaries) of public health services. Thus, 
our first indicator (POTETIAL) for the users of public health services includes individuals with 
health insurance and also with the Green Card. Using this indicator (POTETIAL), we examine 
if the public health system has the potential to help decrease inequality in the economy or not, 
instead of examining if the public health expenditures actually are pro+poor or progressive.  
Secondly, the data gives information on households’ private spending on health goods 
and services (such as doctor and drugs), which is the sign of at least one person in a household 
having used public or private health services. The final question identifies households whose 
drug expenditures are paid by the public (ES, SSK and Bag+Kur). We create VISIT variable by 
matching households with positive health spending and households whose drug expenditures are 
paid by public. This second indicator intends to identify “real” users of public health services. 
VISIT gives us the households, who have used any health good and services in the month that 
they were interviewed. We simply assume that households, who have needed to see a doctor or 
purchase drugs, and whose drug expenditures were paid by the public, have actually used/visited 
public health services in the period of interview.  
However, there are two problems with the second indicator. First, by considering VISIT 
we may exclude households who have used public health services but have not spent any money 
out+of+pocket17; as a result of this we may underestimate the progressiveness of public health 
services. Secondly, questions used to generate VISIT were asked to households not to 
                                                           
17Active members of ES can get their drugs from pharmacies without paying any money. However, 
dependants of ES members, SSK members and Bag+Kur members are asked to pay some percentage of the 
cost of the drugs.  
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individuals, so we do not know how many members in the households needed health services 
nor do we know if the households spent the money on public or private services. As a result of 
this, we will only report the distribution of VISIT across deciles but not allocate the service 
benefits with respect to this indicator. We only allocate the per capita health benefit with respect 
to the number of people with health insurance in the family by using the indicator POTETIAL. 
On the other hand, the analysis based on POTETIAL may lead to overestimate the 
progressiveness of the public health spending, as we saw that out+of pocket expenditures are 
significant to attain the services. 
Table 4.2 provides the distribution of beneficiaries of public health services and per 
adult equivalent household total expenditure by expenditure deciles. Potential users of public 
health services (POTETIAL) rise with deciles steadily, indicating that the poor’s access is more 
limited and the health system does not target to the poor. Despite this, POTETIAL seems to 
have a progressive distributive impact in the sense that the percentage share of potential users in 
the first seven deciles is higher than the percentage expenditure share of those deciles. The 
number of households utilising the services (VISIT) increases with deciles also. However, the 
percentage share of VISIT in the first decile is smaller than the decile’s expenditure share, 
implying the poorest households use health services less. This is consistent with the observation 
that their access, captured by POTETIAL, is more limited. Given that poorer people tend to 
have lower health status, one would expect them to need more health services. So it seems that 
even if the poor has access to public health services, they still hesitate to use the services. HICES 
does not give any information on individuals’ use of public health services less, but, we can use 
the findings of MoH (2006), which shows that 60% of people who did not do anything to solve 
their health problems reported that the reason was lack of money. The reasons for 17% of them 
were low quality of service and long distance, 27% were not insured, 26% were the Green Card 
holders, 22% were living in the east region and 25% were in the first quintile.  
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Table 4.3 also gives the distribution of beneficiaries by regions. If we take POTETIAL 
first as an indicator of usage of public health services, while Istanbul has 28% of household 
expenditure, 17% of people who can potentially use the publicly provided services live in 
Istanbul. We may interpret this in the way that residents of Istanbul may have problems with 
public health services. If we take VISIT, East Anatolia has smaller share of potential users than 
its expenditure share too in addition to Istanbul. East and South East Anatolia are the poorest 
regions of Turkey. These regions have geographical disadvantages as well, making hard to 
achieve the public services particularly in winter. Therefore, we may conclude that even if the 
poor potentially have the right to access the public health services (POTETIAL), their 
presumed use (VISIT) is the least in the poorest decile and in the poorest regions or the region 
with high inequality rate (Istanbul).  
Table 4.2: The Beneficiaries of public health services by deciles 
Deciles Per AE Household Expenditure POTE*TIAL VISIT 
1 2.51 5.64 2.43 
2 3.84 8.44 4.53 
3 4.85 9.19 6.66 
4 5.83 10.28 8.49 
5 6.83 10.89 10.30 
6 8.02 11.33 10.90 
7 9.49 11.28 12.91 
8 11.53 11.17 13.35 
9 15.04 11.14 14.40 
10 32.04 10.67 16.04 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Table 4.3: The Beneficiaries of Public Health Services by regions 
Regions 
Per AE 
Household 
Expenditure POTE*TIAL VISIT 
Istanbul 27.60 17.38 20.98 
Marmara 13.36 14.46 16.73 
Aegean 14.24 14.53 17.37 
Black Sea 8.37 11.22 8.64 
Central Anatolia 15.65 16.90 15.05 
Mediterranean 11.98 12.65 13.05 
East Anatolia 4.83 7.28 3.97 
South East Anatolia 3.97 5.59 4.21 
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Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4.4 is prepared under the presumption that every individual in the society should 
have the right to utilise public health services freely (universal coverage). The third column 
gives the percentage share of population in each decile (universal coverage case), whereas the 
fourth gives the actual situation+ the percentage share of people with health insurance in each 
decile (POTETIAL). The share of per adult equivalent household health benefits18 received by 
each decile is given in the sixth column. The first four deciles do not receive public health 
benefits enough to cover their needs, captured by the population. Moreover, the shares of health 
benefits increase with the deciles implying the benefit is not pro+poor in the sense that health 
benefits are not distributed disproportionately in favour of the poor. However, the services seem 
to have the potential to reach people in the sense that the percentage shares of per adult 
equivalent benefits and potential users are higher than the expenditure share up to the 7th decile; 
it appears that there is redistribution from the top three deciles to the lower deciles. 
Table 4.4: Public Health Service *eeds and Benefits, by deciles, % shares 
  
Deciles 
Per AE Household 
Expenditure 
Population POTE*TIAL 
Per AE Public 
Health Benefits  
1 2.51 13.23 5.64 5.29 
2 3.84 11.73 8.44 8.21 
3 4.85 10.78 9.19 9.11 
4 5.83 10.49 10.28 10.23 
5 6.83 10 10.89 10.95 
6 8.02 9.71 11.33 11.17 
7 9.49 9.29 11.28 11.31 
8 11.53 8.81 11.17 11.35 
9 15.04 8.29 11.14 11.57 
10 32.04 7.67 10.67 10.81 
Total 100 100 100 100 
otes: (1) Per adult equivalent public health expenditure is allocated with respect to POTETIAL indicator 
                                                           
18 Household public health benefits are calculated by multiplying the number of people with health 
insurance  (POTETIAL) by per capita public health expenditure, which approximates average public 
health benefit.  
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Table A 4.10 given in Appendix 4.1 presents the regional distribution of the health 
benefits and the needs for the services captured by the number of health insurers and the 
population. The regions, Istanbul19 and Marmara’s shares of the health benefits are smaller than 
their shares of both population and the number of health insurer. However, Marmara’s benefit 
share is higher than its expenditure share. Istanbul seems to suffer from high migration. The 
poorest region (Southeast Anatolia) receives higher share from the health benefits than it gets 
from the distribution of expenditure, suggesting positive distributional impact of the health 
benefits, although the region seems not to able to cover the needs of health care. From this table, 
we may conclude that public health expenditures help decrease the discrepancies among the 
regions.  
4.2.2 Infrastructure Services 
In Turkey, infrastructure services are provided by a variety of central government 
institutions20. In addition to these four central government institutions, municipalities and 
Special Provincial Administrations (SPA) are responsible to supply infrastructure services such 
as sewerage, clean water, electricity, and city roads in their territory. We sum the total spending 
of four central government institutions responsible for different infrastructure services and the 
tax revenue share of each municipality and SPA from general budget tax revenues to capture 
central spending via local authorities for each province to attain the total public spending of 
                                                           
19 To remind us of Istanbul, Istanbul is the most populous city of Turkey with a very high migration rate. It 
has the biggest share of per adult equivalent household expenditures with a very high inequality rate: Gini 
coefficient is 0.42 whereas it is 0.40 for overall Turkey.  
20 While the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works find and produce clean water resources, the 
General Directorate of Highways is responsible to build highways in Turkey. The Ministry of Transport is 
responsible to organise all kind of transportation services. For rural infrastructure, there is the General 
Directorate of Rural Services which works for only rural areas. 
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infrastructure services in Turkey21. Table 4.5 shows total annual public spending on the 
infrastructure services per household in each region. 
 
Table 4.5: Per Household Annual Public Spending of 
Infrastructure Services in Turkey, 2003 
Regions Million TL 
West Marmara  387 
Aegean  463 
East Marmara  665 
Mediterranean  704 
Istanbul 726 
Central Anatolia  742 
East Black Sea  825 
South East Anatolia 836 
West Black Sea  857 
*orth East Anatolia 989 
West Anatolia  1134 
Central East Anatolia 1274 
Turkey  751 
Source: TUIK and Ministry of Finance 
 
We have the same problem that we have had for the health incidence analysis regarding 
determining the beneficiaries of public services. In order to solve this problem and allocate 
government spending on infrastructure services to households, we produce an index which 
considers the quality of houses in which households live following Pinar (2004). We suppose 
that households living in more valuable properties derive more benefit from infrastructure 
services. This assumption implies the services to have regressive incidence. In HICES, we have 
information on the value of house a household lives in. For owner+occupied houses, we have two 
                                                           
21 The total spending of four government institutions by provinces are taken from the Ministry of Finance, 
while the spending of municipalities and SPAs were provided by TUIK (2003). We do not use the total 
spending of local governments, since local governments have a range of different revenue sources such as 
service fees, local taxes and debt. Since we restrict our analysis on the central government budget, we take 
only the tax share of local governments from the consolidated budget, and so we restrict ourselves to 
examining the distribution of infrastructure spending of the central government.  
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different values: the sale value of the house in the case that the owner wants to sell it and 
imputed rental income of the house if the household wanted to rent it. For households who are 
tenants, we have information on monthly rent. We use imputed rental income for owner+
occupied houses and the rents for renters to calculate the index (Infra_Index) for ith household 
as follows: 
Infra_Indexi: (Rent)i / (Mean Rent)j,  j:1,…,26 
where i denotes households and j denotes 26 regions. We assume that if a household pays more 
rent than average regional rent, that household lives in a neighbourhood with better 
infrastructure services (good infrastructure increases the value of the house). Per household total 
government spending on physical infrastructure (such as roads, street lightening, electricity, and 
water supply) is allocated to households according to the Infra_Index. Table 4.6 provides mean 
value of Infra_Index, with standard deviations by deciles. Mean value of the index rises with 
deciles as expected. This makes us expect that public infrastructure services may be regressive. 
But this also depends on per household public spending which varies across regions.  
Table 4.6: Mean Infra_Index by deciles  
Deciles Mean Standard Deviation 
1 0.54 0.29 
2 0.67 0.35 
3 0.75 0.39 
4 0.84 0.44 
5 0.89 0.46 
6 0.93 0.5 
7 1.05 0.58 
8 1.13 0.61 
9 1.3 0.72 
10 1.91 1.3 
Total 1 0.73 
 
In the data, households were asked if they had basic facilities in their houses such as 
piped water, toilet, electricity, and hot water. We also use these questions to examine incidence 
of public infrastructure services. However, it is worth noting that we do not have any 
information on the quality of services. We aim for creating indicators which show if the basic 
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infrastructure services are utilised by households. As we do not have any direct question for 
sewage facilities in HICES we use the question which seeks if a household has a toilet in the 
residence. Transport and HighRoad are indicators of usage of city and high roads. If there is a 
person in the household who takes any vehicle to commute to work we assume that this 
household uses city roads more (Transport). HighRoad shows if the household has a car or not, 
hence able to use high roads. Table 4.7 and 4.8 gives the distribution of infrastructure facilities 
by expenditure deciles and the percentage of the users of the facilities in each decile. According 
to the tables, while it seems that almost all households have electricity, other facilities such as 
piped water and sewerage22 are distributed unevenly. Table 4.8Table 4.8 presents the percentage 
shares of users in each decile by facilities. Almost all households have electricity, but 26%, 36%, 
42% and 85% of households in the first decile do not have piped water, sewerage, phone and hot 
water respectively. When we look at the users of city transport facilities (particularly city roads) 
and high roads, we see that it increases with the deciles. Table A 4.11 and Table A 4.12 in 
Appendix 4.1 give the distribution of house facilities by region. South East and East Anatolia 
regions receive the least share from the facilities as expected. Moreover rural+urban difference 
seems more striking. As all households have piped water in urban areas, only 81% of rural 
households have piped water. 75% of rural households have sewerage facilities whereas 95% of 
urban residents could enjoy piped water. There is no big difference between rural and urban 
usage for having telephone and electricity and using high roads (having car). However, it is clear 
that hot water is still largely an urban facility. 
To see if Infra_Index is a good approximation to allocate public infrastructure spending, 
the correlation between Infra_Index and dummy variables illustrating if households have basic 
                                                           
22 According to Turkey Demography and Health Survey 2003 (TDHS), only 76% of households (93% of 
households in urban and 36% of households in rural areas) have sewerage facility in Turkey. According to 
HICES 2003, this is 88% for overall Turkey and 95 and 75% for urban and rural areas respectively. The 
difference between HICES and TDHS comes from the fact that TDHS has a clear question if the toilet in 
the residence has sewerage facilities or not. However we accepted that if a house has a toilet in the 
property; it also has sanitary facilities, which is not true always particularly in rural areas. 
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facilities is examined. Table 4.9 presents the correlation coefficients and mean Infra_Index by 
facilities. As it is expected correlation between the index and the dummy variable for electricity 
is very weak as all households have electricity. The high correlation coefficients come from 
Hotwater, HighRoad and Sewerage, since Infra_Index increases with deciles and possessing hot 
water and car is still a phenomenon for households with higher incomes. As we have seen 
already that only 62% of first decile and 75% of rural households have sewerage facilities, so the 
correlation coefficient is high for sewerage. The reason for the relatively weak correlation 
between the index and the dummy variables may make us think that the index does not provide a 
good way to allocate the public spending on infrastructure services. However, we do not know 
the quality of the services households enjoy and as in the case of sewerage we use some 
information to attain a proxy for the service without knowing if households really have the 
service or if the facility works properly. In other words, even if the tables above indicate that 
basic facilities are owned by a large part of the population, it is not clear that households utilise 
those services equally. Therefore, even if the correlation between the index created and the 
dummy variables seems to be weak, we think the index still provides a reasonable way to 
allocate public spending on public infrastructure services.
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G 
Table 4.8: The Percentage of Users of House Facilities by decile and by facility  
Expenditure 
Deciles 
Electricity 
Piped 
Water 
Sewerage Telephone Transport HighRoad 
Hot 
water 
1 99.8 73.52 62.46 58.88 21.22 5.6 14.9 
2 99.98 84.53 78.61 75 29.42 11.15 31.39 
3 99.96 90.49 82.66 81.95 35.26 15.27 38.6 
4 100 94.59 88.59 86.48 39.92 18.69 49.6 
5 100 95.6 91.09 89.19 44.02 23.6 56.95 
6 100 97.37 93.03 90.18 48.46 27.33 59.8 
7 100 98.41 93.61 92.01 49.52 30.02 66.76 
8 100 98.75 96.2 93.5 52.81 35.33 73.07 
9 100 99.32 98.31 95.06 58.83 43.38 77.78 
10 100 99.7 99.11 87.19 63.6 62.25 89.74 
 
 
Table 4.7: The Distribution of Basic House Facilities by deciles (%)  
Expenditure 
Deciles 
Per AE 
Expenditure  
Population Electricity 
Piped 
Water 
Sewerage Telephone Transport HighRoad 
Hot 
water 
1 2.51 10 9.98 7.89 7.07 6.93 4.79 2.06 2.67 
2 3.84 10 10 9.07 8.9 8.83 6.64 4.09 5.62 
3 4.85 10 10 9.7 9.35 9.65 7.96 5.6 6.91 
4 5.83 10 10.01 10.15 10.03 10.19 9.01 6.86 8.89 
5 6.83 10 10 10.25 10.3 10.5 9.93 8.65 10.19 
6 8.02 10 10 10.45 10.53 10.62 10.94 10.03 10.71 
7 9.49 10 10 10.55 10.59 10.83 11.17 11.01 11.95 
8 11.53 10 10.01 10.6 10.89 11.01 11.92 12.97 13.09 
9 15.04 10 10 10.65 11.12 11.19 13.27 15.91 13.92 
10 32.04 10 10 10.69 11.21 10.26 14.35 22.83 16.06 
Turkey 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 4.9: Correlation between Infra_Index and Basic Infrastructure Facilities and Mean 
Infra_Index by facilities 
  Infra_Index Mean Infra_Index 
  Correlation Coefficient If the facility does not exist If the facility exists 
Electricity 0.02 0.26 1 
Piped Water 0.2 0.46 1.04 
Sewerage 0.24 0.52 1.06 
Telephone 0.09 0.84 1.03 
Transport 0.18 0.83 1.1 
HighRoad 0.25 0.89 1.3 
Hot Water 0.34 0.73 1.22 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4.10 provides per household infrastructure benefits by deciles. Since mean value 
of Infra_Index increases with deciles (Table 4.6), the share of per household benefits increases 
with the deciles also, implying that the services are not pro+poor. However, the services appear 
to be progressive in the sense that the shares of the benefits of the deciles up to the 8th decile are 
higher than the expenditure shares of the deciles. The richest two deciles’ shares of benefits are 
smaller than their expenditure shares, suggesting redistribution from these deciles to the lower 
deciles. 
Table 4.10: The Distribution of Public Infrastructure Services, by deciles, % shares 
Expenditure 
Deciles 
Per AE Household 
Expenditure 
Population 
Per Household Public 
Infrastructure Expenditure 
1 2.51 13.23 5.73 
2 3.84 11.73 6.96 
3 4.85 10.78 7.50 
4 5.83 10.49 8.45 
5 6.83 10 8.97 
6 8.02 9.71 9.12 
7 9.49 9.29 10.31 
8 11.53 8.81 11.08 
9 15.04 8.29 12.89 
10 32.04 7.67 19.00 
Total 100 100 100 
The distribution of the infrastructure services among regions seems to be strong. (Table 
A 4.13 in Appendix 4.1). However, Central Anatolia housing the capital receives the highest 
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share of per adult benefits followed by Istanbul and Mediterranean. Apart from the regions, 
South East, Marmara and Aegean, the regions cover their needs. The poorest regions’ share of 
benefits is higher than their expenditure share suggesting equality enhancing impact through the 
services. 
4.2.3 Social Transfers 
Social transfers are important as a direct instrument for governments to affect the 
distribution of household incomes along with the taxes and other public spending. The purposes 
of social transfers may be poverty reduction, income redistribution, the provision of insurance 
such as unemployment insurance, and redistribution of family income through time such as child 
or old age benefits and retirement pensions (Atkinson, 1995; Heady et al. 2001; Whiteford, 
2008). Depending on the main objectives of social transfer systems countries have, some 
classifications have been offered to identify the countries’ social policies (Barr, 2001; Esping+
Andersen, 1991). Whilst some countries are much keener on the direct redistributive role of the 
transfers by mean+tested cash transfers, others are more focused on providing universal benefits 
and risk insurance. For these differences in the objectives of the social transfer systems lead to 
the different redistributive impacts on well+being of households, it is important to examine the 
distributional impacts of the social transfer system to see if these transfers help diminish 
inequality and poverty, and to assess the social objectives of governments. This subsection 
outlines the characteristics of the social cash transfer system in Turkey to depict the potential 
direction of social cash transfers in narrowing inequality. 
The Turkish social transfer system consists of direct cash transfers and social insurance 
system (universal benefits). Direct cash transfers are supposed to be means+tested thus target to 
the poor directly. Social insurance system has two objectives: redistribute lifetime income 
(retirement pensions) and provide risk insurance (unemployment benefits). Turkey has a wide 
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retirement pension system however, because of the high unrecorded employment employees at 
the bottom end of the deciles appear not to engage in the system. The second part of the 
insurance system, unemployment benefits, is a quite recent and suffers from unrecorded 
employment too. Means+tested transfers are old+age benefits, Direct Income Support (DIS) for 
farmers, social transfers from the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund (SASF), and student 
grants. However, their share in total transfers and in households’ income are negligible, 
additionally student grants seem not to benefit the poor. So Turkish social transfer system does 
not seem to function neither risk insurance role of it nor providing cash income to the people in 
need. Because of the distribution of beneficiaries, we conclude that social transfer system is 
expected not to be progressive or even if it is progressive it is not expected to be very important 
in reducing inequality. 
Turkey has been paying more attention to poverty alleviation using social cash transfers 
in recent years. Buğra and Adar (2008) report that means+tested social expenditures by 
institutions directly involved in poverty alleviation increased between 2001 and 2004. Despite 
these recent improvements in social transfers targeting the poor, social transfers still remain very 
marginal and are very far from being systematic. Table 4.11 reports social transfers in cash and 
in kind as a percentage of total decile income. In European Union (EU) countries, social 
transfers account for at least 40% of total decile income in the first decile (Heady et. al., 2001). 
In Turkey, on the contrary, percentage share of social transfers in cash in total household income 
increase with deciles and the share of total transfers in cash and in kind in total household 
incomes account for only 17%1. As we discuss in detail below, this is mainly due to the 
distribution of pensions and other employment+related, non+means+tested transfers such as 
                                                           
1 Transfers in kind are organised generally by the local governments and their amount has increased in 
recent years with the right wing ruling party (AK Party) which has islamic roots. However, Buğra and 
Adar also warn that the mentality behind the social transfers is problematic since social transfers are 
regarded as charity instead of a systematic instrument to fight against poverty and inequalities in the 
society. Thus, these recent developments seem not to be a part of any long+run redistribution policies.  
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unemployment insurance and tax refund, and the significant share of these transfers in total 
transfers. 
The HICES data provide information on if individuals receive any social transfer (cash 
or in+kind) from public or private institutions (or other individuals) and how much they get. In 
the data, individuals reported a number of different transfer types such as retirement pension, tax 
refund, old+age pension, DIS for farmers, social transfers from the SASF targeting especially the 
poor, unemployment benefits, public scholarships to students from poor families, and finally the 
pension for veterans, disabled, widows and orphans.  
Table 4.11: Social Transfers as a percentage of total decile income* 
Expenditure 
Deciles 
Total Transfers Transfers in Cash Transfers in Kind 
Pensions (% of Total 
Transfers) 
1 10.09 9.89 0.2 53.67 
2 14.76 14.67 0.08 68.8 
3 18.13 18.08 0.05 74.08 
4 19.25 19.2 0.05 76.31 
5 19.88 19.84 0.04 77.63 
6 18.7 18.68 0.02 79.09 
7 20.09 20.06 0.02 79.53 
8 20.12 20.11 0.01 80.61 
9 19.78 19.77 0.01 78.69 
10 13.93 13.93 0 82.95 
Turkey  17.43 17.4 0.03 78.4 
otes: Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure   
*Income is defined as disposable household income in cash and in kind including imputed rental income 
 
Tax refund2 is received only by pensioners and recorded workers who are covered by 
any social security organisation. Old+age pension is given to individuals who are older than 65. 
DIS for farmers and social transfers targeting to the poor from SASF and old+age pension were 
recorded in one question. In order to separate old+age pensions from SASF and DIS transfers, 
old+age pensions have been imputed to those individuals who are over 65. Unemployment 
                                                           
2 Tax refund was about VAT payments wage earners do. It was introduced to encourage wage earners to 
get their receipt after shopping as an instrument to increase VAT collection and decrease tax evasion 
regarding VAT. Tax refund was abolished in 2008. 
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benefit as a main instrument of risk insurance was introduced only in 2000 and it has very 
limited coverage. Employees who had not been employed in the last 120 days continuously and 
who had paid social security contributions at least 600 days in the last three years before 
applying for benefit qualify to receive the unemployment benefit.  
As can be seen from Table 4.12, potential beneficiaries of employment+related social 
transfers are concentrated in the poorer deciles as expected. However, middle deciles seem to 
utilise the transfers most. The reasons may be twofold. First, means+tested transfers targeting 
directly the poor are a very small part of the total transfers. Secondly, the large part of the 
transfers is employment+related and the poor, who are more likely to be in unrecorded 
employment, do not qualify for these transfers; 35% of unrecorded employees, who are not 
covered by any social security organisation, are in the first two deciles, and those workers cannot 
receive any social transfer. This is an important problem for a country like Turkey which faces 
instability in the economy very often, affecting particularly employment status of unskilled 
labour. 
Unemployment benefits are particularly far from being enough to cover the needs of 
unemployed. Less than one percent of unemployed individuals3 in HICES could receive the 
unemployment benefits, mainly because of high unrecorded employment. If we compare the 
percentage shares of unemployed workers and unemployment beneficiaries by deciles, we find 
out that 13% of unemployed are in the poorest decile whereas only 5% of unemployment 
beneficiaries are entitled to obtain the benefit in this decile. However, the distribution of the 
beneficiaries does not have any pattern by deciles. It seems it is completely coincidence to be 
able to get the benefits. However, when we look at the percentage share of unemployment 
beneficiaries in unemployed individuals by deciles, we can report that only 0.31% of total 
                                                           
3 Only 29 individuals reported that they had the unemployment benefit in the past year.   
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unemployed in the first decile receive the benefits, this is only 0.81% for the whole country. 
Thus it seems the unemployment benefits are negligible as a transfer instrument.  
The pension system seems not to reach to the poorer deciles either. Only 2% of 
pensioners are in the poorest decile, whereas 9% of potential pensioners4 is in the first decile. 
Because of high unrecorded employment in the lower deciles, social transfers such as pensions, 
unemployment benefits and tax refund mostly go to the middle deciles, implying that the 
redistributive power of social transfers are quite limited in Turkey and a large part of the 
transfers is intended for households that are not poor.  
However, the last column shows a different picture, for beneficiaries of old+age benefits, 
public scholarships, DIS, the pension for veterans, disabled, widows and orphans and SASF 
transfers. Apart from DIS and the pension, the other transfers are designed to target directly the 
poor, but only account for 19% of the total transfers received by households in the data. 
Moreover, when we look at transfers separately, we see that only the old+age pension is 
successful to meet the needs in the society. Table A 4.14 in Appendix 4.1 also gives the 
distribution of receivers of other cash transfers such as student grants and old+age benefits. 
While receivers of old+age benefits and SASF and DIS transfers are concentrated in the first 
deciles, the opposite is true for student grants as the share of the receivers rises with deciles. 
Additionally, beneficiaries of transfers in+kind too seem to be concentrated in lower deciles5. 
There has been a discussion on if means+tested transfers or universal transfers should be 
used to fight against inequality and poverty in the literature6. Since means+tested transfers are 
                                                           
4 Before 1999 retirement age was 38 for female and 43 for male employees who had worked at least for 
5,000 days. In 1999, the retirement age became 50 for females and 60 for male workers if they had worked 
for 7,000 days. However, the law let people retire before 50 (or 60) if they started to work before 1999. 
Thus we assume that in 2003 minimum retirement age is 43 for female and 47 for male.  
5 It is impossibe to separate the receivers of DIS and SASF transfers that are the only direct transfers to the 
poor in the social transfer system. However, the data allow us to determine old+age pension and public 
scholarship beneficiaries. These figures are reported in Table A 4.15 and Table A 4.16 in Appendix 4.1.   
6 See Atkinson (1995) and Besley (1990) for the discussion. 
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supposed to go to the people in need, they are considered to be more effective than universal 
benefits in terms of cost effectiveness and reducing poverty and inequality. However, the 
arguments against means+tested transfers have been also considered. These arguments are 
focused on the problems of targeting and related inefficiencies caused by these problems.  
Administrative costs and imperfect information are the most discussed problems which are 
thought to make means+tested transfers inefficient.  
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Table 4.12: Percentage shares of receivers of social transfers by deciles  
Expenditure 
Deciles 
Unrecorded 
Employees 
Potential 
Pensioners* 
Pensioners Unemployed 
Unemployment  
Beneficiaries 
% of 
Unemployment 
Beneficiaries in 
Unemployed 
Tax 
Refund 
Others** 
1 19.29 9.13 2.11 13.34 5.02 0.31 1.56 11.31 
2 15.83 9.01 4.93 13.03 15.58 0.97 4.52 10.47 
3 13.37 9.48 7.04 11.65 5.47 0.38 5.77 10.65 
4 11.3 9.77 8.49 10.96 14.93 1.11 7.73 10.19 
5 9.58 10.09 9.95 9.9 14 1.15 9.65 9.99 
6 8.54 10.22 10.6 10.62 10.8 0.83 10.79 9.94 
7 7.57 10.26 11.84 8.68 9.85 0.92 12.27 10.06 
8 5.98 10.4 13.18 8.65 5.89 0.55 13.76 9.02 
9 4.65 10.94 14.63 7.6 12.6 1.35 16.46 10.31 
10 3.9 10.72 17.23 5.58 5.86 0.85 17.49 8.06 
Turkey  100 100 100 100 100 0.81 100 100 
ote: Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure  
* Potential pensioners are people over 43 (female) or 47(male) who had the right to retire in 2003.  
**Other: Old:age pensioners, farmers receiving DIS, students with public scholarships and SASF beneficiary   
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Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4.13 provides the distribution of social transfers by deciles. Per adult equivalent 
household expenditure indicates the after benefit living standard of the households in the case of 
transfers since household expenditures were made with the transfers households have received. 
We have two different definitions for the total transfers: per adult equivalent transfers with 
pensions (1) and without pensions (2). The reason for this division is the big share of retirement 
pensions (78%) in the total transfers. Pensions are the kind of transfers whose aim is to 
redistribute incomes across the lifecycle instead of providing insurance in the face of adverse 
risks (unemployment, disability, sickness). On the other hand the some unknown part of 
retirement pensions come from the sum of which pensioners have paid to the social security 
institutions as payroll tax while they were working. Hence, it is impossible to determine the size 
of the pure redistributive role of the state in the case of pensions with a cross sectional data. 
Table 4.13: The Distribution of Social Cash Transfers, by deciles % shares 
    
Expenditure  Per AE Per AE  Per AE  
Deciles Expenditure Social Transfers Social Transfers 
    with pension without pension 
1 2.51 1.93 3.97 
2 3.84 3.82 5.29 
3 4.85 5.76 6.71 
4 5.83 7.12 7.39 
5 6.83 8.44 8.38 
6 8.02 9.03 8.62 
7 9.49 11.04 9.98 
8 11.53 13.09 12.14 
9 15.04 16.45 17.68 
10 32.04 23.32 19.83 
otes: (1) Per adult equivalent transfers (expenditure) with pensions. (2) Per adult equivalent transfers without 
pensions. 
 
Considering this fact, some empirical research, seeking lifetime redistributive impacts of 
public policies, has been done to distinguish the share of pensioners’ contributions in total 
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retirement pensions (Whiteford 2008). Our aim here is to attain a better understanding about the 
role of social transfers in Turkey by examining pensions separately.  
As can bee seen from the table the share of transfers (with and without pensions) 
increases with deciles suggesting that they are not pro+poor. The percentage share of transfers 
with pensions in the first decile is smaller than that of household expenditures implying 
regressivity to the transfers. However, it becomes proportional for the second decile and 
progressive for the rest of the deciles with the exception of 10th decile. However when we 
exclude pensions, social transfers become highly progressive in the sense that the share of 
transfers is far higher than that of household expenditures, particularly for the first four deciles. 
However, we do not expect transfers without pensions have a strong redistributive impact since 
social transfers without pensions make up only very small part of the total household incomes 
and expenditures. Table 4.14 provides the distribution of disaggregated social transfers. Apart 
from old+age benefits, SASF ad DIS transfers and transfers in kind the shares of all transfers 
increase with deciles. 
The distribution of social transfers among regions can be examined with the help of 
Table A 4.15 and Table A 4.16 in Appendix 4.1. According to Table A 4.15, the share of South 
East, East Anatolia, Istanbul and Mediterranean from social transfers (1) is smaller than their 
expenditure shares, and the opposite is true for Aegean, Marmara, Black Sea and Central 
Anatolia. However when we look at the transfers excluding pensions, apart from the shares of 
Marmara and Aegean, the other regions increase the shares of social transfers they receive. 
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Table 4.14: The Distribution of Social Transfers by deciles  
Deciles 
Per AE 
Household 
Expenditure 
Pensions 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
Tax 
Refund 
Old?
Age 
Benefits  
SASF 
and DIS 
Transfers 
Student 
Grants 
Transfers 
in kind 
Other* 
1 2.51 1.31 3.51 0.84 26.12 11.49 0.72 26.03 2.57 
2 3.84 3.37 9.15 3.01 15.03 9.31 1.61 13.60 4.86 
3 4.85 5.49 4.71 4.20 16.29 11.78 0.00 11.58 6.31 
4 5.83 7.03 9.12 5.66 6.87 11.40 5.72 11.79 7.50 
5 6.83 8.45 13.72 7.52 10.11 9.56 3.53 9.96 8.40 
6 8.02 9.13 3.64 8.86 7.61 11.69 10.35 6.88 8.37 
7 9.49 11.35 6.52 11.02 10.13 12.07 10.66 8.64 9.58 
8 11.53 13.38 2.87 13.88 4.55 8.34 16.04 4.88 12.52 
9 15.04 16.13 41.76 18.41 2.29 7.53 38.27 3.53 19.24 
10 32.04 24.37 5.00 26.60 1.01 6.83 13.09 3.11 20.65 
Turkey 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*The pensions for veterans and widows.  
Deciles are organised by ranking per adult equivalent household expenditure     
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Decomposition Analysis 
We employ the technique of inequality decomposition by income sources to assess the 
contribution of social transfers to income inequality, using S+Gini decomposition by income 
sources. An S+Gini inequality index for a variable can be decomposed as a sum of the 
concentration indices of the component variables adding up to that variable (Duclos and Araar, 
2006)1. The income variable is per adult equivalent household disposable income, which 
includes imputed rental incomes. We use DAD Software (Duclos and Araar, 2006) to estimate 
the inequality decomposition for different social transfers and per adult equivalent household 
income excluding social transfers with standard deviations, reported in Table 4.15. Table 4.15 
has four columns: coefficient of concentration, share of source of income in total income, 
relative contribution of income source to inequality and absolute contribution of income source 
to inequality. To remind us: the more concentrated income source, the higher contribution from 
that source of income to the overall inequality depending on the share of income source in total 
income. Thus, the negative coefficient of concentration means that source of income in question 
contributes to equality rather than inequality in the distribution.  
According to the results of decomposition analysis, all social transfers make up only 17 
percent of total household incomes and contribute to income inequality rather than equality with  
“0.36” coefficient of concentration2. The most important type of social transfer is retirement 
pensions, accounting for 13 percent of the total household disposable income. Retirement 
pensions (employment related), pensions for widows and tax refund (another employment+
related transfer), are the most important social transfers contributing to inequality, followed by 
public scholarships.  Old+age benefits and SASF and DIS transfers and social transfers in kind 
                                                           
1 See Chapter 2. Additionally, we follow the natural approach to run the estimation and presenting the 
results under ρ=2.  
 
2 2 times of the share column gives us the exact share of the source of income. 
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seem to help decrease inequality with the negative coefficients of concentration and 
contribution. However, their share in the total income is so small, 0.043 and 0.02 percent 
respectively, implying that their contribution to equality is negligible (relative and absolute 
contributions are almost zero). 
Table 4.15: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Social Transfers (in cash and in kind) to Total 
Income* 
Source of Income 
Coefficient of 
Concentration 
Share 
Relative 
Contribution 
Absolute 
Contribution 
     
Gini for Total Income 0.43376 ρ=2   
Standard Error 0.00484    
Total Income  0.4338 0.5000 0.5000 0.2169 
 0.0048 0.0000 0.0011 0.0024 
Total Income without 
Transfers 0.4493 0.4126 0.4274 0.1854 
 0.0057 0.0013 0.0025 0.0020 
All Social Transfers 0.3602 0.0874 0.0726 0.0315 
 0.0066 0.0013 0.0023 0.0008 
Pensions 0.3748 0.0671 0.0580 0.0252 
 0.0076 0.0011 0.0020 0.0007 
Tax Refund 0.4239 0.0038 0.0037 0.0016 
 0.0063 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
Old?Age Benefits and 
SASF&DIS Transfers +0.0126 0.0022 +0.0001 0.0000 
 0.0268 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Scholarships 0.3736 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 0.0789 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Unemployment Benefits 0.2184 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.2294 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Transfers in?kind +0.3450 0.0001 +0.0001 0.0000 
 0.0306 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other Transfers** 0.3377 0.0141 0.0110 0.0048 
  0.0191 0.0005 0.0009 0.0003 
otes:* Total Income is per adult household disposable income. **Other transfers include pensions 
for widows, veterans and disabled. Asymptotic standard errors are in italic 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Welfare Dominance Analysis 
In this section we initially want to use concentration curves to study progressivity and 
redistributive impacts of benefits of these three social services and the total benefits including 
education benefits. We apply the welfare dominance method to examine the progressivity and 
compare distributions of benefits (Yitzhaki and Slemrod, 1991). Because concentration curves 
are constructed from sample data rather than the whole population, it is compulsory to take into 
account statistical robustness of the comparisons we are intended to make. We apply Davidson 
and Duclos (1997) to test the differences between the Lorenz curve and concentration curves 
statistically. We estimate the differences between curves with asymptotic standard errors by 
using DAD software3.  
It is worth explaining a point before moving to discuss the results. The analysis of the 
distributional and redistributive impact of the benefits requires determining a “benchmark 
distribution or pre+benefit distribution” which indicates how income distribution would be in the 
absence of the public benefits. As noted in the previous chapter, determining the benchmark 
distribution simply as the welfare indicator less benefits needs another strong assumption: public 
policies do not have any behavioral impact on the distribution of market incomes. In other 
words, with this reasoning it is assumed that if there is no public cash benefit (say pensions), the 
beneficiaries of the public social transfers would not try to have the same income level by doing 
any other activity. This assumption leads to obtain exaggerated results over the redistributive 
role of the public policies, since some public policies such as social cash transfers may cause a 
big reranking of some households who largely depend on the public benefits in question 
(Whiteford, 2008).  In order to avoid this problem, it is suggested to measure the redistributive 
                                                           
3 See Chapter 2 for the details. 
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power of a public policy by the difference between the concentration coefficient of the pre+
intervention distribution ranked according to the post+intervention distribution and the Gini 
coefficient of the post+intervention distribution, instead of taking the difference of the Gini 
coefficients of pre+intervention and post+intervention distributions. By doing this, it is implicitly 
assumed that the public policies in question do not modify the underlying distribution.  
The benchmark distribution for the benefit incidence analysis is given by the total 
household expenditure (per adult equivalent). For public education, health and infrastructure 
services, there appears no problem with choosing this as the household expenditure does not 
comprise these benefits (still ignoring possible behavioral responses of the households). The 
problem appears when we analyse the public cash and in+kind transfers, since the total 
household expenditure also includes the social cash and in+kind transfers and actually the 
distribution of the total household expenditure gives us the post+social transfer distribution. 
However, as we will see in the next section with S+Gini indices of progressivity and 
redistribution, the social transfers cause a significant reranking of the households with social 
transfers and that overestimate the progressivity and redistributive role of the social transfers 
even if their distribution is not more progressive than the underlying distribution, that is, per 
adult equivalent household expenditure. Therefore, we also assume that the social cash and in+
kind transfers do not modify the underlying expenditure distribution and keep ranking 
households according to per adult equivalent household expenditure (AE_EXP) to examine the 
redistributive impacts of the social transfers. 
Figure 4.1 gives the concentration curves4 of the social services apart from education. 
From the figure it seems that all concentration curves are below the 45+degree line, so none of 
                                                           
4 Concentration curves, the differences between Lorenz curve of per adult equivalent household 
expenditure and concentration curves of the benefits with standard errors are given in Table A 4.17 in 
Appendix 4.1. The figures for differences among the concentration curves with confidence interval drawn 
by using DASP Stata Package can be provided on demand. 
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them is absolute progressive (pro+poor). Based on t+tests5 for the differences between ordinates 
of the 45+degree line and concentration curves, we confirm that none of these three social 
services are pro+poor statistically in the sense that concentration curves of the services are 
dominated by 45+degree line (Table 4.16) under both decision rules. This finding gives further 
support to the finding we have attained with descriptive analysis that health, infrastructure 
services and social transfers do not target the poor, since the share of benefits increase with the 
deciles.  
In order to decide if the benefits are progressive or not, we test for the differences 
between ordinates of the Lorenz curve and concentration curves. According to the statistical 
tests, the concentration curves for health and infrastructure services dominate the Lorenz curve 
of per adult equivalent household expenditures (AE_EXP) under the both decision rules. 
However, while social transfers (both 1 and 2) are progressive under the Decision Rule 1, 
Howes’ Criterion says that we cannot reject the null hypothesis for social transfers (1) for all 
ordinates we tested. To overcome ambiguity regarding progressivity of social transfers (1), we 
use S+Gini indices of progressivity and also apply extended+Gini test in the next section.  
In order to rank the benefits in terms of progressivity, we compare the concentration 
curves for the public transfers. From Figure 4.16 it seems that the most progressive benefit is 
created by the health services followed by infrastructure services (INFRA), transfers (2) without 
pensions and transfers (1) with pensions. However the concentration curves for infrastructure 
services and both transfers seem to cross, so we apply the dominance test methodology to reach 
unambiguous results. According to the welfare dominance test for the differences of 
concentration curves, transfers (2) dominates transfers (1), yet we reject the null hypothesis of 
                                                           
5 The null hypothesis of the test is that the ordinates of the curves are all the same, in other words there is 
no dominance. Please see Chapter 2 for the details. 
 
6 Households are ranked according to per adult equivalent household expenditure. 
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non+dominance in favour of crossing for the concentration curves of transfers and infrastructure 
services, since there are two ordinates differing statistically in the opposite directions (Table 
4.17). So we are not able to rank the benefits from transfers and infrastructure services 
unambiguously with the dominance test methodology.  
Finally we would like to see the impact of the private health expenditures on the 
progressivity of the public health services. We simply add the private health expenditures to the 
household health benefits to take into account the impact of the private health expenditures. 
Figure A 4+1 provides the concentration curves for the health benefits with (Health Benefits1) 
and without (Health Benefits2) the private household expenditures on health. As we have 
already seen in the second section, the private health expenditures rise with the total household 
expenditure (per adult equivalent), implying that it is more regressive than the total household 
expenditures. We can see that from the table too as the concentration curve for the private health 
expenditures is below the Lorenz curve of the total household expenditures. The impact of the 
private health expenditure is significant in the sense that it reduces the progressivity of the public 
health services by making the concentration curve for the health benefits with private 
expenditures much closer to the Lorenz curve than the health benefits without private 
expenditures. For the rest of the analysis, we do not take into account the impact of the private 
health expenditures, however the negative impact of it on the progressivity of the services should 
be kept in mind in assessing the results.  
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Figure 4.1: Concentration Curves for Benefits 
 
 
Table 4.16: Dominance Results for Public Services, 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve and the 45?Degree Line             
  Health (1) Transfer 1 Transfer 2 Infrastructure 
  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Decision rule 1 + + + + + + + + 
Howes’ Test  + + nd + + + + + 
*otes: 1) compares the column's concentration curve with the Lorenz curve for per adult equivalent household 
expenditures; 2) compares the column's concentration curve with the 45:degree line 
‘+' indicates that the benefits from the column's service are more concentrated among the poor  
than per adult equivalent expenditures (for (1)) or an equal per adult equivalent distribution (for (2)) 
‘' indicates that the service is less concentrated among the poor. The service is dominated by 45:degree line  
‘x' indicates that the curves cross 
nd: non dominance: we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
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Table 4.17: Results of  Dominance Tests for Public Services  
Howes' Test         
  Health Infrastructure Transfer 2 Transfer 1 
Health   + + + 
Infrastructure    X X 
Transfer 2     + 
Transfer 1         
*otes: '+' indicates that the row's benefit dominates the column's benefit 
X' indicates that concentration curves cross   
 
4.3.2 The Progressivity Indices and The Extended Ginis Test 
In this section we follow the same procedure as we did in Chapter 3 and employ 
summary indices of progression and redistribution to reach unambiguous results. We report the 
indices for redistribution and horizontal inequity (Atkinson+Plotnick Index) as well as the 
Kakwani index of TR+Progressivity and the Reynolds+Smolensky index of IR+Progressivity, in 
order to see the extent of inequality reducing impacts of the benefits. 
Table 4.18 reports the indices for the benefits with asymptotic standard errors (in italic) 
estimated by DAD software. In order to show the problem of overestimating the progressivity 
and the redistributive impact of the social transfers, we report two different estimations of the 
indices for the social transfers. For the first one, we accept the benchmark distribution as the 
household expenditure less the social transfers and rank the households by this to obtain the 
progressivity indices. For the second estimation, we assume that the social transfers do not 
modify the underlying expenditure distribution and in estimating the indices of progressivity, 
reranking and redistribution, we keep ranking of households by per adult equivalent household 
expenditure. So we also implicitly suppose that there is no reranking as a result of transfers, thus 
S+Gini indices of IR progressivity and redistribution are equal to each other for the social 
transfers.  
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Since all benefits have positive Kakwani and Reynold+Smolensky indices, they are all 
progressive and have the positive redistributive impact. Let us first discuss the estimations for 
the social transfers. As can be seen from the table, if we rank people by pre+social transfers 
distribution to measure the indices, the most progressive type of benefit is the social transfers 
(both with and without pensions) with very high TR and IR progressivity rates, 0.74 and 0.14 
respectively for the transfers (1) with pensions. Also the social transfers cause 7.8% reduction in 
expenditure inequality which is highest among the benefits. However, the transfers cause 0.065 
reranking which is the highest reranking as well. On the other hand, if we ignore the reranking as 
a result of the social transfers (the results indicated ** in the table), the progressivity rates are 
0.065 and 0.012 for the social transfers (1) and the inequality reduction is only 1.2% which is 
equal to IR progressivity rate. The difference between the two estimations is a result of the 
reranking which is mainly arising from the retirement pensions, as 10% of retired individuals 
have no source of income other than the retirement pensions. As we emphasized before, 
assuming that those individuals would not try to have any other source of income in the absence 
of the pensions is not realistic and this overestimates the progressivity and redistributive power 
of the social transfers. Retired individuals paid payroll taxes to entitle them to the retirement 
pensions and in the absence of the pension system they would save some money, which would 
make them have more than zero income. In this reasoning, for the rest of the analysis, we ignore 
the reranking caused by the social transfers and keep ranking the households by post+social 
transfer expenditure. 
The public health benefits have the highest indices, followed by infrastructure and 
transfers. Transfers without pensions (2) have the higher Kakwani index than with pensions (1) 
as expected, yet transfers (1) is more progressive than transfers (2) according to Reynold+
Smolensky index. The rankings given by Kakwani and Reynold+Smolensky indices for transfers 
are different, because the share of transfers (2) in the total household expenditure is very small, 
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even if it is more concentrated amongst the poor. Thus, due to the small size of the transfers (2), 
the progressivity and the redistributive power of them is quite limited.  If we rank all public 
services including the education benefits, the primary education is the most progressive public 
service, in other words it is the most concentrated amongst the poor; and the higher education is 
the least progressive (least concentrated amongst the poor). All comparisons are statistically 
significant.  
The most inequality reducing impact comes from the health services (1.8%), followed 
by transfers (1) (1.2%), infrastructure services (1.1%) and finally transfers (2) (0.6%). When we 
incorporate the education benefits too, an interesting observation appears. Although higher 
education seems to be progressive with both TR and IR progressivity indices, the redistributive 
impact of it is regressive, arising from the higher reranking relative to progressivity of higher 
education services. The other interesting point is that even if the progressivity rate of the primary 
education is far higher than that of the health benefits, the final redistributive impact they lead is 
almost the same (1.9% for the primary education). The reason for this result may be the relative 
share of benefits in the household total expenditures. It seems that the public health benefits 
make up 6.8% of the total household expenditures, whereas the primary education benefits are 
only 3.8% of the total household expenditures. Therefore, this suggests that in reducing 
inequality both public services need to be given the equal importance. 
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Table 4.18: S?Gini Indices for Benefits (ρ=2)   
 
Kakwani Index 
TR Progression 
Reynolds?Smolensky      
IR Progression 
Atkinson?Plotnick 
Horizontal Inequity 
Redistribution 
Primary 0.577 0.021 0.002 0.019 
 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Secondary 0.426 0.009 0.002 0.007 
 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Higher 0.043 0.001 0.004 +0.003 
 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health  0.312 0.020 0.001 0.018 
 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Infrastructure 0.155 0.012 0.001 0.011 
 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Transfers (1)* 0.740 0.143 0.065 0.078 
 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Transfers (2)* 0.647 0.030 0.012 0.017 
 0.021 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Transfers (1)** 0.065 0.012 0 0.012 
 0.008 0.002 0 0.002 
Transfers (2)** 0.129 0.006 0 0.006 
  0.015 0.001 0 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors estimated by DAD are in italic. Transfer1: including pensions; Transfer2:excluding 
pensions.  
*The households are ranked by pre:social transfer expenditure (the total household expenditure less the social 
transfers) 
**The households are ranked by the total household expenditure 
 
Although the progressivity indices give us a ranking of benefits, we would like to test if 
this ranking is consistent with different inequality aversion parameters. If we could attain higher 
progressivity index for one transfer for the whole range of inequality aversion parameters, we 
say that that transfer “dominates” the others. Also if we attain positive numbers for the indices of 
progressivity and redistribution for the whole range of inequality weights, we confirm the 
progressiveness of the benefit. Table A 4.18, Table A 4.19 and Table A 4.20 give S+Gini indices 
of IR, TR and redistribution with asymptotic standard errors for different values of ρ. Also based 
on these tables, Figure A 4+2, Figure A 4+3 and Figure A 4+4 show visually how the indices of 
the benefits vary with values of inequality aversion parameter, ρ (rho).  
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We summarise the information that we could get from these tables in Table 4.19 which 
gives the extended+Gini test. According to Table 4.19, none of the public services is pro+poor 
(none of the benefits has a negative coefficient of concentration + Table A 4.21), as we have 
found in the previous section. Yet all of them are progressive since TR progressivity indices are 
all positive for the whole range of parameter values. However, TR progressivity rates are not 
different from zero statistically for parameter values of 3.5 and 4, in other words, for the lower 
part of the distribution the concentration curve for transfers (1) and the Lorenz curve of per adult 
equivalent expenditure coincide statistically. Hence according to the Howes’ test we have 
inconclusive result for transfers (1). However, we may say that transfers (1) can be progressive if 
we have a social welfare function which cares more about middle and upper middle part of the 
distribution. It can be seen from Figure A 4+2: TR progressivity values increase up to 2.5 but it 
starts decreasing after 3. This is supported by IR progressivity rates too. 
Table 4.19: Extended?Ginis Test Results, 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve and the 45?Degree Line    
  Health  Transfer 1 Transfer 2 Infrastructure 
ρ 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
1.01 + ? + ? + ? + ? 
1.5 + ? + ? + ? + ? 
2 + ? + ? + ? + ? 
2.5 + ? + ? + + + + 
3 + ? + ? + + + + 
3.5 + ? na ? + + + + 
4 + + na + + + + + 
otes: Based on Table A 4.18 and Table A 4.21   
 
For ranking benefits with TR progressivity, we can confirm that health benefits 
dominate all other benefits as it has the highest indices for all values of ρ for both progressivity 
indices; it also has the highest redistributive impact. Health services are followed by 
infrastructure services, social transfers without pensions (2) and transfers with pensions (1). For 
social transfers with pensions, TR+progressivity index takes the smallest values for 1.01 and 4 
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(two extreme points). But the index increases with ρ up to 2, and when we keep increasing the 
value of ρ, in other words when we put more weight on the poorer, the index declines. We have 
seen this pattern with the descriptive analysis as well. The reason for this phenomenon is the 
high concentration of unrecorded employment in the lower deciles, which causes relatively 
fewer beneficiaries of employment related cash transfers such as retirement pensions and the tax 
refund in the lower deciles and implies the services do not benefit the poor disproportionately.  
Figure A 4+3 in Appendix 4.2 presents how the IR progressivity ranking of the benefits 
varies with values of inequality aversion parameter, ρ.  All benefits have positive numbers for 
the whole range of inequality parameter. The most sensitive benefit is generated by health 
spending, whose progressivity increases with ρ very quickly once ρ is greater than 1.5. The 
progressivity keeps increasing when ρ is greater than 2. Health benefits are followed by 
infrastructure services. However, we cannot rank the benefits unambiguously with IR 
progressivity approach. The progressivity of transfers (1) is higher than that of infrastructure 
services if we put higher weight to the upper part of the distribution, but in contrast with the 
infrastructure services, its progressivity begins to decline once ρ is greater than 1.5. Hence it can 
be said that transfers with pensions are more concentrated in the middle and upper deciles. TR 
progressivity approach told us that transfers (2) is more concentrated amongst the poor than 
transfers (1), so the former dominates the latter. However, with IR progressivity approach, 
transfers (1) seems to have higher progressivity up to 3 for ρ; when we increase ρ further to 3.5 
and 4, transfers (2) becomes more progressive than transfers(1), suggesting pro+poor 
characteristics. The different ranking estimated by TR and IR approaches comes from the very 
small share of transfers (2) in the total household expenditure as noted before. As IR approach 
captures redistributive impact too, it produces different ranking from TR approach.  
Finally if we look at the redistributive impact of the benefits (Figure A 4.4), we see that 
the primary education, health and social transfers (1) compete with each other for the lower 
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values of ρ, but the primary education creates more redistributive impacts when we put more 
weight on the lower part of the distribution. In other words as ρ rises, the redistributive impact of 
transfers (1) decreases and that of the health benefits stays same after ρ is 2. Moreover, higher 
education is the only inequality worsening public service.  
4.3.3 The Overall Analysis of the Social Services 
In this section, we aggregate all public expenditures on education, health, infrastructure 
and social transfers to see the total effect of social services on inequality. The concentration 
curves are given in Figure 4.2. The total benefits7 are progressive regardless of the definition 
since the Lorenz curve is dominated by the concentration curves for the total benefits. However, 
the benefit system is not pro+poor in the sense that the concentration curves are dominated by 
45+degree line. The social transfers worsen the distribution of the total benefits as the 
concentration curve of the total benefits without social transfers are much closer to the 45+degree 
line than the concentration curves with social transfers. These findings are confirmed by the 
summary indices of redistribution in Table 4.20. S+Gini redistribution indices8 increase with ρ 
for Total Benefits (2) and Total Benefits (3), however, the total social transfers (including 
pensions) decrease the redistributive impact of the total benefit system once ρ is bigger than 2.5. 
The total benefit system causes around 5% reduction in inequality. It should be emphasized that 
the publicly provided services we have chosen to examine are supposed to benefit the poor 
                                                           
7 Total Benefits (1) indicates the sum of per adult equivalent benefits from all public services examined 
with social transfers (1); Total Benefits (2) indicates the sum of all benefits with transfers (2); Total 
Benefits (3) indicates the sum of all benefits without social transfers. For Total benefits 1 and 2, we rank 
households according to per adult equivalent expenditure, that is post+social transfer expenditure. 
8 To obtain the redistribution indices for the total benefits with social transfers we estimate the difference 
between the concentration index of the pre+social transfer household expenditure ranked by per adult 
equivalent household expenditure (post+transfer expenditure) and the Gini index for post+benefits 
household expenditure that does not include the social transfers. Pre+social transfers household 
expenditure is equal to household expenditure minus social transfers. As noted before, we assume that the 
social transfers do not modify the underlying distribution which is based on household expenditure the 
data provides. In this manner, we use the concentration coefficient of pre+social transfers household 
expenditure ranked by per adult equivalent expenditure instead of the Gini coefficient of pre+social 
transfers household expenditure.  
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disproportionately to have a significant impact on inequality and poverty. Apart from the 
primary and secondary education services, the public services do not target the poor and the 
benefits appear to be received by middle classes most. 
Figure 4.2: Concentration Curves for Total Benefits 
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Table 4.20: Redistribution Index for Total Benefits with different inequality aversion 
parameter 
Parameter Values Total Benefits (1) Total Benefits(2) Total Benefits (3) 
1.01 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.048 0.039 0.034 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 
2 0.056 0.051 0.045 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 
2.5 0.057 0.055 0.049 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 
3 0.055 0.058 0.052 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 
3.5 0.053 0.059 0.053 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 
4 0.051 0.059 0.053 
  0.002 0.001 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors computed with DAD in italic  
Redistribution is measured by the difference between Lorenz curves for pre:benefit(per AE household 
expenditure) and post:benefit household expenditure 
4.3.4 Regional Level Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 3, regional disparities are important to understand inequalities 
in Turkey. We have given the regional distribution of the benefits so far in each corresponding 
section. In this final section we examine the redistributive impacts of health, infrastructure and 
social transfers and the overall benefit system including the public education benefits by regions. 
In order to see how the services affect within and between regions inequalities, we use the 
inequality decomposition method. The inequality decomposition analysis for each public service 
by regions can be found in Table A 4.22 to Table A 4.27 in Appendix 4.1. Table A 4.22 provides 
the inequality decomposition results for per adult equivalent expenditure which gives post+
transfers and pre+benefits (the sum of education, health and infrastructure) distribution. By 
comparing Table A 4.22 with Table A 4.23 and Table A 4.24, we see that the public health and 
infrastructure services decrease both between+group and within+group inequalities, yet the public 
health services seem more effective than the public infrastructure services. From Table A 4.25 
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and Table A 4.26, we can say that the social transfers decrease the inequalities both within 
regions and across regions. However, the results for the social transfers are based on the pre+
social transfer distribution as we cannot rank the households by post+transfer expenditures with 
the inequality decomposition method. Thus, the results overestimate the redistributive power of 
the social transfers due to the reasons explained before. In order to avoid this and find out if 
there is any discrepancy in inequality reductions in regions, we give the redistributive impacts of 
each service in each region.  
Table 4.22 provides the redistribution indices by the geographical regions. The biggest 
inequality reducing impact as a result of the health services is seen by Central Anatolia (housing 
the capital), followed by Aegean, Black Sea, East Anatolia, Marmara, and Mediterranean; the 
inequality reduction varies from 1.5% to 2%. The extent of inequality change in Istanbul and S. 
East Anatolia is quite limited, less than 1%. The infrastructure services seem to affect the 
poorest regions more: the biggest inequality reduction happens in East Anatolia, and this region 
is followed by S. East Anatolia, Central Anatolia, Marmara, Mediterranean, Aegean and Black 
Sea. Istanbul appears the least affected region surprisingly. This indicates the infrastructure 
problems of big slum areas in Istanbul, which shows the high inequality in the region. The 
redistributive impact of the social transfers (1) is not statistically different from zero (numbers in 
bold) for four regions and it is negative for S. East Anatolia. As the poorest region, S. East 
Anatolia is expected to receive the highest benefits, particularly from the social transfers, which 
are supposed to target the poor directly. Instead the social transfers increase inequality in S. East 
Anatolia. Social transfers (2) seem to have positive but small impact on the expenditure 
inequality in regions; Central Anatolia has the biggest inequality reduction impact with 1%, 
which comes from the capital’s privileges. The redistribution indices for the other regions are 
either statistically zero (Istanbul and S. East Anatolia) or smaller than 1%. When we look at 
urban and rural areas, we see that health and infrastructure services improve inequalities in both 
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areas but the impact is smaller for rural areas; this gives another evidence for targeting problems 
of public services. Social transfers also seem to have no effect in rural areas. 
Table 4.21: Redistribution Index by regions  
  Health Infrastructure Transfers (1) Transfers (2) 
Istanbul  0.0088 0.0014 0.020 0.0024 
 0.0002 0.0005 0.0038 0.0015 
Marmara 0.0152 0.01 0.0304 0.0091 
 0.0006 0.0005 0.0041 0.0015 
Aegean  0.0186 0.0074 0.0068 0.0069 
 0.0007 0.0004 0.0049 0.0016 
Black Sea  0.0167 0.0053 0.0237 0.0087 
 0.0011 0.0011 0.005 0.0019 
Central Anatolia  0.0206 0.0106 0.0047 0.01 
 0.0007 0.0006 0.0041 0.0015 
Mediterranean  0.015 0.0094 0.0004 0.0055 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0039 0.0015 
East Anatolia  0.0158 0.012 0.0018 0.0058 
 0.0018 0.0017 0.0046 0.0021 
S. East Anatolia 0.0045 0.0107 +0.0105 ?0.0027 
 0.0012 0.001 0.0029 0.0017 
Turkey 0.0184 0.0110 0.0117 0.0058 
 0.0003 0.0003 0.0018 0.0006 
Urban 0.0196 0.0128 0.0165 0.0050 
 0.0003 0.0003 0.0022 0.0008 
Rural 0.0125 0.0111 0.0020 0.0076 
  0.0006 0.0005 0.0030 0.0012 
ote: Values are the differences of Gini indices of expenditure distributions before and after education benefits.  
Asymptotic standard errors estimated by DAD are in italic. 
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
 
As noted before, we have three categories for the total benefits to see the impact of 
social transfers properly. The redistribution index for total benefits (1) is measured by the 
difference between the concentration coefficient of pre+social transfers (1) household 
expenditure (ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure) and the Gini coefficient of 
post+benefits (education, health and infrastructure) household expenditure. Total benefits (3) 
consist of education, health and infrastructure benefits, but exclude the impact of the social 
transfers. If we focus on first the total impact of the education, health and the infrastructure 
services (total benefits 3), the extent of inequality reduction in the regions due to these public 
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services varies from 2% to 4.7%. The biggest impact goes to East Anatolia, followed by Central 
Anatolia and Mediterranean. Istanbul and S. East Anatolia appear to have the smallest reduction 
in inequality as a result of the total benefits without the social transfers. Moreover, the public 
education, health and infrastructure services decrease both between and within+group 
inequalities (Table A 4.27). When we include the social transfers with pensions (Total Benefits 
1), Marmara and Black Sea experience the biggest reduction in inequality, and it seems the 
social transfers have the positive impact in all regions except S. East Anatolia, which has the 
smaller redistribution index relative to the redistribution indices caused by Total Benefits (2) and 
(3). When we exclude the pensions from the total social transfers, the decrease in inequality 
caused by the total benefits declines for Istanbul, Marmara and Black Sea, reflecting the high 
number of the pensioners in these regions, whereas the inequality reduction for S. East Anatolia, 
East Anatolia, Mediterranean, Central Anatolia increases relative to Total Benefits (1), 
suggesting the social transfers without retirement pensions target these regions more.  
Table 4.22: Redistribution Index for Total Benefits by regions 
  Total Benefits (1) Total Benefits (2) Total Benefits (3) 
Istanbul 0.0422 0.0246 0.0222 
 0.0042 0.0019 0.0009 
Marmara 0.0660 0.0448 0.0357 
 0.0046 0.0022 0.0015 
Aegean  0.0442 0.0443 0.0374 
 0.0052 0.0023 0.0015 
Black Sea  0.0622 0.0472 0.0385 
 0.0062 0.0032 0.0024 
Central Anatolia  0.0466 0.0519 0.0419 
 0.0046 0.0023 0.0016 
Mediterranean  0.0405 0.0456 0.0401 
 0.0048 0.0025 0.0017 
East Anatolia  0.0491 0.0531 0.0473 
 0.0067 0.0046 0.0037 
S. East Anatolia 0.0225 0.0303 0.0330 
  0.0043 0.0032 0.0026 
Turkey 0.0564 0.0505 0.0447 
 0.0022 0.0010 0.0007 
Urban 0.0630 0.0514 0.0465 
 0.0026 0.0012 0.0008 
Rural 0.0424 0.0480 0.0404 
 0.0035 0.0018 0.0013 
ote: Values are the differences of Gini indices of expenditure distributions before and after 
education benefits. Asymptotic standard errors estimated by DAD are in italic  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
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Finally we want to see the direction of redistribution across regions. While Table 4.23 
presents the percentage expenditure shares of regions before and after each public service 
benefit, Table 4.24 also provides the percentage expenditure shares of regions before and after 
the total benefits. The tables also provide the differences between the shares of regions before 
and after benefit expenditure shares to see if the regional distribution becomes more equal or not 
by assessing the change in regions’ expenditure shares9. According to Table 4.23, the public 
health services redistribute expenditures from Istanbul to the other regions but Istanbul increased 
expenditure share after health benefits. However, the biggest share goes to the second richest 
region, Central Anatolia, followed by Black Sea, East Anatolia (the third and second poorest 
regions respectively) and Aegean (the third richest region). The smallest share goes to Marmara 
and the poorest region S. East Anatolia. To sum up, the health benefits redistribute expenditure 
from the richest city to the other less wealthy regions, but the redistribution does not go to the 
poorest region, implying the health services are not pro+poor regionally either. The infrastructure 
services also follow very similar pattern. In this case, the redistribution occurs from Marmara 
and Aegean as well as Istanbul to the rest of the regions. The biggest share goes to Central 
Anatolia, Black Sea and East Anatolia. The social transfers appear to increase regional 
inequalities. The expenditure shares of Istanbul, S. East and East Anatolia and Mediterranean 
decrease after the social transfers. Surprisingly after the social transfers (1) S. East Anatolia’s 
expenditure lost is very big, even if it is the poorest region, proving the poor targeting of the 
social transfers. Central Anatolia and Aegean receive the biggest share from the redistribution. 
When we analyse the overall benefit system, it is clear that pensions make the total benefit 
system less inequality reducing at the regional level too. The redistribution caused by Total 
Benefits (1) happens from Istanbul, Mediterranean and S. East Anatolia to the other regions 
                                                           
9 Columns 3, 5, 7 and 9 for Table 4.23; Columns 3, 5 and 7 for Table 4.24. Negative difference indicates 
that the expenditure share of the region with negative difference is declined as a result of the public 
services, and redistribution is taking place from the regions with negative difference to the regions with 
positive difference. 
  Chapter 4 
 151
whereas Total Benefits (2) and (3) redistribute expenditures from Istanbul, Marmara and Aegean 
to the other regions and the biggest share from the redistribution is received by East and Central 
Anatolia.  
 
Table 4.23: Redistributive Impacts of benefits, by Region 
Regions 1 2 3 4 5 
 Per AE Per AE Exp. Dist. Per AE Exp. Dist. 
  Expenditure  After Health Ben. (2?1) After Infra. Ben. (4?1) 
S. East Anatolia 3.97 4.01 0.03 4.16 0.19 
East Anatolia  4.83 5.06 0.24 5.20 0.37 
Black Sea  8.37 8.67 0.30 8.69 0.31 
Mediterranean  11.98 12.05 0.07 12.00 0.02 
Marmara 13.36 13.36 0.01 13.13 0.23 
Aegean  14.24 14.39 0.15 13.92 0.33 
Central Anatolia  15.65 15.97 0.32 16.05 0.40 
Istanbul  27.60 26.49 1.10 26.85 0.75 
Regions 1 6 7 8 9 
 Per AE Per AE Exp. Dist Per AE Exp. Dist 
  Expenditure  Before Transfers(1) (6?1) Before Transfers(2) (8?1) 
S. East Anatolia 3.97 4.56 0.59 4.08 0.10 
East Anatolia  4.83 5.18 0.35 4.85 0.02 
Black Sea  8.37 8.01 0.36 8.28 0.09 
Mediterranean  11.98 12.27 0.29 12.04 0.06 
Marmara 13.36 13.15 0.20 13.35 0.00 
Aegean  14.24 13.27 0.98 14.16 0.08 
Central Anatolia  15.65 14.88 0.77 15.44 0.21 
Istanbul  27.60 28.68 1.08 27.80 0.20 
otes: Regions are ranked in ascending order according to their expenditure share. 
 
 
Table 4.24: Redistributive Impacts of Total Benefits, by Region 
        
Regions 
1            
AE_EXP 
 2               
Exp. After        
Total Ben.(1) 
3 
. (2?1) 
4              
Exp. After      
TotalBen(2) 
5 
(4?1) 
6              
Exp. After 
Total Ben.(3) 
7 
 (6?1) 
S. East Anatolia 3.97 3.92 0.06 4.23 0.25 4.30 0.33 
East Anatolia  4.83 5.28 0.46 5.58 0.75 5.61 0.78 
Black Sea  8.37 9.24 0.87 9.14 0.76 9.09 0.72 
Mediterranean  11.98 11.92 0.06 12.06 0.08 12.10 0.12 
Marmara 13.36 13.39 0.03 13.24 0.11 13.24 0.11 
Aegean  14.24 14.74 0.49 14.17 0.07 14.11 0.14 
Central Anatolia  15.65 16.88 1.24 16.66 1.01 16.60 0.95 
Istanbul  27.60 24.63 2.97 24.92 2.67 24.95 2.65 
otes: Total Benefits(1): total education benefits+health+infrastructure+social transfers 
 Total Benefits(2): total education benefits+health+infrastructure+social transfers without pensions 
Total Benefits(3): total education benefits+health+infrastructure 
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4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has aimed to complement the education benefit analysis of the previous 
chapter with the benefit incidence analysis of other public services, namely health, infrastructure 
and social transfers and to examine the redistributive impacts of the whole benefit system, which 
is supposed to have significant impacts on inequality and poverty. We have examined the 
distributional impacts of the health and infrastructure services and the social transfers in cash 
and in kind with the help of different measures and methods. The results show that, at least from 
a static point of view, these services have potential to help reduce inequality; however, public 
expenditures on these services are not pro+poor.  
Turkey does not have universal coverage for the public health services and only 
employees covered by any social security organisation, retired people and their dependants can 
utilise public health services. According to the results, the public health services seem to meet 
the needs of individuals with health insurance. Given the fact that unrecorded employment is 
concentrated in the poorer sections of the society (first four deciles), the public health services 
are not pro+poor.  Although the health services are not pro+poor (or absolute progressive) the 
health services have the highest positive redistributive impact in reducing inequality after the 
primary education services.  
There should be concern over the role of out+of pocket expenditures to reach public 
health services. As been discussed in the chapter, the health system demands households spend 
money to reach better public health services, even though they have the right to use the services 
for free. It is well known that the poor hesitate to use the public health services, either due to the 
necessary out+of pocket expenditures or due to giving less importance to health conditions. This 
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can be seen by the fact that the household private expenditures on health rise with expenditure 
deciles in Turkey. These household expenditures on health include spending on private health 
services, but the largest part of these expenditures still can be assessed as out+of pocket 
expenditures to reach the public health services. We have shown that when we take into account 
the private health expenditures, the public health services become less progressive.  
As for the public infrastructure services, we see that the households have basic 
infrastructure services such as electricity, sewage and running water. However, there is still a 
need to pay more attention the needs of the lower deciles. To allocate the infrastructure 
expenditures of the government to the households, we have created an index which is based on 
the value of residences. The logic of the index comes from the assumption that more valuable 
properties also have better, or make more use of infrastructure services. Since this index 
increases with the deciles as expected, the distributional impact of the services happens to be 
moderate. Social transfers either in cash or in kind have generally been found to be progressive 
in the literature. Since they are supposed to be targeting the poor directly, the social transfers are 
expected to be pro+poor as well. However, HICES suggests that the most important social 
transfers are retirement pensions, and due to the high unrecorded employment in the lower 
deciles, pensions contribute to inequality.  Even the total social transfers with pensions in cash 
and in kind are regressive for the lower deciles. According to the results from the S+Gini 
inequality decomposition analysis, transfers in kind, old+age benefits, SASF transfers to the poor 
and DIS transfers to the farmers seem to contribute to equality. However, the shares of these 
transfers in total income are so small and contribution from these transfers is negligible.  
Given that the data did not allow us to determine the actual beneficiaries of the services 
except the social transfers; the results should be taken with caution apart from the social 
transfers. However, we still think that the findings are a reasonable approximation of the 
distributional impacts of public services in Turkey. Finally, we have aggregated the total benefits 
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from the public education, health, infrastructure services and the social transfers to assess the 
distributional impact of public expenditures which are supposed to be effective instruments to 
fight against inequality and poverty in the literature. The total benefits from these public 
spending seems to be progressive in that the concentration curves are all above the Lorenz curve 
of per adult equivalent household expenditure. On the other hand, they are not pro+poor in the 
sense that their concentration curves are below the 45+degree line. We have tested the 
differences between concentration curves and Lorenz curve and 45+degree line statistically and 
the test results support the findings. The total benefit system including education benefits 
decreases inequality between 3 and 5%. 
The regional level analysis has been conducted too. The public services except social 
transfers cause reduction in both within and between regions inequalities. The total social 
transfers increase inequality in the poorest region, S. East Anatolia. Istanbul with the high Gini 
coefficient and the poorest region, S. East Anatolia, appear to be the most unfortunate regions in 
terms of utilising public services. The redistribution caused by the total benefits without 
pensions is from Istanbul, Mediterranean and S. East Anatolia to the other regions. However, 
when we exclude either only pensions or all social transfers, the direction of the redistribution 
becomes more equitable, namely from Istanbul, Marmara and Aegean to the other regions, yet 
the biggest share from the redistribution is received by East (the second poorest region) and 
Central Anatolia. When we look at urban and rural areas, we see that health and infrastructure 
services improve inequalities in both areas but the impact is smaller for rural areas; this gives 
another evidence for targeting problems of public services. Social transfers also seem to have no 
effect in rural areas. 
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Appendix 4 
Appendix 4.1: Tables 
Table A 4.1: Organizations involved in Turkish health care classified by their function 
Policy Formulation Provision of Health Care  
The Parliament  Public  
The State Planning 
Organization  The MoH  
The MoH  Social Insurance Organization  
The Higher Education 
Council  University Hospitals  
The Court of Constitution  The Ministry of Defence  
Administrative Jurisdiction  Private 
The MoH  Private Hospitals  
Provincial Health 
Directorates  Foundations  
  Minority Hospitals  
Finance of Health Care Private Practitioners/Specialists  
The Ministry of Finance  Outpatient Clinics  
SSK  Laboratories and Diagnostic Centres  
Bağ+Kur  Pharmacies  
ES (or GERF)   
Private Insurance 
Companies  Philanthropic 
Self Funded Schemes  Red Crescent  
International Agencies  Foundations  
Source: MoH, 2004  
 
 
Table A 4.2: Social Security Membership among individuals (employee/employer/self?employed) 
by deciles 
Expenditu
re Deciles SSK ES Bag?Kur *o Coverage Private 
1 2.82 0.49 4.18 19.4 0 
2 6.31 2.65 8.03 15.7 0 
3 8.03 3.55 9.56 13.12 0 
4 9.87 5.38 10.31 11.07 0 
5 10.53 7.54 10.91 9.57 0.3 
6 13.21 9.29 10.47 8.44 6.52 
7 11.67 12.84 11.36 7.33 4.73 
8 11.93 15.59 10.29 6.19 6.79 
9 13.02 20.93 10.43 5.05 10.67 
10 12.59 21.73 14.46 4.12 70.99 
Turkey  100 100 100 100 100 
Source: HICES 
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Table A 4.3 : The Share of MoH Budget in G*P and the State Budget and the Share of 
Total  Public Health Expenditures in G*P 
Years 
% share of MoH 
Budget in G*P 
% share of MoH 
Budget in the State 
Budget 
% share of Total Public 
Health Expenditures in G*P 
1994 0.78 3.7 2.7 
1995 0.62 3.65 2.5 
1996 0.65 2.76 2.4 
1997 0.7 3.28 2.2 
1998 0.73 2.65 2.8 
1999 0.84 2.81 3.3 
2000 0.84 2.26 3.5 
2001 0.71 2.66 4.3 
2002 0.86 2.4 4.8 
2003 1.01 2.4 4.8 
2004 1.13 3.19 5.3 
2005* 1.14 3.55 + 
Source: MoH 2005, SPO 2004 
(*) GNP; Estimates of SPO 2005 year program (YTL) by new GNP series 
 
 
Table A 4.4: The quality of different types of health services  
Outpatient Care  
• MoH health centres and posts, providing free care for the Green Card holders,  
ostensibly at low levels of clinical quality;  
• SSK clinics and hospitals providing care free to its members, ostensibly at  
low levels of clinical quality and patient satisfaction  
• Private providers providing care at high costs to users, at high levels of  
patient satisfaction though not necessarily high levels of clinical quality.  
Inpatient Care:  
• MoH hospitals providing free care to Green Card holders, ostensibly at low levels 
of clinical quality 
• MoH hospitals providing care at established fee+schedules, ostensibly at  
low to medium levels of clinical quality  
• University hospitals providing care at established fee+schedules, at  
medium to high low levels of clinical quality  
• MoH and University hospitals providing care at rates higher than the established 
fee+schedules,  
at medium to high low levels of clinical quality and high levels of patient 
satisfaction.  
• SSK hospitals providing care free to its members, ostensibly at low levels of  
Clinical quality and patient satisfaction  
• Private hospitals providing care at high costs to users, at high levels of patient 
 satisfaction though not necessarily high levels of clinical quality  
Preventive Care:  
• MoH health centres and posts, providing free preventive care  
Source: MoH, 2004 
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Table A 4.5: Monthly household per adult equivalent expenditure on health, by decile, region and type of 
service, Turkey, 2003 
Deciles, 
Region,      
Service 
Type 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Expenditure 
Elasticity 
t?ratio 
Doctors             
Turkey 0.7 1.3 3.1 4.6 5.1 6.8 10.1 8.5 17.2 42.7 1.4 22.4 
Urban  0.1 0.7 1.9 2.5 4.1 5.1 8.8 8.2 18.3 50.4 1.5 18.1 
Rural 2.0 2.9 5.9 9.5 7.5 10.7 13.1 9.1 14.6 24.7 1.3 12.6 
             
Drugs             
Turkey 2.4 4.1 4.8 5.8 7.0 7.8 10.1 11.7 14.5 31.8 1.6 21.2 
Urban  1.1 2.4 3.1 4.6 5.5 6.7 9.1 11.4 16.6 39.5 1.7 17.7 
Rural 5.7 8.7 9.0 9.1 11.0 10.6 12.7 12.6 9.0 11.5 1.5 10.1 
             
Other             
Turkey 0.4 0.8 1.9 1.9 3.0 5.0 5.5 6.4 15.0 60.1 0.9 16.6 
Urban  0.1 0.4 1.0 1.9 2.5 4.4 5.2 6.2 15.2 63.2 1.0 13.7 
Rural 1.2 2.6 5.6 2.0 5.1 7.5 6.7 7.5 14.4 47.5 0.6 7.6 
             
Paramedics (nurses, midwives) 
Turkey 0.8 1.0 2.7 2.2 2.7 5.9 8.5 8.6 7.4 60.3 0.1 5.1 
Urban  0.9 0.7 2.7 2.3 2.7 5.1 4.6 8.9 7.8 64.3 0.1 3.3 
Rural 0.0 4.0 3.0 0.2 2.6 17.2 61.4 3.9 1.8 6.0 0.0 2.2 
             
Outpatient Care            
Turkey 0.2 0.9 0.7 0.8 3.3 7.4 6.6 7.2 13.5 59.5 0.2 6.8 
Urban  0.1 0.5 0.2 0.6 1.5 6.9 4.9 8.0 15.3 62.2 0.2 5.2 
Rural 0.8 3.1 3.2 2.3 13.5 10.3 16.0 3.0 3.9 44.0 0.2 4.0 
             
Inpatient Care 
Turkey 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.9 1.0 5.8 7.9 14.7 67.2 0.1 6.3 
Urban  0.1 0.5 0.3 0.4 2.2 1.0 3.1 8.6 14.7 69.1 0.1 5.1 
Rural 0.5 0.0 0.2 1.2 1.4 1.0 9.8 6.9 14.7 64.4 0.2 3.5 
             
Individuals without social insurance 
Turkey 26.5 17.4 13.5 10.8 8.3 6.8 6.8 4.6 3.2 2.2   
Urban  17.1 15.3 13.8 11.9 10.1 8.7 7.7 6.7 5.0 3.7   
Rural 17.1 15.3 13.8 11.9 10.1 8.7 7.7 6.7 5.0 3.7   
             
Total Private 
Expenditure           
Turkey 1.2 2.1 3.1 4.0 5.0 6.2 8.7 9.2 15.4 45.3 2.3 29.5 
Urban  0.5 1.2 2.0 2.9 4.0 5.2 7.5 9.0 16.5 51.2 2.4 24.5 
Rural 2.9 4.4 5.9 6.9 7.5 8.6 11.8 9.7 12.5 29.9 2.2 14.1 
% of 
AE_EXP 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.1 1.8 2.3 3.2 2.3  
ote: Deciles are ranked by total household expenditure per adult equivalent (AE_EXP); Source: HICES 
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Table A 4.6: The Distribution of Public Health Expenditure and *umber of Health Staff by 
regions in 2003 
Region AE_EXP Population 
Public Health 
Expenditure 
Specialist GP 
Dentist 
Pharmacist 
Paramedics 
Istanbul 27.6 15.47 8.67 28.63 15.2 23.71 10.11 
West Marmara 4.8 4.16 4.16 3.47 3.7 4.4 5.35 
Aegean 14.25 13.26 13.92 16.32 16.3 16.89 16.63 
East Marmara 8.56 8.55 7.24 8.4 8.7 8.31 9.31 
West Anatolia 11.07 9.36 12.44 16.07 15.5 15.7 13.03 
Mediterranean 11.98 13 13.35 9.73 11.8 11.45 13.52 
Central 
Anatolia 4.55 6.15 6.43 3.53 6.4 4.22 7.09 
West Black Sea 4.62 6.9 7.98 4.54 6.8 5.17 7.96 
East Black Sea 3.76 4.5 5.68 2.14 3.6 2.77 5.17 
*orth East 
Anatolia 1.96 3.55 4.46 1.5 2.6 1.32 2.69 
Central East 
Anatolia 2.88 5.44 7.02 2.06 3.8 1.64 3.69 
South East 
Anatolia 3.97 9.67 8.66 3.62 5.7 4.41 5.44 
Turkey 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: HICES, MoH 2005; GP: general practitioner 
 
Table A 4.7: Public and Private Health Expenditures by Regions, (%) 2000 
Regions 
Public Health 
Expenditure 
Private Health 
Expenditure 
Total 
 West (Istanbul, Marmara 
and Aegean) * 72.44 27.56 100 
 South  (Mediterranean) 56.19 43.81 100 
 Central  (Central Anatolia) 66.23 33.77 100 
 *orth  (Black Sea) 63.88 36.12 100 
 East  (South East and East 
Anatolia) 59.42 40.58 100 
Turkey 64.34 35.66 100 
Source: MoH (2006) 
* MoH (2006) uses a different regional classification from the one we use throughout the study. Our 
classification is given in parentheses. 
 
 
Table A 4.8: The Distribution of Private Expenditures on Health Care 
by Region(1) 
  Rural Urban Turkey 
Doctors 29.82 70.18 100 
Drugs 27.55 72.45 100 
Other 19.92 80.08 100 
Paramedics 6.83 93.17 100 
Outpatient Care 15.21 84.79 100 
Inpatient Care 39.89 60.11 100 
Total Private Health Expenditure 28.09 71.91 100 
Source: HICES 
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Table A 4.9: The Distribution of Private Expenditures on Health Care by Region (2) 
  Rural Urban Turkey 1
st
 Decile 10
th
 Decile 
Doctors 34.3 31.53 32.31 20.77 30.5 
Drugs 34.84 35.78 35.52 69.58 24.94 
Other 11.22 17.62 15.82 6.16 21 
Paramedics 0.21 1.14 0.88 0.4 1.18 
Outpatient Care 1.63 3.55 3.01 1.3 3.96 
Inpatient Care 17.72 10.43 12.48 1.78 18.53 
Total Private Health 
Expenditure 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: HICES 
 
 
Table A 4.10: Public Health Service *eeds and Benefits, by region % shares 
Regions 
Per AE Household 
Expenditure Population POTE*TIAL VISIT 
Per AE Public Health 
Expenditure 
Istanbul  27.6 17.13 17.38 20.98 10.28 
Marmara 13.36 13.85 14.46 16.73 13.46 
Aegean  14.24 15.25 14.53 17.37 16.51 
Black Sea  8.37 10.96 11.22 8.64 13.24 
Central 
Anatolia  15.65 15.82 16.9 15.05 20.82 
Mediterranean  11.98 13.39 12.65 13.05 13.15 
East Anatolia  4.83 6.87 7.28 3.97 8.30 
S. East 
Anatolia 3.97 6.74 5.59 4.21 4.24 
Turkey 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table A 4.11 : The Percentage of Users of House Facilities by rural/urban location 
and by facility 
  Rural Urban Turkey 
Electricity 99.93 100 100 
Piped 
Water 81.55 100 100 
Sewerage 75.19 95.33 99.11 
Telephone 81.45 86.82 87.19 
Transport 45.91 74.61 63.6 
HighRoad 23.67 29.26 62.25 
Hotwater 39.53 65.03 89.74 
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Table A 4.12: The Distribution of Basic House Facilities by region (%), 
Region Population 
Per AE 
Household 
Expenditure 
Electricity 
Piped 
Water 
Sewage Phone Transport HighRoad Hot water 
Istanbul   17.13 27.6 17.14 18.36 19.36 17.46 22.18 17.77 21.31 
Marmara 13.85 13.36 13.85 14.75 14.45 14.43 15.56 14.04 14.97 
Aegean  15.25 14.24 15.25 15.93 14.76 15.43 14.25 17.76 14.48 
Black Sea  10.96 8.37 10.96 9.28 11.88 11.47 7.45 8.08 9.78 
Central Anatolia  15.82 15.65 15.82 16.47 15.31 16.56 15.65 18.18 16.04 
Mediterranean  13.39 11.98 13.38 13.63 12.34 13.17 14.52 17.29 15.92 
East Anatolia  6.87 4.83 6.86 6.3 6.34 6.31 5.16 3.9 4.8 
Southeast Anatolia  6.74 3.97 6.74 5.29 5.56 5.17 5.21 2.99 2.7 
Turkey   100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table A 4.13: Redistributive Impacts of Public Infrastructure Services by regions 
Regions 
Per AE Household 
Expenditure Population 
Per Household Public 
Infrastructure Benefits 
Istanbul   27.6 15.47 16.51 
Marmara 13.36 12.71 10.40 
Aegean  14.24 13.27 9.41 
Black Sea  8.37 11.40 12.31 
Central 
Anatolia  15.65 15.47 20.70 
Mediterranean  11.98 13.00 12.59 
East Anatolia  4.83 9.00 10.59 
S. East 
Anatolia 3.97 9.68 7.49 
Turkey  100 100 100 
 
Table A 4.14: Percentage shares of receivers of social transfers by deciles  
Expenditure 
Deciles 
People aged 
65+ 
Old?Age 
Pensioners 
SASF and 
DIS 
receivers 
Students 
with Public 
Scholarships 
Beneficiaries of 
Public In?kind 
Transfers 
1 12.45 26.74 14.98 2.31 15.6 
2 10.04 16.72 12.69 1.71 12.78 
3 10.18 14.02 13.77 0 10.37 
4 9.97 7.48 13.91 6.19 10.41 
5 10.9 8.82 10.16 6.17 10.7 
6 10.07 9.77 11.04 14.06 10.06 
7 9.11 8.64 8.98 13.75 10.04 
8 9.14 3.96 5.98 15.96 8.74 
9 9.4 2.52 4.54 29.77 6.5 
10 8.74 1.34 3.96 10.08 4.81 
Turkey  100 100 100 100 100 
ote: Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure 
 
 
Table A 4.15: The Distribution of Social Transfers by regions   
Regions 
Per AE Household 
Expenditure 
Per AE Transfers (1) Per AE Transfers (2) 
Istanbul  27.6 22.71 23.47 
Marmara 13.36 14.18 13.12 
Aegean  14.24 18.43 16.01 
Black Sea  8.37 10.06 10.16 
Central Anatolia  15.65 18.57 19.03 
Mediterranean  11.98 10.88 11.33 
East Anatolia  4.83 3.43 4.66 
S. East Anatolia 3.97 1.74 2.21 
Turkey  100 100 100 
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Table A 4.16: The Distribution of Social Transfers by regions  
Regions 
Per AE 
Household 
Expenditure 
Pensions 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
Tax 
Refund 
Old?
Age 
Benefits  
SASF 
and DIS 
Transfers 
Student 
Grants 
Transfers 
in kind 
Other* 
Istanbul  27.6 22.48 11.42 20.71 3.57 0.37 24.71 5.05 27.77 
Marmara 13.36 14.50 56.16 13.69 12.02 21.45 3.65 16.15 12.21 
Aegean  14.24 19.15 8.52 14.59 19.82 14.40 13.12 11.05 16.41 
Black Sea  8.37 10.02 0.00 10.06 15.74 8.61 13.52 9.32 9.97 
Central Anatolia  15.65 18.43 6.81 21.05 19.54 38.46 33.65 31.23 16.51 
Mediterranean  11.98 10.75 9.56 12.49 14.90 9.00 7.37 19.87 10.94 
East Anatolia  4.83 3.06 7.53 4.50 10.54 7.06 3.90 5.00 4.12 
S. East Anatolia 3.97 1.60 0.00 2.92 3.88 0.64 0.08 2.34 2.07 
Turkey  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*The pensions for veterans and widows        
  Chapter 4 
 163
 
Table A 4.17. The differences of ordinates of the Lorenz curve and 
Concentration Curves 
Ordinates 
(p) 
Health  
Transfers 
(1) 
Transfers (2) Infrastructure 
0.05 +0.014 0.002 +0.006 +0.011 
 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 
0.1 +0.031 0.004 +0.016 +0.022 
 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 
0.15 +0.056 0.004 +0.022 +0.032 
 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.001 
0.2 +0.080 0.004 +0.030 +0.044 
 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.001 
0.25 +0.103 0.000 +0.044 +0.055 
 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.002 
0.3 +0.128 +0.012 +0.055 +0.064 
 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.002 
0.35 +0.151 +0.020 +0.059 +0.074 
 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.002 
0.4 +0.174 +0.027 +0.075 +0.083 
 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.002 
0.45 +0.193 +0.033 +0.090 +0.092 
 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.002 
0.5 +0.216 +0.041 +0.090 +0.100 
 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.003 
0.55 +0.234 +0.044 +0.100 +0.105 
 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.003 
0.6 +0.251 +0.047 +0.094 +0.107 
 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.003 
0.65 +0.262 +0.058 +0.097 +0.112 
 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.003 
0.7 +0.271 +0.064 +0.103 +0.116 
 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.003 
0.75 +0.274 +0.076 +0.098 +0.114 
 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.003 
0.8 +0.271 +0.082 +0.095 +0.112 
 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.003 
0.85 +0.259 +0.092 +0.095 +0.107 
 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.003 
0.9 +0.236 +0.097 +0.139 +0.101 
 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.003 
0.95 +0.186 +0.113 +0.117 +0.082 
 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.002 
0.99 +0.082 +0.009 +0.009 +0.042 
  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. The null hypothesis could not be rejected for 
the values in bold at 5% significance level. Ranked by per adult equivalent gross household 
expenditure the data provides 
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Table A 4.18: TR?Progressivity Index for Benefits by different inequality weights 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Health 
Benefits 
Infrastructure Transfers (1) Transfers (2) 
1.01 0.0086 0.0044 0.0037 0.0048 
 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 
1.5 0.2355 0.1162 0.0681 0.1074 
 0.0040 0.0026 0.0062 0.0116 
2 0.3118 0.1548 0.0653 0.1291 
 0.0050 0.0032 0.0075 0.0151 
2.5 0.3435 0.1737 0.0545 0.1369 
 0.0057 0.0035 0.0079 0.0165 
3 0.3577 0.1849 0.0435 0.1408 
 0.0063 0.0038 0.0081 0.0173 
3.5 0.3636 0.1923 0.0335 0.1431 
 0.0069 0.0039 0.0083 0.0179 
4 0.3652 0.1974 0.0247 0.1443 
 0.0075 0.0040 0.0084 0.0183 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors computed with DAD in italic.  
 
 
 
Table A 4.19: IR?Progressivity Index for Benefits by different inequality weights 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Health 
Benefits 
Infrastructure Transfers (1) Transfers (2) 
1.01 0.0006 0.0004 0.001 0.000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.0150 0.0093 0.014 0.005 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.002 0.001 
2 0.0199 0.0123 0.012 0.006 
 0.0003 0.0003 0.002 0.001 
2.5 0.0219 0.0139 0.008 0.006 
 0.0003 0.0003 0.002 0.001 
3 0.0228 0.0148 0.004 0.006 
 0.0004 0.0003 0.002 0.001 
3.5 0.0232 0.0153 0.001 0.006 
 0.0004 0.0003 0.002 0.001 
4 0.0233 0.0158 ?0.002 0.006 
 0.0005 0.0003 0.002 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors computed with DAD in italic. Pre:benefit household expenditure 
for transfers is equal to gross (pre:benefit, post:indirect taxes) household expenditures the data 
provides minus transfers. 
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Table A 4.20: Redistribution Index with different inequality aversion parameter 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Health Infrastructure Transfers (1) Transfers (2) 
1.01 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.005 
 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
2 0.018 0.011 0.012 0.006 
 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
2.5 0.020 0.012 0.008 0.006 
 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
3 0.020 0.013 0.004 0.006 
 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
3.5 0.020 0.013 0.001 0.006 
 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
4 0.019 0.014 ?0.002 0.006 
  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors computed with DAD in italic. Redistribution is measured by the 
difference between S:Gini indices for pre: and post:benefit household expenditure. Both pre:benefit 
post:benefit expenditures are ranked by per adult equivalent expenditure. Pre:benefit expenditures 
are equal to household expenditures the data provides minus total transfers; Post:benefit 
expenditures are equal to pre:benefit expenditures plus per AE transfers in question. So 
redistribution is equal to IR progressivity. 
 
 
Table A 4.21: Extended Coefficients of Gini and Concentration for Household 
Expenditure and Benefits 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Per AE 
Household 
Expenditure 
Health 
Benefits 
Infrastructure 
Benefits 
Transfers 
with pension 
Transfers 
without 
pension 
1.01 0.010 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.282 0.046 0.165 0.214 0.174 
 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.011 
2 0.400 0.088 0.245 0.335 0.271 
 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.015 
2.5 0.468 0.125 0.295 0.414 0.332 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.016 
3 0.514 0.157 0.329 0.471 0.373 
 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.017 
3.5 0.548 0.184 0.356 0.514 0.405 
 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.018 
4 0.574 0.209 0.376 0.549 0.430 
  0.004 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.018 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors computed with DAD in italic   
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Table A 4.22: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini  
Population 
Share  
Expenditure 
Share  
Absolute 
Contribution  
Relative 
Contribution  
Total 
Expenditure 
0.400     
Istanbul 0.423 0.17 0.28 0.02 0.05 
Marmara 0.327 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Aegean  0.365 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.02 
Black Sea  0.337 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.01 
Central 
Anatolia  0.381 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.02 
Mediterranean  0.375 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.02 
East Anatolia  0.369 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
S. East 
Anatolia 0.363 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 
WithinGroup     0.055 0.137 
BetweenGroup     0.149 0.372 
Overlap        0.197 0.492 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure  
Decomposition Approach: Analytical  
 
 
 
Table A 4.23: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure After Health Benefits* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini 
Population 
Share 
Expenditure 
Share 
Absolute 
Contribution 
Relative 
Cont. 
Total 
Expenditure 
0.382     
Istanbul 0.41 0.17 0.26 0.02 0.05 
Marmara 0.31 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Aegean  0.35 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.02 
Black Sea  0.32 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.01 
Central Anatolia  0.36 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.02 
Mediterranean  0.36 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.02 
East Anatolia  0.35 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
S. East Anatolia 0.36 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 
WithinGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.052 0.137 
BetweenGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.137 0.359 
Overlap  :::  :::  :::  0.192 0.504 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure plus per AE health benefits 
Decomposition Approach: Analytical 
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Table A 4.24: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure After Infrastructure Benefits* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini 
Population 
Share 
Expenditure 
Share 
Absolute 
Contribution 
Relative 
Cont. 
Total 
Expenditure 
0.389     
Istanbul 0.42 0.17 0.27 0.02 0.05 
Marmara 0.32 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.01 
Aegean  0.36 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.02 
Black Sea  0.33 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.01 
Central Anatolia  0.37 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.02 
Mediterranean  0.37 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.02 
East Anatolia  0.36 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
S. East Anatolia 0.35 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 
WithinGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.053 0.137 
BetweenGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.138 0.354 
Overlap  :::  :::  :::  0.198 0.508 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure plus per AE infrastructure benefits 
Decomposition Approach: Analytical  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 4.25: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure Before Social Transfers(1)* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini 
Population 
Share 
Expenditure 
Share 
Absolute 
Contribution 
Relative 
Cont. 
Total Expenditure 0.478     
Istanbul 0.49 0.17 0.29 0.02 0.05 
Marmara 0.44 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Aegean  0.46 0.15 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Black Sea  0.46 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.01 
Central Anatolia  0.46 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.02 
Mediterranean  0.44 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.02 
East Anatolia  0.43 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
S. East Anatolia 0.38 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
WithinGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.066 0.139 
BetweenGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.150 0.315 
Overlap  :::  :::  :::  0.261 0.547 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure plus per AE social transfers (1) 
Decomposition Approach: Analytical 
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Table A 4.26: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure Before Social Transfers(2)* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini  
Population 
Share  
Expenditure 
Share  
Absolute 
Contribution  
Relative 
Cont.  
Total Expenditure 0.417     
Istanbul 0.44 0.17 0.28 0.02 0.05 
Marmara 0.35 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Aegean  0.39 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.02 
Black Sea  0.36 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.01 
Central Anatolia  0.40 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.02 
Mediterranean  0.39 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.02 
East Anatolia  0.39 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
S. East Anatolia 0.37 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 
WithinGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.057 0.137 
BetweenGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.149 0.356 
Overlap  :::  :::  :::  0.211 0.506 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure plus per AE social transfers (2) 
Decomposition Approach: Analytical  
 
 
 
 
Table A 4.27: Decomposition Analysis: Contribution of Geographical Regions to Total 
Expenditure After Total Benefits (3)* 
Regions 
Estimated 
Gini 
Population 
Share 
Expenditure 
Share 
Absolute 
Contribution 
Relative 
Cont. 
Total Expenditure 0.355     
Istanbul 0.40 0.17 0.25 0.02 0.05 
Marmara 0.29 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.02 
Aegean  0.33 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.02 
Black Sea  0.30 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.01 
Central Anatolia  0.34 0.16 0.17 0.01 0.03 
Mediterranean  0.34 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.02 
East Anatolia  0.32 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 
S. East Anatolia 0.33 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 
WithinGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.049 0.138 
BetweenGroup  +++  +++  +++  0.117 0.330 
Overlap  :::  :::  :::  0.189 0.532 
otes:* Total expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure plus per AE benefits of education, 
health and infrastructure  
Decomposition Approach: Analytical  
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Appendix 4.2: Figures 
 
Figure A 4?1: Concentration Curves for Health Benefits with private health expenditures 
 
 
 
Figure A 4?2: TR Progressivity of Benefits with varying inequality aversion 
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Figure A 4?3: IR Progressivity of Benefits with varying inequality aversion 
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Figure A 4?4: Redistribution of Benefits with varying inequality aversion 
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CHAPTER 5:  TAX I*CIDE*CE A*ALYSIS I* TURKEY, 2003 
5.1 Introduction 
It is commonly believed that redistribution through tax policies is limited and this 
limitation is particularly significant in developing countries whose tax effort as a percentage of 
GNP is especially small due to the limited tax base, arising from high level of informal economy 
and tax evasion and their pervasiveness. Additionally due to the observation of that the poor 
rarely pay income taxes in developing countries, it is argued that expenditure side of government 
budgets should be given more attention as a redistributive tool (Chu et. al. 2000; Martinez+
Vazquez, 2004; Shah and Whalley, 1991; Tanzi 1998;). Despite these concerns, it is an 
important empirical question how tax policies affect income distribution to understand the role 
of tax policies as a redistributive instrument in developing countries.  
The main way to examine the distributional impacts of government taxation is the 
analysis of tax incidence. Tax incidence is the analysis of whose purchasing power ultimately 
declines due to taxes. The partial equilibrium models or conventional models of tax incidence 
allocate tax burdens to different income groups by using different assumptions on who bears the 
final tax burden. The assumptions used to calculate tax burdens are called shifting or incidence 
assumptions and these assumptions aim to capture how different taxes are shifted to households 
as consumers, producers or owners of factors. Household income and expenditure surveys are 
used to acquire information on households’ income sources and consumption patterns, which are 
necessary to calculate tax burdens originated from either direct or indirect taxes. To calculate tax 
burdens of each household, either actual tax revenues by income brackets (from tax collection 
data provided by tax authorities if available) for each tax are allocated to households according 
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to their income sources or consumption patterns; or alternatively, the nominal legal tax rates are 
applied to information on household income sources and consumption patterns by using adopted 
shifting assumptions. After calculating each household’s tax burden, the same procedure of the 
benefit incidence analysis is followed and households are ranked by a welfare indicator from 
poor to rich to see how calculated household tax burdens are distributed.  
Tax incidence analysis has been performed for developing countries recently 
(Devarajan, and Hossain, 1998; Sahn and Younger, 1998, 2003; Rajemison and Younger, 2000; 
Younger 1996; Younger, et.al., 1999; Pinar, 2004). These studies generally focus on the impacts 
of recent tax policy changes in developing countries. Those works capture the effects of both 
direct and indirect taxes depending on available data. Direct taxes include income and business 
taxes, while indirect taxes encompass excise, import tariffs, and value added taxes (VAT)1. 
Although the results change with adopted shifting assumptions and countries, the general results 
from these studies showed that direct taxes and property taxes are mostly progressive; indirect 
taxes are generally regressive but vary with particular indirect tax examined; the overall tax 
system varies with countries but regressive at low incomes.  
Turkey’s tax system took its present structure after 1980s, when Turkey implemented 
structural adjustment programs with IMF and World Bank support2. One of the aims of these 
structural adjustment programs was to improve fiscal imbalances in the economy, including the 
introduction of VAT in 1985. The major components of government tax revenue in Turkey are 
the personal income tax (PIT) and the indirect taxes. With the introduction of VAT in 1985, the 
share of indirect taxes in total tax revenues (TTR) increased dramatically from 37% in 1980 to 
52% in 1985 and made the indirect taxes the main source of tax revenue for government budget, 
while the percentage share of the direct taxes kept declining in time. The percentage share of the 
                                                           
1 See Chu et al. (2000), Gemmell and Morrissey (2003) and Martinez+Vazquez (2004), Shah and Whalley 
(1991) among others for detailed survey on developing countries’ tax systems and tax incidence analysis. 
2 For the historical background of Turkish tax system, see Bulutoglu and Thirsk (1997). 
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direct taxes in TTR is 31% and indirect taxes account for 52% (or 67% when foreign trade taxes 
are included) in 20033. Despite these structural changes in the tax system, due to the late 
introduction of household level data, there is only one empirical work (Pinar 2004) studying the 
incidence of tax policies for Turkey using micro data. This study examines redistributive impacts 
of both tax and expenditure policies for 1994 and 2002. The results show that personal income 
tax is progressive, but redistribution is enjoyed mostly by middle income classes; VAT has no 
effect on income distribution but it has very small negative impact on the bottom part of the 
distribution. Pinar concludes that if the aim of VAT is to raise tax revenues this aim is 
accomplished but it has no redistributive impact. Excise taxes such as Motor Vehicles Taxes and 
Petroleum Consumption Tax create a higher burden on higher incomes in absolute terms, 
although they do not result in a redistributive impact because the distribution of car ownership is 
similar to the initial income distribution. Pinar did not examine the payroll tax. However, Pinar 
only applies descriptive analysis and ignores statistical robustness of the results.  
The main contribution of this chapter is twofold. The first contribution of the chapter is 
to examine the distributional impacts of tax policies by applying the welfare dominance analysis 
and different summary statistics of progressivity with the statistical dominance testing 
methodology for 2003 by using the 2003 HICES. The second contribution of the chapter is to 
estimate effective tax rates for indirect taxes by using Input+Output tables to capture incidence of 
indirect taxes not only on final goods but also intermediate inputs and imported goods. The 
studies done on indirect tax incidence in recent years make use of nationally representative 
household survey data. Survey data is used to attain households’ pattern of demand to determine 
the tax paid by each household. However, these studies generally capture tax incidence only on 
final domestic goods with statutory tax rates in question; and either ignore taxes on inputs and 
imported goods or make some strong assumptions to include these issues in the analysis. 
                                                           
3 See Table A 5.1 in Appendix 5.1. 
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Following Ahmad and Stern (1991) and Rajemison et al. (2003), we calculate “effective tax 
rates” by using the Input+Output table in order to attain the incidence of taxes on intermediate 
inputs and imports. In the chapter we apply both the standard tax incidence analysis and the 
effective tax rate methodology and compare the results from both methods.  
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Turkish tax 
structure. Section 3 discusses the extent of informal economy and tax evasion in Turkey. The 
incidence assumptions and calculations of tax liabilities for each tax examined are explained in 
Section 4. Section 5 provides the results of both direct and indirect tax incidence analysis. While 
the effective tax rate methodology is applied to indirect taxes in Section 6, Section 7 presents the 
regional level analysis. The final section offers concluding remarks.  
5.2 Turkish Revenue System 
The major components of government tax revenue in Turkey are the personal income 
tax (PIT) and the indirect taxes. The former is considered a progressive tax in the sense that 
(average) tax rate increases with taxable income and is expected to have an equalizing impact on 
income distribution (Kakwani, 1986:72+86; Lambert 1993) 4. The latter is usually levied at a 
standard rate, which may result in a pro+rich redistribution due to relatively higher propensity to 
consume among the poor. In order to prevent such an effect, some differential lower rates are 
applied to some goods, such as basic needs and luxury goods. Turkish tax system has also 
property taxes such as Motor Vehicles Tax (MVT), property tax and trade taxes. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the relative importance of different taxes, particularly the share of 
each tax in GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and Total Tax Revenue (TTR) in 2003. The 
percentage share of the direct taxes in TTR is 31% and indirect taxes account for 52% (or 67% 
                                                           
4 See Chapter 2 for the discussion on progressivity definitions.  
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when foreign trade taxes are included). One can also notice from the table that the share of 
property taxes is very limited (2.48%). In this respect, Turkey represents a typical developing 
country, which has limited coverage of direct taxes.  
As we will discuss later in detail, Turkey is a typical developing country in terms 
of other senses as well such as a low tax+to+GDP ratio, widespread tax evasion, the 
predominance of indirect taxes and a limited share of capital and wealth taxes (Chu et. 
al. 2000). 
Table 5.1: Central Government Domestic Revenue, Turkey, 2003 
  Total Amount* % of GDP % of Total Tax Revenue 
Direct Taxes 25,716 7.21 30.50 
Income tax 17,064 4.78 20.24 
Corporation Tax 8,645 2.42 10.25 
Other 7 0.00 0.01 
Taxes on Property    
Motor Vehicles Tax 1,206 0.34 1.43 
Property Tax and Other 886 0.25 1.05 
Indirect Taxes 43,927 12.32 52.10 
VAT 15,390 4.31 18.25 
Private Consumption Tax 22,306 6.25 26.46 
Private Communication Tax 1,048 0.29 1.24 
Other Indirect Taxes 5,184 1.45 6.15 
Foreign Trade Taxes 12,579 3.53 14.92 
Other 2 0.00 0.00 
Total Tax Revenue 84,314 23.64 100 
Total *on Tax Revenue 15,934 4.47  
Total Revenue 100,248 28.11   
*Trillion (1,000,000,000,000)TL 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
We can see trends in direct5 and indirect taxes and tax effort with the help of Table A 
5.1 in the last 25 years. Direct taxes (measured as a percentage of TTR) have downward pattern 
since 1985 whereas indirect taxes kept increasing its share in TTR in the same period. The share 
of direct taxes declined dramatically from 62% in 1980 to 46% in 1985 and kept declining over 
time. The share of direct taxes in TTR decreased to the level of 30% in 2003. We may conclude 
that Turkish governments prefer indirect taxes to finance their spending to direct taxes.  
                                                           
5 Direct taxes include PIT, corporation tax and property taxes. 
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One of the main problems of developing countries is the lack of ability to increase their 
tax effort. This is also an issue in Turkey. As a middle+income country Turkey increased its tax 
revenue share in GNP in 2000s. The share of total taxes in GNP varied from very low level of 14 
and 11% between 1980 and 1995. Recent years have seen a rise in tax effort since 1995 and it 
became 24% in 2003. Average tax effort is 29% in developed countries and 23% in middle+
income countries (Bird and Zolt, 2005). The main reason for this low level of taxation is the size 
of informal economy and high rate of tax avoidance in Turkey and other developing countries 
(Pinar, 2002). The size of informal economy and tax evasion and their impact on tax system in 
Turkey will be discussed later in this section.  
5.2.1 Direct Taxation
6
 
Direct taxes are known to be less likely than indirect taxes to be shifted as they are 
generally applied to a tax base closer to the individual, such as her income and do not directly 
interfere with market operations, although their indirect effects cannot be avoided (Kakwani, 
1986). Turkish direct taxation system consists of three main taxes: PIT, corporation tax, property 
taxes and payroll tax (social security premiums). The only tax we exclude from the analysis is 
the corporation tax, as we work with household level data. 
Personal Income Tax 
An individual is subject to income tax on his income and earnings, in contrast to a 
company, subject to corporation tax on income and earnings. Personal income tax (PIT), the 
most important direct tax in Turkey comprising 20% of TTR, is followed by the corporation tax 
with 10%. Table 5.2 demonstrates the income tax schedule for employers or self+employed 
                                                           
6 See The Presidency of Revenue Administration Department of Taxpayer Services (2006) for details of 
Turkish taxation system. 
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individuals and employees with different income ranges in Turkey. As can be seen from the 
table, the tax rate increases with taxable income, implying progressive property of PIT schedule.  
Table 5.2: Income Tax Schedule 1 for Employers and Self?Employed Individuals  
If taxable income is over But not over Tax Liability Tax Rate 
0 5000* 20% 20% 
5,000 12,000 1,000 plus 25% of the amount over 5,000 25% 
12,000 24,000 2,750 plus 30% of the amount over 12,000 30% 
24,000 60,000 6,350 plus 35% of the amount over 2,4000 35% 
60,000 120,000 18,950 plus 40% of the amount over 60,000 40% 
120,000 No limit 42,950 plus 45% of the amount over 120,000 45% 
Income Tax Schedule 2 for Employees  
If taxable income is over But not over Tax Liability Tax Rate 
0 5,000 15% 15% 
5,000 12,000 750 plus 20% of the amount over 5,000 20% 
12,000 24,000 2,150 plus 25% of the amount over 12,000 25% 
24,000 60,000 5,150 plus 30% of the amount over 24,000 30% 
60,000 120,000 15,950 plus 35% of the amount over 60,000 35% 
120,000 No limit 36,950 plus 40% of the amount over 120,000 40% 
*All incomes in millions of Turkish Lira (TL) 
 
Because of its progressive character, it is expected to have equalising impact on the 
distribution of income in the society. The expected progressive effect of PIT may be limited on 
the economy because of its low share in TTR. In order to understand the possible redistributive 
effect of PIT, we may need to assess sources of income in Turkey. Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 
created from 2003 HICES, provide the percentage shares of different sources of income in the 
total net disposable income of Turkey by rural+urban breakdown and by quintiles: wages and 
salaries including daily wage comprise 42% of the total, incomes from capital is 32%, transfers 
account for 20% (mostly pensions), rent and property incomes account for 6% of total income. 
As these tables are based on the reported net disposable income of individuals, it is subject to 
underreporting of income for especially higher income classes. 
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Table 5.3: Income Structure of Turkey, 2003 
The Sources of Income 
Total 
Income* 
% of Total 
Income Urban* 
% of Total 
Urban Income Rural* 
% of Total 
Rural Income 
Total 161,832 100 114,194 100 47,638 100 
Wage and Salary 62,561 38.7 51,741 45.3 10,820 22.7 
Daily Wage 5,042 3.1 2,992 2.6 2,050 4.3 
Total Capital Income 51,817 32.0 27,584 24.2 24,233 50.9 
Agriculture 15,932 30.7 1,574 5.7 14,359 59.3 
Manufacturing 6,146 12.4 5,228 19.0 1,188 4.9 
Construction 2,129 4.1 1,636 5.9 493 2.0 
Trade 16,923 32.7 11,359 41.2 5,564 23.0 
Service 10,416 20.1 7,787 28.2 2,629 10.9 
Rent 5,812 3.6 5,079 4.4 733 1.5 
Property Income 4,261 2.6 3,270 2.9 991 2.1 
Transfers 32,340 20.0 23,528 20.6 8,812 18.5 
From Government 28,238 87.3 20,542 87.3 7,696 87.3 
From abroad 975 3.0 616 2.6 359 4.1 
Other 3,127 9.7 2,370 10.1 757 8.6 
Source: TURKSAT HICES 2003 
*Trillion (1,000,000,000,000) TL 
 
Table 5.4 would be more helpful to assess possible redistributive effects of PIT as it 
provides the percentage shares of different sources of income in each expenditure quintile. 
Before we start examining the table, it is worth noting that transfers (both public and private), 
accounting for 20% of total income, are exempt from PIT. The percentage shares of all sources 
of income increase as we move to upper quintiles apart from daily wage and agricultural 
incomes. Daily wage is generally paid to informal employees7 who are not paying any tax and as 
we’ll discuss in detail later, agricultural incomes are largely subject to a stoppage rate which 
ranges from 2 to 4%.  Around 50% of total incomes from these two income types are located in 
the first two quintiles. However, the share of these two sources of income in the total household 
income is only 13%. From these first observations, we may expect that households with daily 
wage and agricultural incomes in the first and maybe in the second quintiles are expected to pay 
                                                           
7 Only 20% of individuals who are earning daily wage is covered by a social security instituiton.  
  Chapter 5  
 180
less tax relative to their income shares. As shares of the other sources of income increase with 
quintiles, we may expect that progression in the tax schedule will produce redistribution from 
upper quintiles to lower quintiles. However, this will depend on the extent of tax evasion and 
informal economy which are two main problems in Turkey.  
 
Table 5.4: Income Structure of Turkey by deciles, 2003 
Quintiles 1 2 3 4 5 Turkey 
Expenditure 6.4 10.7 14.9 21.0 47.0 100 
Wage and Salary 4.8 10.2 16.1 22.3 46.7 38.7 
Daily Wage 32.7 24.4 19.7 13.9 9.3 3.1 
Total Capital Income 11.1 14.3 16.2 18.8 39.7 32.0 
Agriculture 25.3 23.7 20.1 18.1 12.8 30.7 (9.8) 
Other 5.2 10.4 14.5 19.2 50.7 69.3 (22.2) 
Transfers 6.9 12.7 17.2 23.6 39.5 19.9 
Rent&Property Income 2.2 4.4 6.6 14.4 72.4 6.2 
Source: TURKSAT HICES 2003 
Households are ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure 
 
In Turkey, there are two main tax collection methods, the ‘declaration’ method and the 
‘deduction of tax at source’ method. PIT on wage and salaries, agricultural incomes, interest 
incomes and a large part of rental income on commercial buildings are subject to deduction at 
source; incomes of self+employed and employers are taxed according to their declaration8. 
However, the share of agricultural taxes deducted at source in total taxes collected via deduction 
                                                           
8 Agricultural incomes, interest incomes and rental income on commercial buildings are supposed to be 
taxed by the declaration method too. However, the governments hesitate to tax agricultural incomes and 
this sector is only taxed at certain stoppage rates, which are deducted when agricultural products are 
traded in markets. Agricultural goods are exempted by the income tax if this stoppage has been paid. The 
same process is working for the interest incomes. Banks withhold 5% or 15% of the total amount of 
interest income from a bank account (depending on the legal status of the bank), when interest incomes are 
realized and then the owner of the bank account is exempted to pay the income tax, even if the total 
amount of the bank account is really high. There is a discussion on this issue in Turkey, which states that 
interest incomes are not fully taxed; this stoppage prevents to see the potential taxable income of the 
taxpayer and tax evasion is taking place legally.  For rent incomes on commercial buildings, there is 25% 
stoppage rate the tenants are supposed to pay. The owner of the property declares rental income on the 
commercial buildings if the total gross rental income is higher than certain amount which would cause 
higher tax liability than the stoppage rate produces.  
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was only 2.19% in 1999 (Nejatkan, 2003)9. Additionally, tax revenues deducted at source come 
largely from wage and salaries10. Although there are no statistics about the percentage share of 
taxes paid by each source of income11, one may use Table 5.5 to get an idea about the extent of 
the tax burden on each income source. Table 5.5 presents percentage shares of these two 
methods in total PIT; 90% of PIT is collected by the deduction at source method. If we unite the 
observations from Table 5.3, Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, we may conclude that PIT revenue is 
borne largely by wage earners, particularly civil servants due to the high tax avoidance in the 
private sector. In order for taking this fact into account we will need to know the extent of tax 
evasion among self+employed individuals and employers.  
For civil servants, tax evasion is impossible since the income tax is deducted from their 
salary; for wage earners in private companies, the employer declares the tax base to the tax 
authorities. It is known that employers have a high inclination not to declare the whole amount 
of wage they pay to the employee, in order to pay less payroll taxes12. These issues have to be 
accounted in incidence analysis discussed in the next section. The government plans to introduce 
some new instruments about PIT to decrease the share of tax paid by employees, such as 
minimum living allowance from 2008.  
                                                           
9 This rate has declined from 4.99 in 1990 to 2.19 in 1999 (Nejatkan, 2003; Yılmaz, 1996). 
10 See http://www.vdd.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1729&Itemid=48 (in 
Turkish), Yilmaz (1996) states that 61% of total collected PIT via deduction come from wage and salaries 
in 1994, but the author warns that this rate may account for 70% for some years.  
11 Ministry of Finance provides income taxes paid by each economical sector and occupations that can be 
found on following web page: http://www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/user_upload/VI/FGGOVB79.htm. 
Unfortunately, these figures do not provide the information required to assess who is paying and who is 
not paying taxes.  
12 The Social Insurance Organisation (Turkish acronym, SSK), the pension fund for workers in the private 
sector and the public sector. For SSK members there is minimum and maximum wage levels that are 
subject to the payroll tax. Employers cannot declare less than this minimum wage level and if a wage level 
of an employee is higher than the maximum wage level for payroll tax, the tax base of payroll tax is 
accepted to be the maximum amount determined by the government every year. Based on SSK Annual 
Statistics (2003), 52,9% of employees’ wages are declared by their minimum wage for SSK payroll tax. 
However, from the HICES data we see that only 20% of total SSK members’ annual wage income is equal 
or less than the official minimum wage valid for payroll tax. This implies that the tax evasion by 
underreporting true wages is taking place in private companies. 
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Table 5.5: Tax Collection Methods for Personal Income, 2003  
(% of Total Personal Income) % 
Total Personal Income 100 
Declaration Method 6.39 
Deduction at source Method 90.2 
Other 3.4 
Source: Ministry of Finance  
 
Personal income tax bills are also calculated on interest incomes and rent incomes. 
Taxpayers do not need to declare interest incomes if 5 or 15% of stoppage rate has been 
withdrawn by the bank. However, the taxpayer should declare rent incomes. The tax burden for 
persons who have rent incomes and whose amount we can find in the data is taken into account. 
Two different pieces of information on rent incomes are provided in the data, the total individual 
net rent income and the monthly rent incomes from different properties (residences, land, and 
commercial and industrial buildings) at household level. We use the household level monthly 
gross rent information, as the incidence assumptions on residential and commercial properties 
differ and there are different exemptions related to these properties.  
Property taxes 
There are two main property taxes: Property Tax for buildings (residential or 
commercial) and land and Motor Vehicles Tax (MVT). Property tax is paid each year on the tax 
values of land and buildings at rates varying from 0.1% to 0.3%. Property taxes take very small 
place in TTR; the share of property taxes generally varies between 1 and 2% of TTR. Due to the 
existence of different tax rates on properties, the tax burden of the property tax at the individual 
level is not taken into account for this study and the tax burden of the property tax will be 
calculated at household level. The data gives us the pre+tax market value of households’ 
properties. Hence we compute tax bill for Property Tax as follows:  
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VoPtPTB i *= , i: Property tax  
where, PTB= Tax Bill for property taxes and VoP=Value of Property; t=tax rate 
Property tax rates change with respect to the location (village or municipality) of 
property and are employed primarily by local governments. As the data does not give the 
location of households’ property, we do not know which tax rate the owner of the property faces. 
We know only whether the households live in rural or urban areas and assume that rural (urban) 
households face the property tax rates prevailing in villages (municipalities) to calculate the 
burden of property tax on households13. We take into account the exemptions, even if the 
exemptions depend on unobserved characteristics of the owner of property. Firstly, legally a 
pensioner having only one home and not having any other income does not pay the property tax. 
Assuming the household head is the owner of the house, we exclude pensioners with one home 
from the taxpayers of the property tax. Secondly, we exclude households whose income is zero 
and have only one house. In addition to these exemptions, we assume that there is no tax levied 
on agricultural land. At the first stage, we will estimate tax incidence with no evasion 
assumption and then we will compare our results to assess how tax evasion on agricultural land 
changes the distribution of the tax burden.  
MVT is paid by car owners who register their cars every year. The rate is subject to 
quality and cost of vehicles. The data gives us who has motor vehicles and how many vehicles 
households have; however we do not know the quality and cost of the vehicles (with the 
exception of jeeps). We assume that households in higher quintiles have more expensive and 
high quality vehicles to compute the MVT bill for each household, which more likely gives us 
progressive incidence. Accepting this assumption, we take the amount of tax valid in 2003 for 
                                                           
13 For residences, the property tax rate is 0.01%, for other buildings 0.02%, for land 0.01% and for 
building estate 0.03% in villages. To get tax rates in municipalities, we double the property tax rates of 
villages.  
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the luxury cars aged between 4 and 6 year old. The amount of the tax varies with the weight of 
the car. Thus it is assumed that households in the first expenditure quintile have the lightest car 
and pay 178 million Turkish Liras and households in the 5th quintile have the heaviest car and 
pay 3,621 Turkish Liras. 
Table 5.6: The Annual Amount of Motor Vehicles Tax (MVT) by type of car  
*et weight (KG) Quintile 1 ? 3 years 4?6 years 7 ? 11 years 12 ? 15 years 
950 and below 1 267* 178 89 89 
951 ? 1200 2 406 271 135 135 
1201 ? 1600 3 900 675 225 225 
1601 ? 1800 4 2711 1808 675 450 
1801 and above 5 5432 3621 1356 904 
*Million TL. Engine cylinder volume is 1601 cm3 (luxury car) for all cars 
.  
Payroll Tax 
There are three main social security institutions in Turkey: Firstly, the Social Insurance 
Organisation (Turkish acronym, SSK), which is the pension fund for workers in the private sector 
and the public sector and is the second largest provider of health care in Turkey. Secondly, there 
is the Social Insurance Agency of Merchants, Artisans and the Self+employed (Turkish acronym, 
Bag:Kur); and thirdly, the Government Employees’ Retirement Fund for civil servants (the 
GERF) (Turkish acronym, ES). Social security contributions are deducted automatically when 
the salary is paid to wage earners in the public sector. However, in the private sector, the payroll 
tax bill is based on the declared amount of wage level as given by the employer to the tax 
authorities. 
Table 5.7 provides social security membership of employees by quintiles. More than 
half of total employees seem to work without any social security (Informal), suggesting very 
high unrecorded employment. The social security contributions for wage earners who are 
covered by any social security institution are calculated in this study. Some assumptions are 
made for calculating the tax bill for the payroll tax for each social security institution. For SSK, 
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it will be assumed that the employers’ share of the payroll tax is also paid by employees in the 
private sector, yet it is paid by the employers if the employer is public. In Turkey, wages are 
determined on the base of the net wages suggesting that the social security contributions may be 
subject of wage bargaining between employees and employers in the private sector. Private 
employers may offer higher net wages in return for no social security or lower wages to make 
employees cover employer’s share of social security contribution in addition to the employees’ 
share. Hence this means that the net salary of an employee working for a private company may 
be lower than the salary of a public employee. Moreover, there is a maximum amount of taxable 
salary for payroll tax to SSK members (27,489 YTL in 2003). If the salary of a member of SSK 
is higher than this amount, the payroll tax bill is calculated as if the salary of the employee was 
27,489. Additionally, the second payroll tax bill for workers with SSK in the private sector will 
be assessed. For those workers, it will be assumed that their payroll tax base is the gross 
minimum wage level. Moreover, the premiums for self+employed and employer will be worked 
out if they are covered by Bag+Kur. 
Table 5.7: Social Security Membership by expenditure quintiles 
Quintiles 1 2 3 4 5 Turkey 
SSK 13.1 28.6 39.6 42.0 46.5 32.9 
ES 1.6 4.9 9.8 17.6 27.0 11.5 
BK 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Private 0.0 0.00 0.08 0.1 0.9 0.2 
Informal 84.9 65.9 50.2 39.9 25.2 54.9 
Turkey  100 100 100 100 100 100 
ote: Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure   
5.2.2 Indirect Taxation 
The common sales tax is the Value+Added Tax (VAT) in Turkey. VAT is applied to 
various components of household spending at different rates: 1% on raw food, 8% on processed 
food, and 18 % as the standard rate. There is an excise tax for luxury goods called Private 
Consumption Tax (PCT), issued in various rates on different products such as durable goods, 
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cigarettes and tobacco products, alcoholic drinks, petroleum goods and motor vehicles. PCT 
rates range from 6.7% to 275% percent. Even if PCT is not levied as widely as VAT, the share 
of the tax in total indirect tax revenue is higher than that of VAT. Private Communication Tax 
(PCOT) is another excise tax: all types of installation, transfer and telecommunication services 
given by mobile phone operators are subject to 25% PCOT. The tax base for PCOT is the same 
as the VAT base.  
Trade taxes are another important part of indirect taxes. Import tariffs and VAT on 
imported products are the main trade taxes. Since 1998, when Turkey entered into a formal 
Custom Union agreement with European Union, the share of trade taxes in indirect tax revenues 
started declining (Table 5.8).  Table 5.9 presents import trends by the country groups. The 
European Union is the most important trade partner of Turkey with 50% of the total. Table 5.10 
also gives the information on which products Turkey imports; intermediate goods account for 
some 70% of the total. In the first part of our work, we exclude import taxes, since we do not 
know which goods in the consumption bundle of households in the data are imported. In the 
second part of the chapter, we estimate effective tax rates by using Input+Output Tables for the 
indirect tax incidence analysis, so we will be able to cover the effects of import taxes and 
indirect taxes on intermediate goods. As aforementioned, Turkey has differential rate for VAT to 
reduce its regressive character. Table 5.11 presents consumption pattern in Turkey by 
expenditure deciles calculated from 2003 HICES.  
Table 5.8:  The Structure of Indirect Tax Revenue (% of Total Tax Revenue) 
Years Taxes on goods and services Taxes on trade Total Indirect Taxes 
1995 39.59 17.95 57.54 
1996 43.26 17.25 60.52 
1997 41.84 17.41 59.25 
1998 39.07 14.27 53.35 
1999 41.27 13.36 54.63 
2000 42.87 16.18 59.06 
2001 45.55 13.97 59.52 
2002 50.42 15.91 66.33 
2003 52.10 14.92 67.02 
Source: State Planning Organisation, Economic and Social Indicators 1950:2006 
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Table 5.9: Import by Source since 2000 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU (25 Country) 50.25 45.77 47.56 48.31 46.59 42.15 42.54 
Africa  4.98 6.81 5.23 4.81 4.94 5.18 5.31 
America  8.8 9.28 7.88 7.1 6.76 6.73 6.74 
Asia  18.91 19.08 18.85 20.33 21.62 24.45 25.95 
Other  17.06 19.06 20.48 19.45 20.09 21.5 19.46 
Total Import 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade 
 
Table 5.10: Import Composition, selected years in Turkey 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Investment Goods 16.29 16.33 17.84 17.44 
Intermediate Goods 73.04 71.73 69.25 70.11 
Consumption Goods 9.50 11.27 12.41 11.97 
Others 1.16 0.67 0.51 0.49 
Total Import 100 100 100 100 
Source: Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade  
 
 
Table 5.11: Consumption Pattern in Turkey, 2003     
Expenditure Quintiles 1 2 3 4 5 Turkey 
Food 43.1 38.3 34.5 30.0 18.9 27.5 
Alcohol and Tobacco 5.6 5.4 5.0 4.7 3.0 4.1 
Clothing 3.1 4.4 5.3 6.2 7.5 6.2 
Housing, fuel, light and water 32.6 30.9 30.3 29.4 25.8 28.3 
Durable&*on?durable Household 
Goods 2.5 3.7 4.4 5.4 7.3 5.7 
Health 1.3 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.8 2.2 
Transportation  3.7 5.1 6.3 7.6 14.0 9.8 
Communication 3.3 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.3 
Recreational goods and services 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.7 3.4 2.2 
Education 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 3.5 2.0 
Restaurants and other catering 
services 2.4 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.1 
Other 1.6 2.2 2.6 3.1 4.7 3.5 
Source: TURKSAT 2003 HICES     
 
It is assumed that households bear a greater burden of a tax if the expenditure share of 
the product is above the national average. From the table it is seen that the poorest first quintile’s 
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expenditure share is over the national average on food, alcohol and tobacco, and housing, fuel, 
light and water. For food, VAT rates are either 1% or 8%, which may help reduce the regressive 
impact of VAT. Although alcohol and tobacco products are subject to the high PCT, 72% of 
people consuming alcohol is concentrated on the 4th and 5th expenditure quintiles, which may 
imply a progressive character to PCT. Therefore we suggest that despite the fact that the share of 
indirect taxes in TTR is very high in Turkey, regressivity of indirect taxes could be small. 
5.3 Informal Economy and Tax Evasion  
There is a consensus on the fact that informal economy14 causes many problems in an 
economy and its size increased on a global scale (Schneider, 2005). However there are important 
disagreements on how to define and measure it and its impacts on the economy (Schneider and 
Savaşan 2006: 2).  
The commonly used definition of informal economy refers to all economic activities 
which contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product, but not 
captured official national accounts statistics (Schneider and Enste, 1999; Bagachwa and Naho, 
1995)15. Bagacha and Naho (1995) classify unrecorded economies as informal sector, parallel 
and black market activities. By informal sector the authors mean very small+scale (unrecorded) 
units producing and distributing goods and services and consisting of both employed workers 
and independent self+employed persons in both rural and urban areas. Economic units in 
informal sector are “mostly unregistered, unrecorded in official statistics; and participants have 
little or no access to organized markets, to credit institutions, to formal education and training or 
to many public services” (Bagacha and Naho, 2000: 1388).  
                                                           
14 In the literature informal economy is called unrecorded, underground, shadow, unofficial, black or 
irregular economy. We prefer to use informal economy following Bagachwa and Naho (1995)’ 
classification.  
15 See Schneider and Enste (1999), Schneider (2005) and Öğünç and Yılmaz (2000) for different 
definitions of informal economy.  
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Schneider and Savaşan (2006) make broad and narrow definitions to capture all features 
of unrecorded economies. The broad definition includes both legal and illegal economic 
activities. Illegal activities such as drug dealing and trade of stolen goods could be done through 
monetary and non+monetary economic transactions. Legal activities comprise of all hidden 
monetary and non+monetary transactions to avoid legal costs.  The narrow definition consists of 
only legal economic activities. For Schneider and Savaşan (2006:3+5) the reasons for those legal 
economic activities to be concealed from public authorities are: to avoid payment of income, 
value added or other taxes; to avoid payment of social security premiums; to avoid having to 
meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, 
safety standards; to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms16. The empirical studies to measure the 
size of unrecorded economy in a country are generally based on this narrow definition and 
exclude illegal economic activities from the discussion.  
Following Bagacha and Naho (1995), we use the term informal economy in this study to 
refer the legal economic activities which are not recorded in official statistics. This also captures 
the narrow definiton of Schneider and Savaşan (2006). Moreover, the small+scale economic units 
(enterprises) dominate Turkish economy. Businesses with less than 10 employees make up 
96.32% of total  businesses and 3.09% of total businesses have between 10 and 49 employees in 
2002 in Turkey (TUIK, 2002). According to HICES 2003, while 85% of employees work in 
enterprises with less than 50 workers, 15% of total emplyees work in enterprises with 50 or more 
employees17. In this sense, the term “informal sector” is therefore appropriate for Turkey. The 
main problem with small+scale businesses in terms of taxation is that it is much difficult  and 
costly to inspect those small+scale businesses.  
                                                           
16 See Schneider and Enste (1999) for the detailed discusion on the causes of unrecorded economy. 
17 When we exclude agricultural enterprises, 78% of total employees work in smal+scale economic units, 
whereas 22% of them work in enterprises having 50 or more than workers.   
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Although one could hear that the size of informal economy in Turkey is 50% of GDP, 
Schneider and Savaşan (2006) estimated the size of the informal economy by using the narrow 
definition and found the size is around 35% of actual GDP18. However, there are serious doubts 
on the reliability of these estimations (Öğünç and Yilmaz, 2000).  
In addition to the impact of the informal economy on reliability of statistics, 
employment, price level, distribution of sources and income, it restricts taxable income in the 
economy. Empirically it has been found that tax and social security contribution burdens are one 
of the main causes of the shadow economy (Schneider, 2005; Schneider and Savaşan 2006). 
Savasan (2003) also found that direct and indirect taxes and social security contributions have 
affected the size of informal economy in Turkey positively and significantly. This close 
relationship between the motives of being in informal sector and tax burdens should not allow us 
to use the terms tax evasion or avoidance19 and informal sector as if they refer to the identical 
facts. It is not necessarily true that economic agents working in the informal part of the economy 
are evading tax or the reason for them being in the informal part of the economy to evade tax. 
Moreover, taxes could also be evaded easily even when an economic agent is running a 
completely formal economic activity by underreporting incomes made. Moreover, there are 
some costs relating to running a business in the informal sector too such as not being able to 
access subsidised public loans for small and medium+scale businesses and to reclaim VAT. To 
                                                           
18 See Table A 5.2 in Appendix 5.2 for the estimations of the size of informal economy in Turkey for 
different years by different authors. See also Öğünç and Yilmaz (2000) for the review on empirical studies 
about the size of informal economy in Turkey.  
19 Tax evasion and tax avoidance are two different notions. Tax evasion is an unlawful way of reducing 
tax liabilities, for example, by underreporting income made or reporting inflated business deductions. Tax 
avoidance implies all those permitted lawful steps made in order to reduce or totally obviate the tax 
liability, making use of all the legal shortcomings and loopholes. However, in this study we use the term 
tax evasion to refer both lawful and unlawful actions by taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities.  
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sum up, the decision of running a business in the informal sector would depend on relative size 
of benefits to the related costs of it20.  
The effect of the informal economy on taxation is important. If unrecorded incomes are 
circulated in recorded economic activities through consumption and investment, some of 
unrecorded incomes may be taxed via indirect taxes. In this sense, we need to find out the actual 
impact of informal economy on taxation. Pinar (2002) estimated that due to the inability of 
including all incomes in the economy into the taxable income, Turkey loses 31% of potential tax 
revenue. This creates sort of circle in the economy: The revenue loss forces governments to levy 
more taxes or increase rates of existing taxes, encouraging people particularly in the private 
sector to locate in the informal sector (Savasan 2003).  
The only information that we could attain from the HICES data about the fact of 
informal economy in Turkey is based on unrecorded employees. In this sense we accept that if 
employees are not involved in any social security organisation, they work in informal sector and 
then they do not pay any direct tax and social security contribution. Savasan (2003)’s finding 
supports this assumption. Therefore, when we use informal economy we refer to the unrecorded 
employees. The proportion of people who are not covered by any social security institution to 
the total labour force can also be used as an indicator of informal economy. The 2003 HICES 
data displays that this rate is 42%, which is higher than the estimated size of informal economy 
in Turkey. In addition to the high unrecorded employment, 52% of the SSK members’ wages are 
declared at the minimum amount even if they are recorded employee, implying high 
underreporting of incomes to pay less tax and social security contribution (SSK, 2003).  
                                                           
20 A business is not necessarily located in the informal sector completely. It can be formal to access some 
public facilities such as subsidised public loans but still hide some employees from the legal authorities to 
avoid the burden of social security constributions or meet some labour market regulations for bigger scale 
businesses.  
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Data on the extent of tax evasion are not easily available for Turkey like some other 
developed or developing countries because of the fiscal authorities’ attitude to keep data secret. 
We were not able to access any formal tax evasion statistics from Ministry of Finance. 
Additionally, we could not attain any information on actual tax payment in terms of income 
ranges or average tax rates that we can use to approximate who is paying or evading tax. 
However, Table 5.12 reveals the extent of tax evasion with two different indicators. The table’s 
second column was attained from an official report for the 9th Development Plan of State 
Planning Organisation (SPO). According to the second column of table the rate of non+taxed 
incomes to the potential tax base is 42% in 2003. However, despite high growth rates in recent 
years, the rate of non+taxed incomes to the potential tax base is prone to increase instead of 
decreasing.  
Table 5.12: Tax Evasion in Turkey  
Years 
The rate of non? taxed incomes to potential tax base in Turkey, 
1985?2004(%) 
1985 50 
1990 39 
1995 30 
2000 35 
2001 65 
2002 37 
2003 42 
2004 46 
Source: SPO,  9th Development Plan, Tax Report 2006  
 
In tax incidence analysis, informal economy is generally ignored due to the data 
restrictions. However, the results of tax incidence analysis for a country with big informal 
economy are not reliable (Emran and Stiglitz 2007), since the informal economy also effects the 
distribution of income in the society. Given the extent of informal economy and tax evasion in 
Turkey, these need to be included in our analysis. As we mentioned before, we will cover 
informal economy by considering unrecorded employees, but this allows only us to take into 
account tax loss from employees. However, we do not have any precise information about who 
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actually evades taxes and to what extent, but can make assumptions regarding the tax evasion. 
The methods of tax evasion vary according to the certain types of tax and sources of income. 
Some well+known facts related to wage earners will be considered to draw a more realistic 
picture in terms of tax evasion. However, when no information on the behaviour of taxpayers to 
any type of tax incidence is available such as tax payers over business incomes, we estimate tax 
evasion rates by using HICES for self+employed and employers. The estimation of tax evasion 
rate will be explained in the next section. Allowing for the share of overall income tax in TTR 
and the size of tax evasion, one may expect that progressivity of PIT is very limited in Turkey. 
5.4  Incidence Assumptions and Estimating Tax Liabilities 
5.4.1 Incidence Assumptions 
Determining who pays the taxes is the key issue in the analysis of tax incidence and 
redistribution. Direct taxes are thought to be less likely to be shifted, whereas indirect taxes are 
easier to be shifted. The idea behind this is the fact that direct taxes are generally applied to tax 
bases closer to individuals, such as their incomes or properties. Additionally direct taxes do not 
have direct impacts on markets, even if they may create some indirect effects.  On the other 
hand, due to the direct effects indirect taxes have on markets, it is easier to shift indirect tax 
burdens. Theoretically, Dalton’s law uses demand and supply conditions of taxed commodities 
to determine the incidence of taxes. In the context of indirect taxes, the extent of shifting tax 
burden to buyers in increased prices depends on price elasticities of demand and supply of the 
commodity.  Thus, “the more elastic the supply, the more the market price will rise and the 
greater will be the extent of shifting the tax to the buyers” (Kakwani, 1986: 116+118). Generally 
speaking, in a competitive market the incidence of a tax on a factor whose supply is perfectly 
elastic is completely shifted (Stiglitz, 2000: 496). In this section the incidence assumptions used 
to estimate tax burdens are explained.  
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Two different sets of incidence assumptions are used in this study21 and the assumptions 
are summarised in Table 5.15. In addition to the shifting assumptions, we also adopt additional 
assumptions to allow for the impacts of informal employment and tax evasion. By adopting the 
assumptions, we will identify two extremes to represent “maximum” and “minimum” estimates 
of tax burdens. Finally, in this study it is assumed that there is no indirect effects taxes create as 
in line with the benefit incidence, therefore, we ignore the behavioural responses individuals 
could show against taxes and assume that the existing distribution of before taxes would have 
been the same in the absence of taxes.  
The first set of the shifting assumptions is called the standard tax incidence assumptions 
reflecting the statutory incidence of taxes in question. For the first set (Variant 1), PIT is 
assumed to be bourne by those who pay it and indirect taxes (general sales and excise taxes), by 
consumers of the taxed commodities. PIT on rent incomes (residencies, commercial and 
industrial buildings and land) is bourne by who owns properties. The owners of the properties 
can deduce the expenses they have made for their properties from their gross rental incomes. 
They either deduce actual expenses they have spent by providing documents for them or they 
simply deduce 20% of gross rental incomes. The taxable rental incomes are found after this 
deduction. Payroll tax is assumed to fall on both employees and employers. This assumption is 
valid for the public sector. However, for the private sector, it is known that mostly employer’s 
share of payroll tax is also paid by employees, which will be taken into account in the second set 
of assumptions. Property taxes are assumed to fall on the individuals who own them.  
Moreover, with the assumption of no tax evasion or informal economy (Variant 1), it is 
assumed that net individual incomes in the data are the net incomes that individuals would earn 
in the absence of informal employment and tax avoidance opportunities. This assumption 
                                                           
21 See Shah and Whalley (1991) for an assessment of incidence assumptions adopted in the empirical 
literature for developed and developing countries 
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implies that individual taxpayers would not change their work preferences if there were no way 
to work in the informal economy or to avoid paying income and payroll tax. 
The last source of income is interest. Banks automatically apply two stoppage rates for 
interest incomes: 5% for the publicly traded company and 15% for other private companies. The 
data does not give the legal status of companies from which households get interest incomes. So 
the 5% stoppage rate is taken to calculate the tax bill by assuming that in Turkey by 2003, banks 
are largely publicly traded companies. There is another source of income, which is also subject 
to the stoppage, namely interest incomes from dividends. There is 10% stoppage for these 
incomes.  
Agricultural incomes are subject to the usual PIT, with three stoppage rates depending 
on the size of agricultural land. The average stoppage rate is used (2.5%) to calculate the tax bill 
for agricultural incomes and no evasion is assumed.  
For the second set of incidence assumptions (Variant 2), shifting assumptions on payroll 
tax and PIT on rent are affected. It is assumed that employer’s share of payroll tax is paid by 
employees who work for a private company. For both Variant 1 and 2 we also assume that there 
is no tax evasion and no informal employment, but we consider the exemption on rent incomes 
on residential properties. Thus, we assume that unrecorded wage earners are members of SSK 
and calculate payroll tax bill for unrecorded wage earners to see what would happen if there was 
no informal employment for both Variant 1 and Variant 2. 
For PIT on rent, it is assumed that 50% of PIT on rental incomes on residences is shifted 
to the tenants and 50% of it is paid by owners of the residences. However, there is no 
information to identify the tenants of the rental houses to shift the tax to the actual tenants, but 
the data provides the information on households who live in a rental residence. To calculate PIT 
for the tenants, it is assumed that households, who are in the same expenditure decile, are in a 
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relationship of tenant and landlord. As a result of this incidence assumption, tenants will pay 
more rents and owners will pay less tax, in other words they will get 50% “refund” from tenants.  
For commercial and industrial buildings and land, it is assumed that the tax is largely 
shifted to tenants. There is 25% stoppage for rent incomes on commercial buildings that are 
supposed to pay by the tenants. The owners of the properties declare their rental income only if 
the calculated tax burden according to the PIT schedule is higher than the paid stoppage by the 
tenants. Therefore, under Variant 2, we calculate 25% stoppage, the tenants are supposed pay, 
and deduce 25% stoppage from the calculated tax burden under Variant 1 to get the tax burden 
for the owners of commercial buildings under Variant 2.  
As mentioned before, the size of informal economy is an important problem in Turkey. 
For both Variant 1 and Variant 2 we assess the tax incidence if there were no informal 
employment and no tax evasion. To see how tax liabilities change when we consider unrecorded 
employments, we have a third case called Variant 3. With Variant 3, we assume that individual 
wage earners who are not covered by any social security institution pay neither PIT nor payroll 
tax. We both adjust Variant 1 (Variant1&Variant3) and Variant 2 (Variant2&Variant3) 
according to this assumption to see how the informal employment affects the tax burdens under 
different shifting assumptions. Thus, the difference between Variant 1 (Variant 2) and 
Variant1&Variant3 (Variant2&Variant3) is that we exclude unrecorded employees with the 
latter.   
 PIT bill (IT) is calculated for wage earners, self+employed and employers and the 
taxpayers who earn interest income and rental income. There are some well+known facts 
regarding to wage earners in public or private sector. In addition to Variant 3, we create Variant 
4 to use these facts to include exemptions and tax evasion attitudes. It is known that Turkish 
governments pay some extra amounts to civil servants whose job demands skilled labour and 
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high responsibility, such as professors, doctors and managers. However, these extra amounts are 
exempted from PIT, since the governments want to keep those civil servants’ salaries higher as a 
subsidy. Therefore, the higher the salary of a civil servant the lower PIT she paid as a percentage 
of salary. In order to consider this, it is presumed that civil servants’ tax base is equal to the 
minimum salary in public institutions (Variant 4). As emphasized before, 52% of the SSK 
members’ wages are declared at the minimum amount even if they are recorded employee. 
Therefore for the taxpayers working for private companies, in an extreme case, it is assumed that 
employers only declare the minimum wage, irrespective of actual income. In other words, we 
assume that private employees only pay PIT on the minimum wage (Variant 4). Employees with 
no social security do not pay any tax under Variant 4 either, so Variant 4 includes the impacts of 
informal employment as well. 
Estimation of Tax Evasion for Business Incomes 
There is a problem with self+employed and employer incomes in terms of taking into 
account tax evasion among these groups apart from agricultural incomes. Although it is known 
that the rate of tax evasion among self+employed and employers is high, there is no information 
by sources of income or income classes. However, we can use the HICES data to determine who 
is evading tax and what extent. The discrepancy approach was used to estimate the size and 
extent of tax evasion by making use of household level data. Dilnot and Morris (1981) 
introduced this approach to estimate the extent of tax evasion for UK by using 1977 Family 
Expenditure Survey. Dilnot and Morris assume that individuals who evade taxes tend to 
underreport their income and as a result of this underreporting there should be difference 
between their expenditure and incomes in household surveys. There may be other reasons behind 
the discrepancy between household expenditures and incomes such as temporary fall in current 
incomes of households, age+dependent higher expenditure attitudes of very young or very old 
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people, taking expected lifetime income as a base for expenditures instead of current income 
(Pyle, 1989).  
They found that the discrepancy is true mostly for self+employed people who have more 
opportunity to hide their actual incomes from tax authorities. The method requires some 
assumptions: tax evaders should be represented in the sample to the same degree as non+evaders 
and tax evaders must declare the same income as they reported to the tax authorities22. The 
authors call households “evaders” if their reported expenditure is higher than their reported 
income. They use different criteria to determine evaders in the sample and as a result of these 
different criteria they ended up having different estimations of the size and extent of tax evasion. 
For example, they think households whose expenditure exceeded income by at least 50 percent 
are evaders and then they relax this criterion and they include households whose spending is 
more than 20 percent of their recorded income. In order to take into account the other reasons for 
having exceed expenditures, they exclude some households from the sample such as retired and 
unemployed.  
We use the discrepancy approach to attain an estimation for tax evasion in the 
subsample of households with self+employed and employer members23. Even if we estimate tax 
liabilities by using individual annual income, we have to compare the annual disposable 
household incomes and household monthly expenditure to determine tax evaders as the HICES 
reports expenditures only at household level. Household disposable income includes imputed 
rent as household total expenditure does. The HICES have 8,834 (out of 25,764 households) 
                                                           
22 Thus tax evaders must not report their true income to the survey; otherwise the discrepance between 
reported expenditure and income would disappear. Please see Pyle (1989: 57+83) for the detailed 
discussion of the discrepancy approach.  
23 We excluded households with no business enterprise incomes even if they have a self+employed or 
employer  member. Those households we excluded are mostly earning agricultural incomes. Agricultural 
incomes are reported separately in the HICES. As agricultural incomes are assumed to be subject to 2.5% 
stopage we do not include hosueholds with agricultural incomes in the tax evasion estimation.  
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households with at least one self+employed or employer member. After excluding households 
with no enterprise incomes, we have 4,454 households to examine tax evasion.   
We use two different criteria to determine tax evaders among households with enterprise 
income. First we assume that households whose expenditure+income difference is higher than 
average decile expenditure+income difference are evading PIT (EVADERS1). Secondly, we 
presume that households whose expenditure is more than 20 percent of their recorded income are 
tax evaders (EVADERS2). After determining who is evading taxes, the extent of evasion is 
estimated. In order to estimate the extent of evasion, we simply divide the expenditure+income 
difference of households by their incomes. For EVADERS1, we take the part of expenditure+
income difference, which exceeds average decile difference, as numerator. For example if 
household expenditure+income difference is 100 Turkish Liras, average decile difference 50 
Turkish Liras, and the household income is 200 Turkish Liras, we assume that the household is 
evading 25 percent of its income. The calculation made is follows: 
ij IDeEvasionRat /)(D 1 i −= ,   i: 1,…,4454; j: 1,…,10 
ii IIvasionRate /)*20.0(D 2E i −=  
where, Di is expenditure+income difference of ith household, Ii is the monthly disposable 
income of ith household, Dj is average expenditure+income difference of jth decile.  
The estimations based on these two criteria by decile are presented in Table 5.13. Under 
EVADERS1, 9% of self+employed and employer households evade 41% of their incomes 
whereas 13% of households evade 48% of their incomes under EVADERS2. The number of tax 
evaders rise with expenditure deciles under both EVADERS1 and EVADERS2 as expected. 
However, the extent of evasion does not follow a certain pattern. It interestingly takes the 
highest values in the first and 10th deciles under both criteria.  
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We use the average of these two estimations by decile to calculate tax burdens of each 
decile that is given in Table 5.14. So it is assumed that 2.9% of total household income in the 
first decile is evaded. We adjust both Variant 1 and Variant 2 according to Variant 4 to see both 
the impacts of informal employment and tax evasion under each set of shifting assumption, 
namely Variant1&Variant4 and Variant2&Variant4 as in the case of Variant 3. Table 5.15 
summarises the incidence assumptions and the assumptions made to incorporate informal 
employments and tax evasion in our analysis. Variant 3 is not seen in the table as it requires only 
one assumption. 
  
Table 5.13: The Size and Extent of Tax Evasion among Self?employed and Employer 
Households  
(as a percentage of total number of self?employed households by decile) 
Decile EVADERS1 EVADERS2 Extent of Evasion 1* Extent of Evasion 2 
  % % % % 
1 7.06 9.19 32.88 38.41 
2 7.86 9.03 19.44 26.08 
3 7.99 8.66 26.68 32.67 
4 8.01 9.26 24.53 32.10 
5 7.46 10.14 33.94 36.44 
6 8.53 10.41 22.34 29.36 
7 10.17 12.93 27.32 34.82 
8 12.48 16.72 23.81 34.07 
9 10.43 12.69 29.41 37.10 
10 12.09 26.25 55.56 57.61 
Turkey 9.44 13.25 40.67 47.53 
* Percentage of positive expenditure:income difference in total household disposable income 
EVADERS columns give percentage of households, Extent of Evasion columns give reported expenditure:income 
difference as a percentage of household incomes. 
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Table 5.14: Tax Evasion among Self?employed Households   
(average of EVADERS1 and EVADERS2 by decile)  
Decile Average of EVADERS1&2 Average of Extent of  EVADERS1&2 Evasion Rate 
  % % % 
1 8.13 35.65 2.90 
2 8.45 22.76 1.92 
3 8.32 29.67 2.47 
4 8.63 28.32 2.45 
5 8.80 35.19 3.10 
6 9.47 25.85 2.45 
7 11.55 31.07 3.59 
8 14.60 28.94 4.23 
9 11.56 33.25 3.84 
10 19.17 56.58 10.85 
Turkey 11.34 44.10 5.00 
* Percentage of positive expenditure:income difference in total household disposable income 
Evasion rate is obtained by multiplying average number of EVADERS1&2 by average extent of evasion by decile 
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Table 5.15: Incidence and Tax Evasion Assumptions  
  Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 4 
 (V1) (V2) (V4) 
PERSO*AL I*COME TAX 
on Wages The owner of the factor   
Employees without social security do 
not pay any tax 
ES members  The owner of the factor   
The part of salary over minimum civil 
servant salary is exempted from 
income tax (the proportional share of 
tax bill in salary decreases as salary 
increases) 
SSK members The owner of the factor     
Public sector (SSK) The owner of the factor     
Private sector (SSK) The owner of the factor   
Tax base is equal to the minimum 
gross wage level for payroll tax if 
individuals' wage is higher than this 
amount 
on Business Incomes The owner of the factor   Estimated Evasion  
on Interest Incomes The owner of the factor    
on Rental Incomes The owner of the factor     
on Residences The owner of the factor 
 50% tenants/50% the owner of 
the property (50% "tax refund" 
for owners)  
on Land The owner of the factor   Agricultural land is not taxed 
on Commercial 
Buildings The owner of the factor  Tenants and the owners  Tenants and the owners 
On Agricultural 
Incomes 
The owner of the factor 
(2.5% stoppage)     
PROPERT TAX   
On Residences and 
Commercial 
Buildings The owner of the property   
On Land The owner of the property   Agricultural land is not taxed 
Motor Vehicles Tax The owner of the property    
PAYROLL TAX   
ES members  
Both employee and 
employer   
Tax base adjusted according to the 
assumption on income tax 
SSK members 
Both employee and 
employer     
Public sector (SSK) 
Both employee and 
employer     
Private sector(SSK) 
Both employee and 
employer Employee  
Tax base adjusted according to the 
assumption on income tax 
Indirect Taxes Consumers    
*ote: Empty cells indicate that the assumptions in the previous column are valid. 
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5.4.2 Estimating Tax Liabilities 
For direct taxes, we use individual annual disposable income to calculate direct tax 
burden and then we aggregate individual tax burdens into household level. We use net (after 
income and payroll tax) annual income from all sources earned in the past 12 months provide by 
HICES. As noted before, the data provides monthly incomes too, as monthly incomes do not 
include all sources of income such as bonus and tips for wage earners and some cash transfers 
from government, we prefer to adopt annual incomes. The following components of income are 
provided by the data: wages and salaries, business income, private and government cash 
transfers, other income and imputed rent. Wages and salaries include all net individual earnings 
from the main, additional, and changed jobs24 after deduction of personal income tax. Business 
income is the net income of employers or self+employed persons after deduction of personal 
income tax and business expenses. Government cash transfers consist of pensions (retirement, 
old+age, and other pensions), unemployment benefits, student scholarships, DIS and SASF 
transfers, whereas private transfers include transfers from private institutions or individuals and 
other governments. Other income includes income from investment, bank, and other interests, 
dividends, and rent. All components of annual income are reported in both cash and kind. 
However, in calculating tax burdens of individuals, we only consider total cash incomes as 
taxable incomes except government and other cash transfers and imputed rent. Government 
transfers are exempt from taxation and the private transfers are assumed to be unrecorded.  
There are two different taxes that wage earners have to pay: PIT and payroll tax. The 
survey reports income net of (after) income and payroll tax, whereas household expenditure 
incorporates indirect taxes paid in consumption. Given the tax regimes on various income 
components, the income tax bill (IT) for each household has been computed as follows: 
                                                           
24 If the individual has changed the job or the individual is unemployed currently but worked for a while in 
the past one year, we include the earnings from these changed jobs too.  
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PTItATI *)1( −=  
)1(
*
t
ATIt
IT
−
=  
where IT : income tax bill, t: income tax rate, ATI: after+tax income, PTI: pre+tax income 
Pre+tax income (PTI) is equal to the total tax bill paid by each household plus net 
income. Since PIT is subject to a progressive taxation, we need to take into account the income 
tax schedule while calculating PTI. In order to do this, we calculate maximum amount of ATI to 
place households in correct income ranges with different tax rates.25.  
Tax base for PIT for wage earners is after payroll tax individual gross income. In other 
words pre+tax income (gross income) for PIT is post+tax income (net income) for payroll tax. 
Since the data reports post+income and payroll tax net income of individuals, to obtain pre+tax 
(both payroll tax and income tax) gross income of individuals we first need to find tax base of 
PIT and then add payroll tax to this amount. Thus, tax base of PIT (PTI) is payroll tax+inclusive 
income of individuals:  
ITATIPTI +=  
Tax bill for payroll tax is calculated as follows: 
)1/( ptPTIPT −=  
where PT is payroll tax paid by individual, and  tp payroll tax rate.  As stated before, there are 
three social security institutions with different payroll tax rates. Employees’ payroll tax share for 
SSK members is 15% and employers’ share is 22% of gross wage. Employees’ share for ES 
members (civil servants) is 16%. Finally members of Bag+Kur pay 40% of their gross salary as 
social security contribution. With the assumption that employees pay employers’ share of 
                                                           
25 Calculation is presented in Table A 5.3 in Appendix 5.1. 
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payroll tax if they are working for private companies (Variant 2), payroll tax rate for the 
employees will be 37%. Since the data reports net incomes, this assumption will affect gross 
incomes. Thus gross income for those employees will be higher than other wage earners’ gross 
income implying that they pay higher taxes even if they have the same level of post+tax net 
income. To sum up, we suppose that the employees working for private companies would have 
earned higher incomes, if the employers had paid their share of payroll tax. Since the mean 
wages in the private sector are lower than the public sector (Table A 5.4), we think this 
assumption is reasonable and able to capture the fact in Turkey.   
To show this issue with an example, let’s have two wage earners with the same level of 
net income, 100 Turkish Liras. The first employee works for a private company and the second 
one for a public institution and both is member of SSK. Thus, PIT rate is 15%, payroll tax rate is 
15%, but the first worker pays employer’s share as well, so the employee faces 37% payroll tax 
rate. Pre+tax gross incomes and tax bills for PIT and payroll tax are calculated as follows: 
First worker: 
118)15.01/(100 =−=IPTI  
18118*15.0 ==IT  
187)37.01/(118 =−=PPTI  
69187*37.0 ==PT  
Second worker: 
118)15.01/(100 =−=IPTI  
18118*15.0 ==IT  
138)15.01/(118 =−=PPTI  
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21138*15.0 ==PT  
 
where, PTII is pre+tax income for PIT (tax base for PIT),  PTIP is pre+payroll tax income. IT is 
tax bill of PIT and PT is payroll tax bill. As can be seen from above, both workers pay same 
amount of income tax, 18 Turkish Liras and have the same level of income tax+inclusive income 
level (PTI). However, even if the workers have the same net income which is reported by the 
data, the first one pays higher payroll tax and thus have higher gross income than the second 
worker does.  
In order to calculate tax burdens for households with self+employed and employer 
member who are found to evade PIT, we still assume that reported income is true income of 
those households and apply the same method to find their pre+tax income as we used for non+
evaders. After finding pre+tax income of tax evaders, we simply use estimated average tax 
evasion rate of each decile to calculate “true” pre+tax incomes of tax evaders declared to tax 
authorities. Calculations are follows.  
)*(* ijjijij PTIERPTIPTI −=   i: 1,…,4454;    j:1,…,10 
where ERj is the evasion rate of jth decile, PTI*ij is the “true” pre+tax income of ith household in 
the jth decile.  
 
We calculate three different tax bills for the incidence of indirect taxes: VAT, PCT and 
PCOT. The data gives us tax+inclusive consumption expenditures at household level. There is a 
point we need to make clear before starting with the calculation of the indirect tax bill for each 
household. If a good is subject to both VAT (or PCOT) and PCT, we need to calculate PCT first 
and add this amount to tax+exclusive spending in order to get the tax base for VAT and PCOT. 
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Since household expenditures on each good in the data shows tax+inclusive spending that each 
household has made on goods, we firstly need to compute tax+exclusive spending (PTS) of 
households as follows: 
ijjij PTStATS *)1( +=  
where ATS is tax+inclusive spending, i presents households, j presents commodities that each 
household consumes, and tj is a composite of various commodity+specific taxes. If we write the 
formula by including the different indirect taxes, we have the following: 
)1(*)1( ,,, ihPCTijPCOTijVAT
ij
ij
ttt
ATS
PTS
+++
=  
where tPCT is the rate of PCT, tVAT is the rate of VAT and tPCOT is the rate of PCOT.  
After calculating PTS, we can compute tax bill for those three taxes as follows: 
PTStTB PCTPCT *=  
)(* ,ijPCTijjij TBPTStTB += , j: VAT and PCOT 
where TB is tax bill for these three taxes calculated for different commodities.  
While we do not have any serious matching problem between VAT rates and categories 
of household expenditure data, either in food goods or non+food goods, we have some problems 
with PCT. PCT on oil spending is not ad valorem, but  6,750 TL per litre. The data includes the 
car owners and their total oil spending, so we calculate how much litre a household have 
consumed by taking an average oil price.  
As a result of these calculations, we will have six different total gross incomes based on 
each corresponding incidence assumption: I: Variant 1 (V1); II: Variant 1 and Variant 3 
(V1&V3);  III+ Variant 1 and Variant 4 (V1&V4); IV: Variant 2 (V2); V: Variant 2 and Variant 
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3 (V2&V3); VI: Variant 2 and Variant 4 (V2&V4). The extremes, “maximum” and “minimum” 
tax burdens, are given by cases I and IV respectively. Variant 1 is the most unrealistic case, 
which does not consider the unrecorded employment, tax evasion and the shifting of the tax 
burdens on the payroll tax and PIT on rent incomes, which are well known facts for Turkey and 
most of other developing countries. Therefore, V1 is the case, which would give the incidence of 
the tax system, if there was no informal economy, tax evasion and shifting opportunities for the 
tax payers. In other words, V1 provides the “intended” incidence of the tax system. The second 
extreme case is Variant 2 with Variant 4 (V2&V4). In this case, we adopt the shifting 
assumptions concerning the payroll tax and PIT on rent incomes as well as the assumptions of 
the informal employment and the tax evasion.  In the thesis, we will try to discuss and compare 
the all variants as far as possible, but mostly focus on these two extreme cases to discuss the 
incidence of taxes26. 
5.5 Results 
Before starting with the welfare dominance analysis, it would be helpful to look at some 
descriptive statistics to assess the distributive impacts of taxes in Turkey. In this section we aim 
to discuss the differences among the results that the shifting assumptions would produce. Table 
5.1627  presents the average rates of PIT under different shifting assumptions by income deciles 
(as a percentage of the household income) and indicate how the burden of the tax varies with the 
household income. According to Table 5.16, the overall tax rate of all households is just over 
15% under both V1 and V2 and varies with income deciles with the minimum of 9% to the 
maximum of 23%. However the overall rate declines when we consider informal employment 
                                                           
26 See Table A 5.8 in Appendix 5.1 for the definitions of gross and net incomes (expenditures) for the tax 
incidence analysis. 
27 Appendix 5.1 provides the average tax rates by expenditure deciles for the direct taxes (Table A 5.5, 
Table A 5.6 and Table A 5.7). As the tables based on the expenditure deciles have the same pattern that 
the income deciles offer, we do not discuss the tables in detail. 
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and tax evasion (V3 and V4) as expected. While the informal employment (V3) decreases the 
overall average tax rate by around 1%, informal employment and tax evasion together (V4) 
causes 5% drop in the average tax rates for both incidence sets (V1 and V2).  
The average tax rate for PIT increases with deciles under all variants, but the rates are 
more or less constant for the first five deciles under V1 and V2 and the sharp progressiveness of 
income tax shown in the individual income tax schedules is not reflected in the actual income 
taxes paid by the household. We can show this phenomenon by comparing average tax rates with 
average household net disposable income in each decile. While the average income of the richest 
decile is 16 times as big as that of the poorest decile, the average tax rate of the richest decile is 
only 2.5 times as big as that of the poorest decile. To remind us, the difference between shifting 
assumptions of V1 and V2 comes from the assumptions about payroll tax and rent incomes on 
residences and commercial buildings. Because of these shifting assumptions, employees and 
tenants pay more tax under V2 than they do under V1 and property owners pay less tax under V2. 
Since tenants are more or less equally allocated among deciles there is no big jump in deciles’ 
tax rates. The only interesting observation is provided by 10th decile tax rate under V2 which is 
smaller than the rate of 10th decile under V1. This may come from the fact that households 
having rental income on properties are concentrated in the higher deciles28. Since property 
owners pay less tax under V2, we might expect that V2 may be less progressive that V1. 
When we take into account unrecorded employment (V3), the average tax rates drop 
dramatically in the first decile. The reason for this phenomenon is that unrecorded employees, 
who pay neither PIT nor payroll tax under V3, are concentrated in the first quintile (Table 5.7). 
Since informal employment decreases with quintiles, the difference between the first decile’s 
and 10th decile’s average tax rate is bigger under both V1&V3 and V2&V3 than is that under V1 
                                                           
28 31% of households with rental income on commercial buildings or land is in the 10th decile and 72% of 
households with rental income on commercial properties is in the last 4 deciles. Very similar pattern can 
be found for households having rental income on residences. 66% of them is in the last 4 deciles.  
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and V2. It seems that the informal employment makes PIT more progressive. However, it is 
worth noting that unrecorded employees and their family are not able to benefit public health 
facilities and public social transfers, which makes these services regressive at the lower deciles29.  
When the tax evasion is taken into account in addition to the informal employment (V4), 
all deciles experience average tax rate decline. Both under V1 (V1&V2) and V2 (V2&V4), tax 
evasion makes higher deciles pay less tax, which can be seen by increasing average tax rate drop 
as we move to higher deciles. There may be two reasons for this: Firstly, for the recorded 
employees, we assume that the private employees declare only the minimum wage to the tax 
authorities, suggesting that progressivity of PIT is ruled out for these employees. Similarly, for 
the civil servants we assume that the part of their wage, which is over minimum civil servant 
salary is exempt from PIT as a subsidy. Secondly, the tax evasion rate we estimated for self+
employed and employers in the previous section rises with deciles, implying that the higher 
income classes evade more taxes than the lower income classes. These assumptions may 
decrease the extent of potential progressivity of PIT. 
Table 5.16: Average Rates of PIT by decile  
as a percentage of per adult equivalent household disposable income (AE_I*C)  
Income 
Deciles 
Average Income 
(Million TL) 
V1 V2 V1&V3 V2&V3 V1&V4 V2&V4 
1 50 9.04 10.06 3.75 4.77 3.65 4.67 
2 83 9.71 10.72 5.88 6.86 5.40 6.37 
3 107 9.56 10.50 6.94 7.89 6.17 7.11 
4 131 9.45 10.23 7.53 8.31 6.39 7.17 
5 156 9.50 9.96 8.08 8.54 6.82 7.32 
6 184 10.32 10.81 8.96 9.45 7.24 7.73 
7 220 11.03 11.36 9.73 10.05 7.51 7.83 
8 273 12.19 12.52 11.16 11.49 8.46 8.82 
9 360 13.98 14.23 13.10 13.33 10.08 10.32 
10 826 23.26 22.90 22.17 21.88 15.00 14.64 
Turkey  239 15.44 15.62 14.03 14.24 10.25 10.44 
otes: Income is per adult equivalent net disposable household income after income and payroll tax, including 
Households are ranked by per adult equivalent household net disposable income; V1: Variant 1 (Standard tax 
incidence) V2: Variant 2 (Income tax on rent is partly shifted to tenants and payroll tax is on only employees) 
V3: Variant 3 (Unrecorded employees do not pay any tax); V4: Variant 4 (Informal employment and tax evasion 
together)                                                            
29 Please refer to the second chapter. 
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The average tax rates for the payroll tax as a percentage of the total household 
disposable income and wage can be found in Table 5.17 and Table 5.18 respectively by deciles. 
The average tax rate is around 7% for all deciles except the 8th decile (8%), if both the employers 
and the employees bear the burden of the payroll tax together (V1). However, when the 
employers in the private sector shift the tax burden to the employees under V2, the overall 
average tax rate is more than doubled; even it takes the values of between 17 and 20% for the 
deciles in which the private sector employment is concentrated. Under V1 and V2, we assume 
that there was no informal employment, and thus we try to see what would happen if all 
employees paid the payroll tax. When we take into account the unrecorded employees who are 
paying no payroll tax actually (V1&V3 and V2&V3), we see a more realistic picture. As the 
informal employment declines with deciles, the difference between the tax rates of V1, and 
V1&V3 and V2, and V2&V3 gets smaller as we move to higher deciles. However, the average tax 
rate of higher deciles decreases dramatically, when we include the tax evasion assumptions for 
the private sector employees and presumed subsidies for civil servants (V4). This arises from the 
fact that since PIT base for private employees and civil servants are assumed to be minimum 
wage and salary respectively, the tax base for the payroll tax is also modified with respect to tax 
base for PIT.  
Table 5.18 is important to see the tax burden on wages. If there was no informal 
employment, the average tax paid by the wage earners would make 21% and 46% of the overall 
wages, which is very high. The most realistic variant is given by V2 with the informal 
employment and tax evasion (V4) (the last column of the table). The tax burden for V2&V4 case 
is the minimum of about 12% in the first decile reflecting the high unrecorded employment, and 
the maximum of 27%. The burden increases with the deciles up to the 5th decile and start 
decreasing after this point as the public employment is concentrated in the middle deciles and 
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the public employees pay only their share for the payroll tax. As a final observation from the 
table, in the richest decile the average rate decreases to 13%. The reason for the low rate for the 
10th decile comes from the facts that we do not calculate the payroll tax for the employees with 
the private insurance that are mostly in the 10th decile and the public employment.  
The total property tax for each household is sum of property tax and MVT bill. Table 
5.19 suggests that, under both V1 and V4, average rates rise with deciles. Under V1, the overall 
tax rate is 6% and it is only around 1.5% up to the 3rd decile. Since we assume that agricultural 
land is not taxed under V4, V4 seems to affect first 3 deciles’ rates mostly, in which households 
working in the agricultural sector are located.  
Table 5.17: Average Rates of Payroll Tax by decile   
as a percentage of per adult equivalent household disposable income (AE_I*C)  
Income Deciles 
Average Wage 
(Million TL) 
V1 V2 V1&V3 V2&V3 V1&V4 V2&V4 
1 19 7.0 17.6 1.6 4.5 1.7 4.4 
2 33 7.7 20.2 3.7 10.6 3.9 9.3 
3 40 7.6 18.8 4.8 12.1 4.8 9.7 
4 45 7.1 17.8 5.1 12.8 4.7 9.4 
5 49 6.7 15.7 5.2 12.0 4.7 8.6 
6 64 7.4 16.3 6.0 12.9 5.3 8.9 
7 78 7.6 16.3 6.3 12.9 5.3 8.6 
8 100 8.0 16.1 7.0 13.6 5.7 8.4 
9 121 7.3 14.0 6.5 12.0 5.3 7.4 
10 245 6.6 13.6 5.8 11.7 3.1 4.1 
Turkey  79 7.1 15.3 5.8 12.1 4.4 6.9 
otes: Income is per adult equivalent net disposable household income after income and payroll tax, including 
imputed rent. Households are ranked by per adult equivalent household net disposable income 
 
  Chapter 5  
 213
 
Table 5.18: Average Rates of Payroll Tax by decile   
as a percentage of per adult equivalent household wage  
Income Deciles 
Average Wage 
(Million TL) 
V1 V2 V1&V3 V2&V3 V1&V4 V2&V4 
1 19 18.7 47.2 4.2 12.1 4.4 11.7 
2 33 19.5 51.5 9.5 27.0 10.0 23.6 
3 40 20.4 50.8 13.1 32.8 12.9 26.1 
4 45 20.8 51.8 14.9 37.4 13.8 27.4 
5 49 21.3 49.9 16.5 38.2 14.9 27.4 
6 64 21.4 46.9 17.4 37.2 15.3 25.7 
7 78 21.6 45.9 17.8 36.5 15.1 24.2 
8 100 21.8 44.1 19.0 37.1 15.6 23.1 
9 121 21.8 41.6 19.4 35.6 15.8 22.0 
10 245 22.0 45.6 19.4 39.4 10.5 13.6 
Turkey  79 21.5 46.1 17.5 36.4 13.2 20.7 
otes: Household wage is per adult equivalent net household wage after income and payroll tax 
Households are ranked by per adult equivalent household net disposable income 
 
Table 5.19: Average Tax Rates of Property Tax by decile  
as a percentage of per adult equivalent net household disposable income 
Income Deciles V1 V4 
1 1.46 0.98 
2 1.66 1.31 
3 2.30 1.93 
4 2.41 2.15 
5 3.41 3.18 
6 4.61 4.35 
7 5.50 5.26 
8 7.17 6.97 
9 8.26 8.09 
10 7.97 7.83 
Turkey 6.22 6.02 
ote: Ranked by per adult equivalent household net disposable income  
 
As for the indirect taxes, Table 5.20 presents the average tax rates by deciles with the 
percentage of household expenditure in the household net disposable income (propensity to 
consume). Households in the first 3 deciles spend more than they earn. As we move to the upper 
deciles the percentage share of the household expenditure in the household income declines, 
revealing relatively higher propensity to consume among the poor. This would create a 
regressive impact from the indirect taxes. The overall average tax rate for the total indirect taxes 
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is about 17% and it takes the maximum value of 23% in the first decile. The average rates for all 
indirect taxes apart from the private communication tax (PCOT) decrease with the deciles, 
implying that the indirect taxes may have disequalising impact on the distribution of income.  
However, when we rank the households by the household expenditure we face 
completely different results (Table 5.21). The average rates for all indirect taxes and the total 
indirect taxes increase with the deciles, implying progressive distribution with the exception of 
VAT with 1% (VAT1) and VAT with 8% (VAT8). These results are completely opposed to 
what we have found when we rank the households with income. These tables show that the 
incidence of the indirect taxes is sensitive to the welfare indicator chosen. We have not faced 
this problem with the benefit incidence analysis and the direct taxes. We will examine this issue 
in the next section in detail.  
Table 5.20: Average  Rates of Indirect Taxes by income decile   
as a percentage of per adult equivalent household net disposable income  
Income Deciles 
Household 
Expenditure* 
(%) 
VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes 
1 138.55 0.19 2.89 10.57 13.61 9.06 0.23 22.89 
2 110.07 0.14 2.03 8.92 11.08 7.48 0.27 18.78 
3 105.56 0.13 1.74 9.06 10.94 7.39 0.35 18.67 
4 97.26 0.11 1.6 8.45 10.18 6.94 0.34 17.44 
5 94.25 0.1 1.46 8.39 9.96 6.63 0.36 16.93 
6 93.18 0.1 1.37 8.7 10.16 7.08 0.42 17.66 
7 86.72 0.09 1.21 7.94 9.24 6.37 0.44 16.04 
8 83.99 0.08 1.06 8.2 9.34 7.35 0.49 17.17 
9 76.29 0.06 0.9 7.61 8.57 7.01 0.5 16.1 
10 65.65 0.04 0.62 7.23 7.9 7.46 0.46 15.8 
Turkey  81.87 0.07 1.08 7.93 9.09 7.2 0.44 16.71 
ote: Households are ranked by per adult equivalent household net disposable income  
* Percentage share of the household expenditure in the household income  
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Table 5.21: Average  Rates of Indirect Taxes by expenditure deciles   
as a percentage of per adult equivalent household expenditure  
Deciles 
Household 
Expenditure*  
VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes  
1 65.32 0.13 2.21 6.65 8.98 6.76 0.13 15.92 
2 70.79 0.13 1.98 7.48 9.60 7.40 0.27 17.22 
3 72.94 0.12 1.86 7.80 9.81 6.98 0.31 17.04 
4 75.49 0.12 1.73 8.01 9.84 6.91 0.39 17.17 
5 76.71 0.11 1.64 8.62 10.36 7.77 0.47 18.62 
6 78.98 0.11 1.51 8.78 10.42 7.60 0.49 18.52 
7 81.84 0.10 1.44 9.16 10.71 7.81 0.53 19.07 
8 83.63 0.10 1.34 9.37 10.82 7.80 0.57 19.21 
9 85.00 0.09 1.20 9.76 11.03 8.01 0.63 19.68 
10 88.24 0.06 0.90 11.43 12.38 11.24 0.62 24.19 
Turkey  81.89 0.09 1.32 9.67 11.08 8.78 0.53 20.38 
otes: Households are ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure  
*Percentage share of the household expenditure in the household income    
 
5.5.1 The Welfare Dominance Analysis 
In this section, concentration curves are used to examine the redistributive impacts of the 
Turkish tax system. We will see if a tax is progressive or not by comparing concentration curves 
of taxes to Lorenz curve of per adult equivalent household expenditure. Moreover, we will 
compare concentration curves of taxes to see if a tax is more progressive than any other tax. 
Although, the descriptive tables have provided some indications about the possible impacts of 
different taxes on inequality, the concentration curves would give us global conclusion about the 
redistributive impact of Turkish tax system. We could also examine if the results are statistically 
robust to reach definitive conclusions which has been ignored so far.  
In this section we will use per adult equivalent household expenditure (AE_EXP) and 
household income (AE_INC) as welfare indicators (as benchmark distributions) to rank the 
households in drawing concentration curves. Although AE_EXP and AE_INC, the data provide, 
  Chapter 5  
 216
gives the distribution after income and payroll tax, but before property and indirect taxes, we 
rank households by AE_EXP and AE_INC30. The assumption behind this is that AE_EXP and 
AE_INC are gross income for both direct and indirect taxes to compare the progressivity of 
different shifting assumptions and the impact of tax evasion and informal employment on 
progressivity. The confusion arises in the case of direct taxes, because income provided by the 
data is reported net disposable income instead of gross income. We reach different gross 
incomes for each set of shifting assumptions (see Section 5.4.2 for the calculations of tax 
liabilities). We will take into account the differences in gross incomes appearing with different 
shifting assumptions in the next section. In the case of indirect taxes we will give both income 
and expenditure based welfare dominance analysis, as we have found that the incidence of 
indirect taxes is sensitive to the welfare indicator chosen.  
The concentration curves for the taxes are given in Appendix 5.3. Figure 5.1 below 
provides the Lorenz curve for per adult equivalent household expenditure (AE_EXP) and the 
concentration curves for the direct taxes under V1, Figure A 5.1 compares V1 and V2 for PIT. 
Since the concentration curves for the per adult equivalent household tax burden for PIT and the 
property taxes are located under the Lorenz curve, both of them are progressive under all 
variants. However, it is clear that V2 is less progressive than V1 for PIT due to the assumption of 
rent incomes on residencies. On the other hand, the ambiguity concerning to the progressiveness 
of the payroll tax under V1 can be seen from the concentration curves. The concentration curve 
for the payroll tax seems to cross the Lorenz curve at the lower expenditure deciles, which 
means that it is not possible to reach a conclusion on the redistributive direction of the tax 
without statistical tests. However, the concentration curve of the payroll tax under V2 is lying 
completely above the Lorenz curve, implying that the tax is regressive. From the figures, we can 
                                                           
30 See Table A 5.8 for the definitions of gross and net incomes (expenditures) for the tax incidence 
analysis. 
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confirm that the most progressive tax is property tax and the least progressive one is the payroll 
tax under both V1 and V 2.  
When we consider informal employment (V3), PIT becomes more progressive, whereas 
it becomes less progressive when we include the assumptions of the tax evasion and the informal 
employment together (V4). The payroll tax becomes more regressive under the tax evasion and 
the informal employment assumptions, since the assumptions regarding the tax evasion affect 
mostly the employees under formal employment, who are in the higher expenditure deciles. The 
concentration curve either below or on Lorenz curve at the first three deciles, but it is above the 
Lorenz curve after the 3rd decile and very close to 45+degree line, which suggests that the 
payroll tax is highly regressive, particularly under V2 (Figure A 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7).  
Figure 5.1 
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In Table 5.22, Table 5.23 and Table 5.24, the dominance test results31 are given for both 
decision rules (Davidson and Duclos, 1997). Both DAD software by Duclos and Arrar (2006) 
and Distributive Analyse Stata Package (DASP) by Abdelkrim (2006) are employed to produce 
the difference between the ordinates of a concentration curve and the Lorenz curve with 
asymptotic standard errors. After calculating the differences between the ordinates of curves, a 
two+sided hypothesis test of whether these differences are equal to zero or not with DAD is 
performed. DASP gives us a curve, which plots the differences of two curves with confidence 
intervals that can be provided if required. 
The tables confirm the results we have previously reported. According to the tables, the 
income, and property taxes are progressive statistically under both decision rules regardless of 
the shifting assumptions adopted. In the case of payroll tax, under the first decision rule, the 
payroll tax is regressive with both V1 and V2. The tax turns to be progressive at the lower 
ordinates and proportional at the higher ordinates (statistically zero difference between the 
Lorenz curve and the concentration curve) when we allow for effects of informal employment 
under V1 and V2 (V1&V3 and V2&V3) (Table A 5.10). Thus, although Howes’ test does not 
verify, under the first decision rule the payroll tax can be said progressive with the introduction 
of informal employment effects. Finally the concentration curve for the payroll tax crosses the 
Lorenz curve when the assumption of tax evasion is included as well as the informal 
employment under both V1 and V2. The concentration curves (for V1&V4 and V2&V4) are 
below the Lorenz for the ordinates up to 0.25, but then the curves are located above the Lorenz 
curve, implying the tax is regressive at the middle and higher ordinates, which is the result of 
assumptions we adopted in the case of PIT and the payroll tax. Howes’ test does not confirm the 
first decision rule in the case of the payroll tax with the variants of V1, V2, V1&V3 and V2&V3, 
                                                           
31 For the dominance test methodology, see the second chapter. The differences between the ordinates of 
the Lorenz curve and each concentration curve are given in the tables (Table A 5.9 to Table A 5.16)  in 
Appendix 5.1. 
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as we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the difference between curves being zero for some 
ordinates. We cannot say it crosses the Lorenz curve either, since there is no significant t+
statistic with opposite sign.  
Table 5.22: Dominance Results for Income Tax 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve  
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Income Tax 
  V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
Decision rule 1 + + + + + + 
Decision Rule 2 + + + + + + 
*otes: ‘+' () indicates that the tax is progressive (regressive) and the concentration curve of the 
tax is below (above) the Lorenz curve 
‘na' indicates that the difference between the curves are zero for some ordinates 
‘x’ indicates that the concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve, so no dominance 
 
Table 5.23: Dominance Results for Payroll Tax 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve  
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Payroll Tax 
  V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
Decision rule 1 + + x + + x 
Decision Rule 2 na na x na na x 
 
Table 5.24: Dominance Results for Property Taxes 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve   
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Property Taxes 
  V1 V4 
Decision rule 1 + + 
Decision Rule 2 + + 
 
We use two welfare indicators to examine the progressivity of the indirect taxes as 
emphasized before. The concentration curves for the indirect taxes also support the finding from 
the descriptive tables that the indirect taxes are sensitive to the welfare indicator chosen (the 
figures from Figure A 5.12 to Figure A 5.15). With the per adult equivalent household 
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expenditure as a concept for gross income, all indirect taxes are progressive in the sense that the 
concentration curves for each tax and the total indirect taxes are below the Lorenz curve except 
VAT1 and VAT8. This is confirmed by the welfare dominance test reported in Table 5.2532. 
VAT is the least progressive indirect tax; the most progressive indirect tax is PCOT on mobile 
phone services. At the bottom of the distribution the concentration of PCT curve and the Lorenz 
curve coincide in the sense that the differences for first ordinate are not statistically different 
from zero. Because of this Howes’ test cannot confirm progressivity of the tax, yet PCT is 
progressive under the first decision rule. However, when we rank the household by per adult 
equivalent household net disposable income (AE_INC) instead of household expenditure, all 
indirect taxes become regressive except PCOT under the first decision rule. We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis in favour of dominance for PCT and PCOT with Howes’ test, as we have 
statistically insignificant differences for some ordinates, implying that the concentration curves 
for these two taxes coincide the Lorenz curve at those ordinates, which make the welfare 
dominance analysis inconclusive (Table 5.26).  
Table 5.25: Dominance Results for Indirect Taxes 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve for AE_EXP 
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Indirect Taxes 
  VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT Total  
Decision rule 1 + + + + + + + 
Decision Rule 2 + + + + na + + 
*otes: ‘+’ () indicates that the tax is progressive (regressive) and the concentration curve of the tax is below 
(above) the Lorenz curve. ‘na' indicates that the difference between the curves are zero for some ordinates 
‘x’ indicates that the concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve for per AE household expenditure, so no 
dominance 
 
                                                           
32 See the Table A 5.12 and Table A5.13 for the differences between the ordinates of the concentration 
curves of the indirect taxes and the Lorenz curves for per adult equivalent household expenditure and 
income respectively.  
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Table 5.26: Dominance Results for Indirect Taxes 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve for AE_I*C 
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Indirect Taxes 
  VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT Total  
Decision rule 1 + + + + + + + 
Decision Rule 2 + + + + na na + 
*otes: ‘+’ () indicates that the tax is progressive (regressive) and the concentration curve of the tax is below 
(above) the Lorenz curve. ‘na' indicates that the difference between the curves are zero for some ordinates 
‘x’ indicates that the concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve for per AE household income, so no dominance 
 
In order to overcome the ambiguousness regarding the progressivity of the payroll tax, 
we run the extended Gini test. Table 5.27 provides S+Gini TR+progressivity indices which also 
give the difference between the Lorenz curve and the Concentration curve for the payroll tax for 
different inequality aversion parameters. As can be seen from Table 5.28, we could partly 
overcome the ambiguousness. The results are in line with the welfare dominance method for V1, 
V1&V3, V1&V4 and V2&V3. We have all positive and statistically significant progressivity 
rates for V1&V3 except for 1.01 of ρ, where TR+progressivity rate is zero. Thus, under the 
second decision rule we can only say that informal employment makes the tax progressive when 
we have social welfare function, giving less weight to the rich. For V2 and V2&V4, we can 
confirm that the tax is regressive as the progressivity rates are negative for the whole range of 
parameter values.  
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Table 5.27: S?Gini Indices of TR?Progressivity for Payroll Tax  
  Payroll Tax 
Parameter Values 
(Rho) 
V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
1.01 +0.001 0.000 +0.004 +0.001 0.000 +0.005 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 +0.015 0.024 +0.057 +0.028 0.016 +0.097 
 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.005 
2 ?0.012 0.051 +0.038 +0.037 0.032 +0.098 
 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.011 0.007 
2.5 ?0.007 0.072 ?0.015 +0.039 0.047 +0.083 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.007 
3 ?0.003 0.087 0.005 +0.038 0.059 +0.066 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 
3.5 0.000 0.099 0.021 +0.037 0.070 +0.051 
 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 
4 0.003 0.108 0.034 +0.035 0.079 +0.037 
  0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Households ranked by AE_EXP      
 
Table 5.28: Extended Gini Test for Payroll Tax 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve  
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Payroll Tax 
  V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
Decision rule 1 + + x + + + 
Decision Rule 2 na na x + na + 
*otes: Based on Table 5.27.   
‘+' () indicates that the tax is progressive (regressive) and the concentration curve of the tax is below (above) the 
Lorenz curve 
‘na' indicates that the difference between the curves are zero for some ordinates 
‘x’ indicates that the concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve, so no dominance 
 
The Overall Tax Incidence 
Total indirect and direct taxes are also confirmed statistically to be progressive 
regardless of the shifting assumptions if we rank the households by household expenditure 
(Table 5.29 and Table A 5.14). As can be seen by the concentration curves (Figure A 5.16 and  
  Chapter 5  
 223
Figure A 5.17), the informal employment makes the total tax system more progressive 
under both V1 and V2, as the wage earners in the lower deciles are unrecorded and do pay 
neither the income tax nor the payroll tax. As noted before, these informal employees are outside 
the public social services such as the pension system and health services too. We may expect 
that the whole fiscal system may produce less progressive distribution because of this, which we 
will see in the next chapter. But, when the tax evasion is included in the analysis as well as the 
informal employment, the total taxes become less progressive than the intended incidence 
suggests under both V1 and V2. The comparison of V1 and V2&V4 (Figure A 5.18) shows that 
V2&V4 is less progressive. This implies that if the tax authorities could decrease the extent of 
tax evasion, the tax system, particularly the direct taxes have the potential to decrease inequality 
in a greater extent. So it seems that the tax evasion does not only decrease the tax revenues but 
also it decreases the progressivity of the tax system. 
We also checked if the results regarding the total tax system is sensitive to the chosen 
welfare indicator. The concentration curves (Figure A 5.19, Figure A 5.20, and Figure A 5.21) 
for the total taxes which are ranked by AE_INC indicate that the total taxes are progressive in 
the sense that the concentration curves are below the Lorenz curve for AE_INC under both V1 
and V2. Table 5.30 provides the results of the welfare dominance test for the total taxes and the 
differences of the ordinates of the Lorenz curve of AE_INC and the concentration curves for the 
total taxes are given in Table A 5.15. The total tax system is progressive under all variants. The 
only problem appears for the second ordinate for V2. It seems that at that ordinate the 
concentration curve and the Lorenz curve coincides and the difference between the ordinates of 
the curves is statistically zero. Because of this we cannot confirm the progressivity of Variant 2 
with Howes’ test. By comparing V1 and V2&V4 (Figure A 5.21), it can be concluded that 
V2&V4 is less progressive. But statistically the concentration curves for the total taxes under V1 
and V2&V4 cross each other regardless of the welfare indicator chosen to rank the households. 
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Table A 5.16 provides the differences of the ordinates of the concentration curve for the total 
taxes under V1 and V2&V 4. The first column gives the results we obtain if we rank the 
households by AE_EXP and the second column gives the results for AE_INC. As can be seen 
we reject the null hypothesis for the opposite signs, so the curves cross each other. However, for 
the lower ordinates (up to 0.3 and 0.2 respectively) the total taxes with V1 is less progressive 
than the one with V2&V4, but for the higher ordinates V1 becomes more progressive in the sense 
that its concentration curve is below the concentration curve of V2&V4. V1 seeks the incidence 
when there is no informal employment; so low income earners at the bottom of the distribution 
(in informal employment with no social security) pay tax under V1, which makes V1 less 
progressive at the bottom of the distribution.  
Table 5.29: Dominance Results for Total Direct and Indirect Taxes 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve for Household Expenditure 
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Total Taxes 
  V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
Decision rule 1 + + + + + + 
Decision Rule 2 + + + + + + 
*otes: ‘+' () indicates that the tax is progressive (regressive) and the concentration curve of the tax is below 
(above) the Lorenz curve 
‘na' indicates that the difference between the curves are zero for some ordinates 
‘x’ indicates that the concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve, so no dominance 
 
Table 5.30: Dominance Results for Total Direct and Indirect Taxes 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve for Household Income 
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Total Taxes 
  V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
Decision rule 1 + + + + + + 
Decision Rule 2 + + + na + + 
*otes: ‘+' () indicates that the tax is progressive (regressive) and the concentration curve of the tax is below 
(above) the Lorenz curve 
‘na' indicates that the difference between the curves are zero for some ordinates 
‘x’ indicates that the concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve, so no dominance 
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5.5.2 S?Gini Progressivity Indices  
Even though the results presented above give the evidence for the distribution of tax 
burdens, in this section we would like to see the magnitude of the redistributive impact and also 
to see if the results change with different social welfare functions, which we consider with a 
wide range of inequality aversion parameter. In this section we could also have observations on 
which households enjoy the positive impacts of redistribution through taxes. In order to examine 
this we estimate S+Gini indices of progressivity and redistribution for a wide range of inequality 
aversion parameter which would tell us how the indices would change if we put more attention 
to the poor or the rich.  
In this section, we will use both household expenditure and household income as welfare 
indicators. For the benefit incidence analysis, the results were not sensitive to the welfare 
indicator chosen and we only reported the findings based on household expenditure. However 
the welfare dominance analysis showed that the indirect taxes are sensitive to the welfare 
indicator chosen. So in this section we will report the results based on both income and 
expenditure. 
Table 5.31 and Table 5.32 provide the indices of TR and IR+Progressivity, reranking and 
redistribution for an inequality aversion parameter, ρ=2 for household income and household 
expenditure respectively. S+Gini indices with ρ=2 provide us the values of the indices when we 
focus more on the middle of the distribution. We give this table as a summary of the tables from 
Table A 5.17 to Table A 5.28 in Appendix 5.1, providing S+Gini indices of IR and TR+
progressivity and redistribution by the inequality aversion parameter to see if the progressivity 
and redistributive power varies with inequality aversion parameter. We do not report the all 
progressivity rates for all incidence assumptions. Progressivity rates for only the two extreme 
incidence assumptions + the “intended” or statutory tax incidence (V1) and the incidence 
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considering shifting opportunities of the payroll tax and PIT on rent with informal employment 
and tax evasion (V2&V4)+ rather than for all incidence assumptions  are reported.  
Direct Taxes 
The personal income tax is progressive, as all S+Gini indices are positive for the whole 
range of parameter values regardless of the welfare indicator. TR and IR+progressivity rates are 
the highest when we put more weight on the middle of the distribution and they start to decline, 
once ρ is 2.5 and more, when household income is taken. The redistributive power of PIT takes 
the highest value of 2.5 and 1.6 percent, when ρ is 2 under V1 and V2&V4 respectively. We can 
interpret this in a way that the middle classes enjoy the most of the redistribution caused by PIT. 
The redistributive impact declines by almost 1 percent when the owners of rental incomes shift 
their tax burden to the tenants and the tax evasion and the informal employment are considered 
(V2&V4). This impact comes largely from the tax evasion and, this proves that the tax evasion 
does not only have a negative impact on the tax revenues it also deteriorates the potential 
redistributive impact of the most important direct tax of the Turkish tax system.  
The payroll tax is progressive for the whole range of ρ and progressivity rises with ρ 
under V1 regardless of the welfare indicator. While it is regressive only when ρ is 1.01, it 
becomes progressive once ρ is equal to 2 and rises with ρ under V2&V4 with household 
expenditure. This result is interesting in the sense that V2 makes the payroll tax more regressive 
as it supposes employees pay employers’ share of the tax too. So this progressive impact for 
higher ρ values mainly comes from the assumptions regarding informal employment and tax 
evasion, affecting mainly the lower part of the distribution. The redistributive impact is 
statistically zero, when higher inequality aversion is given to the higher part of the distribution 
and very small for the lower part of the distribution for the intended incidence (V1). Under 
V2&V4, the redistributive impact is negative for first three values of ρ, and is almost zero once ρ 
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is bigger than 3 under V2&V4, although the redistribution rises with ρ. The difference between 
the welfare dominance analysis and S+Gini indices arises from gross expenditure definition. We 
kept ranking households by AE_EXP and AE_INC for the direct taxes to compare the 
progressivity of different shifting assumptions. However, in this section we adjust gross incomes 
and expenditures according to the tax we examine.  
The property taxes are progressive and decrease both income and expenditure inequality. 
However, its redistributive impact seems to be smaller than the income tax, which is reasonable, 
as the share of the property taxes is only 2.5% in the total tax revenues.  With V4 it is assumed 
that the owners of agricultural land do not pay the property tax. This assumption increases 
progressivity of the tax, but its impact on the redistributive power of the tax is negligible. 
Indirect Taxes 
As for the indirect taxes, as noticed earlier, the progressivity of the indirect taxes is 
sensitive to the welfare indicator chosen. We confirm that apart from VAT1 and VAT8, all 
indirect taxes are progressive according to the both TR and IR approaches with AE_EXP as 
gross expenditures. Thanks to the differential rates on VAT, the total VAT is progressive 
although VAT1 and VAT8, on generally food products, are regressive. TR+progressivity rates 
confirm that the most progressive tax is PCOT which is a special tax on mobile phone services. 
PCT seems to be more progressive than VAT when ρ is smaller than 3; as we increase our 
ethical focus on the poor, progressivity rates for PCT decline and PCT becomes less progressive 
than VAT. VAT is the most progressive tax with IR approach, which is the result of the bigger 
share of VAT in the household expenditures relative to PCOT and PCT. For VAT18, VAT, and 
PCOT the progressivity rates rise with ρ, but for PCT and the total indirect taxes the 
progressivity rates take the highest values when ρ is between 1.5 and 2.5, it starts decreasing 
once ρ is 2.5. Although the redistributive impact from the total indirect taxes is positive for the 
  Chapter 5  
 228
whole range of ρ, the extent of redistribution is quite limited: the indirect taxes cause less than 
1% inequality reduction in expenditure inequality.  
When we use household income (AE_INC), all indirect taxes turn to be regressive for 
the whole range of inequality parameters according to both TR and IR approaches except PCOT. 
The most regressive tax is VAT1, followed by VAT8 and VAT18 with TR approach. The 
regressivity rises with ρ, so the most regressive impact is felt by the poor. The ranking according 
to IR approach suggests that the most regressive impact comes from the overall VAT, followed 
by PCT, VAT8, and VAT1. Although PCOT corrects the income inequality with positive values 
of S+Gini indices of redistribution for the whole range of ρ except 1.01, the impact of PCOT is 
not big enough to make the total indirect taxes have improving affect on income inequality. 
Disequalising impact of the total indirect taxes on income inequality increases with inequality 
aversion parameter and when ρ is 4, the taxes cause 4% increase in income inequality, which is 
higher than equalising impact of PIT.  
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Table 5.31: S?Gini Indices for Taxes (ρ=2) (Income) 
 
Kakwani Index      
TR Progression 
Reynolds?Smolensky 
Index, IR 
Progression 
Horizontal Inequity      
Atkinson?Plotnick 
Index 
Redistribution 
Income Tax     
Variant 1 0.173 0.027 0.002 0.025 
 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Variant2&Variant4 0.171 0.018 0.002 0.016 
 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Payroll Tax     
Variant 1 0.031 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Variant2&Variant4 +0.017 +0.001 0.003 +0.005 
 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Property Taxes     
Variant 1 0.186 0.012 0.0038 0.0085 
 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Variant4 0.199 0.013 0.0038 0.0089 
  0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
VAT1 +0.2569 +0.0002 0.0000 +0.0002 
 0.0083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
VAT8 +0.2302 +0.0025 0.0000 +0.0025 
 0.0089 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
VAT18 +0.0565 :0.0047 0.0020 :0.0067 
 0.0077 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006 
VAT +0.0795 +0.0077 0.0021 +0.0098 
 0.0069 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006 
PCT +0.0470 +0.0029 0.0036 +0.0066 
 0.0171 0.0010 0.0004 0.0010 
PCOT 0.0662 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 
 0.0050 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total Indirect Taxes  +0.0627 +0.0111 0.0149 +0.0260 
  0.0105 0.0017 0.0018 0.0011 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors estimated by DAD are in italic.  
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Table 5.32: S?Gini Indices for Taxes (ρ=2) (Expenditure) 
 
Kakwani Index      
TR Progression 
Reynolds?Smolensky 
Index, IR 
Progression 
Horizontal Inequity      
Atkinson?Plotnick 
Index 
Redistribution 
Income Tax     
Variant 1 0.169 0.032 0.055 0.025 
 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 
Variant2&Variant4 0.164 0.021 0.040 0.015 
 0.011 0.002 0.006 0.002 
Payroll Tax     
Variant 1 0.064 0.006 0.003 0.002 
 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Variant2&Variant4 0.039 0.003 0.005 +0.002 
 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Property Taxes     
Variant 1 0.265 0.022 0.0044 0.0174 
 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Variant4 0.285 0.023 0.0041 0.0185 
  0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 
VAT1 +0.1416 +0.0001 0.0000 +0.0001 
 0.0074 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
VAT8 +0.1449 +0.0019 0.0000 +0.0020 
 0.0077 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
VAT18 0.0690 0.0071 0.0003 0.0067 
 0.0043 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 
VAT 0.0410 0.0049 0.0003 0.0046 
 0.0034 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 
PCT 0.0515 0.0040 0.0012 0.0027 
 0.0142 0.0012 0.0000 0.0012 
PCOT 0.1190 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 
 0.0048 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total Indirect Taxes  0.0473 0.0107 0.0036 0.0071 
  0.0075 0.0020 0.0001 0.0020 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors estimated by DAD are in italic 
 
The Overall Tax Incidence 
In this section we examine the redistributive impact of the total taxes including both 
direct and indirect taxes. The figures, from  
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Figure A 5.22 to Figure A 5.25 presents the comparison of the Lorenz curves before and 
after the total taxes for both income and expenditure measure, and Table A 5.29 gives the 
differences between the ordinates of the Lorenz curves with asymptotic standard errors for the 
statistical inference. The comparison between the Lorenz curves of gross and net incomes 
(expenditures) give the total redistributive impact of the taxes.   
Before discussing the results, it is worth recalling the definitions of gross and net 
income/expenditure not to cause any confusion. Household net disposable income (per adult 
equivalent) (AE_INC), reported by households, gives post+income and payroll tax but pre+
property and indirect tax distribution. Household expenditure (AE_EXP) gives pre+direct and 
indirect tax distribution. So we add direct tax burden (except property tax) to income and 
expenditure (AE_INC and AE_EXP) to reach gross income and expenditure (pre+tax distribution 
of income and expenditure). To see the overall redistributive impact of the tax system, we 
compare gross income/expenditure with net income/expenditure (post+indirect and direct tax 
distribution of income/expenditure), which is found by deducing the tax burden originated by 
indirect taxes and property taxes from AE_EXP and AE_INC. Normally we should not deduce 
the indirect taxes from expenditure or income as they are part of the prices. But we simply 
assume that purchasing power of households is decreased by indirect taxes to see their 
progressivity and redistributive impact (See Table A 5.8).  
Figure 5.2 shows that the Lorenz curve for net expenditures is above the Lorenz curve 
for gross expenditures, suggesting that the total taxes reduce expenditure inequality under V1. 
With V2&V4, the redistributive impact on expenditure inequality seems to be smaller relative to 
V1, but still the Lorenz curve for net expenditures is much closer to the 45+degree line than that 
for gross expenditures. The negative differences between the Lorenz curves (Table A 5.29) 
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indicate that the tax system causes more equal distribution of expenditure regardless of the 
variant chosen.  
Figure A 5.24 provides the Lorenz curves for household incomes under V1. The 
redistributive impact of the total tax system is ambiguous as the curves apparently cross. The 
total taxes increase income inequality until p is equal to 0.5, then they have neutral impact for 
next three ordinates and for the higher part of the distribution the total taxes have inequality 
reducing impact on income inequality. The total taxes have negative impact on income 
inequality with V2&V4 as the Lorenz curve for net incomes is below that for gross incomes, so it 
suggests more unequal distribution. The magnitude of inequality reduction will be given below 
with S+Gini indices of redistribution.  
Figure 5.2 
 
S+Gini indices of IR+progressivity, reranking and redistribution for the incidence of the 
whole tax system are given in the tables Table A 5.30 and Table A 5.31 in Appendix 5.1. IR+
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progressivity rates for the whole tax system are positive for all ρ values, implying the tax system 
is progressive regardless of the welfare indicator and the shifting assumptions. With income as 
the welfare indicator, progressivity rates take the highest values when ρ is 2.5 under V1, but after 
this point it starts decreasing, suggesting under the social welfare function giving more weight to 
the poor, the progressivity gets smaller. Under V2&V4, the progressivity rates are smaller than 
the rates obtained with V1. Under V2&V4, the progressivity rates rise with ρ, showing the impact 
of informal employment and tax evasion (despite of high regressivity of the indirect taxes for the 
poor), which favours the lower part of the distribution. Despite positive IR+progressivity rates, 
due to high reranking relative to the progressivity rates, the redistributive impact of the tax 
system is negative; in other words because of the horizontal inequality caused by the tax system, 
the tax system increases income inequality. It is either positive or zero only we adopt V1 and 
when ρ is 1.01 and 1.5, which favours the rich. Rise in income inequality ranges from 0.7% 
(0.03%) to 2.5% (3%) under V1 (V2&V4).  
When we adopt expenditure as the welfare indicator, the tax system seems to decrease 
expenditure inequality both with V1 and V2&V4. The horizontal inequality decreases the 
redistributive power of the tax system and but the redistributive power of the taxes increases 
with ρ. The intended incidence (V1) seems to have a larger inequality reducing impact than 
V2&V4 as in line with the findings from the previous analysis. With expenditure as the welfare 
indicator, the S+Gini indices of redistribution vary from 0.17% (0.10%) to 5.8% (5.4%) 
depending on value of ρ under V1 (V2&V4). 
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5.6 The Incidence of Indirect Taxes by Effective Tax Rates Estimated from 
Input?Output Tables 
5.6.1 Effective Tax Rate Estimation Using Input?Output Tables  
Ahmad and Stern (1991) provide a method for estimating effective tax rates using Input+
Output (I+O) Tables, so researchers can take into account not only taxation on final consumption 
goods but also taxation on intermediary goods. Rajemison et al. (2003) is the first work to make 
use of effective tax rates to allocate tax burdens to households. They overcome an important 
drawback of standard incidence analysis in terms of excluding taxes on imports and inputs from 
the analysis.  
Rajemison et al (2003) examine indirect tax incidence in Madagascar by estimating 
effective tax rates using I+O tables. This enables the authors to trace an indirect tax levied on 
intermediate products through the I+O table to consumers. However, the effective tax rates 
estimated are marginal rates, which show the marginal impact of a change in a tax rate on the 
distribution of welfare. Since we focus on average tax incidence, we use a simpler model 
(discussed below) to calculate effective tax rates. 
We have input+output tables including the tax payments of each sector for import duties, 
purely domestic taxes (such as PCT and PCOT), VAT on domestic goods and VAT on imported 
goods33. Hence, we calculate four effective tax rates using I+O tables. The formula in matrix 
form for the effective tax rates are given below: 
AVADDVATDVATDVAT e *'*_'__ +=′  
2'*_'__ MMVATMVATMVAT e +=′  
                                                           
33 1998 I+O tables provide only one VAT table. However, by using the shares of each I+O sector’s share 
for imported and domestic goods, we have produced two I+O tables for VAT paid by each sector: VAT on 
imported goods and VAT on domestic goods.  
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ASSS e '*'+=′  
1'*' MDDD e +=′  
where e indicates effective rate and prime indicates row vectors. VAT_D, VAT_M, S and D are 
the nominal tax rates for VAT on domestic goods, VAT on imported goods, domestic taxes and 
import duties respectively. These are Jx1 vectors, where j is the number of industries in the IO 
table, VAD is the diagonal matrix with each industry’s unit value added on the diagonal. A is 
technical coefficient matrix for domestic inputs from industry i to industry j (aij) ; and M ( ijm ) is 
the technical coefficient for imported inputs. A and M are JxJ matrices. In Turkey, VAT on 
imported goods is applied to the post+duty price. Therefore, to obtain an effective tax rate for 
VAT on imported goods, we use the technical coefficient matrix (M2) attained from the Input+
Output Table for imported goods at after duty prices instead of the table at cif  prices (M1).  
Although we estimate VAT rates on imported goods and import duty rates for I+O 
industries, HICES expenditure survey does not provide the origin (imported or domestic) of the 
goods purchased by households. However, we can use I+O tables to attain households’ 
consumption share on imported and domestic goods for each I+O industry to overcome this 
drawback. Therefore, we use calculated effective tax rates weighted by domestic and import 
shares of sectors. Calculations for nominal tax rates are given in Appendix 5.2.  
We use 1998 Turkey I+O Tables, the most recent I+O table available to estimate effective 
tax rates for each industry to examine indirect tax incidence. Hence, we assume that from 1998 
to 2003 no structural change had happened in Turkish economy. The 1998 I+O table has 97 
sectors; we aggregate some I+O sectors to match the consumption goods in the 2003 HICES 
expenditure survey. After this aggregation process we end up with 88 sectors.  
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5.6.2 Results 
Estimated effective tax rates and nominal rates by I+O industries are presented in Table 
A 5.43 in Appendix 5.2. Table 5.33 and Table 5.34 present average effective tax rates for 
indirect taxes as a percentage of household expenditure and income. Average tax rates for VAT 
on imported goods and domestic taxes rise with expenditure deciles even if increment in deciles’ 
rates is small. However, average tax rates for VAT on domestic goods and import duty decrease 
as we move to higher deciles, implying higher tax burden to the poor relative to their 
expenditure share. The total tax burden of the total indirect taxes is 17.6% for the first decile and 
19% for 10th decile. The pattern for average tax rates for domestic excises (PCT and PCOT in 
the standard analysis) is in line with the standard analysis, but average rates for VAT on 
domestic goods imply a regressive distribution. When we calculate average tax rates as a 
percentage of household income and rank households by household income (adult equivalent), 
average tax burdens for all indirect taxes decrease with income deciles, suggesting that the 
indirect taxes with effective rates have higher burden on lower part of the income distribution. 
This result is in line with the standard indirect tax incidence, although implied tax burdens on 
lower deciles with effective tax rates are higher than tax with statutory rates.  
Table 5.33: Average  Effective Rates of Indirect Taxes by deciles  
as a percentage of per adult equivalent household expenditure     
Expenditure 
Deciles 
AE_EXP VAT_M 
Import 
Duty 
Domestic 
Taxes 
VAT_D 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
1 2.51 5.19 1.56 2.56 8.37 17.62 
2 3.84 5.45 1.51 2.75 8.41 18.10 
3 4.85 5.62 1.47 2.81 8.24 18.18 
4 5.83 5.65 1.41 2.83 8.06 17.96 
5 6.83 5.85 1.40 2.97 8.17 18.39 
6 8.02 5.97 1.36 2.96 7.98 18.29 
7 9.49 6.17 1.36 3.03 8.10 18.65 
8 11.53 6.24 1.32 3.02 7.94 18.49 
9 15.04 6.37 1.23 3.10 7.73 18.42 
10 32.04 6.60 0.90 4.09 7.43 19.05 
Turkey 100 6.20 1.21 3.32 7.83 18.57 
ote: Ranked by per adult equivalent household expenditure 
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Table 5.34: Average  Effective Rates of Indirect Taxes by decile    
as a percentage of per adult equivalent household income     
Income Decile AE_I*C VAT_M Import Duty 
Domestic 
Taxes 
VAT_D 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes 
1 2.08 8.14 2.17 3.52 12.41 26.27 
2 3.48 6.50 1.63 3.00 9.57 20.65 
3 4.50 6.39 1.49 2.94 8.94 19.83 
4 5.48 5.84 1.38 2.82 8.13 18.22 
5 6.53 5.79 1.31 2.72 7.74 17.55 
6 7.70 5.88 1.26 2.80 7.66 17.60 
7 9.23 5.39 1.12 2.62 6.91 16.02 
8 11.41 5.22 1.04 2.68 6.62 15.57 
9 15.08 4.76 0.91 2.60 5.79 14.06 
10 34.52 4.15 0.60 2.68 4.68 12.10 
Turkey 100 5.08 0.99 2.72 6.42 15.21 
ote: Ranked by per adult equivalent household net disposable income 
 
Concentration curves34 and the dominance test methodology are performed. The 
concentration curve of the total indirect taxes with effective tax rates dominates the Lorenz curve 
for household expenditure under the first decision rule (Table 5.35 and Table 5.36). However, 
the differences for the ordinates between 0.75 and 85 are not statistically different from zero, 
thus Howes’ test cannot verify that the total indirect taxes are progressive. The curve is very 
close to the Lorenz curve for AE_EXP. Domestic VAT and import duty is dominated by the 
Lorenz curve for household expenditure for both decision rules, so they are regressive, whereas 
VAT on imported goods and domestic excise taxes are progressive. Indirect taxes with effective 
tax rates become regressive when we rank household by income, which is in line with the 
standard indirect tax incidence analysis. We have a problem to reject the null hypothesis for the 
differences of the higher ordinates for the domestic taxes. Apart from this we can confirm 
                                                           
34 See Table A 5.32 and Table A 5.33 for the differences between ordinates of the Lorenz curve and the 
concentration curves. See Figure A 5.22 for the concentration curves of effective indirect taxes. 
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statistically that the indirect taxes with effective rates are regressive with income as a welfare 
indicator.  
Table 5.35: Dominance Results for Indirect Taxes with effective rates (expenditure) 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve for AE_EXP 
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Indirect Taxes 
Domestic 
Taxes 
Domestic 
VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Import 
VAT 
Decision rule 1 + + + + + 
Decision Rule 2 na + + + + 
*otes: 
‘+' () indicates that the tax is progressive (regressive) and the concentration curve of the tax is below (above) the 
Lorenz curve 
‘na' indicates that the difference between the curves are zero for some ordinates 
‘x’ indicates that the concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve, so no dominance 
 
Table 5.36: Dominance Results for Indirect Taxes with effective rates (income) 
Relative to the Lorenz Curve for AE_I*C 
  Per Adult Equivalent Taxes 
  Indirect Taxes 
Domestic 
Taxes 
Domestic 
VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Import 
VAT 
Decision rule 1 + + + + + 
Decision Rule 2 + na + + + 
*otes: 
‘+' () indicates that the tax is progressive (regressive) and the concentration curve of the tax is below (above) the 
Lorenz curve 
‘na' indicates that the difference between the curves are zero for some ordinates 
‘x’ indicates that the concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve, so no dominance 
 
S+Gini Indices of progressivity and redistribution support the welfare dominance 
analysis (see the tables from Table A 5.34 to Table A 5.39 in Appendix 5.1). Let’s first discuss 
the results with household expenditure. Both VAT on imported goods and domestic taxes are 
progressive as their progressivity indices are positive for all values of ρ. Yet, progressivity rates 
for domestic goods fall as we focus more on the poor. This finding is consistent with the 
standard analysis for the most important excise tax, PCT. For the total progressive impact, both 
TR and IR progressivity rates take the smallest value for 1.01 of ρ, and then increase with ρ up to 
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2 and stay constant. When we consider household income, all taxes are regressive and 
regressivity increases with values of ρ, suggesting that the poor is more affected by negative 
impact of indirect taxes. The redistributive impact of the indirect taxes with effective tax rates on 
expenditure inequality is around 0.15% (it is around 0.7% with statutory tax rates) which is 
lower than the impact with statutory rates and negligible, whereas the negative impact on income 
inequality ranges from 0.07% for the smallest ρ, to 3% for the highest ρ. Inequality increasing 
impact of indirect taxes on income inequality was 4% for the highest ρ with the standard 
incidence analysis.  
Figure A 5.27 compares the concentration curves for the total indirect taxes with 
standard tax rates and effective tax rates. The concentration curve with the effective rates is 
above that with the standard rates. The difference comes from import taxes and the higher tax 
rates for domestic taxes and VAT because of taxation on intermediary goods, which lead higher 
tax burdens on lower expenditure/income deciles.  
The Overall Tax Incidence 
The figures from Figure A 5.29 to Figure A 5.32 provide the Lorenz curves for the total 
direct and indirect taxes with the effective tax rate methodology. Table A 5.40 gives the 
differences of the ordinates between before and after total tax system with asymptotic standard 
errors for both income and expenditure. The differences are all negative and statistically 
different from zero with household expenditure which means that the total tax system decreases 
expenditure inequality for both V1 and V2&V4. However, while under V1, the Lorenz curves for 
before and after total taxes household incomes cross each other, under V2&V4, the distribution 
of household incomes after total taxes are more unequal than gross incomes. S+Gini indices of 
IR+progressivity and redistribution confirm these findings. Although IR+progressivity rates are 
positive for household incomes, the progressivity rates are smaller than reranking rates, which 
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lead negative redistribution rates with V2&V4.  Under V1, when ρ is 1.01 and 1.5 the tax system 
narrows income inequality by 0.04 and 0.5% respectively, but if we give more attention to the 
middle of the distribution the tax system becomes neutral, but then it turns to increase income 
inequality if we put more weight on the lower income classes. Increase in income inequality is 
much smaller with effective tax rates than statutory tax rates. However, the tax system seems to 
reduce expenditure inequality for both V1 and V2&V4 and positive redistributive impact increase 
with ρ values.  
5.7 Regional Level Analysis 
In this section, we look at how taxes affect between regions and within regions 
inequalities.  Table 5.37 and Table 5.38 present the redistributive impact of taxes by regions 
estimated by the differences between the Gini indices of gross and net expenditures (incomes). 
We apply the decomposition analysis by groups with the analytical approach to obtain the Gini 
indices for gross and net expenditures (incomes) and the numbers in the tables give the 
differences between the Gini indices for each region and for the overall country. Negative 
numbers in the tables indicate that inequality for after tax (net) distribution is higher than before 
tax distribution, thus the tax in question increases inequality in the region. The personal income 
tax, the property taxes and the total direct taxes decrease both expenditure and income inequality 
in all regions for both V1 and V2&V4. Equalising impact of PIT is smaller with V2&V4 in 
almost all regions except S. East Anatolia and for the whole country, but not all regions are 
affected by the assumptions of V2&V4 equally. While Istanbul appears to be the most affected 
region by tax evasion and informal employment, the least affected region is East Anatolia and 
Mediterranean.  As noted before the less progressive impact of V2&V4 for PIT comes from 
largely tax evasion, as informal employment supports progressivity. The reason for this high 
impact on Istanbul is the fact that Istanbul houses the richest and we have found that the rich 
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evade tax more relative to lower income classes. Interestingly, V2&V4 increases the positive 
redistributive impact of PIT in S. East Anatolia, since this region is the poorest region and it is 
affected by informal employment more than tax evasion (see Table A 5.44 and Table A 5.45 for 
the distribution of social security membership by region). The smallest redistributive impact is 
felt by S. East Anatolia under V1, whereas under V2&V4, the smallest impact goes to Aegean. 
When we look at the impacts of the taxes on urban and rural areas, under V1, PIT’s equalising 
impact is almost equal for both urban and rural areas. However, because tax evasion is higher in 
urban areas relative to rural areas and rural areas are dominated by agricultural sector which is 
taxed with 2.5% flat PIT rate, PIT’s equalising impact is higher in rural areas.   
The payroll tax has diverse impacts in regions. The payroll tax increases income 
inequality in regions with high recorded employment such as Istanbul, Marmara, Mediterranean, 
yet the tax increases expenditure inequality in only Istanbul under V1.  Payroll tax with V2&V4 
decreases income inequality only in the regions with low private sector employment and low 
welfare level such as Black Sea, East and S. East Anatolia. The impact of payroll tax on 
expenditure inequality with V2&V4 is negative only in the regions with very high private sector 
employment (Istanbul, Marmara and Aegean). The magnitude of the redistributive impact of the 
payroll tax with V1 is less than 1% except Black Sea (with expenditure); however, under 
V2&V4 the redistributive impact is over 1% for few regions such as Istanbul, S. East Anatolia, 
East Anatolia and Black Sea. Another interesting observation regarding the payroll tax appears 
when we look at rural+urban breakdown. The payroll tax decreases both income and expenditure 
inequality for the whole country and rural areas under V1, however, the tax increases inequality 
in urban areas. The possible reason for this finding comes from the fact that wage earners are 
concentrated in urban Turkey and under V1 we assume that there is no informal employment and 
urban workers with very low wages in informal employment also pay the payroll tax. Under 
V2&V4, the payroll tax increases both expenditure and income inequality for the whole country 
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and urban areas, but it decreases inequality in rural areas. Moreover, the negative impact of the 
tax in urban areas is higher than the impact for the whole country. With assumptions regarding 
tax evasion for the payroll tax, we assume that civil servants and SSK members in private sector 
pay the payroll tax as if they earn minimum wage level for civil servants and private workers, 
making the payroll tax rate flat for these workers. Also with V2 we allow employers to shift their 
payroll tax burden to employees in private sector, concentrated in urban areas. Therefore, the 
assumptions of V2&V4 generate regressive impact. Since civil servants and private employment 
are concentrated in urban areas, these impacts are felt less in rural areas, where self employment 
is more common.  
The total direct taxes decrease both expenditure and income inequality under V1 in all 
regions. Black Sea seems to receive the highest redistribution under V1, followed by East and 
Central Anatolia and Marmara. With V2&V4, regions with high unrecorded employment see 
higher positive redistributive impact relative to V1, and regions with high tax evasion see higher 
negative redistributive impact. Therefore, while Istanbul’s redistribution rate is 2.88% (3.79) for 
income inequality (expenditure inequality) with V1, this rate drops to 0.51% (1.11), implying 
that tax evasion and high payroll tax burden on private employees decreases most of the 
redistributive power of the direct taxes in Istanbul, the centre of industry and finance of Turkey.  
Indirect taxes’ (both with standard and effective rates) redistributive impact on income 
inequality is negative for all regions, whereas the impact on expenditure inequality is positive. 
Another interesting observation from these tables is that the indirect taxes with effective tax rates 
increase expenditure inequality in S. East Anatolia and the negative impact of indirect taxes with 
effective rates on income inequality is bigger than that with standard rates in the same region. 
The reason for this finding may be the region’s higher propensity to consume. 97% of household 
income goes to consumption in this region and most of the consumption is on food products and 
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effective tax rates for VAT on food and food related sectors are higher than statutory VAT rates 
(which are 1% and 8%), due to taxation on imported and intermediate goods. 
While the total taxes with standard indirect tax rates have negative impact on income 
inequality in Marmara, Aegean, Mediterranean and Central Anatolia with V1, the total taxes with 
effective indirect tax rates deteriorate income inequality in Marmara, Aegean, Mediterranean 
and S. East Anatolia. However, the estimated rates are statistically significant only for Black 
Sea, East Anatolia, Mediterranean and urban Turkey. Under V2&V4, the total taxes (both with 
standard and effective indirect tax rates) increase income inequality in Istanbul, Marmara, 
Aegean, Mediterranean and Central Anatolia. While inequality decreasing impact of the total 
taxes with standard indirect tax rates is over 1% for East Anatolia and Black Sea under V1, 
Mediterranean appears to be the most negatively affected region because of the total taxes. With 
effective rates the negative impact is eased for Mediterranean. The total taxes with standard 
indirect tax rates improve expenditure inequality under both V1 and V2&V4, and decline in 
expenditure inequality ranges between 4 and 7% with V1 and 2 and 6.5% with V2&V4. With 
effective indirect tax rates, Marmara and Aegean experiences inequality increase as a result of 
the total taxes, but the negative redistributive impact is less than 1% for these regions and the 
rates are not statistically significant.  
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Table 5.37: Redistribution Index by regions (V1) (Expenditure) 
Regions PIT 
Payroll 
Tax 
Property 
Taxes 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
(Effective) 
Total 
Taxes 
Total 
Taxes 
(Effective) 
Istanbul 0.0291 +0.0041 0.0130 0.0379 0.0106 0.0040 0.0489 0.1061 
 0.0054 0.0019 0.0014 0.0062 0.0061 0.0022 0.0080 0.0143 
Marmara 0.0264 0.0002 0.0187 0.0457 0.0150 0.0108 0.0603 ?0.0076 
 0.0085 0.0012 0.0013 0.0081 0.0041 0.0014 0.0095 0.0131 
Aegean  0.0167 0.0009 0.0191 0.0381 0.0037 0.0039 0.0420 ?0.0061 
 0.0033 0.0011 0.0012 0.0036 0.0020 0.0009 0.0042 0.0202 
Black Sea  0.0332 0.0112 0.0173 0.0603 0.0083 0.0073 0.0694 0.0247 
 0.0055 0.0015 0.0015 0.0057 0.0019 0.0010 0.0059 0.0125 
Central Anatolia  0.0238 0.0045 0.0223 0.0502 0.0016 ?0.0001 0.0516 0.0559 
 0.0031 0.0011 0.0011 0.0035 0.0019 0.0009 0.0041 0.0101 
Mediterranean  0.0256 0.0012 0.0175 0.0437 0.0158 0.0091 0.0604 0.0479 
 0.0054 0.0015 0.0023 0.0061 0.0036 0.0013 0.0072 0.0136 
East Anatolia  0.0148 0.0099 0.0156 0.0406 0.0132 0.0087 0.0553 0.0464 
 0.0024 0.0019 0.0016 0.0039 0.0034 0.0013 0.0055 0.0162 
S. East Anatolia 0.0102 0.0079 0.0114 0.0296 0.0131 0.0027 0.0443 0.0188 
 0.0019 0.0014 0.0013 0.0029 0.0038 0.0015 0.0046 0.0129 
Turkey 0.0253 0.0024 0.0174 0.0449 0.0071 0.0015 0.0523 0.0681 
 0.0022 0.0007 0.0006 0.0024 0.0020 0.0007 0.0030 0.0065 
Urban 0.0231 ?0.0012 0.0166 0.0387 0.0081 0.0027 0.0469 0.0648 
 0.0028 0.0009 0.0007 0.0030 0.0025 0.0009 0.0037 0.0071 
Rural 0.0253 0.0030 0.0164 0.0455 0.0094 0.0066 0.0547 0.0112 
  0.0034 0.0008 0.0012 0.0036 0.0023 0.0008 0.0047 0.0120 
 V2&V4 for PIT and Payroll Tax; V4 for Property Tax 
Istanbul 0.0137 +0.0163 0.0131 0.0111   0.0221 0.0803 
 0.0049 0.0011 0.0013 0.0053   0.0081 0.0136 
Marmara 0.0212 ?0.0018 0.0195 0.0378   0.0531 ?0.0148 
 0.0085 0.0013 0.0013 0.0079   0.0093 0.0128 
Aegean  0.0104 +0.0029 0.0202 0.0289   0.0330 ?0.0150 
 0.0031 0.0012 0.0012 0.0034   0.0040 0.0201 
Black Sea  0.0273 0.0111 0.0190 0.0559   0.0654 0.0202 
 0.0050 0.0015 0.0014 0.0051   0.0055 0.0119 
Central Anatolia  0.0162 0.0006 0.0231 0.0397   0.0418 0.0459 
 0.0029 0.0011 0.0011 0.0032   0.0039 0.0098 
Mediterranean  0.0209 0.0022 0.0187 0.0405   0.0576 0.0455 
 0.0049 0.0014 0.0022 0.0056   0.0068 0.0131 
East Anatolia  0.0123 0.0125 0.0167 0.0410   0.0559 0.0475 
 0.0021 0.0020 0.0016 0.0037   0.0053 0.0162 
S. East Anatolia 0.0148 0.0164 0.0123 0.0424   0.0576 0.0335 
 0.0018 0.0016 0.0012 0.0028   0.0046 0.0128 
Turkey 0.0151 +0.0019 0.0185 0.0315   0.0393 0.0552 
 0.0020 0.0005 0.0006 0.0021   0.0029 0.0061 
Urban 0.0117 +0.0090 0.0169 0.0202   0.0285 0.0477 
 0.0025 0.0006 0.0007 0.0027   0.0036 0.0065 
Rural 0.0229 0.0065 0.0179 0.0470   0.0571 0.0125 
  0.0031 0.0008 0.0012 0.0032     0.0044 0.0117 
ote: The differences between the Gini indices of gross and net expenditures. Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. 
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Table 5.38: Redistribution Index by regions (V1) (Income) 
Regions PIT 
Payroll 
Tax 
Property 
Taxes 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
(Effective) 
Total 
Taxes 
Total 
Taxes 
(Effective) 
Istanbul 0.0266 +0.0042 0.0067 0.0288 +0.0203 +0.0147 0.0019 0.0101 
 0.0030 0.0014 0.0010 0.0028 0.0026 0.0026 0.0046 0.0037 
Marmara 0.0288 ?0.0012 0.0079 0.0354 +0.0313 +0.0266 ?0.0078 ?0.0007 
 0.0051 0.0012 0.0015 0.0037 0.0038 0.0024 0.0058 0.0041 
Aegean  0.0205 0.0006 0.0081 0.0295 +0.0222 +0.0233 ?0.0014 ?0.0019 
 0.0021 0.0009 0.0011 0.0022 0.0019 0.0016 0.0035 0.0032 
Black Sea  0.0302 0.0072 0.0070 0.0431 +0.0230 +0.0257 0.0131 0.0104 
 0.0031 0.0013 0.0012 0.0026 0.0022 0.0018 0.0036 0.0031 
Central Anatolia  0.0230 0.0021 0.0115 0.0362 +0.0282 +0.0264 ?0.0007 0.0031 
 0.0020 0.0009 0.0010 0.0019 0.0020 0.0013 0.0033 0.0026 
Mediterranean  0.0257 +0.0029 0.0060 0.0289 +0.0371 +0.0304 +0.0212 +0.0107 
 0.0031 0.0011 0.0016 0.0031 0.0045 0.0028 0.0066 0.0047 
East Anatolia  0.0201 0.0089 0.0100 0.0375 +0.0193 +0.0228 0.0138 0.0106 
 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013 0.0023 0.0034 0.0023 0.0054 0.0037 
S. East Anatolia 0.0128 0.0069 0.0095 0.0284 +0.0172 +0.0292 0.0064 ?0.0039 
 0.0016 0.0013 0.0012 0.0023 0.0033 0.0029 0.0053 0.0044 
Turkey 0.0248 0.0005 0.0085 0.0334 +0.0260 +0.0248 ?0.0010 0.0021 
 0.0013 0.0005 0.0005 0.0011 0.0011 0.0009 0.0019 0.0015 
Urban 0.0230 +0.0021 0.0082 0.0287 +0.0262 +0.0227 +0.0061 ?0.0004 
 0.0016 0.0006 0.0005 0.0014 0.0014 0.0012 0.0022 0.0018 
Rural 0.0244 0.0005 0.0059 0.0311 +0.0271 +0.0304 ?0.0045 +0.0067 
  0.0022 0.0007 0.0009 0.0022 0.0021 0.0014 0.0036 0.0030 
 V2&V4 for PIT and Payroll Tax; V4 for Property Tax 
Istanbul 0.0131 +0.0157 0.0067 0.0051   +0.0218 +0.0136 
 0.0033 0.0009 0.0010 0.0032   0.0050 0.0041 
Marmara 0.0233 +0.0060 0.0076 0.0249   +0.0181 +0.0111 
 0.0054 0.0013 0.0015 0.0040   0.0060 0.0043 
Aegean  0.0143 +0.0042 0.0088 0.0197   +0.0110 +0.0114 
 0.0021 0.0011 0.0011 0.0022   0.0035 0.0032 
Black Sea  0.0252 0.0059 0.0080 0.0382   0.0084 0.0058 
 0.0029 0.0013 0.0011 0.0025   0.0035 0.0031 
Central Anatolia  0.0163 +0.0023 0.0115 0.0258   +0.0110 +0.0072 
 0.0021 0.0009 0.0010 0.0020   0.0033 0.0026 
Mediterranean  0.0219 +0.0040 0.0064 0.0244   +0.0253 +0.0149 
 0.0031 0.0011 0.0015 0.0029   0.0065 0.0046 
East Anatolia  0.0170 0.0098 0.0102 0.0357   0.0122 0.0089 
 0.0013 0.0015 0.0014 0.0023   0.0053 0.0037 
S. East Anatolia 0.0172 0.0159 0.0091 0.0405   0.0185 0.0083 
 0.0015 0.0015 0.0012 0.0024   0.0054 0.0045 
Turkey 0.0161 +0.0046 0.0089 0.0207   +0.0135 +0.0104 
 0.0013 0.0004 0.0005 0.0012   0.0019 0.0016 
Urban 0.0130 +0.0100 0.0083 0.0119   +0.0229 +0.0172 
 0.0017 0.0005 0.0005 0.0015   0.0024 0.0019 
Rural 0.0224 0.0016 0.0062 0.0304   ?0.0048 +0.0070 
  0.0020 0.0007 0.0009 0.0020     0.0034 0.0028 
ote: The differences between the Gini indices of gross and net expenditures. Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. 
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5.8 Conclusions 
This chapter’s main aim was to examine the redistributive impact of overall Turkish tax 
system. In order to do this, the standard tax incidence analysis has been applied for direct taxes 
which tax burdens of households/individuals are calculated with the actual statutory tax rates. In 
the context of indirect taxes, in addition to the estimations of tax burdens with statutory tax rates, 
effective tax rates have been estimated by using input+output tables (this allowed us to take into 
account the taxes on intermediary and imported goods). Two main sets of shifting assumptions 
are used to see the effect of different shifting assumptions on the incidence of taxes as well as 
the assumptions for tax evasion and informal employment.  
The results are summarised in Table 5.39 below. The results have shown that the 
personal income tax (PIT) and the property taxes are progressive regardless of the shifting 
assumptions and welfare indicator chosen. Despite the progressivity of PIT, S+Gini indices of 
progressivity and redistribution have shown that when we have a social welfare function giving 
more importance to the poor, the progressivity of PIT declines and redistributive impact is 
highest when we put more weight to the middle part of the distribution. S+Gini indices have 
confirmed that tax evasion reduces the redistributive power of PIT, implying that high evasion is 
harmful not only because it generates revenue loss but also it decreases the potential 
redistributive power of PIT. 
However, the progressivity of the payroll tax is ambiguous and sensitive to the shifting 
assumptions and welfare indicator chosen. According to the welfare dominance analysis in 
which we rank households by reported household expenditure, the tax is regressive under both 
V1 and V2. When we allow for informal employment effects, the tax becomes progressive except 
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for the very top of the distribution, reflecting the concentration of unrecorded employment in the 
lower and middle parts of the distribution. The Extended Gini test has shown that the payroll tax 
is progressive if the focus is on the poor, but regressive otherwise. However these results are 
based on the comparison of the Lorenz curve for reported household expenditure (AE_EXP) and 
the concentration curve for the payroll tax ranked by AE_EXP. When we adjust reported 
household expenditure and income to obtain gross expenditure and incomes and use them to 
estimate S+Gini indices the payroll tax is generally progressive, especially when more weight is 
attached to the middle and lower income classes.  
Indirect taxes are sensitive to the welfare indicator chosen. While the total indirect taxes 
are progressive with household expenditure, the taxes become regressive with household income 
as a welfare indicator. The most progressive tax with higher redistributive impact is VAT 
because of its larger share in household expenditure, even if PCT and PCOT are distributed more 
unequally than VAT in favour of the poor.  Although the redistributive impact from the total 
indirect taxes is positive for the whole range of inequality aversion parameter, the extent of 
redistribution is quite limited: the indirect taxes generate a less than one per cent reduction in 
expenditure inequality.  
When we use household income all indirect taxes are regressive, except PCOT, and the 
most regressive impact is felt by the poor. Total indirect taxes increase income inequality with 
greater inequality aversion. The indirect tax incidence with effective tax rates is less progressive 
in the case of household expenditure and more regressive in the case of household incomes, 
because of the impact of taxation on imported and intermediate goods. Domestic excises have 
been found to be progressive with household expenditure, which is consistent with the standard 
incidence analysis. However VAT on domestic goods is regressive in contrast with the standard 
analysis. While import duty is regressive, VAT on imported goods is progressive. Indirect taxes 
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with effective tax rates become regressive with income in line with the standard indirect tax 
incidence. 
Total taxes are progressive with both statutory indirect and effective tax rates and reduce 
expenditure inequality by around six per cent (the redistributive power rises as we put more 
weight on the poor), thanks to high progressivity of PIT and property taxes. The total taxes are 
progressive with household income but because of the high horizontal inequality (reranking) 
they generate, the redistributive impact is negative for the lower parts of the distribution; the 
overall impact on income inequality depends on the shifting assumptions and measure of tax 
rates. These results demonstrate the importance of the welfare indicator chosen in the tax 
incidence analysis.  
Taxes have diverse impacts on regions’ inequality depending on employment structure 
and welfare level. The personal income tax, property taxes and total direct taxes decrease both 
expenditure and income inequality in all regions  payroll tax depend on shifting assumptions, but 
generally the payroll tax increases both expenditure and income inequality for the whole country 
and urban areas, but it decreases inequality in rural areas.  
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Table 5.39: The Summary of The Results 
  Welfare Dominance Method 
The Extended Gini Test and       
S?Gini Indices 
Redistributive Impact 
  Income Expenditure Income Expenditure Income Expenditure 
Income Tax 
Variant 1 Progressive Progressive Progressive Progressive Positive Positive 
Variant2&Variant4 Progressive Progressive Progressive Progressive Positive Positive 
Payroll Tax 
Variant 1 Indeterminate Indeterminate Progressive Progressive Indeterminate Indeterminate 
Variant2&Variant4 Indeterminate Indeterminate Indeterminate Indeterminate Indeterminate Indeterminate 
Property Taxes 
Variant 1 Progressive Progressive Progressive Progressive Positive Positive 
Variant4 Progressive Progressive Progressive Progressive Positive Positive 
Indirect Taxes with statutory rates 
VAT1 Regressive Regressive Regressive Regressive Negative Negative  
VAT8 Regressive Regressive Regressive Regressive Negative Negative 
VAT18 Regressive Progressive Regressive Progressive Negative Positive 
VAT Regressive Progressive Regressive Progressive Negative Positive 
PCT Regressive Progressive Indeterminate Progressive Negative Indeterminate 
PCOT Progressive Progressive Indeterminate Progressive Positive* Positive 
Total Indirect Taxes  Regressive Progressive Regressive Progressive Negative Positive 
Indirect Taxes with effective rates           
VAT on Domestic Goods Regressive Regressive Regressive Indeterminate Negative* Negative* 
VAT on Imported Goods Regressive Progressive Regressive Progressive Negative* Positive 
Import Duty Regressive Regressive Regressive Regressive Negative* Negative * 
Domestic Excises Indeterminate Progressive Regressive Progressive Negative* Positive 
Effective Indirect Taxes Regressive Progressive Regressive Progressive Negative Positive 
Total Taxes  
Variant 1 Progressive Progressive Progressive Progressive Indeterminate Positive 
Variant 2&Variant4 Progressive Progressive Progressive Progressive Negative Positive 
Total Taxes with effective indirect taxes 
Variant 1 Progressive Progressive Progressive Progressive Indeterminate Positive 
Variant2&Variant4 Progressive Progressive Progressive Progressive Negative Positive 
*The impact is negative or positive except for ρ=1.01 
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Appendix 5 
Appendix 5.1: Tables 
 
Table A 5.1: The Trend of Direct&Indirect Taxes (% of TTR) and Tax 
Effort  (TTR as % of G*P) 
Years Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Tax Effort  
1980 62.78 37.22 14.14 
1985 47.68 52.32 10.83 
1990 52.11 47.89 11.43 
1995 42.46 57.54 13.80  
1996 39.48 60.52 14.98  
1997 40.75 59.25 16.14 
1998 46.65 53.35 17.24 
1999 45.37 54.63 18.91 
2000 40.94 59.06 21.10 
2001 40.48 59.52 22.52 
2002 33.67 66.33 21.68 
2003 32.98 67.02 23.64 
2004 29.71 70.29 23.18 
2005 29.44 70.56 24.09 
Source: DPT Economic and Social Indicators 1950:2006  
 
 
Table A 5.2: The Size of Informal Economy in Turkey     
The Author Estimation Method Term of Analysis Informal Economy 
       % of official G*P 
Çetintaş and Vergil 
(2003) Econometric Approach 1971+2000 %18+30 
Savaşan (2003) Mimic Model 1970+1998 %10+45 
Ilgın (2002) 
Constant Rate Approach 1968+2001 %31+84 
Tax Approach 1985+2001 %26+184 
Öğünç and Yılmaz 
(2000) 
Constant Rate Approach 1960+1998 %0+46 
Constant Rate Approach 1971+1999 %11+22 
Yayla (1995) Monetary Approach 1970+1993 %9+21 
Temel, Şimşek and 
Yazıcı (1994) 
Tax Approach 1984+1991 %8+45 
Constant Rate Approach 1970+1992 %0+26 
Volume  1970+1992 %0+26 
Econometric Approach 1975+1992 %6+20 
Kasnakoğlu (1993) Monetary Approach 1970+1990 %3+11 
Source: Baldemir et. All (2005) 
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Table A 5.3: Calculation for Income Tax Ranges (Wage Earners) 
    A B C D   
  Tax Rate 
 Maximum 
gross income 
(PTI) 
Tax bill up 
to the next 
range 
Tax bill over 
the  previous 
range 
Maximum 
net income 
(ATI)   
1. range 15% 5000 750   4250 D=A+B+C 
2. range 20% 12000 750 1400 9850 D=A+B+C 
3. range 25% 24000 2150 3000 18850 D=A+B+C 
4. range 30% 60000 5150 10800 44050 D=A+B+C 
5. range 35% 120000 15950 21000 83050 D=A+B+C 
6. range 40% no limit 36950       
 As seen from Table A 5.3, if household net reported income is equal to or less than 4,250 Turkish Liras     
(TL), that household is subject to 15 percent PIT. If household net reported income is higher than 4,250 
TL  but equal to or less than 9,850 TL, that household is subject to 20 percent PIT.  
 
Table A 5.4: Mean Wages by the Ownership Status of the 
Employer and Social Security Institution 
  Mean* Standard Errors 
Private Sector 4510 81 
SSK members 5940 141 
Unrecorded Employees 2980 60 
Public Sector 8230 84 
SSK members 7860 147 
ES members 8550 88 
Turkey 5320 64 
SSK members 6330 118 
Unrecorded Employees 3020 65 
ES members 8550 88 
*Milyon TL   
 
 
Table A 5.5: Average Rates of PIT by expenditure decile   
as a percentage of per adult equivalent household expenditure  
Deciles AE_EXP V1 V2 V1&V3 V2&V3 V1&V4 V2&V4 
1 2.51 12.88 12.88 7.30 7.30 6.87 6.87 
2 3.84 14.52 15.48 10.87 11.75 9.92 10.87 
3 4.85 15.22 15.60 12.14 12.58 10.82 11.26 
4 5.83 15.13 16.65 12.72 14.19 11.05 12.57 
5 6.83 15.85 16.12 13.79 14.06 11.74 12.01 
6 8.02 16.88 17.19 15.29 15.59 12.51 12.85 
7 9.49 15.66 15.95 14.28 14.57 11.41 11.74 
8 11.53 16.32 16.80 15.16 15.61 11.90 12.35 
9 15.04 18.30 18.42 17.24 17.36 13.29 13.41 
10 32.04 24.19 24.10 22.86 22.76 14.10 14.00 
Turkey  100 18.81 19.07 17.12 17.37 12.50 12.76 
otes: Household expenditure is after indirect and direct tax expenditure   
Households are ranked by per adult equivalent (AE) household expenditure: V1 Standard tax incidence 
V2: Income tax on rent is partly shifted to tenants and payroll tax is on only employees 
V3:Unrecorded employees do not pay any tax); V4: Informal employment and tax evasion together 
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Table A 5.6:Average Rates of Payroll Tax by decile   
as a percentage of per adult equivalent household expenditure  
Expenditure 
Deciles 
Average Wage 
(Million TL) 
V1 V2 V1&V3 V2&V3 V1&V4 V2&V4 
1 21 7.98 19.56 2.43 6.00 2.39 5.05 
2 33 8.89 20.79 5.02 11.35 4.84 9.21 
3 39 8.55 20.38 5.47 12.89 5.24 10.13 
4 48 8.74 20.42 6.34 14.55 5.86 10.89 
5 57 9.11 20.27 6.92 14.91 6.21 10.71 
6 71 9.54 21.75 7.95 17.79 6.81 11.86 
7 79 9.16 19.13 7.75 15.63 6.59 10.39 
8 92 8.84 17.96 7.62 14.97 6.32 9.58 
9 121 9.05 17.71 8.03 15.25 6.39 9.11 
10 232 8.12 17.24 7.10 14.76 3.79 5.15 
Turkey  79 8.71 18.67 7.10 14.74 5.34 8.40 
 
 
Table A 5.7: Average Tax Rates of Property Tax by decile  
% of per adult equivalent household disposable income 
Expenditure Deciles V1 V4 
1 1.41 0.64 
2 1.37 0.81 
3 1.60 1.11 
4 1.66 1.24 
5 3.03 2.62 
6 3.03 2.78 
7 6.85 6.59 
8 6.83 6.59 
9 12.74 12.58 
10 11.05 10.86 
Turkey 7.60 7.33 
otes: Households are ranked by per adult equivalent household 
expenditure 
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Table A 5.8: The Definitions for Income and Expenditure Concepts for the Tax Incidence Analysis 
Tax in examination Definition 
  
The total tax system   
Household Expenditure (the data provides:AE_EXP) After direct tax but before indirect and property tax expenditure 
Gross Expenditure  AE_EXP+Income Tax+Payroll Tax 
Net Expenditure  AE_EXP+Property Taxes+Indirect Taxes 
Household et Disposable Income (the data provides:AE_IC) After direct tax but before indirect and property tax income  
Gross Income  AE_INC+Income Tax+Payroll Tax 
Net Income  AE_INC+Property Taxes+Indirect Taxes 
    
Income Tax   
Gross Expenditure AE_EXP+Income Tax 
Net Expenditure  AE_EXP 
Gross Income  AE_INC+Income Tax 
Net Income  AE_INC 
    
Payroll Tax   
Gross Expenditure AE_EXP+Payroll Tax 
Net Expenditure  AE_EXP 
Gross Income  AE_INC+Payroll Tax 
Net Income  AE_INC 
    
Property Taxes   
Gross Expenditure AE_EXP 
Net Expenditure  AE_EXP+Property Taxes 
Gross Income  AE_INC 
Net Income  AE_INC+Property Taxes 
    
Indirect Taxes   
Gross Expenditure AE_EXP 
Net Expenditure  AE_EXP+Indirect Taxes 
Gross Income  AE_INC 
Net Income  AE_INC+Indirect Taxes 
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Table A 5.9: The differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz curve for Household 
Expenditure and the Concentration Curves 
ρ=2 Income Tax  
 Ordinates 
(p) 
V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
0.05 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.005 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
0.1 0.008 0.014 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.010 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.15 0.012 0.020 0.014 0.012 0.020 0.013 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
0.2 0.017 0.027 0.017 0.015 0.026 0.015 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
0.25 0.021 0.034 0.021 0.019 0.032 0.018 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.3 0.026 0.040 0.022 0.023 0.038 0.019 
 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 
0.35 0.033 0.050 0.028 0.029 0.045 0.021 
 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 
0.4 0.039 0.057 0.031 0.033 0.050 0.022 
 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.007 
0.45 0.045 0.065 0.034 0.039 0.058 0.024 
 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
0.5 0.051 0.072 0.035 0.044 0.064 0.026 
 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.008 
0.55 0.057 0.079 0.039 0.050 0.071 0.029 
 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009 
0.6 0.061 0.083 0.037 0.054 0.074 0.026 
 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.011 
0.65 0.071 0.093 0.043 0.063 0.085 0.032 
 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.012 
0.7 0.083 0.105 0.053 0.075 0.096 0.040 
 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.011 0.013 
0.75 0.093 0.114 0.057 0.083 0.104 0.043 
 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.015 
0.8 0.099 0.120 0.058 0.089 0.108 0.042 
 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.012 0.013 0.017 
0.85 0.116 0.135 0.071 0.105 0.123 0.055 
 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.014 0.015 0.019 
0.9 0.114 0.129 0.060 0.102 0.117 0.043 
 0.016 0.017 0.021 0.015 0.016 0.020 
0.95 0.117 0.130 0.068 0.102 0.114 0.047 
 0.017 0.019 0.023 0.017 0.019 0.022 
0.99 0.072 0.080 0.049 0.065 0.072 0.037 
  0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
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Table A 5.10: The differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz curve for Household 
Expenditure and the Concentration Curves 
ρ=2 Payroll Tax 
 Ordinates (p) V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
0.05 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.006 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.1 0.001 0.015 0.012 ?0.001 0.015 0.009 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
0.15 0.000 0.019 0.010 ?0.001 0.020 0.006 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
0.2 ?0.001 0.024 0.010 ?0.004 0.024 0.002 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
0.25 ?0.001 0.030 0.011 ?0.004 0.030 0.000 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
0.3 ?0.001 0.034 0.007 ?0.006 0.032 ?0.009 
 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005 
0.35 ?0.001 0.036 0.001 +0.009 0.030 +0.021 
 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
0.4 ?0.003 0.036 ?0.007 +0.011 0.031 +0.033 
 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
0.45 ?0.003 0.040 ?0.009 +0.012 0.034 +0.039 
 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
0.5 ?0.005 0.040 +0.016 +0.016 0.032 +0.050 
 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
0.55 +0.012 0.034 +0.030 +0.027 0.022 +0.071 
 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
0.6 +0.016 0.027 +0.047 +0.032 0.013 +0.092 
 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 
0.65 +0.016 0.027 +0.055 +0.031 0.015 +0.101 
 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 
0.7 +0.020 0.020 +0.071 +0.034 0.009 +0.118 
 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 
0.75 +0.018 0.020 +0.080 +0.032 0.009 +0.127 
 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 
0.8 +0.021 0.013 +0.096 +0.029 0.008 +0.137 
 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 
0.85 +0.021 0.008 +0.108 +0.027 0.006 +0.145 
 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.006 
0.9 +0.023 ?0.002 +0.125 +0.019 0.006 +0.150 
 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.005 
0.95 +0.020 ?0.008 +0.129 ?0.006 0.012 +0.137 
 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 
0.99 +0.010 ?0.006 +0.073 0.000 0.008 +0.072 
  0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
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Table A 5.11: The differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz curve for 
Household Expenditure and the Concentration Curves 
ρ=2 Property Taxes 
 Ordinates (p) V1 V4 
0.05 0.003 0.006 
 0.000 0.000 
0.1 0.008 0.014 
 0.001 0.001 
0.15 0.012 0.020 
 0.002 0.002 
0.2 0.017 0.027 
 0.002 0.002 
0.25 0.021 0.034 
 0.003 0.003 
0.3 0.026 0.040 
 0.004 0.004 
0.35 0.033 0.050 
 0.004 0.005 
0.4 0.039 0.057 
 0.005 0.005 
0.45 0.045 0.065 
 0.006 0.006 
0.5 0.051 0.072 
 0.006 0.007 
0.55 0.057 0.079 
 0.007 0.007 
0.6 0.061 0.083 
 0.008 0.008 
0.65 0.071 0.093 
 0.009 0.009 
0.7 0.083 0.105 
 0.010 0.011 
0.75 0.093 0.114 
 0.011 0.012 
0.8 0.099 0.120 
 0.013 0.013 
0.85 0.116 0.135 
 0.014 0.015 
0.9 0.114 0.129 
 0.016 0.017 
0.95 0.117 0.130 
 0.017 0.019 
0.99 0.072 0.080 
  0.005 0.006 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.   
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
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Table A 5.12: The differences of Ordinates of the Lorenz curve for AE_EXP and 
Concentration Curves 
ρ=2 Indirect Taxes under Statutory Tax Rates 
 Ordinates (p) VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
0.05 +0.0047 +0.0072 0.0031 0.0018 0.0008 0.0078 0.0016 
 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 
0.1 +0.0129 +0.0171 0.0067 0.0037 0.0007 0.0182 0.0029 
 0.0009 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 0.0008 0.0008 0.0004 
0.15 +0.0215 +0.0268 0.0100 0.0053 0.0004 0.0275 0.0040 
 0.0012 0.0008 0.0004 0.0003 0.0011 0.0013 0.0006 
0.2 +0.0313 +0.0376 0.0142 0.0076 0.0018 0.0367 0.0062 
 0.0015 0.0011 0.0005 0.0004 0.0014 0.0017 0.0008 
0.25 +0.0399 +0.0474 0.0179 0.0096 0.0036 0.0463 0.0083 
 0.0019 0.0013 0.0007 0.0005 0.0018 0.0022 0.0010 
0.3 +0.0478 +0.0567 0.0221 0.0121 0.0064 0.0562 0.0112 
 0.0022 0.0015 0.0008 0.0006 0.0021 0.0026 0.0011 
0.35 +0.0581 +0.0669 0.0260 0.0142 0.0078 0.0647 0.0132 
 0.0024 0.0016 0.0009 0.0007 0.0024 0.0029 0.0013 
0.4 +0.0675 +0.0755 0.0303 0.0168 0.0115 0.0730 0.0164 
 0.0027 0.0018 0.0010 0.0008 0.0027 0.0033 0.0014 
0.45 +0.0762 +0.0850 0.0337 0.0186 0.0130 0.0770 0.0181 
 0.0029 0.0019 0.0011 0.0009 0.0029 0.0034 0.0016 
0.5 +0.0847 +0.0945 0.0365 0.0198 0.0148 0.0773 0.0195 
 0.0032 0.0021 0.0012 0.0010 0.0033 0.0037 0.0018 
0.55 +0.0962 +0.1010 0.0406 0.0225 0.0208 0.0779 0.0235 
 0.0035 0.0023 0.0013 0.0011 0.0037 0.0039 0.0020 
0.6 +0.1062 +0.1062 0.0430 0.0239 0.0254 0.0847 0.0262 
 0.0038 0.0024 0.0015 0.0012 0.0041 0.0041 0.0022 
0.65 +0.1178 +0.1135 0.0458 0.0254 0.0301 0.0883 0.0290 
 0.0042 0.0026 0.0016 0.0014 0.0046 0.0044 0.0025 
0.7 +0.1205 +0.1177 0.0477 0.0265 0.0368 0.0876 0.0323 
 0.0045 0.0028 0.0018 0.0015 0.0051 0.0047 0.0027 
0.75 +0.1264 +0.1208 0.0495 0.0277 0.0430 0.0910 0.0355 
 0.0049 0.0030 0.0020 0.0017 0.0056 0.0049 0.0030 
0.8 +0.1321 +0.1213 0.0508 0.0287 0.0506 0.0823 0.0388 
 0.0052 0.0033 0.0023 0.0019 0.0062 0.0053 0.0034 
0.85 +0.1268 +0.1194 0.0507 0.0289 0.0608 0.0765 0.0427 
 0.0055 0.0035 0.0026 0.0021 0.0069 0.0056 0.0038 
0.9 +0.1278 +0.1096 0.0526 0.0317 0.0785 0.0542 0.0505 
 0.0056 0.0036 0.0029 0.0024 0.0077 0.0056 0.0043 
0.95 +0.1131 +0.0869 0.0505 0.0327 0.0992 0.0238 0.0583 
 0.0056 0.0036 0.0032 0.0027 0.0086 0.0051 0.0048 
0.99 +0.0457 +0.0306 0.0281 0.0206 0.0609 +0.0193 0.0350 
  0.0022 0.0028 0.0019 0.0015 0.0049 0.0019 0.0027 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
Gross expenditure is per adult equivalent household expenditure (AE_EXP)  
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Table A 5.13: The differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz curve for AE_I*C and the 
Concentration Curves 
ρ=2 Indirect Taxes under Statutory Tax Rates 
 Ordinates 
(p) 
VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
0.05 +0.0172 +0.0182 +0.0050 +0.0067 +0.0060 0.0032 +0.0062 
 0.0012 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0014 0.0009 
0.1 +0.0317 +0.0341 +0.0077 +0.0111 +0.0111 0.0105 +0.0105 
 0.0016 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0013 0.0018 0.0011 
0.15 +0.0500 +0.0495 +0.0107 +0.0157 +0.0143 0.0163 +0.0142 
 0.0020 0.0014 0.0013 0.0012 0.0017 0.0020 0.0013 
0.2 +0.0656 +0.0656 +0.0138 +0.0204 +0.0178 0.0238 +0.0181 
 0.0023 0.0017 0.0015 0.0014 0.0020 0.0023 0.0015 
0.25 +0.0849 +0.0790 +0.0189 +0.0266 +0.0221 0.0281 +0.0232 
 0.0029 0.0020 0.0018 0.0017 0.0025 0.0028 0.0018 
0.3 +0.1042 +0.0927 +0.0230 +0.0320 +0.0264 0.0299 +0.0280 
 0.0032 0.0022 0.0021 0.0019 0.0029 0.0034 0.0021 
0.35 +0.1191 +0.1077 +0.0265 +0.0370 +0.0295 0.0370 +0.0320 
 0.0034 0.0024 0.0022 0.0020 0.0033 0.0035 0.0023 
0.4 +0.1333 +0.1204 +0.0283 +0.0402 +0.0295 0.0428 +0.0336 
 0.0036 0.0026 0.0024 0.0021 0.0037 0.0038 0.0025 
0.45 +0.1468 +0.1324 +0.0320 +0.0450 +0.0312 0.0489 +0.0369 
 0.0038 0.0028 0.0025 0.0023 0.0040 0.0040 0.0027 
0.5 +0.1620 +0.1447 +0.0339 +0.0482 +0.0320 0.0521 +0.0390 
 0.0040 0.0031 0.0027 0.0025 0.0045 0.0041 0.0030 
0.55 +0.1756 +0.1583 +0.0391 +0.0545 +0.0323 0.0499 +0.0428 
 0.0042 0.0034 0.0030 0.0027 0.0050 0.0043 0.0034 
0.6 +0.1874 +0.1675 +0.0430 +0.0591 +0.0313 0.0538 +0.0450 
 0.0044 0.0037 0.0032 0.0029 0.0056 0.0045 0.0037 
0.65 +0.1966 +0.1757 +0.0419 +0.0592 +0.0276 0.0575 +0.0435 
 0.0046 0.0040 0.0035 0.0032 0.0062 0.0048 0.0041 
0.7 +0.2054 +0.1783 +0.0414 +0.0592 +0.0222 0.0557 +0.0414 
 0.0048 0.0043 0.0038 0.0034 0.0067 0.0049 0.0045 
0.75 +0.2122 +0.1791 +0.0432 +0.0608 +0.0233 0.0539 +0.0429 
 0.0049 0.0046 0.0041 0.0037 0.0074 0.0052 0.0049 
0.8 +0.2112 +0.1781 +0.0450 +0.0623 +0.0212 0.0419 +0.0433 
 0.0051 0.0050 0.0044 0.0040 0.0081 0.0055 0.0053 
0.85 +0.2024 +0.1727 +0.0379 +0.0554 ?0.0072 0.0318 +0.0341 
 0.0052 0.0053 0.0046 0.0042 0.0085 0.0056 0.0056 
0.9 +0.1878 +0.1570 +0.0352 +0.0510 ?0.0070 0.0246 +0.0318 
 0.0050 0.0056 0.0048 0.0043 0.0088 0.0055 0.0058 
0.95 +0.1480 +0.1344 +0.0383 +0.0507 ?0.0131 ?0.0014 +0.0347 
 0.0041 0.0053 0.0046 0.0041 0.0085 0.0051 0.0056 
0.99 +0.0777 +0.0759 +0.0132 +0.0212 0.0131 +0.0270 +0.0081 
  0.0022 0.0022 0.0021 0.0020 0.0028 0.0023 0.0022 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross income is per adult equivalent household disposable income(AE_IC) 
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Table A 5.14: The differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz curve for Household Expenditure 
and the Concentration Curves 
ρ=2 Total Direct and Indirect Taxes  
 Ordinates (p) V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
0.05 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.004 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.1 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.012 0.009 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.15 0.011 0.016 0.013 0.008 0.017 0.012 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.2 0.015 0.023 0.018 0.011 0.022 0.016 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.25 0.020 0.029 0.023 0.015 0.029 0.020 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.3 0.025 0.036 0.028 0.019 0.034 0.023 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.35 0.032 0.043 0.034 0.023 0.040 0.026 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.4 0.037 0.051 0.039 0.027 0.045 0.029 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.45 0.043 0.057 0.044 0.031 0.051 0.033 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.5 0.048 0.064 0.048 0.034 0.056 0.035 
 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
0.55 0.054 0.070 0.053 0.037 0.060 0.038 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.6 0.058 0.074 0.055 0.039 0.062 0.038 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.65 0.063 0.079 0.058 0.044 0.066 0.039 
 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 
0.7 0.070 0.085 0.062 0.048 0.071 0.042 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
0.75 0.076 0.091 0.065 0.054 0.075 0.044 
 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
0.8 0.078 0.092 0.063 0.056 0.076 0.041 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
0.85 0.079 0.092 0.060 0.058 0.076 0.038 
 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 
0.9 0.075 0.085 0.050 0.057 0.071 0.030 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 
0.95 0.070 0.077 0.044 0.055 0.066 0.026 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
0.99 0.037 0.041 0.022 0.030 0.035 0.013 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
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Table A 5.15: The differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz curve for Household Income and 
the Concentration Curves 
ρ=2 Total Direct and Indirect Taxes  
 Ordinates (p) V1 V1&V3 V1&V4 V2 V2&V3 V2&V4 
0.05 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
0.1 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.003 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.15 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.002 0.010 0.004 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.2 0.007 0.015 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.004 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.25 0.010 0.019 0.011 0.003 0.016 0.005 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.3 0.013 0.023 0.013 0.004 0.019 0.005 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
0.35 0.017 0.029 0.017 0.006 0.023 0.006 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.4 0.023 0.035 0.021 0.010 0.028 0.009 
 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.45 0.028 0.041 0.025 0.013 0.032 0.010 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.5 0.034 0.048 0.029 0.017 0.037 0.012 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.55 0.038 0.053 0.031 0.020 0.040 0.013 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.6 0.043 0.058 0.034 0.024 0.045 0.014 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.65 0.049 0.065 0.039 0.028 0.050 0.017 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
0.7 0.055 0.071 0.043 0.032 0.055 0.020 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.75 0.056 0.071 0.042 0.031 0.053 0.017 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.8 0.059 0.074 0.041 0.035 0.056 0.016 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.85 0.064 0.077 0.041 0.040 0.059 0.016 
 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.9 0.065 0.076 0.037 0.044 0.060 0.014 
 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
0.95 0.055 0.062 0.025 0.038 0.048 0.004 
 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
0.99 0.041 0.043 0.021 0.031 0.034 0.009 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
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Table A 5.16: The differences of the Ordinates of the Concentration 
Curves for the Total Taxes under V1 and V2&V4 
Ordinates (p) Ranking Variable Ranking Variable 
ρ=2  
Household 
Expenditure(AE_EXP) 
Household Income 
(AE_I*C) 
0.05 0.0014 0.0006 
 0.0002 0.0002 
0.1 0.0024 0.0008 
 0.0004 0.0004 
0.15 0.0016 ?0.0002 
 0.0005 0.0005 
0.2 0.0007 +0.0027 
 0.0006 0.0007 
0.25 0.0002 +0.0048 
 0.0008 0.0008 
0.3 +0.0021 +0.0076 
 0.0009 0.0009 
0.35 +0.0057 +0.0107 
 0.0009 0.0010 
0.4 +0.0083 +0.0141 
 0.0010 0.0010 
0.45 +0.0104 +0.0180 
 0.0010 0.0010 
0.5 +0.0130 +0.0215 
 0.0011 0.0011 
0.55 +0.0160 +0.0251 
 0.0011 0.0011 
0.6 +0.0207 +0.0291 
 0.0012 0.0011 
0.65 +0.0238 +0.0320 
 0.0012 0.0012 
0.7 +0.0279 +0.0351 
 0.0013 0.0012 
0.75 +0.0320 +0.0386 
 0.0014 0.0013 
0.8 +0.0361 +0.0430 
 0.0015 0.0014 
0.85 +0.0405 +0.0475 
 0.0016 0.0015 
0.9 +0.0446 +0.0509 
 0.0017 0.0016 
0.95 +0.0442 +0.0512 
 0.0019 0.0017 
0.99 +0.0241 +0.0325 
  0.0014 0.0012 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.   
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance 
level 
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Table A 5.17: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Income Tax 
(expenditure) 
  TR?Progressivity IR?Progressivity Redistribution 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.008 0.007 0.0014 0.0009 0.0011 0.0006 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.150 0.139 0.028 0.018 0.022 0.013 
 0.007 0.011 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
2 0.169 0.164 0.032 0.021 0.025 0.015 
 0.007 0.011 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
2.5 0.171 0.172 0.032 0.022 0.026 0.016 
 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
3 0.168 0.175 0.032 0.022 0.025 0.016 
 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
3.5 0.164 0.176 0.031 0.022 0.025 0.017 
 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
4 0.161 0.176 0.030 0.022 0.024 0.017 
  0.005 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross expenditure is equal to AE_EXP plus per adult equivalent total income tax   
 
 
 
Table A 5.18: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Income Tax (income) 
  TR?Progressivity IR?Progressivity Redistribution 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.008 0.008 0.0013 0.0008 0.0012 0.0008 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.158 0.151 0.024 0.016 0.023 0.014 
 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
2 0.173 0.171 0.027 0.018 0.025 0.016 
 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
2.5 0.170 0.173 0.026 0.018 0.024 0.016 
 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
3 0.163 0.171 0.025 0.018 0.023 0.016 
 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
3.5 0.157 0.167 0.024 0.017 0.022 0.016 
 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
4 0.150 0.164 0.023 0.017 0.021 0.015 
  0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross income is equal to AE_IC plus per adult equivalent total income tax 
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Table A 5.19: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Payroll Tax 
(expenditure) 
  TR?Progressivity IR?Progressivity Redistribution 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.001 +0.002 0.0001 +0.0002 0.0000 +0.0003 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.040 ?0.009 0.003 ?0.001 0.001 +0.004 
 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
2 0.064 0.039 0.006 0.003 0.002 +0.002 
 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
2.5 0.079 0.082 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.001 
 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
3 0.089 0.116 0.008 0.010 0.004 0.003 
 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
3.5 0.096 0.142 0.008 0.012 0.004 0.005 
 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
4 0.100 0.162 0.009 0.014 0.005 0.006 
  0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross expenditure is equal to AE_EXP plus per adult equivalent payroll tax 
 
 
 
Table A 5.20: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Payroll Tax (income) 
  TR?Progressivity IR?Progressivity Redistribution 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.000 +0.004 0.0000 +0.0003 0.0000 +0.0003 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.015 +0.049 0.001 +0.003 0.000 +0.006 
 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.031 +0.017 0.002 +0.001 0.000 +0.005 
 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
2.5 0.040 0.018 0.003 0.001 0.001 +0.003 
 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 0.046 0.047 0.003 0.003 0.001 +0.002 
 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3.5 0.049 0.071 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.000 
 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 0.051 0.090 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.001 
  0.005 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross income is equal to AE_IC plus per adult equivalent payroll tax 
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Table A 5.21: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Property Taxes 
(expenditure) 
  TR?Progressivity IR?Progressivity Redistribution 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
V1 V4 V1 V4 V1 V4 
1.01 0.006 0.005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.198 0.184 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.012 
 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
2 0.285 0.265 0.022 0.023 0.017 0.018 
 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
2.5 0.321 0.298 0.025 0.025 0.020 0.022 
 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
3 0.334 0.309 0.025 0.026 0.022 0.023 
 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
3.5 0.336 0.311 0.026 0.027 0.022 0.024 
 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
4 0.333 0.307 0.025 0.026 0.022 0.024 
  0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross expenditure is equal to AE_EXP       
 
 
 
Table A 5.22: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Property Taxes 
(income) 
  TR?Progressivity IR?Progressivity Redistribution 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
V1 V4 V1 V4 V1 V4 
1.01 0.003 0.003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.126 0.135 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006 
 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.186 0.199 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.009 
 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2.5 0.213 0.227 0.014 0.015 0.010 0.010 
 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
3 0.225 0.240 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.011 
 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
3.5 0.229 0.244 0.015 0.016 0.011 0.011 
 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
4 0.229 0.245 0.015 0.016 0.011 0.011 
  0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross income is equal to AE_IC       
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Table A 5.23: S?Gini Indices of TR?Progressivity for the Indirect Taxes (expenditure) 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 +0.0047 +0.0036 0.0025 0.0017 0.0038 0.0016 0.0025 
 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 
1.5 +0.1143 +0.1076 0.0562 0.0347 0.0569 0.0752 0.0444 
 0.0066 0.0069 0.0043 0.0034 0.0134 0.0042 0.0073 
2 +0.1416 +0.1449 0.0690 0.0410 0.0515 0.1190 0.0473 
 0.0074 0.0077 0.0043 0.0034 0.0142 0.0048 0.0075 
2.5 +0.1495 +0.1609 0.0737 0.0430 0.0438 0.1433 0.0462 
 0.0073 0.0074 0.0039 0.0032 0.0130 0.0048 0.0068 
3 +0.1513 +0.1691 0.0759 0.0439 0.0382 0.1579 0.0450 
 0.0071 0.0071 0.0035 0.0030 0.0120 0.0048 0.0063 
3.5 +0.1508 +0.1736 0.0770 0.0443 0.0343 0.1673 0.0440 
 0.0069 0.0069 0.0033 0.0028 0.0113 0.0047 0.0059 
4 +0.1492 +0.1761 0.0775 0.0444 0.0315 0.1737 0.0431 
  0.0068 0.0067 0.0031 0.0027 0.0108 0.0047 0.0056 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. Gross expenditure is equal to AE_EXP 
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level   
 
 
 
Table A 5.24: S?Gini Indices of IR?Progressivity for the Indirect Taxes (expenditure) 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 +0.000004 +0.00005 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0006 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
1.5 +0.0001 +0.0014 0.0058 0.0042 0.0044 0.0004 0.0100 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0005 0.0012 0.0000 0.0019 
2 +0.0001 +0.0019 0.0071 0.0049 0.0040 0.0006 0.0107 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0012 0.0000 0.0020 
2.5 +0.0001 +0.0022 0.0076 0.0052 0.0034 0.0008 0.0104 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0011 0.0000 0.0018 
3 +0.0001 +0.0023 0.0078 0.0053 0.0029 0.0008 0.0101 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0010 0.0000 0.0016 
3.5 +0.0001 +0.0023 0.0079 0.0053 0.0026 0.0009 0.0099 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009 0.0000 0.0015 
4 +0.0001 +0.0024 0.0080 0.0053 0.0024 0.0009 0.0097 
  0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009 0.0000 0.0015 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level   
Gross expenditure is equal to AE_EXP, net expenditure is equal to AE_EXP minus tax burden 
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Table A 5.25: S?Gini Indices of Redistribution for the Indirect Taxes (expenditure) 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 +0.000004 +0.000049 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
1.5 +0.0001 +0.0015 0.0055 0.0039 0.0032 0.0004 0.0067 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0005 0.0012 0.0000 0.0019 
2 +0.0001 +0.0020 0.0067 0.0046 0.0027 0.0006 0.0071 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0012 0.0000 0.0020 
2.5 +0.0001 +0.0022 0.0072 0.0048 0.0020 0.0008 0.0067 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0011 0.0000 0.0018 
3 +0.0001 +0.0023 0.0074 0.0049 0.0015 0.0008 0.0062 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0010 0.0000 0.0016 
3.5 +0.0001 +0.0023 0.0075 0.0049 0.0011 0.0009 0.0057 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 0.0010 0.0000 0.0015 
4 +0.0001 +0.0024 0.0075 0.0049 0.0008 0.0009 0.0054 
  0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009 0.0000 0.0015 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross expenditure is equal to AE_EXP, net expenditure is equal to AE_EXP minus tax burden 
 
 
 
Table A 5.26: S?Gini Indices of TR?Progressivity for the Indirect Taxes (income) 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 +0.0075 +0.0065 +0.0021 +0.0027 ?0.0012 0.0002 +0.0020 
 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 
1.5 +0.1954 +0.1718 +0.0453 +0.0621 +0.0323 0.0365 +0.0477 
 0.0071 0.0077 0.0071 0.0063 0.0159 0.0042 0.0098 
2 +0.2569 +0.2302 +0.0565 +0.0795 +0.0470 0.0662 +0.0627 
 0.0083 0.0089 0.0077 0.0069 0.0171 0.0050 0.0105 
2.5 +0.2842 +0.2594 +0.0616 +0.0878 +0.0572 0.0828 +0.0710 
 0.0086 0.0090 0.0073 0.0067 0.0161 0.0053 0.0100 
3 +0.2986 +0.2769 +0.0647 +0.0927 +0.0650 0.0923 +0.0766 
 0.0087 0.0089 0.0070 0.0064 0.0152 0.0054 0.0094 
3.5 +0.3068 +0.2885 +0.0667 +0.0960 +0.0711 0.0977 +0.0808 
 0.0089 0.0088 0.0068 0.0063 0.0145 0.0055 0.0090 
4 +0.3120 +0.2970 +0.0682 +0.0984 +0.0760 0.1009 +0.0839 
  0.0090 0.0087 0.0066 0.0062 0.0140 0.0057 0.0088 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. Gross income is equal to AE_IC  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level   
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Table A 5.27: S?Gini Indices of IR?Progressivity for the Indirect Taxes (income)  
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 +0.00001 +0.0001 +0.0002 +0.0003 ?0.0001 0.0000 +0.0004 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
1.5 +0.0001 +0.0019 +0.0037 +0.0060 +0.0020 0.0002 +0.0085 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 0.0000 0.0016 
2 +0.0002 +0.0025 +0.0047 +0.0077 +0.0029 0.0003 +0.0111 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 0.0000 0.0017 
2.5 +0.0002 +0.0028 +0.0051 +0.0084 +0.0036 0.0004 +0.0126 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 0.0000 0.0016 
3 +0.0002 +0.0030 +0.0053 +0.0089 +0.0040 0.0004 +0.0136 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 0.0000 0.0014 
3.5 +0.0002 +0.0031 +0.0055 +0.0092 +0.0044 0.0004 +0.0143 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 0.0000 0.0013 
4 +0.0002 +0.0032 +0.0056 +0.0095 +0.0047 0.0004 +0.0149 
  0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 0.0000 0.0013 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross income is equal to AE_IC, net expenditure is equal to AE_IC minus tax burden 
 
 
 
Table A 5.28: S?Gini Indices of Redistribution for the Indirect Taxes (income) 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
VAT1 VAT8 VAT18 VAT PCT PCOT 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 +0.00001 +0.0001 +0.0002 +0.0003 +0.0002 0.0000 +0.0007 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1.5 +0.0001 +0.0019 +0.0051 +0.0074 +0.0046 0.0002 +0.0184 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 0.0000 0.0009 
2 +0.0002 +0.0025 +0.0067 +0.0098 +0.0066 0.0003 +0.0260 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 0.0000 0.0011 
2.5 +0.0002 +0.0029 +0.0075 +0.0110 +0.0078 0.0003 +0.0311 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 0.0000 0.0014 
3 +0.0002 +0.0031 +0.0080 +0.0118 +0.0088 0.0004 +0.0351 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 0.0000 0.0018 
3.5 +0.0002 +0.0032 +0.0085 +0.0124 +0.0096 0.0004 +0.0386 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 0.0000 0.0022 
4 +0.0002 +0.0033 +0.0088 +0.0129 +0.0103 0.0004 +0.0418 
  0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 0.0000 0.0026 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross income is equal to AE_IC, net expenditure is equal to AE_IC minus tax burden 
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Table A 5.29:The Differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz Curves Before and After Total 
Taxes 
ρ=2  Income Expenditure 
Ordinates (p) V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
0.05 0.0085 0.0082 +0.0016 +0.0022 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0002 0.0002 
0.1 0.0091 0.0082 +0.0043 +0.0054 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0003 0.0002 
0.15 0.0091 0.0080 +0.0073 +0.0087 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0003 0.0003 
0.2 0.0088 0.0078 +0.0106 +0.0121 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0004 0.0004 
0.25 0.0083 0.0077 +0.0143 +0.0155 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0005 0.0005 
0.3 0.0074 0.0077 +0.0181 +0.0186 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 
0.35 0.0062 0.0076 +0.0219 +0.0214 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0008 0.0008 
0.4 0.0048 0.0074 +0.0257 +0.0239 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 
0.45 0.0031 0.0071 +0.0293 +0.0260 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 
0.5 0.0013 0.0069 +0.0324 +0.0273 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013 0.0013 
0.55 ?0.0004 0.0067 +0.0351 +0.0284 
 0.0010 0.0011 0.0015 0.0015 
0.6 ?0.0021 0.0064 +0.0375 +0.0291 
 0.0011 0.0011 0.0017 0.0017 
0.65 +0.0040 0.0060 +0.0396 +0.0293 
 0.0011 0.0012 0.0019 0.0019 
0.7 +0.0055 0.0059 +0.0411 +0.0291 
 0.0012 0.0013 0.0022 0.0021 
0.75 +0.0068 0.0059 +0.0417 +0.0279 
 0.0013 0.0014 0.0025 0.0024 
0.8 +0.0079 0.0059 +0.0415 +0.0260 
 0.0014 0.0015 0.0027 0.0026 
0.85 +0.0093 0.0057 +0.0404 +0.0234 
 0.0016 0.0017 0.0031 0.0029 
0.9 +0.0107 0.0054 +0.0386 +0.0203 
 0.0017 0.0018 0.0034 0.0032 
0.95 +0.0093 0.0063 +0.0337 +0.0155 
 0.0019 0.0020 0.0038 0.0036 
0.99 +0.0072 0.0025 +0.0171 ?0.0067 
  0.0018 0.0020 0.0039 0.0037 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.    
Gross income (expenditure) is equal to AE_IC (AE_EXP) plus per adult equivalent total income and payroll 
tax 
et income (expenditure) is equal to AE_IC (AE_EXP) minus per adult equivalent property taxes and total 
indirect tax 
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Table A 5.30: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Total Taxes (income) 
  IR?Progressivity Reranking Redistribution 
Parameter Values (ρ) V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.0011 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 +0.0003 
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
1.5 0.0266 0.0143 0.0225 0.0230 0.0041 +0.0087 
 0.0020 0.0021 0.0017 0.0017 0.0015 0.0015 
2 0.0328 0.0214 0.0338 0.0350 ?0.0010 +0.0135 
 0.0021 0.0022 0.0024 0.0024 0.0019 0.0019 
2.5 0.0340 0.0252 0.0412 0.0431 +0.0072 +0.0178 
 0.0019 0.0021 0.0030 0.0030 0.0023 0.0023 
3 0.0335 0.0273 0.0469 0.0493 +0.0134 +0.0220 
 0.0018 0.0019 0.0035 0.0035 0.0028 0.0028 
3.5 0.0324 0.0284 0.0518 0.0546 +0.0194 +0.0261 
 0.0017 0.0018 0.0040 0.0040 0.0033 0.0033 
4 0.0311 0.0290 0.0563 0.0593 +0.0252 +0.0302 
  0.0017 0.0018 0.0046 0.0046 0.0038 0.0038 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
Gross income is equal to AE_IC plus per adult equivalent total income and payroll tax  
et income is equal to AE_IC minus per adult equivalent property taxes and total indirect tax 
  
 
 
Table A 5.31: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Total Taxes (expenditure) 
  IR?Progressivity Reranking Redistribution 
Parameter Values (ρ) V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.0026 0.0019 0.0009 0.0009 0.0017 0.0010 
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
1.5 0.0634 0.0490 0.0221 0.0214 0.0414 0.0276 
 0.0029 0.0028 0.0006 0.0005 0.0028 0.0027 
2 0.0793 0.0660 0.0270 0.0267 0.0523 0.0393 
 0.0030 0.0030 0.0007 0.0006 0.0030 0.0029 
2.5 0.0844 0.0742 0.0281 0.0282 0.0563 0.0460 
 0.0028 0.0027 0.0008 0.0007 0.0028 0.0027 
3 0.0858 0.0785 0.0279 0.0284 0.0579 0.0501 
 0.0026 0.0025 0.0009 0.0008 0.0026 0.0025 
3.5 0.0856 0.0808 0.0274 0.0281 0.0582 0.0527 
 0.0024 0.0024 0.0010 0.0008 0.0025 0.0024 
4 0.0848 0.0821 0.0268 0.0276 0.0580 0.0545 
  0.0023 0.0023 0.0011 0.0009 0.0024 0.0023 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
Gross expenditure is equal to AE_EXP plus per adult equivalent total income and payroll tax  
et expenditure is equal to AE_EXP minus per adult equivalent property taxes and total indirect tax 
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Table A 5.32:The Differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz curve for Household 
Expenditure and the Concentration Curves 
ρ=2  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
Ordinates (p) 
Domestic 
VAT  
Import 
VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Domestic 
Excises 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
0.05 +0.001 0.002 +0.003 0.002 0.001 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.1 +0.002 0.004 +0.008 0.005 0.001 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
0.15 +0.004 0.005 +0.013 0.008 0.001 
  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
0.2 +0.006 0.008 +0.019 0.011 0.001 
  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
0.25 +0.007 0.009 +0.025 0.014 0.001 
  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
0.3 +0.008 0.012 +0.030 0.018 0.002 
  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.35 +0.010 0.014 +0.036 0.022 0.002 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
0.4 +0.010 0.016 +0.041 0.027 0.003 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
0.45 +0.012 0.018 +0.047 0.029 0.003 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
0.5 +0.014 0.020 +0.054 0.034 0.003 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 
0.55 +0.015 0.021 +0.060 0.038 0.004 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 
0.6 +0.017 0.022 +0.066 0.044 0.004 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 
0.65 +0.019 0.021 +0.074 0.048 0.003 
  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 
0.7 +0.020 0.021 +0.080 0.054 0.003 
  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 
0.75 +0.022 0.021 +0.086 0.061 0.003 
  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 
0.8 +0.023 0.020 +0.092 0.066 0.003 
  0.002 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 
0.85 +0.023 0.018 +0.096 0.072 0.003 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.002 
0.9 +0.021 0.016 +0.095 0.083 0.005 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.002 
0.95 +0.018 0.011 +0.089 0.095 0.007 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.002 
0.99 0.003 0.003 +0.007 0.038 0.009 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.     
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
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Table A 5.33: The differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz curve for Household Income 
and the Concentration Curves 
ρ=2  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
Ordinates (p) 
Domestic 
VAT  
Import 
VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Domestic 
Excises 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
0.05 +0.011 +0.007 +0.014 +0.004 +0.009 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.1 +0.019 +0.012 +0.025 +0.006 +0.015 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.15 +0.028 +0.018 +0.037 +0.008 +0.022 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.2 +0.037 +0.023 +0.049 +0.010 +0.028 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
0.25 +0.047 +0.030 +0.062 +0.013 +0.036 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.3 +0.056 +0.036 +0.074 +0.014 +0.043 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
0.35 +0.064 +0.041 +0.086 +0.016 +0.049 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
0.4 +0.071 +0.046 +0.097 +0.015 +0.054 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 
0.45 +0.079 +0.051 +0.109 +0.016 +0.060 
  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 
0.5 +0.086 +0.055 +0.120 +0.016 +0.065 
  0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 
0.55 +0.095 +0.063 +0.133 +0.017 +0.072 
  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 
0.6 +0.103 +0.070 +0.144 +0.016 +0.079 
  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 
0.65 +0.105 +0.071 +0.150 +0.014 +0.080 
  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 
0.7 +0.108 +0.072 +0.154 ?0.009 +0.081 
  0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.004 
0.75 +0.110 +0.074 +0.158 ?0.009 +0.083 
  0.004 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.004 
0.8 +0.112 +0.076 +0.161 ?0.007 +0.084 
  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.005 
0.85 +0.105 +0.071 +0.158 0.004 +0.077 
  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.005 
0.9 +0.098 +0.065 +0.152 0.005 +0.072 
  0.005 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.005 
0.95 +0.087 +0.062 +0.129 ?0.002 +0.066 
  0.005 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.006 
0.99 +0.043 +0.031 +0.067 0.013 +0.030 
  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.005 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.     
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
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Table A 5.34: S?Gini Indices of TR?Progressivity for the Indirect Taxes (household 
expenditure) 
  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
Parameter Values 
(ρ) 
Domestic 
VAT  
Import 
VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Domestic 
Excises 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 0.000 0.001 +0.003 0.004 0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 +0.015 0.026 +0.076 0.070 0.010 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.003 
2 +0.019 0.035 +0.089 0.075 0.011 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.003 
2.5 +0.021 0.039 +0.091 0.074 0.012 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.003 
3 +0.021 0.041 +0.090 0.072 0.012 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.003 
3.5 +0.021 0.042 +0.089 0.071 0.012 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.002 
4 +0.021 0.043 +0.088 0.069 0.012 
  0.002 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.002 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.     
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% 
significance level  
 
 
 
 
Table A 5.35: S?Gini Indices of TR?Progressivity for the Indirect Taxes ( household 
income) 
  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Domestic 
VAT  
Import 
VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Domestic 
Excises 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 +0.004 +0.003 +0.006 +0.001 +0.003 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
1.5 +0.107 +0.072 +0.149 +0.017 +0.082 
 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.006 
2 +0.140 +0.092 +0.191 +0.024 +0.106 
 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.013 0.006 
2.5 +0.155 +0.100 +0.208 +0.029 +0.118 
 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.006 
3 +0.163 +0.105 +0.218 +0.034 +0.124 
 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.006 
3.5 +0.169 +0.108 +0.224 +0.037 +0.129 
 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.005 
4 +0.173 +0.110 +0.227 +0.040 +0.132 
  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.005 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. Household income is household net disposable income 
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
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Table A 5.36: S?Gini Indices of IR?Progressivity for the Indirect Taxes (household 
expenditure) 
  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Domestic 
VAT  
Import 
VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Domestic 
Excises 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 +0.001 0.002 +0.001 0.002 0.002 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2 +0.002 0.002 +0.001 0.003 0.003 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2.5 +0.002 0.003 +0.001 0.003 0.003 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3 +0.002 0.003 +0.001 0.002 0.003 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3.5 +0.002 0.003 +0.001 0.002 0.003 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
4 +0.002 0.003 +0.001 0.002 0.003 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.     
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
 
 
 
 
Table A 5.37: S?Gini Indices of IR?Progressivity for the Indirect Taxes (household income) 
  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Domestic 
VAT  
Import VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Domestic 
Excises 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 +0.007 +0.004 +0.001 0.000 +0.015 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2 +0.010 +0.005 +0.002 +0.001 +0.019 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2.5 +0.011 +0.005 +0.002 +0.001 +0.021 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3 +0.011 +0.006 +0.002 +0.001 +0.022 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3.5 +0.012 +0.006 +0.002 +0.001 +0.023 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
4 +0.012 +0.006 +0.002 +0.001 +0.024 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. Household income is household net disposable income 
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
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Table A 5.38: S?Gini Indices of Redistribution for the Indirect Taxes (household 
expenditure) 
  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Domestic 
VAT  
Import VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Domestic 
Excises 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 +0.001 0.002 +0.001 0.002 0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2 +0.002 0.002 +0.001 0.002 0.002 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2.5 +0.002 0.002 +0.001 0.002 0.002 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3 +0.002 0.003 +0.001 0.002 0.002 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3.5 +0.002 0.003 +0.001 0.002 0.002 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
4 +0.002 0.003 +0.001 0.002 0.001 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.     
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
 
 
 
 
Table A 5.39: S?Gini Indices of Redistribution for the Indirect Taxes (household income) 
  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
Parameter 
Values (ρ) 
Domestic 
VAT  
Import VAT 
Import 
Duty 
Domestic 
Excises 
Total Indirect 
Taxes 
1.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 +0.008 +0.004 +0.001 +0.001 +0.019 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2 +0.010 +0.005 +0.002 +0.001 +0.025 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2.5 +0.012 +0.006 +0.002 +0.001 +0.028 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3 +0.012 +0.006 +0.002 +0.001 +0.031 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
3.5 +0.013 +0.007 +0.002 +0.002 +0.032 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
4 +0.013 +0.007 +0.002 +0.002 +0.034 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. Household income is household net disposable income 
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
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Table A 5.40:The differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz Curves Before and After Total 
Taxes  
 Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
ρ=2  Income Expenditure 
Ordinates (p) V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
0.05 0.0039 0.0036 +0.0017 +0.0022 
 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
0.1 0.0047 0.0039 +0.0043 +0.0054 
 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 
0.15 0.0050 0.0039 +0.0072 +0.0086 
 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
0.2 0.0051 0.0040 +0.0104 +0.0119 
 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 
0.25 0.0049 0.0043 +0.0139 +0.0151 
 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 
0.3 0.0042 0.0045 +0.0175 +0.0181 
 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 
0.35 0.0034 0.0047 +0.0212 +0.0208 
 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 
0.4 0.0023 0.0049 +0.0248 +0.0231 
 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
0.45 0.0010 0.0050 +0.0281 +0.0249 
 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 
0.5 ?0.0004 0.0052 +0.0309 +0.0259 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0011 0.0010 
0.55 +0.0017 0.0054 +0.0332 +0.0266 
 0.0009 0.0009 0.0012 0.0012 
0.6 ?0.0028 0.0057 +0.0351 +0.0267 
 0.0009 0.0010 0.0014 0.0013 
0.65 ?0.0041 0.0059 +0.0367 +0.0265 
 0.0010 0.0011 0.0016 0.0015 
0.7 ?0.0053 0.0061 +0.0376 +0.0256 
 0.0011 0.0012 0.0018 0.0017 
0.75 +0.0062 0.0065 +0.0374 +0.0236 
 0.0012 0.0013 0.0020 0.0019 
0.8 +0.0071 0.0068 +0.0363 +0.0209 
 0.0013 0.0014 0.0022 0.0020 
0.85 +0.0082 0.0068 +0.0346 +0.0176 
 0.0014 0.0015 0.0025 0.0023 
0.9 +0.0094 0.0067 +0.0324 +0.0141 
 0.0015 0.0016 0.0028 0.0025 
0.95 +0.0081 0.0075 +0.0277 +0.0095 
 0.0017 0.0018 0.0031 0.0027 
0.99 +0.0066 0.0031 +0.0150 ?0.0046 
  0.0017 0.0019 0.0031 0.0028 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic. Gross income (expenditure) is equal to AE_IC (AE_EXP) 
plus per adult equivalent total income and payroll tax et income (expenditure) is equal to AE_IC 
(AE_EXP) minus per adult equivalent property taxes and total indirect tax with effective rates 
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Table A 5.41: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Total Taxes (expenditure) 
  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
  IR?Progressivity Reranking Redistribution 
Parameter Values (ρ) V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.0022 0.0014 0.0007 0.0007 0.0015 0.0007 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.054 0.040 0.017 0.016 0.037 0.023 
 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
2 0.069 0.056 0.021 0.021 0.048 0.035 
 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
2.5 0.074 0.064 0.022 0.022 0.052 0.042 
 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
3 0.076 0.069 0.021 0.022 0.055 0.047 
 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
3.5 0.076 0.071 0.021 0.021 0.055 0.050 
 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
4 0.075 0.073 0.020 0.021 0.056 0.052 
  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
Gross expenditure is equal to AE_EXP plus per adult equivalent total income and payroll tax  
et expenditure is equal to AE_EXP minus per adult equivalent property taxes and total indirect tax 
  
 
 
Table A 5.42: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Total Taxes (income) 
  Indirect Taxes under Effective Tax Rates 
  IR?Progressivity Reranking Redistribution 
Parameter Values (ρ) V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.0008 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 +0.0003 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.019 0.007 0.014 0.015 0.005 +0.008 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
2 0.024 0.012 0.021 0.023 0.002 +0.010 
 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
2.5 0.024 0.015 0.026 0.028 ?0.002 +0.012 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
3 0.023 0.017 0.029 0.031 +0.005 +0.014 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
3.5 0.022 0.018 0.031 0.034 +0.009 +0.015 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
4 0.021 0.019 0.033 0.036 +0.012 +0.017 
  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.  
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level 
Gross income is equal to AE_IC plus per adult equivalent total income and payroll tax 
et income is equal to AE_IC minus per adult equivalent property taxes and total indirect tax 
  Chapter 5  
 277
 
 
Appendix 5.2: Calculations for *ominal Tax Rates  
 
TGVA
TPC
VAT
DVAT
D
_=  
2
_
M
MVAT
M
TPC
TPC
VAT =
 
1M
TD
TPC
TPC
D =
 
D
TS
TPC
TPC
S =
 
TPC presents total private consumption of tax and other I+O tables. TPCVAT is the total 
private consumption of VAT matrix for domestic (D) and imported (M) goods; TPCTD that of 
import tax matrix; TPCTD is that of domestic tax matrix. Moreover, subscripts M and D illustrate 
import and domestic IO tables. TGVA is total gross value added for each sector from Turkey I+O 
Table. 
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Table A 5.43:*ominal and Effective Tax Rates, 1998 Turkey IO Table 
 E * E * E * E * 
Industries VAT_D VAT_D S S VAT_M VAT_M D D 
Cereals and crops n.e.c. 0.046 0.036 0.024 0.000 0.086 0.081 0.048 0.046 
Vegetables,& nursery 
prod. 
0.101 0.094 0.007 0.000 0.082 0.080 0.028 0.028 
Fruit, nuts, beverage and 
spice crops 
0.059 0.055 0.004 0.000 0.082 0.081 0.108 0.107 
Animals,agricultural&an
imal husbandry service 
activities (excl. veterinary 
act.) 
0.086 0.064 0.001 0.000 0.044 0.042 0.046 0.045 
Forestry, and related 
service activities 
0.025 0.022 0.004 0.000 0.082 0.082 0.000 0.000 
Mining of coal and  
lignite 
0.032 0.023 0.034 0.002 0.081 0.079 0.027 0.026 
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas 
0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mining of metal ores 0.012 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Quarrying of stone, sand 
and clay 
0.008 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Mining and quarrying 
n.e.c. 
0.008 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Processed meat and meat 
products 
0.146 0.106 0.003 0.000 0.101 0.097 0.004 0.003 
Fishing&Processed fish 0.094 0.082 0.019 0.000 0.091 0.090 0.148 0.147 
Processed fruit and 
vegetables 
0.141 0.108 0.005 0.000 0.097 0.094 0.033 0.032 
Vegetable and animal oils 
and fats 
0.319 0.243 0.003 0.000 0.105 0.094 0.084 0.078 
Dairy products 0.234 0.202 0.002 0.000 0.086 0.083 0.149 0.148 
Grain mill products, 
starches& starch 
products 
0.037 0.016 0.008 0.000 0.028 0.022 0.056 0.054 
Prepared animal feeds 0.113 0.067 0.003 0.000 0.109 0.101 0.017 0.013 
Bakery products 0.097 0.071 0.016 0.000 0.027 0.023 0.002 0.000 
Sugar 0.334 0.308 0.006 0.000 0.106 0.100 0.044 0.041 
Cocoa, chocolate, sugar 
confertionery & n.e.c. 
0.189 0.139 0.005 0.000 0.106 0.102 0.014 0.013 
Alcoholic beverages 0.162 0.137 0.478 0.442 0.141 0.138 0.005 0.004 
Soft drinks&mineral 
waters 
0.245 0.163 0.217 0.213 0.099 0.095 0.001 0.000 
Tobacco products 0.412 0.366 0.217 0.202 0.141 0.130 0.036 0.033 
Other textiles 0.058 0.034 0.007 0.000 0.134 0.107 0.023 0.020 
Textiles 0.098 0.072 0.008 0.000 0.252 0.228 0.017 0.015 
Leather; manufac.of 
luggage, handbags& 
saddlery 
0.053 0.025 0.005 0.000 0.109 0.087 0.021 0.019 
Footwear 0.403 0.367 0.015 0.000 0.360 0.342 0.021 0.019 
Publishing and Printing 0.068 0.043 0.005 0.000 0.058 0.042 0.013 0.011 
Sawmilling and planing 
of wood 
0.014 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Coke, refined petroleum 
products 
0.043 0.041 0.403 0.397 0.163 0.157 0.040 0.040 
Basic chemicals, plastics 
in primary forms and of 
synthetics rubber 
0.041 0.027 0.020 0.000 0.144 0.111 0.025 0.019 
Fertilizers and nitrogen 
compounds 
0.009 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.000 
ote: E indicates effective rates;  indicates nominal rates 
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*ominal and Effective Tax Rates, 1998 Turkey IO Table, Continued 
 E * E * E * E * 
Industries VAT_D VAT_D S S VAT_M VAT_M D D 
Pesticides, agrochemicals 
&paints, varnishes 
0.078 0.060 0.031 0.000 0.143 0.115 0.007 0.003 
Pharmaceuticals, 
medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products 
0.222 0.185 0.003 0.000 0.145 0.128 0.001 0.000 
Cleaning materials, 
cosmatics&chemicals&m
an?made fibres 
0.137 0.109 0.014 0.000 0.137 0.115 0.019 0.015 
Household Textiles 0.125 0.104 0.008 0.000 0.142 0.120 0.022 0.019 
Glass&glass products 
and ceramic products 
0.068 0.054 0.012 0.000 0.129 0.122 0.016 0.014 
Manufacture of cement, 
lime and plaster related 
articles these items 
0.009 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Finishing of stone and 
man. of other non?
metallic mineral products 
n.e.c. 
0.030 0.016 0.012 0.000 0.128 0.122 0.005 0.004 
Basic iron and steel 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Basic precious and non?
ferrous metals 
0.007 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Casting of metals 0.008 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fabricated metal 
products, tanks, 
reservoirs and steam 
generators 
0.011 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other fabricated metal 
products; metal working 
service activities 
0.102 0.088 0.006 0.000 0.133 0.126 0.018 0.017 
General purpose 
machinery 
0.042 0.029 0.006 0.000 0.133 0.122 0.010 0.009 
Special purpose 
machinery 
0.038 0.024 0.006 0.000 0.051 0.042 0.014 0.013 
Domestic appliances 
n.e.c. 
0.217 0.200 0.004 0.000 0.138 0.131 0.008 0.007 
Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 
0.081 0.067 0.003 0.000 0.136 0.120 0.004 0.003 
Electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c. 
0.118 0.100 0.006 0.000 0.139 0.126 0.009 0.008 
Radio, television and 
communication 
equipment and apparatus 
0.087 0.072 0.004 0.000 0.160 0.131 0.021 0.018 
Medical, precision and 
optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 
0.040 0.028 0.006 0.000 0.135 0.113 0.011 0.009 
Motor vehicles, 
trailers&semi?trailers 
0.175 0.150 0.312 0.292 0.164 0.147 0.004 0.003 
Transport equipment 
n.e.c. 
0.242 0.217 0.006 0.000 0.142 0.131 0.012 0.011 
Furniture 0.265 0.236 0.003 0.000 0.128 0.117 0.003 0.002 
Paper and paper 
products and nec 
0.175 0.155 0.006 0.000 0.152 0.144 0.020 0.018 
Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.213 0.199 0.003 0.000 0.147 0.146 0.020 0.020 
Production,collection and 
distribution of electricity 
0.041 0.035 0.012 0.000 0.106 0.100 0.000 0.000 
Gas;distribution of 
gaseous fuels through 
mains 
0.076 0.074 0.002 0.000 0.080 0.080 0.000 0.000 
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*ominal and Effective Tax Rates, 1998 Turkey IO Table, Continued 
 E * E * E * E * 
Industries VAT_D VAT_D S S VAT_M VAT_M D D 
Collection, purification 
and distribution of water 
0.024 0.019 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sale, maintenance and 
repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles; retail sale of  
fuel 
0.013 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.019 0.018 0.000 0.000 
Wholesale trade and 
commission trade,except 
of motor vehicles and 
motorcyles 
0.014 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Retail trade and repair of 
personel & household 
goods, exc.motor vehicles 
and motorcyles 
0.007 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Hotels; camping sites and 
other provision of short?
stay accommodatin 
0.073 0.042 0.021 0.000 0.138 0.135 0.000 0.000 
Restaurants, bars and 
canteens 
0.118 0.084 0.022 0.000 0.111 0.107 0.001 0.000 
Transport via railways 0.154 0.134 0.052 0.000 0.089 0.079 0.001 0.000 
Land transport; 
transport via pipelines 
0.036 0.024 0.059 0.003 0.042 0.035 0.001 0.000 
Water transport 0.053 0.038 0.038 0.000 0.755 0.686 0.001 0.000 
Air transport 0.024 0.013 0.034 0.000 0.031 0.022 0.001 0.000 
Supporting and auxiliary 
transport activities; 
activities of travel 
agencies 
0.076 0.042 0.009 0.000 0.068 0.066 0.000 0.000 
Post and 
telecommnications 
0.023 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.077 0.076 0.000 0.000 
Financial 
intermedediation,except 
insurance and pension 
funding 
0.010 0.000 0.104 0.092 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Insurance and pension 
funding,except 
compulsory social 
security 
0.013 0.000 0.079 0.067 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Renting of machinery and 
equip. without 
operator&personal&hous
ehold goods 
0.021 0.006 0.014 0.000 0.088 0.082 0.000 0.000 
Computer&related 
activities 
0.025 0.007 0.012 0.000 0.053 0.043 0.000 0.000 
Research and 
development 
0.038 0.020 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Other business activities 0.066 0.051 0.013 0.006 0.091 0.088 0.020 0.019 
Education 0.115 0.102 0.022 0.000 0.077 0.074 0.000 0.000 
Health and social work 0.126 0.117 0.008 0.000 0.098 0.093 0.000 0.000 
Recreational,cultural and 
sporting activities 
0.065 0.053 0.015 0.000 0.122 0.105 0.001 0.000 
Other service activities 0.131 0.117 0.018 0.000 0.092 0.090 0.000 0.000 
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Table A 5.44: The Distribution of Social Security Membership of Employees by region (%) 
 SSK 
ES (Civil 
Servants) 
Bag?Kur Private 
Unrecorded 
Employee 
Istanbul 27.9 8.0 8.8 56.4 13.6 
Marmara 17.6 11.1 16.4 4.1 12.3 
Aegean  15.1 15.0 19.8 14.4 13.7 
Black Sea  6.8 13.6 13.6 2.9 13.5 
Central Anatolia  13.7 21.9 17.4 19.5 12.6 
Mediterranean  10.1 13.8 16.4 1.5 16.0 
East Anatolia  4.1 12.0 5.3 0.0 8.1 
S. East Anatolia 4.7 4.6 2.2 1.2 10.1 
Turkey 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table A 5.45: The Distribution of Social Security Membership of Employees in regions (%) 
 SSK 
ES (Civil 
Servants) 
Bag?
Kur 
Private 
Unrecorded 
Employee 
Turkey 
Istanbul 51.9 5.3 4.1 0.7 38.0 100 
Marmara 39.9 9.0 9.2 0.1 41.9 100 
Aegean  32.9 11.6 10.6 0.2 44.7 100 
Black Sea  19.2 13.7 9.5 0.1 57.5 100 
Central Anatolia  30.5 17.3 9.6 0.3 42.3 100 
Mediterranean  23.5 11.4 9.4 0.0 55.7 100 
East Anatolia  18.6 19.6 6.0 0.0 55.8 100 
S. East Anatolia 21.4 7.4 2.5 0.0 68.6 100 
ote: SSK and Bag:Kur are social security institutions for workers and self:employed respetively 
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Appendix 5.3: Figures 
Figure A 5.1 
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CHAPTER 6:  CO*CLUSIO* 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this study has been to investigate the redistributive impacts of public 
fiscal policies in a middle income developing country, Turkey. As explained in Chapter 1, 
Turkey has been experiencing very high, persistent inequality in the distribution of income and 
public redistributive policies are one of the potential remedies for this high inequality. To date 
apart from only Pinar (2004), redistributive impacts of Turkish fiscal policies have not been 
investigated using recent literature on inequality and progressivity measures at household level. 
Using micro data for 2003 the thesis considers if the existing public finance and expenditure 
policies may be one of the reasons for discrepancies in welfare levels and/or public policies can 
be used as an effective instrument to mitigate inequalities and improve living standards of the 
poor. The method employed is the tax and benefit incidence analysis with different measures of 
progressivity and redistribution, utilizing the 2003 Household Income and Consumption 
Expenditures Survey from the Turkish Statistical Institute. 
The chapter is organized as following. In the following section a summary of key 
findings for benefit and tax incidence is provided, including a discussion of limitations. Section 
3 combines and relates tax and benefit incidence to assess net fiscal incidence+how does the 
system combine to affect redistribution. The final section deals with directions for future work.   
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6.2 Summary of the Key Findings 
6.2.1 Benefit Incidence Analysis 
Chapters 3 and 4 examined the expenditure side of Turkish government budget by 
focusing on public spending on the publicly provided services, intended to decrease income 
inequality and improve the well+being of the poor: education, health, infrastructure services and 
social cash and in kind transfers. The non+behavioural benefit incidence approach supposes that 
the value of benefit from a service to households/individuals can be approximated by the unit 
cost of the service for the government. Accepting this assumption, the total central government 
spending on education, health and infrastructure services are allocated to the users of the 
services to obtain per person benefits. In the case of social transfers, the HICES data have 
provided the information on the type and amount of public transfers to individuals.  
The results of Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that only public primary education services 
are successful in targeting the poor (benefits are absolutely more concentrated on the poor). The 
pro+poor incidence occurs due to the greater number of children in lower+income households. 
While the secondary education services are progressive, the higher education services are 
regressive if our focus is on the poor. Primary, secondary and total education benefits cause 1.9, 
0.7 and 2.2 percent inequality reduction respectively, whereas higher education increases 
inequality by 0.3 percent (for an inequality aversion parameter equal to two). Another important 
finding is that for secondary and higher education, the middle income households use more 
public education services. It seems that the poor struggle to send their children to school after 8+
years compulsory primary level education. This is more the case for girls than for boys. 
According to the results of regional analysis, the poorer regions (South East and East Anatolia) 
receive the least share of the benefits. In addition to these poor regions, Istanbul is also having 
difficulty covering the educational needs of its huge population. The inequality decomposition 
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analysis shows that both the primary and secondary education services decrease both within 
regions and between regions inequalities, whilst higher education increases within region 
inequalities, it decreases between regions inequalities.  
Turkey does not have universal coverage for the public health services and only 
employees covered by any social security organisation, retired people and their dependants can 
utilise public health services. According to the results, the public health services seem to meet 
the needs of individuals with health insurance. Given the fact that unrecorded employment is 
concentrated in the poorer sections of the society (first four deciles), the public health services 
are not well targeted to the poor.  Although the health services are not pro+poor, the health 
services have the highest positive redistributive impact in reducing inequality after the primary 
education services. There should be concern over the role of out+of pocket expenditures for 
public health services. As discussed in Chapter 4, the health system demands households spend 
money to reach better public health services, even though they have the right to use the services 
for free. It is well known that the poor hesitate to use the public health services, either due to the 
necessary out+of pocket expenditures or due to giving less importance to health conditions. This 
can be seen by the fact that the household private expenditures on health rise with expenditure 
deciles in Turkey. These household expenditures on health include spending on private health 
services, but the largest part of these expenditures still can be assessed as out+of pocket 
expenditures to reach the public health services. We have shown that when we take into account 
the private health expenditures, the public health services become less progressive.  
Households have basic infrastructure services such as electricity, sewage and running 
water. However, there is still a need to pay more attention the needs of the lower deciles. To 
allocate the public infrastructure spending of the central government to the households, we 
created an index based on the value of residences. The logic of the index comes from the 
assumption that more valuable properties have better, or make more use of, infrastructure 
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services. Since this index increases with the deciles as expected, the distributional impact of the 
services is moderate.  
Social transfers either in cash or in kind have generally been found to be progressive in 
the literature. Since they are supposed to be targeting the poor directly, the social transfers are 
expected to be pro+poor as well. However, the HICES suggests that the most important social 
transfers are retirement pensions, and due to the high unrecorded employment in the lower 
deciles, pensions contribute to inequality instead of equality.  Even total social transfers with 
pensions in cash and in kind are regressive for the lower deciles. Results from the S+Gini 
inequality decomposition analysis suggest that mean+tested transfers contribute to equality, but 
the effects in narrowing inequality are small; their targeted nature is offset by the low amount of 
expenditure. 
Overall, the total benefit system decreases expenditure inequality between 3 and 5% 
even if they are not well targeted to the poor. The benefits are effective in narrowing inequalities 
between and within regions as well; public services except social transfers reduce both within 
and between regions inequalities. Total social transfers increase inequality in the poorest region, 
S. East Anatolia, although redistribution due to total benefits without pensions is from Istanbul, 
Mediterranean and S. East Anatolia to other regions. For urban and rural areas, health and 
infrastructure services improve inequalities but the impact is smaller for rural areas. Social 
transfers seem to have no effect in rural areas. 
Limitations of the benefit incidence analysis 
For the health and infrastructure services, we have not been able to identify the actual 
users of the services. This has forced us to create some approximate indicators to allocate the 
benefits to households. For infrastructure services, the index we created increases with welfare 
level, thus we have imposed a certain degree of regressivity to the services at the beginning of 
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the analysis, which may have lead to underestimate redistributive effects of public infrastructure 
services. Moreover, we have included the possible impacts of the quality of the services by 
regionally disaggregated public expenditures, which is not enough to assess the quality 
differences completely. 
 In the case of the public health spending, we may have overestimated the progressivity 
of the services, as we have treated individuals with health insurance equally without 
differentiating the benefits received by members of different social security institutions. As 
explained in Chapter 3, there are considerable quality differences among the services, but we 
have not been able to account for these. Furthermore, we have used the total public health 
expenditures without disaggregating expenditures by facility or service (hospital, health 
centre/inpatient, outpatient etc.). It has been found that while outpatient care is progressive in 
developing countries, inpatient care or hospital services are regressive. The fact that we were not 
able to take into consideration the differences among different health services is another reason 
why we may have overestimated the progressivity of the health services. We have also shown 
that private expenditures on health, which are supposed to increase the quality of the services 
received by households, reduce the progressivity of the public health services. When taking into 
account these concerns, we may conclude that the progressivity of public health services has 
been overestimated to some extent. 
We have assumed that the households would not change their economic decisions if 
there was no public service. In other words we have ignored the behavioural responses of 
households towards public services and assumed that pre+intervention welfare level is equal to 
their total household expenditure. This is an important drawback of non+behavioural benefit 
incidence.   
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Marginal Incidence for education 
We have investigated the incidence of the services at one point in time and considered 
only the distribution of average benefits. As emphasized in the literature, from policymakers’ 
point of view, marginal incidence may offer a better understanding for future policy 
recommendations. As reported in Appendix 6, we have applied the marginal incidence analysis 
for education following Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999). With the basic model explained in 
Chapter 3, equation (1) and given in Appendix 6, we regress the sample participation rates from 
the 26 provinces on the average participation rate from each of the seven regions1 to estimate 
marginal incidence of education services for three education levels (primary, secondary and 
higher). In Turkey, there are significant differences in enrolment rates among provinces and 
regions2 (Figure A 6.1, Figure A 6.2 and Figure A 6.3 in Appendix 6). We attempt to see who 
(which expenditure quintile) would benefit from an increase in the public spending on education 
services. The average odds of enrolment suggests (the ratio of quintile specific enrolment rate to 
the mean enrolment rate) that public spending in primary education mildly favours the non+poor, 
whereas for secondary and higher level education public spending favours largely richest 
quintiles (Table 6.1). According to marginal odds of enrolment rates estimated by the 
regression, the highest share of the increase in public expenditures on primary education goes to 
the 4th quintile, whereas the smallest share goes to the richest quintiles (Table 6.2). For 
secondary education the pattern is completely different. The largest share from the expenditure 
increase goes to the poorest and richest quintiles followed by middle income classes (3rd and 4th 
quintiles). For higher education, however, the largest share is received by the middle income 
classes. The estimates of the marginal odds of participation suggest that expanding primary 
schooling would not be pro+poor at the margin. The implication for the incidence of subsidies to 
                                                           
1 See Appendix 6 for the details of the method. 
2 See Chapter 3 Section 3.3.1 for enrolment rates by regions 
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secondary education is clear. The average odds of participation suggest that the share of the total 
subsidy going to the poorest quintile is only 13.6 percent (0.68 times one+fifth). By contrast, the 
marginal odds of participation imply that the poorest quintile would obtain about 22.4 percent of 
an increase in the total subsidy going to secondary education. However, it is worth noting that 
the coefficient of  5th quintile for higher education is not statistically significant whereas the 
coefficient for the first quintile is significant only at 10% level. The reason behind this result is 
that enrollment rates for the first two quintiles are very low for higher education. We may 
conclude that expanding public spending on secondary and primary education will be beneficial 
to the poor, but the expansion in higher education expenditures will benefit the middle income 
classes.  
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Table 6.1: Average Enrolment Rates in Turkey, 2003 
Quintiles Primary Ed. Secondary Ed. Higher Ed. 
  Enrolment Av. Odds of Enrolment Av. Odds of Enrolment Av. Odds of 
   Rate Enrolment  Rate Enrolment  Rate Enrolment 
1 91.57 0.96 49.05 0.68 5.65 0.24 
2 97.05 1.01 65.78 0.92 11.56 0.49 
3 98.00 1.02 76.38 1.06 20.95 0.89 
4 97.44 1.02 91.04 1.27 30.65 1.30 
5 99.49 1.04 102.30 1.42 60.26 2.55 
Turkey 95.69 1.00 71.83 1.00 23.67 1.00 
otes: The table gives the average enrolment rates as a percentage of children for each education level and the 
 average odds of enrolment, defined as the ratio of the quintile specific enrolment rate to the mean  
enrolment rate. Households are ranked by total expenditure per adult equivalent  in forming the quintiles.  
 
Table 6.2: Marginal Odds of Enrolment in Turkey, 2003 
Quintiles Primary Ed. Secondary Ed. Higher Ed. 
1 0.95* 1.12* 0.80** 
 [3.76] [3.87] [1.75] 
2 0.93* 0.74* 0.83* 
 [2.58] [3.05] [2.24] 
3 0.90* 1.08* 0.90* 
 [2.67] [6.1] [2.97] 
4 1.08* 1.10* 0.92* 
 [2.92] [4.86] [3.07] 
5 0.69* 1.12* 0.57*** 
  [2.65] [4.76] [1.64] 
Notes: The table gives the instrumental variables estimates of the regression  
coefficients of the quintile+specific enrolment rates for each level of education  
across provinces on the average rate by region. The numbers in parentheses are t+ratios. 
*significant at 5% level, ** significant at 10% level, ***not significant 
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6.2.2 Tax Incidence 
Taxes are seen to have a smaller redistributive impact than public expenditures in 
developing countries. There are several reasons for this, such as the size of informal economy, 
tax evasion and administrative difficulties, which prevent developing countries having a wide 
tax base. However, due to the high share of indirect taxes in total tax revenues in developing 
countries, the redistributive impacts of taxes are an important empirical issue.  
Chapter 5 investigated the distributional impact of the Turkish tax system. The standard 
tax incidence analysis has been applied for direct taxes in which tax burdens of 
households/individuals are calculated with the actual statutory tax rates. For indirect taxes, in 
addition to the estimation of tax burdens with the statutory tax rates, effective tax rates have 
been estimated by using input+output tables. Using input+output tables allowed us to take into 
account the taxes on intermediary and imported goods. We had two main sets of shifting 
assumptions to see the effect of different assumptions on the incidence of taxes. In order to allow 
for tax evasion and informal employment we introduced additional variants of the shifting 
assumptions.  
The broad conclusions of the analysis are that the direct taxes have larger and positive 
redistributive impacts than indirect taxes thanks to the progressivity of personal income tax and 
property taxes. However, the redistributive impact of personal income tax mostly goes to middle 
income households. Indirect taxes narrow expenditure inequality, whereas they increase income 
inequality, even if the overall redistributive impact is small. This result shows that differential 
rates for VAT and indirect taxation on luxury goods through PCT and PCOT decrease potential 
larger regressive impact of indirect taxes in Turkey. Using estimated effective indirect tax rates 
has resulted in less progressive incidence with expenditure measure, and more regressive 
incidence with income measure. This additional analysis has shown the importance of taxation 
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on imported and intermediate goods, which has been ignored by most tax incidence analyses. 
Given the fact that indirect taxes account for 70 percent of total tax revenues, these results are 
not very promising in terms of using taxes as an instrument to fight against inequality and 
poverty in Turkey.  
The total direct and indirect taxes have also diverse impacts depending on the welfare 
indicator chosen and the shifting assumptions. The thesis has shown that the intended incidence 
of the direct taxes is progressive regardless of the welfare indicator. However, the incidence 
resulting from the shifting assumptions including the impacts of shifting the payroll tax to 
employees, PIT to tenants, informal employment and tax evasion is less progressive with 
expenditure measure and regressive with income measure. The overall impact from taxes 
reduces expenditure inequality, but increases income inequality under this second set of shifting 
assumptions. The results also highlight the negative effects of tax evasion not only on tax 
revenues but also on income/expenditure distribution, as households with higher welfare level 
have more opportunities to evade taxes than lower income households. This is very significant 
especially for wage earners whose tax is deducted from source despite the existence of certain 
levels of tax evasion for private sector employees. The impacts of informal economy are 
included in the analysis by unrecorded employment. As unrecorded employees are concentrated 
in the lower income/expenditure deciles, informal employment appears to be beneficial for the 
poor as they pay neither personal income tax nor payroll tax. However, since those unrecorded 
employees are also out of public services (particularly health services and pension system), this 
impact should not be seen as a positive side of the informal economy.  
6.3 Policy implications  
The first policy implication of our results from the benefit incidence analysis is that 
reallocating government resources toward primary education is likely to be pro+poor, as primary 
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education is the only pro+poor public service in Turkey. However, it has been shown that 
education increases labour force participation, and this effect and the returns to education 
increase with the level of education in Turkey. Furthermore, the income share of workers with a 
low level of education in total incomes has reduced over time in Turkey, whereas earnings of 
people with a university degree have significantly increased in recent years (Duman, 2008; 
Tansel, 2004). We have found that after compulsory primary education, the poor have 
difficulties to send their children to secondary and higher education. Incorporating our findings 
with the findings cited above, we can say that the children of the poorer with only compulsory 
primary education may end up having low+paid jobs, which may lead to a so+called “poverty 
trap”3 if more attention is not put towards increasing the opportunities of the poor for secondary 
and higher level education. The marginal incidence analysis for education also supports this for 
secondary education.  
Another important issue concerning the public education services is the differences 
between the enrolment rates of girls and boys. From the enrolment rates we have seen that 
gender discrimination is still a significant problem in the poorer households and the poorer 
regions. This suggests that there should be particular policies encouraging parents to send their 
female children to school. According to the results, rural Turkey gets less benefit than urban 
Turkey for all services. S. East Anatolia and Istanbul are two regions requiring particular 
attention. This implies that even if the services are redistributive, the planning of the services 
should be more focused on the poorer parts of Turkey to be more effective. 
The Turkish health system suffers from limited coverage and this prevents it being pro+
poor: Green Card for the poor increases the opportunities for the health services to reach the 
poor, however, from our findings this instrument does not seem to be very effective. One of the 
                                                           
3 See Barham et al. (1995) for an example investiagting the concept of poverty trap and its relation with 
education.  
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main reasons for this is the fact that the health system requires employees to be in recorded 
employment. Providing universal coverage for the health system is a solution.  
Social security systems have two objectives: redistribute lifetime income (retirement 
pensions) and provide risk insurance (unemployment benefits). Turkey has a wide retirement 
pension system, however because of the high unrecorded employment employees in the poorest 
deciles appear not to engage in the system. The second part of the insurance system, 
unemployment benefits, is quite recent and suffers from unrecorded employment too. The share 
of means+tested transfers in total transfers and in households’ income is negligible and even 
student grants benefit the middle classes most. So Turkish social transfer system does not seem 
to provide risk insurance role or cash income to the people in most need. Any policy to improve 
the role of the social security system is unlikely to be effective without policies to reduce the 
extent of informal employment.  
The results from the tax incidence analysis indicate that direct taxes have the potential to 
mitigate inequality and poverty in Turkey if the tax base for personal income tax can be 
increased which may result in reduction in the share of indirect taxes in tax revenues which is 
the main tax revenue source for the central budget. To increase tax base is not easy task given 
the extent of informal economy and tax evasion. Increasing tax base would also decrease the 
extent of the need for other revenue sources such as debt. 
In order to overcome tax evasion, it is accepted that not only applying higher penalties 
and/or increasing the frequency of audits, but also tax compliance of taxpayers is crucial. For 
example, rational individuals are expected to evade taxes to maximise their utility when penalty 
rates are not high and the possibility of auditing is low (Feld and Tyran, 2002). However, in 
reality, even if penalty rates are not high and the possibility of auditing is low, taxpayers have an 
incentive to pay taxes (Guth et al., 2005). 
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Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992) examined whether public good in exchange for the 
taxes paid increases compliance or not and they found that if taxpayers think they will receive 
something in exchange for the taxes they pay, they have a tendency to pay taxes. Hence, 
effective public services also may be very crucial to decrease tax evasion in Turkey, which are 
not well targeted to the poor. 
6.4 Redistributive Effects of Fiscal Policies 
Net fiscal analysis can be used to combine the results for tax and expenditure incidence. 
Not all government expenditures and taxes are included in the analysis: corporation taxes were 
excluded from the tax incidence, and the benefit incidence only included government 
expenditures having potential positive impacts on income distribution and poverty. Therefore, 
this summary does not claim to analyse the redistributive impact of the whole fiscal system but 
attempts to see if the tax policies affecting households directly and government expenditures 
targeted to the poor increase household and individuals’ welfare and reduce inequality 
(redistribute income) in Turkey in 2003.  
The idea behind net fiscal incidence analysis, or combined tax and expenditure 
incidence, comes from the fact that any fiscal policy may be regressive (e.g. taxes), but if 
revenues from a regressive tax have been used to build schools or hospitals for the poor, the total 
impact of the government policies may be progressive. Since the net fiscal incidence analysis 
demands data necessary for expenditure and tax incidence, the first studies of fiscal incidence 
generally focused on one side of the government budget. However, with increasing availability 
of household data including information on both income and expenditure for 
households/individuals and usage for government services, combined tax and expenditure 
analysis became feasible for developing countries (Devarajan an Hossain, 1998; Johannes et. al., 
2006; Pinar 2005).  
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“et fiscal incidence calculations aim to estimate what each household in any given 
income category receives from or pays to the public sector on a net basis, i.e., benefits less 
taxes” (Piggott and Whalley, 1987: 685). The first step in the net fiscal incidence analysis is to 
calculate tax and benefit incidence separately and in the second step estimated tax burdens and 
allocated government benefits for households are combined to obtain the net impact from the 
fiscal policies. After having examined public benefits and the tax system for Turkey separately, 
this section presents the combined impact for the four public services and the taxes examined on 
income and expenditure distribution.  
As we have found in the previous chapter, tax incidence is sensitive to the welfare 
indicator chosen. In order see if this is the case for the net fiscal incidence we will report the 
results for both household income and expenditure. In order to obtain the net benefit to the 
households we simply deduct net taxes (taxes minus benefits) from gross expenditure/income4. 
We exclude social transfers from the analysis as they are included in household income 
(AE_INC) and expenditure (AE_EXP), thus we examine education, health and infrastructure 
benefits and the total taxes.  
The figures from Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.4  provide the Lorenz curves for household 
expenditures (incomes) before and after net taxes and Table 6.3 presents the differences between 
the coordinates of Lorenz curves with asymptotic standard errors. All differences of the 
estimated ordinates are statistically significant (except for 0.1) for household incomes. As seen 
from the figures the Lorenz curves for net expenditures (incomes) are above the Lorenz curves 
for gross expenditures (incomes), revealing that the combined tax and benefit effects reduce both 
expenditure and income inequality. The incidence pattern of taxes based on household incomes 
is negative; it is the pattern of public benefits that drives the combined incidence, which is 
                                                           
4 Gross expenditure/income for the net fiscal incidence is gross expenditure/income for the total tax 
system.  
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progressive. Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 provide S+Gini indices by inequality aversion parameters. 
As both the public benefits and the total taxes are progressive with expenditure measure, IR 
progressivity rates are positive for the whole range of ethical parameter values and the rates rise 
with ρ regardless of welfare indicator and shifting assumptions.  However, the second set of 
shifting assumptions including the impacts of tax evasion and informal employment (V2&V4) 
generate lower progressivity as expected. The net taxes cause reranking for the whole range of 
ethical parameters, yet reranking rates are smaller than IR progressivity rates so the net taxes 
decrease both expenditure and income inequality. The extent of inequality reduction is measured 
by S+Gini indices of redistribution. Since both taxes and benefits are progressive and reduce 
expenditure inequality, S+Gini redistribution indices are very high and increase with inequality 
aversion parameters, suggesting that the net taxes favour the poor more. The redistribution rate is 
only 0.3% (0.2%) once ρ is 1.01 (which puts more weight to very rich), and it is 11.5% (11%) 
when ρ is 4 under V1 (V2&V4). With household income, it has been found that the total taxes 
increase income inequality when ρ is greater than 2 under V1 and the total taxes increase income 
inequality for the whole range of ρ under V2&V4. As a result of this negative impact of the total 
taxes, the redistributive impact of the net taxes on income inequality is much smaller than that 
on expenditure inequality. The equalising impact of the net taxes on income inequality is around 
5% or 6% depending on the shifting assumptions if our focus is more on the poor.  
Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 give regional redistributive impacts of the net taxes with 
expenditure and income measures respectively. The total impact of taxes and benefits is positive 
on both expenditure and income inequality in all regions and urban and rural areas. Istanbul with 
the highest income/expenditure level and highest inequality rate has the smallest equalising 
effect of the net taxes. Rural areas have higher inequality reducing impact than urban areas under 
V2&V4, reflecting the impact of informal employment, zero property tax rates on agricultural 
land and flat PIT rate for agricultural incomes. For the whole country equalising impact of the 
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net taxes on expenditure (income) inequality is 10% (6%) under V1 and around 9% (5%) under 
V2&V4. The impact is smaller with effective indirect tax incidence. Istanbul and S. East 
Anatolia are two regions having smaller redistributive impact than for the country.  
These results should be assessed with caution because of the reasons regarding the 
problems of the benefit incidence analysis. Given the fact that we may have overestimated the 
incidence of the health and education benefits, we may expect the progressivity and 
redistributive power of the net benefits would be lower than we have estimated.  
6.5 Scope of Further Research 
Depending on data availability, comparison of behavioural benefit incidence and non+
behavioural incidence should be done to see the impact of behavioural responses. To assess the 
real impact of the social expenditures, it would be useful to analyse how successful the public 
expenditures by using the outcomes of the policies such as health outcomes and student success. 
Also lifetime distribution of the social benefits can be helpful to examine the impacts of social 
transfers. The empirical literature on developed countries evaluates the extent to which the 
public transfers into social security institutions providing retirement pensions and the extent to 
which individuals contributed to the system during their working lives. This type of analysis 
would differentiate the extent of redistribution between individuals and redistribution over 
different phases of the lifecycle of the same individual (Whiteford, 2008). Although this type of 
analysis demands panel data, which is not available for Turkey, there is an alternative method 
using pseudo panel data. Pseudo panel data can be created if surveys have the same or similar 
structure and comprehension to generate cohorts based on some social indicators such as age, 
gender, region, and welfare deciles (Deaton, 2000).  
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This thesis has measured the incidence of fiscal policies at one point in time. For further 
research, it should be useful to see the comparisons over time. Although there are three more 
household surveys available for Turkey after 2003, they are not as comprehensive as the 2003 
survey. However, Turkish Statistical Institute announced that it is planning to conduct a 
household survey for 2009 which is supposed to be as comprehensive as the 2003 survey. After 
this data becomes available, pseudo panel analysis will also be possible for Turkey. 
Marginal tax incidence analysis in the sense of Ahmad and Stern (1991) would also be 
useful to see how tax policies can be more redistributive. We have seen that indirect taxes are 
regressive with income, and progressivity of indirect taxes with expenditure is limited. Direct 
taxes are progressive but progressivity is reduced by tax evasion and shifting opportunities. The 
impact of a tax reform to decrease the share of indirect taxes and increase the share of direct 
taxes can be investigated.  
With conventional tax incidence analysis, behavioural responses are ignored. However, 
it is a well known fact that taxes have impacts on individuals work preferences and this is 
especially true for payroll taxes. As discussed in Chapter 5, in Turkey, high payroll tax burden 
has been found to be the main reason for informal employment. Thus, in terms of future 
research, investigating labour market interactions for payroll tax will enrich our analysis.  
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Table 6.3:The Differences of the Ordinates of the Lorenz Curves Before and After *et Taxes  
ρ=2  Income Expenditure 
Ordinates (p) V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
0.05 0.0026 0.0023 +0.0041 +0.0045 
 0.0007 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 
0.1 ?0.0005 ?0.0013 +0.0095 +0.0105 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0002 0.0002 
0.15 +0.0043 +0.0053 +0.0155 +0.0168 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0003 0.0003 
0.2 +0.0084 +0.0094 +0.0221 +0.0234 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 
0.25 +0.0129 +0.0135 +0.0289 +0.0300 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 
0.3 +0.0178 +0.0174 +0.0358 +0.0362 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 
0.35 +0.0227 +0.0213 +0.0426 +0.0420 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
0.4 +0.0275 +0.0249 +0.0493 +0.0474 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0010 0.0009 
0.45 +0.0324 +0.0283 +0.0557 +0.0522 
 0.0009 0.0009 0.0012 0.0011 
0.5 +0.0372 +0.0316 +0.0617 +0.0564 
 0.0009 0.0009 0.0013 0.0013 
0.55 +0.0418 +0.0345 +0.0670 +0.0600 
 0.0010 0.0010 0.0015 0.0014 
0.6 +0.0459 +0.0372 +0.0718 +0.0630 
 0.0011 0.0011 0.0017 0.0016 
0.65 +0.0495 +0.0395 +0.0757 +0.0652 
 0.0012 0.0012 0.0020 0.0018 
0.7 +0.0524 +0.0409 +0.0787 +0.0663 
 0.0013 0.0013 0.0022 0.0021 
0.75 +0.0544 +0.0415 +0.0804 +0.0662 
 0.0014 0.0014 0.0025 0.0023 
0.8 +0.0551 +0.0411 +0.0808 +0.0650 
 0.0016 0.0016 0.0028 0.0026 
0.85 +0.0550 +0.0398 +0.0789 +0.0616 
 0.0018 0.0017 0.0031 0.0029 
0.9 +0.0525 +0.0363 +0.0741 +0.0555 
 0.0021 0.0019 0.0035 0.0032 
0.95 +0.0432 +0.0275 +0.0622 +0.0438 
 0.0023 0.0022 0.0039 0.0035 
0.99 +0.0239 +0.0142 +0.0312 +0.0206 
  0.0023 0.0023 0.0039 0.0035 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.    
Gross income (expenditure) is equal to AE_IC (AE_EXP) plus per adult equivalent total income and payroll 
tax; et income (expenditure) is equal to AE_IC (AE_EXP) minus per adult equivalent property taxes and 
total indirect tax plus total education, health and infrastructure benefits 
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Table 6.4: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Total Fiscal System  
(expenditure) 
  IR?Progressivity Reranking Redistribution 
Parameter Values 
(Rho) 
V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.0040 0.0033 0.0009 0.0009 0.0032 0.0024 
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
1.5 0.1022 0.0872 0.0232 0.0221 0.0791 0.0650 
  0.0029 0.0027 0.0005 0.0005 0.0029 0.0026 
2 0.1325 0.1178 0.0316 0.0301 0.1010 0.0876 
  0.0031 0.0028 0.0006 0.0006 0.0030 0.0028 
2.5 0.1453 0.1328 0.0359 0.0342 0.1094 0.0986 
  0.0028 0.0027 0.0007 0.0006 0.0028 0.0026 
3 0.1516 0.1413 0.0386 0.0366 0.1130 0.1047 
  0.0026 0.0025 0.0008 0.0007 0.0026 0.0024 
3.5 0.1549 0.1465 0.0405 0.0382 0.1144 0.1084 
  0.0025 0.0024 0.0008 0.0008 0.0025 0.0023 
4 0.1566 0.1498 0.0419 0.0393 0.1146 0.1106 
  0.0025 0.0023 0.0009 0.0008 0.0024 0.0023 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
Gross expenditure is equal to AE_EXP plus per adult equivalent total income and payroll tax  
et expenditure is equal to AE_EXP minus per adult equivalent property taxes and total indirect tax  plus total 
benefits excluding social transfers 
 
Table 6.5: S?Gini Indices of Progressivity and Redistribution for Total Fiscal System (income) 
  IR?Progressivity Reranking Redistribution 
Parameter Values 
(Rho) V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 V1 V2&V4 
1.01 0.0028 0.0021 0.0006 0.0006 0.0022 0.0015 
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
1.5 0.0724 0.0594 0.0209 0.0208 0.0515 0.0386 
 0.0020 0.0020 0.0013 0.0013 0.0016 0.0016 
2 0.0943 0.0816 0.0322 0.0322 0.0620 0.0494 
 0.0021 0.0021 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 
2.5 0.1036 0.0929 0.0400 0.0401 0.0636 0.0528 
 0.0020 0.0020 0.0023 0.0023 0.0019 0.0019 
3 0.1081 0.0994 0.0461 0.0461 0.0620 0.0533 
 0.0019 0.0019 0.0027 0.0027 0.0022 0.0022 
3.5 0.1105 0.1034 0.0512 0.0510 0.0593 0.0524 
 0.0018 0.0019 0.0031 0.0030 0.0025 0.0025 
4 0.1116 0.1061 0.0557 0.0553 0.0560 0.0507 
  0.0018 0.0018 0.0034 0.0034 0.0028 0.0028 
otes: Asymptotic standard errors are in italic.      
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the values in bold at 5% significance level  
Gross income is equal to AE_IC plus per adult equivalent total income and payroll tax  
et income is equal to AE_IC minus per adult equivalent property taxes and total indirect tax plus total 
benefits excluding social transfers 
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Table 6.6: Redistribution Index by regions  (Expenditure) 
Regions 
*et Incidence 
(V1) 
*et Incidence 
(V2&V4) 
*et Incidence 
(V1) (Effective) 
*et Incidence 
(V2&V4)(Effective) 
Istanbul 0.0737 0.0469 0.0684 0.0416 
 0.0080 0.0080 0.0063 0.0057 
Marmara 0.0954 0.0879 0.0927 0.0851 
 0.0095 0.0093 0.0085 0.0083 
Aegean  0.0815 0.0723 0.0824 0.0733 
 0.0043 0.0040 0.0039 0.0036 
Black Sea  0.1054 0.1010 0.1046 0.1003 
 0.0061 0.0054 0.0059 0.0053 
Central Anatolia  0.0958 0.0854 0.0948 0.0844 
 0.0042 0.0038 0.0039 0.0035 
Mediterranean  0.1017 0.0986 0.0973 0.0943 
 0.0065 0.0060 0.0058 0.0052 
East Anatolia  0.0973 0.0976 0.0950 0.0954 
 0.0058 0.0055 0.0051 0.0048 
S. East Anatolia 0.0731 0.0861 0.0657 0.0788 
 0.0053 0.0052 0.0042 0.0041 
Turkey 0.1010 0.0876 0.0972 0.0839 
 0.0030 0.0028 0.0025 0.0022 
Urban 0.0989 0.0804 0.0953 0.0767 
 0.0038 0.0036 0.0031 0.0028 
Rural 0.0949 0.0969 0.0938 0.0958 
  0.0047 0.0043 0.0040 0.0036 
 
Table 6.7: Redistribution Index by regions  (Income) 
Regions 
*et Incidence 
(V1) 
*et Incidence 
(V2&V4) 
*et Incidence 
(V1) (Effective) 
*et Incidence 
(V2&V4)(Effective) 
Istanbul 0.0333 0.0096 0.0398 0.0161 
 0.0043 0.0047 0.0037 0.0041 
Marmara 0.0479 0.0376 0.0530 0.0427 
 0.0058 0.0059 0.0047 0.0049 
Aegean  0.0497 0.0400 0.0495 0.0398 
 0.0032 0.0032 0.0031 0.0030 
Black Sea  0.0746 0.0697 0.0729 0.0680 
 0.0041 0.0038 0.0039 0.0036 
Central Anatolia  0.0657 0.0553 0.0677 0.0573 
 0.0032 0.0030 0.0028 0.0026 
Mediterranean  0.0461 0.0418 0.0536 0.0492 
 0.0053 0.0051 0.0042 0.0039 
East Anatolia  0.0828 0.0811 0.0816 0.0800 
 0.0047 0.0045 0.0042 0.0040 
S. East Anatolia 0.0598 0.0722 0.0533 0.0656 
 0.0044 0.0042 0.0042 0.0040 
Turkey 0.0620 0.0494 0.0642 0.0516 
 0.0018 0.0018 0.0016 0.0016 
Urban 0.0588 0.0419 0.0631 0.0462 
 0.0022 0.0022 0.0019 0.0019 
Rural 0.0571 0.0566 0.0557 0.0551 
  0.0034 0.0032 0.0030 0.0027 
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Figure 6.1 
 
Figure 6.2 
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Figure 6.3 
 
Figure 6.4 
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Appendix 6: The Marginal Incidence Analysis 
 
The basic regression that Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) estimates is as following: 
qkqqqki upap ++= β,,   (1) 
where i indexes a small geographical unit (62 regions in their case), k indexes a larger one (19 
states in their case) which contains small geographical units and q indicates the welfare quintile. 
The method requires some information on service participation at the household level and 
sufficient regional disaggregation and variance in participation for estimation to be possible. 
The data that we use is regionally representative. We have codes for 7 geographical 
regions (larger geographical unit) and 26 provinces (small geographical unit) of Turkey. In the 
basic model we regress for any given combination of quintile and public service, we regress the 
sample participation rates from the 26 provinces on the average participation rate (irrespective of 
quintiles) from each of the 7 regions.  
We rank sampled households by total household expenditure per adult equivalent and 
define quintiles over the entire population. We estimate the regression in (1). Hence, i takes 
values from 1 to 26, k from 1 to 7 and q from 1 to 5. The left+hand variable is the enrollment rate 
for a given province and quintile. The regressor is the participation rate for the region in which 
that province is located. βq is the marginal effect of an increase in the program which is called 
marginal odds of participation by Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999).  
The authors estimate the regression by using two+stage least+squares (Instrumental 
Variables) to avoid biased estimations from ordinary least squares. We follow them and use the 
“leave+out mean” as an instrumental variable for regions’ average participation rates. The leave+
out mean is the mean for a region excluding the specific province in the region and quintile in 
  Chapter 6 
 322
estimating average participation rate for that region. For example we exclude quintile 3 and 
province 2 for region 1 to estimate leave+out mean.  
We also define average odds ratio of participation as the ratio of the participation rate of 
one quintile to the overall average and think that differences between the marginal and average 
odds of participation reflect differences in the incidence of inframarginal spending. We also 
assume that the cost to the government is the same for all participants of the services. 
 
Figure A 6.1:  Enrolment Rates for Primary Education by provinces 
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Figure A 6.2: Enrolment Rates for Secondary Education by provinces 
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Figure A 6.3:  Enrolment Rates for Secondary Education by provinces 
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